Armored Cavalry Regiments Along the Iron Curtain

Armored Cavalry Regiments Along the Iron Curtain by Lieutenant General Bruce C. Clarke (Reprinted from May-June 1958) “The responsibility of alerting Seventh Army and the rest of the world, in case of attack, is the mission of armored cavalry regiments along the Iron Curtain.” One of the most important military jobs in the world today is being handled by the Seventh Army’s three armored cavalry regiments. Sitting astride the rugged, mountainous terrain along the border that separates the United States’ area of responsibility in Germany from Soviet Satellite Czechoslovakia and the Soviet zone of Germany, these three regiments are charged with the tremendous responsibility of alerting Seventh Army, and the rest of the world, in case of attack. To accomplish this vital mission, personnel of the regiments must be constantly on the move, watching, listening, scouting, and patrolling day and night, month after month, and year after year. The alert, when and if it comes, must come swiftly and surely. A delay of a few minutes may mean the difference between victory and defeat. There can be no relaxation, no let-down, no half-way measures. Personnel and equipment must be in top shape constantly. No other units in the United States Army today, except for those in Korea, have an actual tactical mission to perform, and few units anywhere have a mission of such importance to the whole free world. It was no accident that armored cavalry regiments were chosen for the task. It is a traditional cavalry mis sion, and one for which they are equipped and able to perform well. The capabilities needed for the bor der mission are almost precisely those set forth in the armored cavalry regiment table of organization and equipment (TOE), 17-51R. Mission requirements are:

• To operate as a light armored task force in security and light combat missions without reinforcement.

• To operate as a highly mobile armored task force when suitably reinforced.

• To execute screening and counterreconnaissance missions.

• To reconnoiter for higher echelons, normally by independent action without reinforcement. Because of heavier armor and greater firepower, M48 tanks replaced M41s in Seventh Army’s armored cavalry regiments. March-April 2007 — 21

