Soviet Wartime Tank Formations

Soviet Wartime Tank Formations by Major Albert 2. Conner and Robert G. Poirier (This material has been reviewed by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) to assist the authors in eliminating classified information, if any; however, that review neither constitutes CIA authn-tication of material as factual nor implies CIA endorsement of the authors’ views,, Today’s massive modem Soviet armored forces occupy territory stretching from the Pacific westward to the border of the Federal Republic of Germany. These forces, crowned by tank formations, are clearly the most formidable mass of that type found in any of the world’s major powers. Together with the armored forces of the Warsaw Pact nations they embody the decisive ground-gaining strike force threatening NATO in both conventional and nuclear war scenarios. Therefore, it is essential for the West to understand the underlying nature of this threat. In order to accurately do so, we must examine its historical progression in three ways. First, the essential aspects of military art,’ which drove the development of tank forces, must be set forth. Second, the organizational methodology used by the Soviets must be analyzed. Third, the evolution of the tank formations in the epoch years of WW 11 must be reviewed. The “Great Patriotic Wd’ (WW 11), which served as the crucible for the development of all Soviet armed forces, can be more objectively studied now than at any time in the past. We have tied to do so in this article by using a combination of Soviet writings, recently declassified intelligence documents, and the files of the wartime German intelligence organization, Foreign Armies East (Fremde Heere OstFHO). We believe that these sources can provide the most realistic insights to date into the development of the Soviet tank force. The ability to view tank force require menta through Soviet eyes is of prime importance to understanding their developmental processes. The U.S.S.R. is historically a Continental power and enjoys great geographic advantages when considering land combat in either Asia or Europe. Thus, Russian force planners pay considerable attention to specific military-geographic regions where their enormous ground forces are likely to be in combat. This is in contrast to American planners who, due to the nature of our global commitments, must shape forces that can operate successfully in any environment. Soviet military theorists have organized all of the regions of the periphery of the U.S.S.R. and the rest of the world’s continental and maritime areas into theaters of war (teatr toyny-TV).2 These are three dimensional areas where hostilities may-june 1983 19

