Are You Fast With a “God Gun”???

those who do not learn from history are doomed to repeat it. Valuable lessons can always be learned from all combat operations, especially when those combat operations result in the development of new vehicles. All combat operations result in someone having to pay the “butcher’s bill,” and all soldiers would rather have the bill paid by the opposition. Notes 1“Army Announces Vision for the Future,” (Army Public Affairs, 12 Oct 99). 2Ibid. 3Ibid. 4Gary Sheftick and Michele Hammonds, “Army selects GM to make Interim Armored Vehicles,” (Army News Service, 20 Nov 00). 5Janes Defense Systems Modernization, May 99. 6Lester W. Grau, “Russian-Manufactured Armored Vehicle Vulnerability in Urban Combat: The Chechnya Experience,” (Red Star Thrust, Jan 97). 7Timothy Thomas, “The Caucasus Conflict and Russian Security: The Russian Armed Forces Confront Chechnya III. The Battle for Grozny, 1-26 January 1995,” (Journal of Slavic Military Studies, Vol. 10, No. 1, Mar 97), pp.50-108. 8MAJ Gregory J. Celestan, Wounded Bear: The Ongoing Russian Military Operation in Chechnya, (Foreign Military Studies Office, Aug 97). 9Thomas, pp.50-108. 10Grau. 11Ibid. 12Eugene Yanko, “The Tank Becomes an Armored Personnel Carrier,” (Russian Weapons Catalog, www.weapons-catalog.com). 13Russian Weapons and Military Technologies CD-ROM, BTR-T on the base of the T-55 tank/Exhibits, H- APC (BTR-T)/Exhibits, Scout-patrol vehicle/Exhibits, (VTTV-Omsk-99, Nov 99). 14Anatoly Ilyin, “Tank Support Combat Vehicle,” (Military Parade, Sep 00).

SFC Ira L. Partridge received his initial Armor training at Fort Knox, Ky., in 1985. He graduated the Master Gunner Course in 1993 with an A8 ASI. His assignments as a master gunner include one year as a company master gunner and three years as battalion master gunner for 5-77 AR, 1st AD, Mannheim, Germany, moving with the unit in 1994 and re-designating to 1-32 AR, 2nd ID, Fort Lewis, Wash. He is currently serving as the newsletter editor, webmaster, and operations sergeant for the Master Gunner School at Fort Knox, Ky. Deployable Vs. Survivable from Page 14 44 ARMOR — March-April 2001

This is easily accomplished with existing CSMs who go to the NTC for periodic rotations. They operate with an existing team sergeant major or independently after completing the Observer Controller (OC) Academy. This is accomplished in conjunction with their unit’s Leader Training Program (LTP). Everyone benefits from this initiative and the cost is minimal. The Army has the ability to begin to better set up CSMs for success by immediately restructuring the CSM Course from one to two weeks and training the leader tasks discussed here. They should provide an exportable leader teaching program for major commands (MACOM) and begin the close examination of the program of instruction at the United States Army Sergeants Major Academy. Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) has the unique ability to incorporate the training observations from the NTC, the course developers at the USASMA, and service school doctrinal writers. We have the ability to utilize the NTC OC Academy and the FORSCOM LTP to place trained, experienced coaches, teachers, and mentors in the world’s best training environment. We are in a period of great changes in the Army. These changes cannot be limited to equipment and information technology. They must include changes in the Army’s most important resource — soldiers — and specifically the CSM. These changes, in consonance with the Army’s process of rebuilding itself, will better leverage the abilities of unit CSMs and more effectively enable units to train, deploy, stabilize a situation, enforce peace, or win in decisive combat.

CSM Jim DePriest is a graduate of Class 36, USASMA. He has served at the battalion, squadron, and brigade level as a CSM. He has five rotations to the National Training Center as a CSM. He holds a B.S.L.A. from the University of the State of New York. He is currently the CSM for 1st Brigade, 4th Infantry Division.