Their TOE mission is to operate as a light armored force in security, light combat, and reconnaissance missions, and this too, is precisely the mission they have today. In performing this mission, the three regiments involved, the 3d, 11th, and 14th, have over 500 miles of border to watch, and to more fully understand the problems with which they are faced, a knowledge of some of the conditions which exist is necessary. Along this very formidable front, the three regiments are deployed not necessarily as they would like to be, but as they must be because of the location of troop housing. In some cases, this actually puts a battalion behind the regimental headquarters and many miles away, both from the regimental headquarters and from the border it is expected to guard. The entire border for which Seventh Army is responsible is generally mountainous, rugged terrain. Roads do not always follow the border, and usually they are in poor condition. East and West methods of marking the border are a stark revelation of the basic philosophic difference between the communist and the free worlds. Let’s look first at the communist side of this border. Indicating the border exactly from one end to the other are white stone markers. Along the East German border, and at some locations along the Czech border, comes a plowed strip several yards wide. This strip is kept raked, and the purpose seems to be to detect signs of border crossers who may have slipped through other barriers. Three rows of barbed-wire fences run the full length of the Czech border and at some places along the East German border. The two outside rows are about four feet high. The center row is from six to eight feet high, and porcelain insulators indicate that it is capable of being electrified and probably is at night. Wherever this fence crosses a road, gates have been installed, and at some places tunnels have been dug beneath the fence. These fences are never located right on the border, but from a few to hundreds of yards behind it, with no apparent pattern. Hundreds of towers have been erected all along the border on the communist side, and most are mutually supporting. Here again, there is no pattern for manning the towers. Some appear to be manned all the time, and some appear never to be manned. Where they exist, the fences and the plowed strip are maintained in good repair. Details are often observed repairing the fences and raking the plowed strip. Little farming is permitted along the Czech border, and entire villages within a mile of the border have been evacuated or razed. Some of the farm buildings are now used by the Czech guards. East German farmers, however, cultivate their fields, in most cases right up to the border, and villages close to the border appear to be intact. On the western side, the situation is entirely different. Except where there are old roads leading to the border, the only indications a border exists are the white stone markers and signs in German which read “Landes Grenze,” meaning “state border,” placed at intervals alongside the stone markers. For American personnel, we have erected along each all-weather road signs that read “Attention — 50 Meters to the Border.” Also on these roads, German customs officials have placed a simple wooden bar. And that’s all. No plowed strip, no barbed-wire fences, no towers. Although methods of marking the border may differ between East and West, vigilance does not. Observation posts dug into the hills all along the border are manned constantly by men of Seventh Army’s three armored cavalry regiments. Five-man motorized patrols move constantly between border camps and the observation posts. The border patrols check not only with our own camps and observation posts (OP), but with the German border security police and German customs officials. Information is exchanged each time. It becomes fairly obvious, without mentioning other factors, that the border mission is no part-time job. If all this were not enough, the cavalrymen are constantly faced with harassing phenomena from the other side of the border. One OP reported 160 flares fired in 45 minutes, and lesser pyrotechnic displays are not unusual. This seems to be a favorite way for communist border guards to communicate with each other. Sounds of rifle fire often punctuate the border night, and thin fingers of searchlights probe incessantly for information. Despite all this, the more homely aspects of military life must go on. Maintenance must still be performed. Training must be given. Supplies must be drawn and issued. Personnel problems must be solved. How to do these things most efficiently has always been a matter to be reckoned with, and we have recently made some organizational changes in the armored cavalry regiments, which we think have improved soldiers’ ability to perform An artist’s drawing of border precautions taken by communists to make sure no one escapes to the West. The towers offer good fields of vision and fire. 22 — March-April 2007 missions and at the same time to function better in more conventional pursuits. Initially, we started with essentially the organization set forth in TOE 17-51R for an armored cavalry regiment (Figure 1). Under this organization, most of the service elements of the regiment are concentrated at regimental headquarters. The supply, maintenance, medical, and administrative sections that work for the battalions are all in either the regimental service company or the headquarters and headquarters company. To illustrate exactly what this means to the Seventh Army, let me use the 11th Armored Cavalry Regi ment as an example. The regimental headquarters with all the service elements is located at Straub-ing, along with its 1st Battalion. The 2d Battalion is located 41 miles away at Landshut, and the 3d Battalion at Regensburg, 27 miles from regimental headquarters. The border for which the regiment is responsible runs from the junction of the Czechoslovakian, Austrian, and West German borders, 132 miles north to Baernau. This puts the regimental headquarters and its 1st Battalion 45 miles from the border, and its 2d and 3d Battalions respectively 90 and 55 miles from it. Both the 2d and 3d Battalions are located behind regimental headquarters with respect to the border. You can see immediately that the distances involved pose a mighty problem for the service elements of the regiment. The perfect solution would be, obviously, to reduce the front for which the regiment is responsible, move the battalions forward of the regimental headquarters and closer to it. Unfortunately, the obvious solution is an impossible one. As previously mentioned, the location of the units is dictated by the availability of troop housing. With the physical locations of our units imposed on us by circumstances beyond our control, the only alternative, if we were to improve the situation, is to alter our organization to fit the circumstances. After some discussion with the regimental commanders, I directed such action in March 1957. The reorganization was not difficult. We simply organized the headquarters and headquarters companies of our reconnaissance battalions as set forth in TOE 17- 56R, but as though they were not organic to an armored cavalry regiment. This was done by simply adding a personnel section, a maintenance platoon, and a supply platoon to each battalion’s headquarters and headquarters company, and was provided for in the TOE. To get the personnel and equipment for the change, we took the battalion sections of the regimental headquarters and headquarters company, service company, and medical detachment and transferred them to their respective battalions. And then we went one step further. We found that there was so little left in the regimental service company that it no longer served a useful function as a separate unit. The remaining personnel and equipment were transferred to the regimental headquarters and headquarters company, and the service company was eliminated completely. Although the medical detachment was similarly depleted, we placed it directly under command of the headquarters and headquarters company commander instead of eliminating it. We thus arrived at organization as shown in Figure 2. There are, of course, pros and cons to this organization. However, all three regimental commanders and the corps commanders, under whose immediate supervision they operate, agree with me that this is the best organization for our particular need in Seventh Army. We are operating over wide fronts, wider perhaps than would be imposed even on an atomic battlefield, and the new organization gives us the best setup for wide front, extended area operations in which all three battalions are employed and faced with a big job. Armored Cavalry Regiment