SIZE Of F W E S

BRINGING UNIT1 W

TO STRENGTH

BANNERS

AOMIN

/ I Figure 1. may occur. The TV is further divided into theaters of military operations (teatr voynnykh deystviy-TVD). Theae are ground, maritime, or intercontinental areas where their armed services (strategic rocket, ground, national air defense, and air and naval forces) will engage in actual combat. TVDs are classified as either main or secondary, and are themselves subdivided into one or more strategic axes or directions. Strategic axes lead from key areas of Soviet territory to an adversary's strategic objectives.' Since the Soviets view the modem tank army as both a major field force and a strategic formation of the ground forces, the strategic axis de facto becomes an important military geographic entity in force planning. Even more important in the struc turing of tank forces, however, is the operational axis. This is a subdivision of a strategic axis that, like its larger counterpart, leads to important objee tives. The primary significance of an Operational axis, however, is the fact that it considers the enemy's main forces in terms of both locations and composition. A shifting or restructuring of the enemy's forces causes a conse quent shift in the Soviet operational axis. Otherwise, only a change in the goals or objectives of the operation could force such a shift. Thus, we arrive at our first significant conclusion: Soviet force structure for tank units is primarily based on the premise of defeating a specific enemy on the designated operational axis.5 Second in importance, when viewing tank force development through Soviet eyes, is an insight into their organizational methodology (figure 1). In order to accomplish this, we must first understand the roles of the Organizational Department of the General Staff. In WW 11, as today, that department was responsible for the size, composition and structure of the armed forces. It employed an approach that may at first seem peculiar to American readers-that of extreme centralization. The command element at every level strictly controlled the actions of the units and means assigned to it in the execution of highly centralized plana and orders. Centralization in the planning and organization of forces was (and is) the natural extension of that principle. Tank forces were systematically structured according to studied and established norms, calculations and formulae. This was accomplished in an environment that drew heavily on history and science, supplemented by experimental feedback. The available histories of the organizational processes reveal a confluence of the ruthless, driving personalities of major Soviet wartime leaders and the steady, scholarly seriousness of general staffofficers. These staff officers immersed themselves in the study of military geographic regions, the battles or operations at hand, and the availability, quality, and quantity of weapons, vehicles, and equipment. All of this was intended to assure one result the superiority of Soviet formations over those of their enemies. The end result of this process was vested in a "correct" table of organization to defeat a specif~c enemy, at a specific time, and in a specisc operation.6 The mechanics of the organizational process are worth summarizing. The politico-military strategic goals were established by Stalin and the State Defense Committee (Gosudarstvenny Komitet Oborony-GKO). Military strategy, which primarily determined the mission of the armed forces and weighted the main efforts, was worked out by the senior military leadership (Stavh). A commander of a front or army was given a plan, orders, a predetermined and tailored force structure, and an array of subcommanders (artillery, tank, rear services, etc.), with strict vertical command chains and operating procedures. The combat order itselfreflected this process: itwas arigid directive issued by the commander to subordinates to carry out the plans he made. The order not only included intelligence and other general items common to all orders, but it also contained radical differences. It had rigid timetables; designated placement of command posts with their deployment times and extremely precise tasks to be executed byt he chief/commanders of the various arms and services. It is withi this context that the organizational process took place.7 The Organization, or Second Deparb ment, of the General Staff received validated requirements from the Operations (First) Department. These were arrived at through the process described earlier. Specific responsibility for armored and cavalry forces was vested in a section of the Organization Department, which normally contained a dozen officers commanded by a generalmajor (one star). The section made a thorough study and analysis that led to specialized organizational structures of regiments, divisions, corps, and armies for the planned operations. This task required that the section have detailed knowledge of the current locations, personnel, and equipment status of every unit (by 1944, for example, the Germans had identified 173 Soviet tank regiments, 181 brigades and 33 cavalry divisions).B In addition to the normal factors, the section also had to consider studies of combat experiences written by a special section of the General Staff. Input from active field commanders and from the staff of the Commander of Tank Troops of the Red Army also had 20 only the General Staff, as the executive arm of the Supreme High Command (uerkhounoye glavnoye komamandouaniye- VGK), could determine the organization of the armed forces. Only they answered all the questions incumbent on such decisions. In the Soviet view, only a radical shift in the political goals of the war, or the introduction of dramatic new technology or weaponry, could radically alter this organizational methodology.9 The final step in comprehending the development of Soviet tank forces is the examination of structural changes that appeared during WW 11. To set this scene into its historical perspective, we must first set forth the principal factors affecting tank troops before Germany’s invasion of Russia. The Eastern Front in WW I was essentially the same futile bloodbath inflicted in the west. It had, however, left some Germans with an alternate school of tactical thinking that began to favor maneuver over attrition. It left Russia with a revolution followed by civil war and foreign intervention, all in the space of 3 years. These events convinced the Bolsheviks that modem, mobile forces, backed by strong industries, a viable military doctrine, and a powerful mobilization potential, were essential to the survival of the socialist state. Stalin’s industrialization program, cooperation with German and western industrialists, and the education of a generation of technicians, laid the foundations for a successful survival. Marshall of the