A Different Kind of War: Al-Qaeda and the True Nature of Global Jihad

Islam is back on the strategic military offensive for the first time since the Ottoman Empire’s military defeat during the siege of Vienna in 1683, at the hands of Polish King Jan Sobieski.2 The attacks on 11 September 2001 helped define the much debated ‘future war’ conundrum in the military establishment, which has been raging since the end of the Cold War. Prior to this attack, many theorists had argued that anew type of warfare was on the horizon based on world changes since the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the bipolar world. One such construct has been coined ‘fourth generation warfare’ (4GW). Its originators have theorized that the United States and her allies are currently embroiled in this type of warfare against al-Qaeda and its affiliates. The concept of 4GW has developed over time and has taken shape to fit the current conflict with al-Qaeda. Globalization has brought about a shift in warfare from nation-state, conventional, force-driven conflict to one dominated by non-state actors confronting traditional states with asymmetry, irregular forces, and adaptive 4GW methods. As Clausewitz so aptly stated over 170 years ago, “War is more than a true chameleon that slightly adapts its characteristics to the given case.”3 This article argues that al-Qaeda has adopted 4GW as its doctrine and continues to adapt itself and the use of the 4GW framework in its current global Islamic jihad. As noted in the opening quote, Clausewitz warned that leaders should clearly understand the type of war being entered before committing forces. This warning is as relevant today as it was in earlier eras. Defining war, especially ‘future war,’ is sometimes the greatest challenge those who train armies face. This was true at the end of the Cold War when the U. S. military found itself with more than 40 years of conventional doctrine in preparation to fight a foe that no longer existed. Military leaders, at all levels, were asking what they should be preparing for; if not for a large conventional conflict with the Soviet Union, then who and what would they face? World realities had changed the nature of conflict with which the United States and its allies were faced. It was during this time that a group of military thinkers put forth the concept of 4GW to answer those queries. In 1989, the Marine Corps Gazette ran an article titled, “The Changing Face of War: Into the Fourth Generation,” that began with the admonition that “the peacetime soldier’s principal task is to prepare effectively for the next war. In order to do so, he must anticipate what the next war will be like.”4 William Lind, Colonel Keith Nightengale, Captain John F. Schmitt, Colonel Joseph W. Sutton, and Lieutenant Colonel Gary I. Wilson put their minds together and developed the 4GW framework. Their article was written to generate discussion on what future war might look like. In their article, these authors “The first, the supreme, the most far-reaching act of judgment that the statesman and commander have to make is to establish by that test the kind of war on which they are embarking; neither mistaking it for, nor trying to turn it into, something that is alien to its nature.”1 Carl Von Clausewitz, On War

“Islam is back on the strategic military offensive for the first time since the Ottoman Empire’s military defeat during the siege of Vienna in 1683, at the hands of Polish King Jan Sobieski. The attacks on 11 September 2001 helped define the much debated ‘future war’ conundrum in the military establishment, which has been raging since the end of the Cold War.” times, according to the 4GW theorists. Low-tech combatants would use improvised weapons and attack enemies everywhere and anywhere they could. They would seek targets of opportunity across the full spectrum of culture and civilization to bring about capitulation of their adversaries. In the originating article by Lind and his comrades, the premise of 4GW was stated: “In broad terms, fourth generation warfare seems likely to be widely dispersed and largely undefined; the distinction between war and peace will be blurred to the vanishing point. It will be nonlinear, possibly to the point of having no definable battlefields or fronts. The distinction between “civilian” and “military” may disappear. Actions will occur concurrently throughout all participants’ depth, including their society as a cultural, not just a physical, entity…all these elements are present in third generation warfare; fourth generation will merely accentuate them.7 This viewpoint was echoed by Martin Van Creveld in his book, The Transformation of War, when he states, “As new put forth the notion that there had been three prior generations of warfare beginning in 1648 with the Peace Treaty of Westphalia.5 This treaty was the result of the bloody Thirty Years War and brought about the birth of the nation-state system. The treaty provided governments the authority to rule within their borders free from outside intervention. In turn, this new ‘state’ system gave rise to what has been termed the “nation-state’s monopoly on violence.” This first generation of warfare was marked by massed manpower where, due to the limitations of armaments capabilities, concentrations of men fighting in close proximity to one another were the decisive form of combat. Massed armies and formations met in close-order battle and tactics, such as charges and line and square formations, were the norm. This generation is typified by the Napoleonic and American civil wars. The second generation of warfare followed a dramatic change