TOE 17-51R

HQ & HQ

Company Recon Battalion Service Company Medical Detachment Figure 1 The addition of the H13 helicopter provides speedy evacuation of sick and injured from border camps and observation posts. March-April 2007 — 23

The other side of the coin was illustrated during Command Post Exercise (CPX) Lion Noir, conducted shortly after the reorganization took place. Just before the counteroffensive portion of the exercise, the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment was in reserve with two attached battalions — one tank and one armored infantry. An infantry regiment attacked to create a gap in the enemy lines through which the reinforced 11th was to pass. This was done on schedule, but the gap was only about 8,000 yards wide. From here, Colonel Allen D. Hulse, commander of the 11th, tells it in his own words: “Our scheme of maneuver provided for a fast passage of lines with two battalions abreast. We had hoped for a clean breakthrough, followed by a hasty river crossing to get our objectives. However, enemy resistance was organized and moderately determined all day long. The width of the zone restricted maneuver so that two of my five battalions did most of the fighting and needed plenty of logistical support by nightfall. Two of my battalions were never committed on the first day. Under the old organization, all the service company, plus any supporting service elements, could have gone to work for the two battalions which had carried the ball all day.” As you can see, our organization is not going to be the best for all possible circumstances. The regimental commander unquestionably loses some flexibility. We doubt, however, that this is an appreciable loss under the operational requirements with which the regiments are faced in Germany. In our reorganization of the regiments, we also considered the problem of furnishing adequate and timely logistics support to the regiments from outside. With an actual tactical requirement to fulfill, the regiments could not tolerate the delays in support which sometimes occur. We felt it necessary to see that this support was always there at the precise time it was needed, and so during the last half of 1957, we attached to each regiment three additional service elements. These are a reduced-strength direct support ordnance company, a full-strength armored medical company, and a full-strength armored engineer company. These units live and train with the regiments and so become part of the team. They learn the mission, the terrain, and the operational requirements of the regiment they must support. In addition to the foregoing modifications and innovations, some important substitutions and additions in equipment have also been made, especially in tanks and airplanes. The TOE provides for M41 tanks in the reconnaissance companies and M48s in the tank companies of the regiments. We have replaced all the M41s with M48s. The obvious advantages of better protection by heavier armor, better antitank capabilities, and longer range and increased firepower far outweigh the almost no decrease in tactical mobility occasioned by the change. Logistics problems are also somewhat simplified since ammunition, repair, and maintenance are standardized and fewer types of ammunition must be handled. In aircraft we also attempted to increase the capabilities of the regiments. Besides the daily border patrol missions, all aircraft fly if weather permits; armored cavalry regimental commanders rely heavily on them for moving equipment, for emergency use as radio relay stations, and for normal passenger flights. To the TOE authorization of eight L19s we first added an H13 helicopter to permit commanders to perform transportation jobs they could not previously perform, as well with other means. Aside from getting the regimental commander quickly to command posts and border stations inaccessible to fixed wing aircraft, the helicopter has proven invaluable, especially in winter, for evacuating injured or ill soldiers from border posts in the mountains. More recently, we have authorized each regiment to replace one L19 with an L20. This will give them the additional load and passenger-carrying capacity they have long needed and will provide an all-weather capability not present before. These L20s are now on hand and will be issued to the regiments as soon as installation of the new ARC 44 radios has been completed. Finally, I want to discuss the methods used by the regimental commanders in accomplishing the mission of keeping the border under observation at all times. Methods of operation vary somewhat among the three regiments, and the differences are determined largely by the distance the units are located from the Iron Curtain border. Battalions of the 14th, for example, are housed close enough to the border to permit company command-Armored Cavalry Regiment Seventh United States Army