Soviet Union Tukhachevskiy provided a solid military science and a conceptual framework for the armed forces. Beyond that, the Russians applied the technology of mechanization and motorization to their military science. The growth of large tank and mechanized units was temporarily reversed by incorrect conclusions drawn from the Spanish Civil War and the great purges. But by 1940, the battles with the Japanese and Finns, the great success of the Germans in Poland and France, and the return of more objective policies as the purges ended, led to renewed interest in large tank formations. By then, the Russians had acquired new territories in Poland, the Baltic and in Romania. Analysis of the geographic factors in the three western strategic directions (west, Corps contained divisions and brigades on the German pattern and, had their organization and training been complete, the initial period of the war mjght, have been less disasterous. It should be noted, however, that the existence of the T-34 tank with its 76-mm gun, and the heavy KV-1 tank came as a genuine “The growth of large tank and mechanized units was temporarily reversed by incorrect comlmiom drawn from the Spanish Civil War and the great purges. ” shock to the Germans. They had no tank to match either the T-34 or KV-1 and immediately recognized these for the threat they were.12 Nevertheless, the Soviets found their forces caught in numerous encirclements and many tank formations were badly mauled or destroyed. The results of these losses in tanks and trained personnel, together with the necessity of creating support for rifle units carrying the main burden of combat, led to tank force restructuring by the fall of 1941. The Stuuku, that had thought the main German effort would come on the southwestern axis, had been outgen-eraled. As fall turned into winter, the Germans stood at the gates of Moscow. The Stuuku VGK reorganized their few re maining tank assets into small brigades (figure 2) and regiments. Expediency dictated to organization as the remnants of the force were husbanded and sparingly used to back up rifle units facing the German threat on critical sectors. These brigades contained only 48 tanks (light, medium, and heavy) but retained the combined arms structure of the 1940 ~0rps.l~ To the surprise of everyone, particularly their western allies, the Russians held. Not only did they hold at Moscow, but they inflicted the first major defeat of WW 11 on Germany. The counterattack of 6 December 1941, was spearheaded by T-34s and rugged Siberian rifle divisions from the Far East. The Stuuku transferred some 40 divisions west when they became convinced Japan would not enter the war. The timing of their attack was too much for the exhausted and overextended period of the war and had seen that tank units tied down with infantry support roles were clearly incapable of spearheading strategic offensives. Committed to the employment of tanks en m u s e plans for tank corps and armies were drawn up. The tank corps made their appearance in April, 1942 (figure 2), thetankarmy,inMay.14Mechanized corps were identified in combat by the Germans in September 1942.15 These corps could now be equipped due to increased equipment production, but were based on the brigade rather than the division, as in 1940. The tank corps contained thee tank and one motorized rifle brigade, while the mechanized corps reversed the ratio.’S Tank armies varied in composition but normally combined two or three tank corps and several rifle divisions. Although these formationsmetwithlimited success, the VGK still had problems in controlling large mobile formations. After they had contained -the ill-fated Kharkov Offensive in the spring of 1942, German panzer units had driven to Stalingrad and deep into the Caucasus by November. Concurrent with these battles, the Russians saw the emergence “Furthermore, as will be shown, organization could at times be almost exclusively driven by the availability of vehicles and weapons from industry and capital repair facilities.” of new, dynamic and talented commanders within their armored force. In discussions with the Stuuka represen-etives at the front and general staff officers, these men pointed out that rifle divisions and other nonmotorized ele ments of tank armies of combined composition could not keep up with the armor during attacks. This problem prevented the development of penetrations into operational depth and led to additional modifications to the structure of tank units. Modifications, such as would be suggested by field commanders, were easier to make in 1942 than in 1941. The VGK had made a concerted effort to form new reserve units and specialized armored formations. The generation of reserves may-june 1983 21 was a priority task of the Stavka h m the outset of the war. The process had been disrupted in June 1941 and this hnrl nuomvatd tho nrnhlom nf ntnm- e5 11u.. Ubb-U.U-- 1-1- y L " " . - I y " L "--A. ming the blitzkrieg. Now, expanding tank production from relocated factories in the Urals, and deliveries via the Lend-Lease Program, eased equipment troubles. Significant numbers of new and reserve units of all types were created. Besides tank battalions and regiments, independent tank regiments specifically structured for joint cooperation with rifle troops began to be formed. Heavy tank units were used to reinforce large rifle units in breakthrough operations and for combatting German tank units breaking through the Russian defense.17 The Soviet Military Historical Journal provides insight into the organization, number, and use of new tank formations. TheRussians distinguished between tank units designatedfor direct support of infantry and those meant for exploitation and pursuit. Independent tank and self-propelled artillery units and independent tank and mechanized corps were considered to be the principal organizations of tank troops in WW 11.18 More than 40 percent of all tanks and self-propelled artillery pieces were assigned to direct infantry support. The remainder were massed in the hdepen-dent tank and mechanized corps included in the reserve of the Supreme High Command (rezerv verkhnogo glavnogo komandovaniya-RVGK). These RVGK units were placed at the disposal of front and selected combined-arms armies operating on the decisive axes of the operation. When their mission had been completed, control of these units reverted directly to the VGK. By the time of the Stalingrad counteroffensive, the Russians considered the tank troops to be the main strike and maneuver element of the ground forces.19 Just as the Soviets depended upon these units for decisive offensive actions, the Germans recognized that their identification was critical to the detedion of impending Russian offensives. Postwar declassified reports demonstrated the emphasis placed on the identification of tank formations by

