Above and Beyond (SSG Ruben Rivers Honored)

— SSG Charles King was chosen to lead the attack, and leading CPT Williams’ most forward platoon was a young and audacious staff sergeant named Ruben Rivers. On November 7th, 1944, while advancing towards Guebling, SSG Rivers’ unit encountered a roadblock that impeded its advance. Without thought for his own life or safety, SSG Rivers dismounted his vehicle under heavy direct fire, attached a cable, and dragged the roadblock out of the way, in order for the unit to continue with its mission. For this action, he received the Silver Star. Ten days later, on November 17th, following SSG Rivers’ lead, Able Company continued its attack. As the company moved across a railroad crossing, SSG Rivers’ Sherman tank hit an antitank mine, sending shrapnel into the turret and slashing Rivers’ thigh to the bone. Refusing evacuation and morphine for the excruciating pain, SSG Rivers took control of his section after the section commander was killed and directed the movement towards the enemy strongholds. When the Engineers began constructing abridge over the river into Guebling, the company commander, CPT David J. Williams, came over to SSG Rivers tank to check on him. It was then that he realized that while SSG Rivers was in unbearable pain, he said nothing of it. Again, the commander told him to administer the morphine and evacuate to the rear. SSG Rivers once more refused both the morphine and the evacuation. For the next three days SSG Rivers went about his duties despite extreme pain, all the while leading the company towards Bougaltroff. As they were entering the town, SSG Rivers encountered extremely heavy enemy resistance and was ordered to pull back. SSG Rivers reported that he had spotted enemy positions and was advancing on them, saying, “I see ’em. We’ll fight em.” As he entered the city, SSG Rivers destroyed three tanks and their crews before the turret of his Sherman was hit by an 88mm armor-piercing round, killing both Rivers and his gunner. As a result of these heroic actions and SSG Rivers’ expertise with the.50 caliber machine gun, he was credited with over 200 enemy deaths. It was this series of events that led his company commander to recommend SSG Rivers for the Congressional Medal of Honor. After SSG Rivers’ death on November 19, CPT Williams went to the battalion commander and told him that he was going to recommend SSG Rivers for the Medal of Honor. Four days later, he turned in the written recommendation to the battalion commander, but because it was then misplaced or lost, it would be the last time he would see it. For the next fifty years, CPT Williams would spend considerable amounts of time in the pursuit of SSG Rivers’ Medal of Honor. Unfortunately, there was one catch that CPT Williams was unaware of. The time limit in which the medal could be bestowed on SSG Rivers had run out in 1952. Finally, in June of 1990, there was a breakthrough. CPT Williams, with the help of sworn affidavits from many of the soldiers who were in France that day, was able to influence Congressman James M. Inhofe (R-OK.) to propose a resolution to Congress to waive the time limitation on the recommendation for SSG Rivers’ Medal of Honor. On 6 June 1990, Congressman Inhofe went to the floor of the House of Representatives and told the story of SSG Rivers and why he deserved the award. The house granted the waiver of time limits to SSG Rivers and he was finally awarded his Medal of Honor. Williams, the company commander, was the guest speaker at the February 13th ceremony naming the auditorium in honor of SSG Rivers. Williams was drafted into the Army while in his third year at Yale, and served for eleven months, reaching the rank of corporal before being selected for OCS. After graduating from OCS, CPT Williams was sent to Camp Clairborne, La., where he thought he would wait out the war. He just could not see the Army sending an all-black unit into battle. But, midway through the war, the black GIs started demanding the chance to fight for their country instead of being assigned menial jobs at Camp Clairborne. The 761st, an all-black battalion, finally received its chance in 1944. Sent to Europe, they landed on Normandy beach in the early fall. During the next several months, they distinguished themselves as one of the best tank battalions in World War II. But, like all black soldiers of the era, the battalion never received its due recognition. Finally, in 1978, at the urging of Williams, the 761st Tank Battalion received the Presidential Unit Citation that it so greatly deserved. The families, friends, and comrades of the soldiers have spent the last 50 years waiting in anxious anticipation for the honors recently bestowed by President Clinton. A special Army Senior Officer Awards Board chose the seven men according to facts accumulated by a panel of military historians over a 15-month study. The study included written works from the National Archives, as well as recollections from soldiers who had served with the men on the battlefield during World War II. Two of SSG Rivers’ sisters, Grace Rivers Woodsfork and Mae Rivers Hills, attended the ceremony at Fort Knox. Mrs. Woodsfork’s son, a former mayor of Richmond, California, also attended. There were local politicians present, as well as members of the area’s chapter of the NAACP. During the ceremony SSG Rivers was knighted into the U. S. Armor Association’s Order of St. George for extraordinary leadership qualities on the battlefield. After 53 years, a great wrong has been righted with the honoring of the seven men who received the Medal of Honor, but as a nation and as soldiers, there is an inherent duty to ensure that such injustice never happens again. Soldiers should feel honored in serving in the same Army as these great men. SSG Rivers and the men who served in the 761st unswervingly demonstrated their unique pride in America — a pride that can be shared and should be remembered. They fought for freedom on the battlefields of Europe without the benefits of full freedom at home and in doing so, taught America and the Army a lesson not easily learned. A sense of duty, honor and courage is not dependent on one’s skin color, but rather from deep within one’s soul. ARMOR — 47 Private First Class Darryl M. Metcalf has been in the U. S. Army for two years. He is currently the driver for the Director of the Armor School. His previous assignments include M1A1 crewman in 1/72 AR in the ROK, and as an M1A2 crewman in 4/16 CAV. He is currently competing for the Army’s Green to Gold program, and plans on enrolling in the ROTC Department at the University of Louisville in the fall of 1997. Tank Modernization Plans Still in Formative Stage This letter to the editor corrects some of the misperceptions found in CPT Todd Tolson’s “Building Tanks at Lima” article in the November-December issue.