in armament capabilities and was an age that relied on mass firepower. This was the generation typified by World War I and mass artillery, the widespread use of cartridge-loading rifled firearms and machine guns. The increased capabilities and lethality of weapons and armaments caused a shift in tactics. More dispersion, trench warfare, and massive artillery barrages to pound the enemy forces into submission through attrition were the norm during this period. Due to further technological changes, the third generation of warfare developed and was the age of maneuver warfare. This third generation was seen as starting with the German blitzkrieg of 1939. Tanks, motorized vehicles, planes, and radio communications were the technological enablers of this generation of warfare. This third generation typified warfare through the first Gulf War and combinations of these three generations of war have been the preferred Western method of warfare to date.6 The collapse of the bipolar world with the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War created the world’s first ‘hyper-power’ in the United States. This supremacy in conventional and technological firepower forced a regression to a type of warfare practiced in earlier forms of armed conflict multiply and spread, they will cause the lines between public and private, government and people, military and civilian, to become blurred as they were before 1648.”8 A few years later, author Thomas

X. Hammes wrote The Sling and the Stone: On War in the 21st Century, where he went further in defining 4GW: “Fourth-generation warfare uses all available networks — political, economic, social, and military — to convince the enemy’s political decisionmakers that their strategic goals are either unachievable or too costly for the perceived benefit. It is an evolved form of insurgency. Still rooted in the fundamental precept that superior political will, when properly employed, can defeat greater economic and military power, 4GW makes use of society’s networks to carry on its fight. Unlike previous generations of warfare, it does not attempt to win by defeating the enemy’s military forces. Instead, via the networks, it directly attacks the minds of enemy decisionmakers to destroy the enemy’s political will. Fourth-generation wars are lengthy — measured in decades rather than months or years.”9 4GW organizations focus on long-term objectives rather than short-term tactical ones. Ideology, survivability, and continuity are hallmarks of these organizations. The 4GW opponent seeks to bleed the larger and more technically advanced adversary until they can simply no longer continue the fight politically, economically, or socially. As Hammes indicates, “The target of all 4GW actions is the mind of the enemy decision makers.”10 The non-state group, al-Qaeda, has adopted this form of warfare in its global jihad and has continued to develop the concept of 4GW even further over time. Al-Qaeda and its global jihad present a solid case study to frame the application of 4GW tactics, operational plans, and strategies. As the original brain trust behind 4GW has stated, the 4GW framework brings nothing new, it merely merges and enhances existing practices and capabilities available to the combatant. Al-Qaeda has used 4GW against open and free western societies. Insurgents that gain travel visas and have valid passports can travel to any country where a potentially strategic target exists and prepare 14 for operations. Using technology, detailed communications with intelligence, including video, high-resolution photos, and other materials, can be transmitted to a website or other location via email not necessarily tied to a geographic-centric operational base. Maintaining this flexibility and freedom from bases and networks is a key strength of the 4GW practitioner. The ability to use the infrastructure that globalized society has come to rely on for business and social interaction as a weapons system further augments the conceptualization of 4GW. One of the most critical vulnerabilities of the globalized and internet-connected world is the capability to use these very same systems against us. As Thomas Friedman notes in The Lexus and the Olive Tree, “Globalization isn’t a choice. It’s a reality.”11 In the past several decades, business and other institutions have driven a global society into an internet-connected world culture. This new global communications capability has enabled unprecedented economic and social growth; however, it has also created another medium for insurgents. In this virtual medium, the insurgent can operate remotely, independently, and in a virtual sanctuary from anywhere in the world. No longer are safe havens or secure operating bases limited to geographic terrain-based locations. Al-Qaeda can distribute propaganda worldwide in near-instantaneous fashion from anywhere they have access to the net. “The knowledge of how to conduct an attack is developed in one country, then that knowledge is combined with the raw materials, personnel, and training available in other countries, which can include the target country, to create a weapon in the target country.”12 True global collaboration between subject-matter experts is possible for everyone. The President of the United States unequivocally agreed with the importance of technology when he stated that, “The gravest danger our Nation faces lies at the crossroads of radicalism and technology.”13 The virtual community is also a key source of fundraising and finance, which is facilitated through legal, as well as illegal, methods.14 “The old police technique of tracking illegal activity