FHO.20

Independent tank and self-propelled artillery battalions, regiments, and brigades on the other hand, were considered High Command Reserves (rezerv glavnogo komandovaniya-RGK). Unlike the RVGK, these units were placed at the disposal of army commanders. On their orders, they were attached to combined-arms divisions and corps to increase their capabilities to conduct successful offensive or d e fensive actions. In offensive operations, the tank units would be used to pene

(650 CBT MH1CLE.S)

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1152 PERSONNEL

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flgure 2. trate fortified defenses in conjunction with rifle units. During 1942, certain of these tank units were formed either into elite Guards or Heavy Tank Breakthrough Regiments (figure 3).21 In defensive actions, RGK formations would backstop rifle and antitank unit defenses in key sectors. While it is denied, or conveniently overlooked today, the FHO archives clearly show that a number of these new tank units were formed using Lend-Lease British Maiilda and Churchill tanks and American Grants and Shermans.22 The mobile units that cut off the German Sixth Army at Stalingrad, and fended off Manstein's attempts to relieve that force, were the results of organizations developed in Moscow during the preceding months. Orders issued by Zhukov in August, and Stalin in October 1942, took into account the lessons learned earlier that year and the main German effort on the southwestern axis. The new orders covered tank unit organization and employment techniques. Under Stalin Order 325, the main mission of independent tank regiments and brigades was the destruction of German infantry. Tank corps, on the other hand, were to be employed in the direction of the main thrust to widen the breakthrough while pursuing and destroying enemy infantry. Surprise was to be the prerequisite for success.23 In the aftermath of Stalingrad and Manstein's brilliant counterthrusts, it was realized that tank armies of mixed composition did not completely meet the requirements of highly mobile combat operations nor did they ensure the o p timal use of the tank corps.24 This problem was encapsulated in a meeting between Stalin and one of his most successful commanders, General PA. Rotmistrov. Rotmistrov pointed out to the 22

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Supreme Commander-inchief that, in order to assume and maintain the offensive strategic initiative, it was necessary to have highly mobile formations possessing great striking power and hpower. These units would be the best way to develop success in the operational depth as well as ensuring proper conditions for massing tanks on critical axes. He proposed the establishment of a tank army of unified (homogenous) composition; it was accepted after lively debate.25 The new tank armies were to constitute a Teaenre of the Supreme High Command and to be attached only to those fronts conducting the most important attacks. The introduction of the tank army into frontal operations resulted in a modification of the echeloning of armored troops. They would attack in three echelons. The first was made up of independent RGK tank regiments and brigades in direct support of d e units. The second echelon consisted of tank and mechanized corps, while the third echelon was formed from RVGK tank armies and independent tank and mechanized corps.26 All units of the new tank armies, of which the first was 5th mistrov, were mechanized or motorized. Five additional tank armies of unified. composition were formed between February 1943 and January 1944. They contained two tank corps, a mechanized corps, antitank, artillery, and other specialized uNts and rear services. The newly-revamped tank formations took the best the Germans could throw at them in the great tank battles at Kursk in July 1943, and in the Ukraine during the next few months. The successful battles on the southwestern strategic axis allowed the Stavlta to seize strategic initiative, never to lose it Guards Tank Army commanded by Rot- 1944,29 Soviet tank tactics reached full development. The core of the tank force was centered upon the excellent T-34 medium tank now produced with an 85 mm gun. It was considered the main shock weapon of the tank corps and all other armored equipment was designed to support and protect it. T-34-equipped units prepared the way for the breakthrough while seeking surprise and maximum shock effect. They were not allowed to attack at an infantry pace. These unita sought to disrupt German centers of resistance up to, but not beyond, the planned operational objectives. Heavy tank unita were to support the T-34s by long-range fire and then destroy German heavy tanks, preferably from ambush. Once the breakthrough had been achieved, the exploitation force (mobile group) was committed. This action normally took place on the first or second day of the offensive. Tank units used in the exploitation were ARMayp may-june 1983 23