COL Randy Anderson is a 1975 Distinguished Military Graduate from Stephen F. Austin State University. While in command of 2-68 Armor, Baumholder, Germany, he deployed to Kuwait for Intrinsic Action 95-03 and to Bosnia-Herzegovina as IFOR of Operation Joint Endeavor. He is currently the commander of 1st Brigade, 4th Infantry Division. CSM Role continued from Page 26 The 27th Enhanced Separate Infantry Brigade needs observer/controllers for JRTC Rotation 01-09, Fort Polk, Louisiana, 1–15 August 2001. Captains (12C) with cavalry troop command or platoon leader experience; master sergeants or first sergeants (19Z) with cavalry troop experience; and staff sergeants and sergeants first class (19D) interested in assisting fellow Guardsmen and providing yourself a superior professional training experience should contact CPT Wilson or CPT Porter for more information. Are You Fast With a “God Gun”??? National Guard Bureau Needs ARNG O/C Augmentees CPT John Wilson Phone: (703) 607-9154

DSN: 327-9154

john.wilson@ngb.army.mil CPT Garry Porter Phone: (703) 607-7317

DSN: 327-7317

garry.porter@ngb.army.mil The National Guard Bureau funds these tours as additional Annual Training. Travel and per diem is included.

The Readers Respond “An Infantryman’s Thoughts on Armor”

Dear Sir: Interesting article by MAJ Bateman (“An Infantryman’s Thoughts on Armor”). I find it interesting that with such a strong opinion he of all people seems to miss the mark on the addition of the medium weight vehicle to the force. Notice that I did not say transition from M1A1. MAJ Bateman’s points on logistics and force projection are quite valid. We are heavy and require a lot to sustain. This is nothing that the heads of the armor community haven’t said repeatedly in this very publication. There is a plan for addressing these things and it is called the Future Combat System, not an interim weight vehicle. I would rather focus on the role that MAJ Bateman thinks Armor has on the battlefield. First and foremost, I think that most soldiers place a high priority on survival. I certainly do. The idea that survival is some sort of an afterthought just doesn’t register here. Let’s win the fight and come back home. Just a thought. There is something that you get that accompanies that rather substantial amount of steel that you have wrapped around you in a tank. That is the knowledge that although you are not invincible, it does take a lot to destroy you. This translates to confidence and aggressive actions on the battlefield that are critical to success. I wasn’t in the Army when Desert Storm began, but I think the number of casualties would have been a little bit higher without the M1A1 in the fight. Protection does matter. There is a reason that we have different branches/MOSs in the Army. To attempt to place the role of Armor into the same category and apply the same criteria to Armor as Infantry would be a big mistake. I applaud you for stepping into battle with your “BDU Armor” but you are not asked to accomplish the same mission with your BDUs and Javelin as I am. The protection that means jack **** to you means something totally different to me. It means that if needed, to help you in a time of need, I can raise risk and lessen caution as I close with and destroy the enemy that threatens you because I know the capabilities of the armor around me will allow me to act a lot more aggressively than I would if I were in a Bradley or an LAV. For the record I’ll summarize this whole heavy/medium/light thing. The Army identified a need to get more firepower on the ground quicker than we can with the M1 tank. The interim weight vehicle bridges a gap that was clearly there and addresses rapid deployment issues and should help in places where maneuvering a tank would be impractical. The next generation of tank will continue to do most of what the M1 does. It will have the lethality of an M1A1, more protection than a LAV, and be lighter and more deployable. Ideally, it will allow us to maintain the boldness and audacity that is inherent in Armor and Cavalry right now. No need to feel sorry for tankers. We’re pretty happy with where we are and where we’re going. We’ll be there when you call.