by watching certain places and peoples does not work when communications is carried out on line.”15 Globalization has created anew combat multiplier in 4GW capabilities. Al-Qaeda networks can be virtual, as Angel Rabasa explains, “Even more challenging from a security point of view is that the people do not have to go out to establish these networks. They do not have to be in the same country or even on line at the same time.”16 The internet has made it possible for the current manifestation of al-Qaeda and its version of global insurgency to exist.17 It was through the use of these tools and theories that al-Qaeda planned, organized, and executed the attacks on 11 September and introduced a shocked nation to this different method of waging war. It was shortly after these attacks that senior al-Qaeda strategy advisor, Abu Ubeid al-Qurashi, wrote about what he describes as a fourth-generation war against the infidels, and compares the attacks of 11 September to the 1941 attack on Pearl Harbor. His commentary is worth noting at length herein: “In 1989, some American military experts predicted a fundamental change in the future form of warfare. …They predicted that the wars of the 21st century would be dominated by a kind of warfare they called ‘the fourth generation of wars.’ Others called it ‘asymmetric warfare.’ With the September 11 attacks, al-Qaeda entered the annals of successful surprise attacks, which are few in history; for example, the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941. …Moreover, in the pain it caused (al-Qaeda) surpassed these surprise attacks, because it put every individual in American society on (constant) alert for every possibility, whether emotionally or practically. That has an extreme high economic and psychological price, particularly in a society that has not been affected by war since the American Civil War. The fourth-generation wars would, tactically, be small-scale, emerging in various regions across the planet against an enemy that, like a ghost, appears and disappears. The focus would be political, social, economic, and military. [It will be] international, national, tribal, and even organizations would participate (even though tactics and technology from previous generations would be used).18 “…there had been three prior generations of warfare beginning in 1648 with the Peace Treaty of Westphalia. This treaty was the result of the bloody Thirty Years War and brought about the birth of the nation-state system. The treaty provided governments the authority to rule within their borders free from outside intervention. In turn, this new ‘state’ system gave rise to what has been termed the ‘nation-state’s monopoly on violence.’ ” 15

It is apparent that al-Qaeda is no stranger to Western military theories and concepts. In fact, copies of the 1989 Marine Corps Gazette article on 4GW were reportedly found by U. S. troops in the caves of Tora Bora, the al-Qaeda stronghold in Afghanistan, and in 2001, after the attacks on the World Trade Center in New York, a copy of Clausewitz’ On War was found in an al-Qaeda safe house.19 In the spirit of Sun Tzu, and his adage about knowing the enemy and oneself, al-Qaeda has obviously done its homework and used our own analysis to frame its combat doctrine.20 This group has chosen to target political, economic, infrastructure, and cultural targets in accordance with the 4GW framework. It was a conscious decision to choose the twin towers of the World Trade Center in New York as both a cultural and economic symbol of U. S. power. Sensationalized targets that generate the most media attention are great psychological warfare combat multipliers. The willingness of al-Qaeda operatives to commit suicide in the name of martyrdom and Allah strikes fear in the minds of Westerners.21 The mass transit bombings of Britain and Spain were huge media successes and did much, due to their timing, to ensure Spain withdrew from the conflict by turning the population there against the war.22 In accordance with 4GW doctrine, the true strategic target of al-Qaeda is the population and its support of government actions that are counter to the objectives of Islamic fundamentalists. Their horrific actions continue to have ripple effects throughout our societies. These attacks have generated al-Qaeda’s desired reaction within our society and culture, and placed the United States on the strategic defensive. Dramatic changes have occurred in our lifestyles, economic spend ing, and security posture. We have expended vast amounts of national treasure and blood in an effort to counter its actions, capture or kill its members, and prevent any recurrence of attacks. This conflict, as described by al-Qaeda spokesmen and predicted by Lind, Van Creveld, and others, is an ideological and cultural conflict. Al-Qaeda strategist, Mustafa Setmariam Nasar, wrote a 1600-page book titled, The Global Islamic Resistance Call, which advances the evolution and adoption of 4GW into the al-Qaeda operational playbook.23 This work conceptualizes a capabilities-based organizational template, which is not physically structured as al-Qaeda has been previously. It seeks to further decentralize and create a ‘nizam la tanzim’ or a ‘system, not secret organization.’ This virtual organization is more of a philosophy or ideological-based construct rather than one that has a command hierarchy and structure that can be targeted.24 Nasar had studied Western doctrine and philosophies on insurgencies and guerrilla warfare. He is reported to have read and lectured on Robert Taber’s The War of the Flea: The Classic Study of Guerrilla Warfare.25 The volumes of studies and information available on asymmetric warfare, guerrilla warfare, and insurgencies have merely served as educational material for these 4GW practitioners. “Fourth-generation warfare uses all available networks — political, economic, social, and military — to convince the enemy’s political decisionmakers that their strategic goals are either unachievable or too costly for the perceived benefit. It is an evolved form of insurgency.” “4GW organizations focus on long-term objectives rather than short-term tactical ones. Ideology, survivability, and continuity are hallmarks of these organizations. The 4GW opponent seeks to bleed the larger and more technically advanced adversary until they can simply no longer continue the fight politically, economically, or socially.” 16