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1944. Its ability to replenish tank losses was impressive. During the course of the August battles, FHO personnel reported that the 134th Tank Regiment of the IV Guards Cavalry Corps was receiving tanks produced in July and August from the Omsk and Gorkiy plants. September losses were being tilled in some units by tanks from the August production run at Nizhniy Tagil. In October, they seem to have reported with some relief that no tanks from the September production runs had yet appeared in Hungary." These identifications, on what had become a secondary front, point to an efficient and well-organized rear services. By the Vistula-Oder Operation in 1945, Soviet tank strength had grown to 14,000 with an additional 7,500 assault guns.35 A small part of this force was sent east and in August 1945, it helped overwhelm the Japanese Kwantung Army. After the war, a major reorganization of the ground forces was undertaken in

1946. The lessons learned in the last tank and mechanized divisions (figure

4) and tank armies became mechanized armies. The new mechanized divisions were formed from elite mechanized corps and selected rifle divisions; a large number of the latter, moreover, were retained by given a new TO&E. Self-propelled gun and heavy tank regi-menta and mechanized infantry were included in the composition of the mechanized division to provide them with greater striking power and mobility. Concurrent improvements took place within the Tank Troops. Appearing in 7 . I .

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nent disposal of the infantry. Mobrized Rifle Troops, unlike the infantry o f WW II, now have the capability of breaking through defenses to operational depth with their own asseta. Creation of proper The Soviet armored force, with its rich combat traditions and body of experience, must clearly be seen as a continuum from WW 11. Tank Troops will continue to appear and be committed o n Footnotes 1 ‘The theory and practice of engaging in combat, operations, and armed wnilict as a whole, with the use of all the resources of the service branches and Services of the armed forces as a whole. It is the main field of military science and includes strategy, operational art and tactics.” Dictionary of Basic Military T e r n : A Soviet View (U.S. Government Printing Oflice. Washington, D.C., 1965). p. 39, #294. Hereafter referred to as Dictionary. 2 Dictionary, p. 220, #1522 3 Ibid, p. 220, #1521 4 Ibid. p. 214, #1480 5 Ibid, p. 145, #lo21 6 Army General S.M. Shtemenko, The Lmt Sir Months (New York, Kensington Publishing Corp., 1977). pp.2-5. Hereafkr referred to as Shtemenko. . 7 Shtemenko, pp. 7-8. 8 National Archives and Records Group, T-7$ Series, Reel 496 from the files of F r e d Here Ost (FHO). Formerly classified SECRET. declassified by the US. Army and the National Archives and Records Service. Hereafter referred to as FHO. (All 9 Dictionary, p. 145, #1021. Shtemenko, p. 11. 10 FHO, T-78, Reel 462. 11 Ibid 12 Kenneth Macksey, Guderiam Cleator of the Blitzkrieg (Stein and Day Publishers, New York, 1976). p 166. 13 General Major of Tank Trwps, I. Krupchenko, “Characteristic Featmen of the Development and Employment ofTank ‘hop.” in Military Historical Journal, (Moscow, No. 9,1979). pp. 25-32, Hereafter referred to as MHJ, Krcrpchenko, and Marshal of Armored Troops P. Poluboyarov, “The Armored Troops of the Soviet Army,” in Military Thought (Moscow,No.9,1967),pp. 1819.Hereafterreferredto as Military Thought, Poluboyarov. 1‘ Military Thought, Poluboyarov, p. 19. FHO, T-78, Reel 486. 15 FHO, T-78, Reel 486. 18 Ibid., T-78, Reel 462. 17 Ibid., T-78. Reel 486. Militnry Thought. Pohboy m u , p. 20. Military Intelligence Division, Tcrcticol originals in German). and Technical Tim&, (Washington, D.C., No. 57. April, 1945), pp. 16-20. Hereafter referred to ae Trends. 10 National Archives and, Records Sayice (NA&), “Air Reconnaissance Agamst the RusmanssOme German Experiences.” Sewnth A m y Interrogation Center (Apo New York, 758.28 June, 1945). pp. 14. Formerly classified TOP SECRET. D e c l d e d by

NARS.