HQ & HQ

Company Recon Company Maintenance Section Howitzer Company Recon Battalion

HQ & HQ

Company Tank Company Personnel Section Medical Detachment Security Platoon Tank Section Figure 2 24 — March-April 2007 ers to send out the necessary patrols from garrison locations. The 3d and the 11th Regiments are not so fortunate. Their distance from the border dictates that complete companies be moved from garrison to border camps. From these camps, the units operate the patrols and observation posts. In all three regiments, the border patrol mission is rotated between companies so that each company has an equal amount of time on the border. The 3d and the 14th Regiments have assigned sectors of responsibility to all three of their battalions. Battalion commanders are responsible for the border operation of their particular sector, and they run the whole operation with their own personnel and equipment. In each of these regiments, a small number of additional personnel have been added to the S2 section to handle the increased workload imposed at regimental headquarters by the border operation. The 11th Regiment, on the other hand, prefers to handle the complete border operation from regimental headquarters, and has established a separate staff section for the purpose. Until January 1958, this section was separate from the others and its chief reported directly to the commander. In January, the border section, still with the same responsibilities, was combined with the S2 section. The border section of the 11th has complete operational control, under the regimental commander, over everything pertaining to the border mission. It does all the planning, gives direction to the companies on the border, and is responsible for logistics support of the border units, including the vast communications network that links the observation posts, patrols, and the border camps to the regimental headquarters. Battalion commanders are responsible only for seeing that their companies are properly equipped and moved to the border camps. Their responsibility for the border operation ends there. After arrival at the border camps, the companies come under operational control of the regimental commander, through his border officer. Colonel Hulse, the 11th Regiment commander, feels that this method of operation has several advantages: it puts the complete border operation under one commander at all times; it permits the battalion commanders and their staffs to devote full time to training activities, which are considerable; and it permits all communications to be operated and controlled by one section for the entire border. The disadvantages are that the battalion commander is removed from the chain of command for one part of his unit’s operation, and that the method takes slightly more personnel. Colonel Hulse points out that if his battalions were closer to the border, it might be better for them to handle their share of the border operation, but since they are not, he prefers to leave them out of the picture almost entirely. I must point out that aside from setting forth the mission to be accomplished, higher headquarters leaves the business of how to accomplish the mission pretty much up to the regimental commanders. These differences in organization are largely a matter of personal preference of the commanders concerned, and both systems get the job done. All too briefly I have outlined the major changes we in Seventh Army felt necessary to make in the organization of our three armored cavalry regiments, and as much of their methods of operation as is un classified. These represent the collective judgment and empirical data gathered over a good many years of actual operations. One more point demands mention. The tremendous responsibility placed on these three regiments presents challenges of leadership available in few other units. The officers and men of the regiments live every day with the knowledge that if armed aggression comes, it will come to them first. There will be no time for correcting mistakes; no time for checking the book to see what to do. The everyday training must be superior and it must be worked into a schedule already tightly filled with a very real tactical mission. Because of the physical separation of units and because of their individual missions, the training task rests squarely on the shoulders of the company, platoon, section, and squad leaders. The opportunities for professional mental and moral growth in an assignment are without parallel. Perhaps because of this very situation, the esprit de corps and efficiency of these units are of an excellence to be envied. I am sure every man knows what would be demanded of him if aggression came. I am just as sure, from my own observations, that the armored cavalry regiments of the Seventh United States Army are trained and equipped to perform the vital military mission with which they have been charged. Lieutenant General Bruce C. Clarke, commanding general of the U. S. Seventh Army at the time he wrote this article, graduated from the U.S. Military Academy in 1927. He earned a B.S. degree in Civil Engineering from Cornell University. During World War II, he served in Europe with the 4th and 7th Armored Divisions. He commanded a corps in Korea during hostilities. Subsequently, he was the commanding general, USARPAC. He assumed command of the Continental Army Command in 1958, shortly after the publication of this article. The addition of an L20 to each regiment provides an all-weather capability. March-April 2007 — 25