The further decentralization of operations and continued ability to use the communications methods of a globalized world to disseminate strategic and operational guidance all speak to the adoption and adaptation of 4GW.26 The overwhelming U. S. response to 11 September and the dismantling of the Taliban has forced al-Qaeda members into this more ideological model as they run and continue to hide primarily in the federally administered tribal areas (FATA) of Pakistan on the border of Afghanistan. Al-Qaeda has conducted its global jihad by striking high payoff targets, which has infused fear into the population and created enough paranoia to promote spending billions to prevent another attack. Their selection of targets, timing, and subsequent media coverage is all by design. Al-Qaeda knows it cannot defeat the United States militarily in conventional combat; it seeks to protract the conflict and wear down the will of the people. Hammes asserts, warfare has “shifted from an industrial-age focus on the destruction of the enemy’s armed forces to an information-age focus on changing the minds of the enemy’s political decisionmakers.”27 Al-Qaeda has masterfully used its resources to mass the effects of media coverage, promote fear, and remain in the headlines. It is clear that al-Qaeda has used 4GW theories of asymmetry and technology in its global jihad. Global communications allow insurgents to broadcast and disseminate their vision to gain support and recruits on a global scale. It provides for command and control, as well as a means to organize, collect information, plan, and execute disparate operations simultaneously, while exposing al-Qaeda leaders and organizers to minimal physical risk. It also allows them to promote messages, once an attack has been carried out, to further the impact and effect of the attack through mass media outlets globally. Globalized networking technology enables masses of young disillusioned Islamic fundamentalists around the globe, in madrassas, and across the street in downtown America to congregate and network as a single organizational unit through the internet.28 As warned in The Changing Role of Information Warfare, the very technology and infrastructure we rely on for our global economy could become an instrument to assault society and the world’s economic platform.29 Al-Qaeda has proven to be an evolving and learning organization. In its infancy, the network was principally concerned with training mujahedeen and the fight against the Soviets in Afghanistan.30 Many of the training areas they developed and used under the watchful eye of Pakistan and the United States were later used to train the terrorists that launched subsequent attacks worldwide, to include 11 September. Al-Qaeda has since expanded into an organization and ideology with global strategy and reach. Through technology, this network has created easily accessible doctrine for training, planning, intelligence gathering, weapons and device manufacturing, as well as directing strategy for numerous cells around the world.31 Al-Qaeda is a true example of a practitioner of 4GW. This article has shown that al-Qaeda has adopted the 4GW strategy and has used it to great effect in its operations. It has shown its willingness to employ weapons of mass effect anywhere in the world to execute its strategic vision. The adaptive nature of al-Qaeda has allowed it to take on the form of a transnational ideological movement, stringing together any number of Islamic fundamentalists across the globe who are willing to execute the directives laid out in bin Laden’s fatwas and declarations. As Al Suri states, “Al-Qaeda is not an organization, it is not a group, nor do we want it to be; it is a call, a reference, a methodology.”32 Its resiliency, coupled with adaptive asymmetric tactics of 4GW, make combating this group an extremely tough endeavor. Although no key strategic aim of al-Qaeda has been met, it continues to inspire Islamic fundamentalist actions. As 4GW practitioners, al-Qaeda has mutated into a more ideological movement-based organization that inspires and provides direction to fundamentalists around the world.33 Captain William Ault is currently serving as the assistant S3, 2d Infantry Brigade Combat Team (2 IBCT), 28th Infantry Division (28th ID), Washington, PA. He earned a bachelor’s degree from Robert Morris University. His military education includes Infantry Captain Career Course, Armor Officer Basic Course, and Antiterrorism Force Protection Level II Course. He has served in various leader and staff assignments, to include commander, Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 1st Battalion, 110th Infantry, 2d IBCT, 28th ID, Washington, PA; commander, C Company and D Company, 1st Battalion, 110th Infantry, 2d IBCT, 28th ID, Washington, PA; and assistant S3, 2 IBCT, 28th ID, Camp Habbaniyah, Iraq.