PIbid., T-78, Reel 462. T-78, Reel 481. MHJ, Krupchenko, p. 28. Military Thought, Poluboyamu, p. 20. FHO, T-78, Reel 462. FHO, T-78, Reel 486. a trends,^. 16. 24 General Lieutenant F. Ebknov, “A Conference at Headquarters on the Reorganization of the Tank Army,” MHJ(Moscow, No. 3, 1979), pp. 36-41. 25 Ibid Military Thought, Poluboyamu, p. 21. n Marshal of the Soviet Union L Yaknbovskiy, “The Third Guards Tank Army in the Battle of Kursk,” Military Thought (Moscow, No. 8,1971). p. 29 Military Thought. Poluboyamv, p. 23. 30 Trends, pp. 21-22. n. 28 FHO, T-78, Reel 486. 31 amv, p. 20. 32 Major Stephen Shervais, Jr., “Soviet Tank Repairs in World War Il,” in Stmtegy and Tactics, Nr. 83 (Simulations Publications, New York, 1980). pp. 3334. 33 Ibid. 31 FHO, T-78, Reel 481. 35 MHJ, Krupehenko, p 32. Military Thought, Poluboyamv, pp. 2526. Ibid., p. 25. a Ibid., p. 27. 98 Ibid, p. 26. Ibid., p. 27. Military Thought, Yakubovskiy, pp. F%ictwnary, pp. 215216, #1490. John M. Collins, U.S. Soviet Military Balance (McGraw-Hill Publications co., 1980). pp. 305318. FHO, T-78, Reel 486. Milihry Thought, Poluboy intelligence ngency uviiian Meritorious Service Medal. He is a member of the Army Reserve and currently is collaborating with Mr. Poirier on a book analyzing German WW II military systems and operations in Russia. ROBERT G. POlRlER received his MA degree from the University of Massachusetts, Amherst, in 1967 and served as an armor officer until 1969. He joined the Central Intelligence Agency in 1975 and the National Photographic Interpretation Center in 1976. In June, 1978 he was awarded the CIA Sherman Kent Award and in 1979 he received the annual award from the National Intelligence Study Center, Georgetown University.

may-june 1983 25

Late Odober 1984. . . As the lead tanks of Task Force (TF) 294 Armor were pushing through a hole in the enemy’s lines, a leatherclad Soviet helicopter squadron commander calmly prepared to unleash a nasty surprise. The lead elements of A company’s armor had just cleared the town of Oberfeld and were racing across a series of beet fields, intent upon being the first US. Army personnel to prove the concept of the deep attack. Suddenly, out in the distance, just above the trees, two tlights of Mil-24Js (Hinds) rolled in for a napof-theearth missile run from two directions and opened up at 6,000 meters with their supersonic AT-10 missiles. The tankers of A company never had a chance. Two runs by the Hinds were enough. Fourteen blackened MI hulls were all that were left of A company after a mere3 minutes. The accompanying Sergeant York air defense systems managed to clip a few Russian tail feathers, but 12 Soviet helicopter pilots had something to talk about over their vodka that night. After the lines stabilized following TF 294 Armor’s abortive attack, the TF commander was debriefed about the setback. “Our Yorks couldn’t even see those guys, let alone shoot ’em!” he told his colonel. “And as for our Stingerteams, well, all they could do was dodge shrapnel. Where the hell was ow air support? Who’s going to kill those things?” His questions deserve an answer. Who will deal with the rotary-wing threat in future conflicts? What is the best weapons system to use to ensure low-altitude air superiority, and how should this system be most effectively employed on The LHX Pursuit t by Captain G an extended battldeld? These questions must be addressed and answers provided if we are to be successful in future conflids. Traditionally, the role of engaging enemy aircraft has rested with the United States Air Force and the army’s Air Defense Artillery, with the Air Force having responsibility for aerial combat and the Air Defense Artillery being responsible for ground-hair engagements. However, on the battlefield of today and, as projected to the year 2o00, with the emphasis on rapid maneuver, dispersion, and combined arms operations, low-altitude air defense ground systems will be thinly spread, and the Air Force will have its hands full, contending with masses of Threat high-performance, hed-wing aircraft intent upon owning the skies. Indeed, the air defense umbrella, upon which we rely heavily, may have a number of helicopter-sized holes in it. Even with the advent of today’s notoriously lethal air defense systems and the most sophisticated interceptor aircraft ever fielded, helicopters have consistently evaded detection and engagement on every battlefield upon which they have been employed. Given the sheer weight of thedevas-tating firepower that the numerous Threat Mil-8 (Hip) and Mil-24 (Hind) helicopters possess, and their subsequent effect on ground combat elements, it would appear that countering these rotary-wing platforms would give NATO forces the freedom of maneuver so greatly needed to fight a numerically-superior enemy. “The helicopter is unique among the weapons of war. Eke 26 A R m may-june 1983 llicopter Squadron