ROBERT P. ASHE

CPT, AR

USMA AR Branch Rep

Armoring the Infantry Recalls Success of WWII

Dear Sir: I wish to comment on the diatribe against heavy armor by Major Bateman, “An Infantryman’s Thoughts on Armor,” that appeared on pages 11-12, ARMOR, Jan-Feb 2001. The only part of the article that I agree with is his conclusion’s opening sentence, “To make a weak historical point…” I concur that it is weak. It is also out of context and flat wrong. MAJ Bateman’s argument that the Germans were winning when they had lighter tanks (Mark II, III, and IV) and losing when they had heavy Panthers and Tigers is obnoxious, and he should know better. He ignores the doctrinal and operational concepts under which the opposing forces fought. He also ignores the fact that Allied tanks improved and were vastly superior to earlier models. But let me hit the real issue concerning “Transformation,” which has nothing to do with gun tube elevation, vehicle maintenance, fuel consumption, or anything else concerning the Abrams MBT. The real issue is that light infantry is too light. Look back to Reorganization Objective Army Divisions (ROAD) that served us since the mid-60s. It was a direct carryover from WWII experience (disregarding the failed Pentomic Division, the Army’s “Transformation” of the early ’60s). The general purpose Infantry Division (Light) had organic tank and mechanized battalions, the exact number of each to be tailored based on METT-T. The division could be readily beefed up into an Infantry Division (Mechanized) by simply increasing the proportion of mechanized infantry battalions. Two decades ago, the Army ignored all those lessons of WWII, scrapped this balanced organization, and created the Light Infantry Division (LID). This was a 10,000- man unit that regularly demonstrated an inability to even feed itself in deployments and exercises, much like its WWII predecessor. But it could deploy rapidly, so we made more of them. Further confounding the effort to lighten the force, the Army repeatedly refused to procure a light tank to replace the Vietnam-era M551 Sheridan. I’d like to remind younger readers that the M8 Armored Gun System (AGS) that was type classified but then canceled in 1995 is essentially the same vehicle that was tested in the mid ’80s but was never procured then, either. The AGS was the linchpin of the 9th Infantry Division’s experimental and revolutionary 1980’s High Technology Light Division (HTLD), sometimes derisively called the “Dune Buggy Division.” Without AGS, the concept could not succeed, so the 9th ID was reorganized conventionally and subsequently deactivated before the deployment to Desert Shield and Storm. So, in 1999, the new Chief of Staff of the Army recognizes that the light forces are too light, and determines to use new technology to develop a lightweight equivalent of the heavy force. His objective is a 20-ton tank with the survivability and lethality of today’s 70-ton Abrams. Great idea! But now, it seems as though every “light fighter” who slept through the logistics planning portions of C&GSC wants to twist this into saying that we need to eliminate the heavy force TODAY and replace the MBT with a an APC with a cannon. That is utter nonsense. The other point that has been totally obfus-cated in “Transformation” debates is that the IBCT is essentially a mechanized infantry brigade equipped with a newer family of light armored vehicles. There are variants for infantry, engineers, mortars, antitank, air defense, command, maintenance, medical, etc., etc., just like the M113 family of APCs; like the family of halftracks of WWII, even!! In other words, discounting the mindlessly distracting debate of wheel versus track, the Army enters the 21st century having finally stumbled into the secret we mastered so well in WWII: “Mechanized (or Armored) Infantry.” All that is missing is a suitable AGS, but this time, we might actually get one in the form of

LETTERS from Page 4 ARMOR — March-April 2001 45 the 105mm cannon-armed Mobile Gun System (MGS). So I wish “Light Fighters” all the best in their quest to mechanize themselves so that they can bring more than backbreaking manpacked loads to the fight, and move faster than plodding at a foot marching pace. And with keen focused insight, hopefully they will design the vehicles of those mechanized battalions so that they can elevate against high targets and deliver precise, lethal fire in support of the accompanying dismounted and mounted infantry. And with that accomplished, I am fully confident that they will be able to deploy rapidly and bring a sufficiently lethal capability to meet most contingencies. And if need be, they will have sufficient combat power to defend and buy time for the heavy legacy force to deploy and enter the theater, where it can utterly destroy the threat that was impertinent enough to challenge the Armed Forces of the United States of America. But so long as there remain thousands of modern MBTs, IFVs, APCs, and armored SP artillery in the hands of potential opponents world wide, I suggest that the rush to eliminate the Abrams, the best MBT on the planet, and castrate the U.S. Army’s Armor is plainly misguided.

CHESTER A. KOJRO

LTC, AR, USAR (Ret.)