R. Hampton any other weapons system, ita sole reason for existence is to allow the commander to bring maximum combat power to bear on the enemy at a time and place of his own choosing. But, unlike any other weapon, the helicopter can apply this tactic with speed, versatility, and effectiveness never before achievable through the employment of a single weapon.”’ By using the protection of terrain and by not being hampered by its trafficability restrictions, the helicopter can engage and disengage the enemy with a degree of flexibility previously unknown in the history of warfare. Unfortunately, the current employment techniques for NATO’s armed helicopters are presently restricted to defensively-oriented antiarmor missions-using the hiband-run method. The helicopter’s capabilities as an air-teair weapon system have just begun to surface in many publications, both foreign and domestic, all of which extoll the virtues of the rotary-wing platform. What other weapons system can operate in the same environment as a helicopter? What system has the versatility, maneuverability, and firepower? Air defense weapons have great difficulty engaging terrain-flying helicopters. Small arms are easily defeated by armor plate and specific component hardening. High performance, fixed-wing aircraft have great difficulty acquiring and engaging helicopters operating in a napof-theearth environment. Only a helicopter-an advanced, lightweight, highly-maneuverable fighter helicopter-can deal most effectively with the rotary-wing threat. The planning for an aircraft to iU this void is currently underway at the United States Army Aviation Center and the Army Aviation Research and Development Command, and is centered on a variant of a new family of light helicopters,. collectively known as the LHX LHX is the acronym used to describe a family of light, highly-maneuverable, multipurpose rotorcraft that are to be fielded in the 1990’s. The LHX series of aircraft will replace the aging fleet of OH-6, OH-58, UH-1, and AH-1 helicopters and will greatly enhance Army Aviation operations into the 21st Century. The LHX will incorporate designs that emphasize simplicity, small size, and light weight.2 Two versions are now being planned: a scout/attack helicopter (SCAT) and a light utility helicopter, both sharing common components and many design features. Some of the proposed designs for the SCAT variant are shown in figures 1-4. These aircraft are seen to be roughly the size of the OH-58, with a mission-gross-weight of from 6,000 to 8,000 pounds. Performance will be one of the key selling points of the LHX SCAT. Maximum airspeeds of up to 300 knots are within the reach of these designs and, when coupled with upcoming improvements in rotor system design, the LHX will be afforded a degree of maneuverability far beyond that of our current fleet of helicopters. Incorporating advanced, highly-automated cockpit technology, the LHX will be capable of singlepilot operation, with many pilot functions automatically executed by may-june 1983 27 onboard computers. Operations will be possible during even the worst lighting, ceiling, and visibility conditions, due to a sophisticated array of electro-optical sensors operating in conjunction with a panoramic flight display screen. Simplified flight controls and a preprogrammable automatic pilot, capable of extreme low-level flight, will free the pilot to concentrate on the overall tactical situation and weapons empl~yment.~ Armament and tire control systems under consideration for the LHX SCAT include turreted, lightweight cannon, air-tuair hypervelocity missiles, and directed energy beams. Coupled with an automatic target recognizer and an extremely sophisticated millimeter wave radar, which can detect low-altitude, napof-theearth helicopters, the LHX will possess an extremely lethal and accurate punch. In short, the LHX will embody the qualities that are needed to provide low-altitude air superiority to the maneuver commander. Organization No matter how potentially effective a weapon may be by itself, it must be effectively organized into a cohesive, well-trained, properlyemployed unit in order to fully exploit the weapon’s full combat value. During the Battle of France in 1940 the French Army possessed a qualitatively superior tank, the Somua 35, but poor unit organization and improper tactical employment resulted in its defeat by the well-organized, technologically-inferior German armor force. Thus, to fully exploit the advantages of the LHX in the countmh&copter, low-altitude, air-superiority role, it must be organized into a unit with the primary mission of destroying aerial targets. The unit’s training and organization should reflect one single focal point: that of owning the airspace just above the trees. The notional organizational diagram (figure 5) d e c t e the structure necessary to support the LHX in the Airland Battle. I 1 Figure 5. I 9, 3 UHdO Fiaure 6. Fmure 1. I Figure 3. This squab-sized unit is to be assigned to the corps aviation brigade (figure 6) and subsequently tasked to support division and brigadesized units. In this manner, the corps and division commander can have fingertip control over the low-altitude airspace in their zone of operations. Based upon the principles of Corps and Division 86 organization, the LHX Pursuit Helicopter Squadron provides four operational troopsized maneuver units, each capable of employing up to 10 LHX SCAT helicopters simultaneously. Additionally a platoon of six LHX utility aircraft is attached to the headquarters troop to provide for general support and search-and-rescue operations. All major maintenance activities are provided by the aviation and ground maink nance platoons assigned to the headquarters troop. The entire squadron organization, both ground support and aviation elements, are organized to be extremely light and mobile in order to meet the tremendous maneuver require ments of the Airland Battle. Pursuit Helicopter Squadron Employment The LHX Pursuit Helicopter Squadron’s primary miscion in the Airland Battle will be to clear the airspace from the top of the weeds to some 300 meters. Inside this air envelope, helicopters and fixed-wing aircraft will be conducting intensive operations to further the ground force’s scheme of maneuver, and the LHX Pursuit Helicopter Squadron will be afforded numerous scenarios for employment on the battle field. The following scenarios show how the Pursuit Squadron may be employed in a counterair role. Scenario One. Threat mechanized forces are attacking in echelon against a U.S. heavy division in Europe. The Threat ground commander commita his attack helicopter assets early in the battle in an attempt to suppress the US. antitank helicopters. Anticipating this tactic, the U.S. division commander orders an LHX Pursuit ?koop, which has been placed under the division’s operational control from corps headquarters, to provide protection for the attack helicopters of the division’s Cavalry Brigade, Air Attack (CBAA). The LHX SCAT aircraft, operating above and around the CBAA’s aircraft in a combat air patrol formation, acquire and engage 28 Mhloff may-june 1983 advance of their own slow moving Sergeant York, Roland, and Chaparral air defense systems. As the Threat helicopters attempt to fix and engage the ground column in conjunction with any available armor support, the high-speed LHX SCAT helicopters, operating in pairs for mutual support, peel off and pounce upon their heavily-loaded opponents. After a short, fierce air battle, the LHX helicopters emerge vict~rions, confident that the ground attack will remain free from any Threat helicopter interruptions. Scenario Three. After extensive %week long operations, Threat forces have been forced to consolidate their gains short of their European objectives. Lacking the logistical support necessary to make one, last, all-out assault, the Threat commander opts for an airmobile assault in conjunction with a limited ground attack to seize key locations in the NATO rear area. Launching a massive array of troops and equipment-carrying, heavy-lift helicopters, the Threat airmobile force penetrates the line of contact under the cloak of darkness relatively unscathed and proceeds toward its pre arranged landing zones. Alerted to the presence of the impending attack by the forward air defense radar network, two LHX Pursuit Helicopter troops are alerted for action. Having been placed on pad alert as part of their standby, rear-area, security mission, the two troops are quickly airborne and are attack helicopter. Footnotes 1 Brittingham, Michael L, “Attack Helicopter Employment Options,” p. 1. US. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leaavenworth, Kansaa. 1980. 2 Feaster, Dr. Lewis. “LHX-Light Helicopter of the Future.” p. 10, United States A m y Aviation Digest. Volume XXVIII No. 1, May 1981. 3 Mia, Donald R. Jr., “LHX-Keeping Pace with Technology,” United States Army Aviation Digest, Volume XXVIII, No. 12, December 1981. 4 Brittingham. Op. Cit, p. 81. itary graduate from Colorado State University in 1977. He is an honor graduate of the rotary wing aviator course and has served as a scout and

CAPTAIN GREG R. HAMP-

TON was commissioned in armor as a distinguished mil-attack helicopter platoon leader and as an operations officer, of the 6th Cavalry Brigade (Air Combat). He is currently assigned to the 2d Armored Division, Fort Hood, TX .

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