Survivability Looms as a Question In Army’s Shift to Light Armor

Dear Sir: I read MAJ Bateman’s article in the Jan-Feb 2001 issue of ARMOR, and while I agreed with several of his points, I also disagreed with a couple... As I am a tanker, I guess that won’t surprise you. As I understand it, the senior Army leadership intends to field some light “armored” brigades now and eventually mothball the M1 series of tanks (I’m still not clear if they intend to totally do away with all the heavy armor). First of all, the LAV III is more deployable, cheaper, and probably less maintenance-intensive; we’ll soon find out. However, without the extra applique armor package, it can only stop a 14.5mm round. Now, I agree that we should be able to deploy quickly, and rapid deployment infantry units should be able to utilize armor, light or heavy, as soon as they’re on the ground. LAV IIIs are clearly much more rapidly deployable than the M1 series. But I do think we need to use caution here. It seems we’re so concerned with getting there fast that we’re not thinking about what we’ll face when we get there. Will China, Iraq, or North Korea sweat when they see LAV IIIs; probably not. It’ll still be a speed bump, just a little bigger. The concern I have is that the threat will outgun us in the fight. A T-90, or T-62 for that matter, can chew through LAV IIIs, at most armed with a 105mm, just as easily as it can chew up crunchies. I think it is good that the LAV IIIs will be able to go with infantry in a hurry. I do not think we should look to the LAVs to do any decisive fighting unless we know for sure that they will face no enemy medium to heavy armor. The problem is, sooner or later they will face enemy armor, and then what? We keep looking at the M1 and saying, well, it’s not deployable. Have we taken a closer look at our means of moving it. Yes, aircraft wise, the Galaxy can take only one, but what about the naval mode?... What new ships are under development, specifically in the cargo transportation area? I think we need to consider this because, in my opinion, we will still need heavy armor for some time. Eventually, who knows what will transpire with the electrical rounds or lasers they’re developing, but for now we need heavy armor and will for some time. This leads me to another point, survivability. He says mission accomplishment is ranked ahead of survivability. He also says our armor protection doesn’t mean anything to him. Come on, that’s a good one! How many times does that armor provide cover for dismounts? Many. Also, I haven’t read of too many dead soldiers accomplishing the mission. If tankers had to leave their tanks to join infantryman in a fight, we wouldn’t need tanks, just more infantry. There will always be situations or places where only infantry can go. That is what infantryman get paid for. I will tell you that tankers are entitled to more armor protection; that is the point. Our mission statement is to close with and destroy the enemy using firepower, maneuver, and shock effect. I love infantrymen, but they really don’t shock that much. You get shock effect when you hear a 120mm go off and see that SABOT or HEAT utterly destroy something. I would venture that you get more shock effect when an enemy sees its main battle tank fire at and hit an M1 and watch in horror as their main tank killing munition sticks out of the front slope, the M1 turret turns and sends a 120mm greeting card into and through the other side of the enemy MBT. That is exactly when the enemy’s will starts to falter, and when that happens, victory is not far behind. That same will can only be strengthened at the sight of countless burning U.S. LAV IIIs and scattering U.S. infantry. In Somalia, the relief column was made up of HMMWVs and was decisively defeated. Senior Army leadership publicly regretted the fact that there was no U.S. heavy armor available to send to the Rangers. There have been incredible advances in anti-armor capability, specifically armor penetration and ease of use for the aggressor. That is a big problem for the

LAV.

Finally, his historical example of Germany losing with the Tiger and King Tiger was very poor. The reason the Germans lost is not because their heavy tanks were not better. They were, although the 85mm T-34 was very good. They lost because they were being totally out-manufactured. The Russians and Americans were producing more that 10 tanks for every one the Germans were producing. The Germans also had too many models and so maintenance parts weren’t universal at all. If the Germans had as many tanks as the Russians, we’d probably be speaking German now. I can see why MAJ Bateman generates so much mail. The BLUF is, we’re all on the same side and, though few will admit it, tankers need infantrymen as much as infantrymen need tankers. I guess we just disagree a little on what systems we use in our mutually supporting relationships. Again, maybe one day heavy armor will be a thing of the past, but for the next 10 years, I think we’ll need it.

CPT MATT EICHBURG

HHC/2-8 CAV

1st Cavalry Division

Can Armor Guys Take Note, And Not Offense?

Dear Sir: I am a tank battalion commander and I enjoyed MAJ Bateman’s article in the Jan-Feb 2001 ARMOR. He has a great gift for prose and I do agree with his assessment. As an Armor officer for over 15 years, I have seen the day of the M1 come and go. My biggest issue with the M1 is the main gun storage capacity. As has been proven in many wars, but especially wars between Israel and Arab countries, the number of main gun rounds carried on tanks made huge differences in the outcome of small unit combat. I also agree with his assessment of mobility from a operational point of view. The M1 is horrible. As for fuel, I wish my checking account looked like my fuel account! I applaud him for his far-thinking article, I can only hope my fellow armor officers will take note versus taking offense.

KEITH D. LOCHNER

MAJ(P), AR, CAARNG

Cdr, 1st Battalion, 185th Armor

To “Complete the Mission,” You’re Gonna Need Tanks

Dear Sir: On MAJ Bateman’s article, I disagree with most all of it. The one smart thing in his article is that he knows that he will need armor.... Those light (armored vehicles) will not survive, and then who are you going to call? There is no such thing as too much firepower, accuracy, or protection, and I don’t care how much fuel or support it takes; get it there, an infantryman’s life depends on it. MAJ Bateman has fallen prey to the political correctness of not bullying these Third World countries into line. They are not worth one American life. He sounds like he wants to die for our country. I want to complete the mission and go home. (Remember GEN Patton, history teacher?) It takes survival to make that happen. It takes survival to complete the mission. Go ahead and get some sort of light gun system to keep your head above water ’til we get there... Bottom line is, it will still

46 ARMOR — March-April 2001