The Army Science Board Tank Modernization Study recommendations matched the independent Armor Integrated Concept Teams’ recommendations in nearly every area. Neither recommended an evolutionary approach to a Future Tank. Both recommended (using the Abrams) the same set of high pay-off improvements to the Abrams. The Army Science Board, which did not consider affordability, recommended buying additional M1A2 tanks. The Abrams Integrated Concept Team stated that the Army’s current procurement objective of 1,079 M1A2s was not based on an operational need and recommended that the Army Staff conduct a study to determine the right/affordable number. The “Leap-Ahead Strategy” to a Future Combat System was decided by Senior Army Leaders (not Fort Knox). The Integrated Concept Team is in the process of providing definition to that decision. Future Combat System operational requirements are far from being determined. Initial performance goals have been crafted to guide science and technology efforts. We will seek approval of a Mission Needs Statement in Fiscal Year 1997. Our timeline requires Operational Requirements Document approval no later than 2005. Future Combat System fielding is targeted to begin sometime between 2015 and 2020. The Program Executive Officer, Ground Combat and Support Systems, and the Chief of Armor jointly signed a tank modernization plan which provides the details of this strategy. The plan was recently mailed to senior leaders across the Force. We will publish excerpts of the Tank Modernization Plan in future issues of ARMOR so that all may understand and contribute. JOHN F. KALB

COL, Armor Director, Force Development Ft. Knox, Ky.

You Can’t Mothball Human Skills At Army Tank Plants Dear Sir: CPT Tolson’s excellent article in the November-December issue, “Building Tanks at Lima” refers to a CBO study which recommended that the tank production facilities be mothballed to save money. My comment on that study is that it is an extremely shortsighted approach. The most important capabilities to save are the human resources, not the machinery, and we can only do that by keeping open some limited production capability.

I go into this at some length in an article that I hope ARMOR will publish in the near future. (This article is in the early stages of production. -Ed.)

Robin Fletcher has done his usual, well-reasoned work in his article in the November-December issue, “From the External Gun to the Hybrid Tank,” but I have several comments: It is not correct to say that my article in the January-February 1996 issue, “The External Gun Turret: Often a Bridesmaid, Never a Bride,” attributed the failure of the EGT concept to be adopted principally because of the absence of commander’s direct “top vision.” However important it is, it is only one of four reasons that I mentioned, the other three being: elevated gun position decreases survivability due to high silhouette and exposed mechanisms, excessive complexity due to the need to remote the operation of subsystems, and the loss of interior volume and mounting surface area. All are important, but the last is certainly the most under-appreciated. I just don’t believe that an advanced “tank,” or any advanced combat system, will result from fooling around with how the gun is mounted. The horse cavalry was at the logical end of its development when it was replaced by the airplane and the armored, tracked vehicle; which were real new technology, not just a rearrangement of components. If I may resort to reductio ad absurdum, there was no possibility of a then-year “AHCS” (Advanced Horse Cavalry System) to result from fooling around with rearranging how the cavalryman was mounted — say by mounting the saddle under the horse’s belly and forcing the rider to ride upside down. Such a system, which makes about as much sense to me as the EGT, would have the theoretical advantages of both reduced silhouette and “decreased crew vulnerability” because the rider is under the horse and less likely to be shot. Direct “top” vision would be missing because of the rider’s position, but since it doesn’t now bother the advocates of the EGT, it shouldn’t have been a handicap for the AHCS. We can just assume that, like the FCS, the technologists will solve the problem, given enough time and money — which they will be glad to do; that is, use the time and money. Results are another thing.

Focusing on the gun mounting is looking through the wrong end of the telescope. What we need to concentrate on is how to achieve the improved lethality at the target end of the engagement. Speaking of that subject, I also believe that all the concepts being considered for the next generation system may well be wrong in that they concentrate on a heavy, high-velocity, high muzzle energy, high recoil force, flat trajectory, humongously long telephone pole of a weapon. CPT Pryor has written two fine articles (“M1A2s, Smart Ammunition, and Time and Space Theory,” January-Feburary 1996; and “Part II, The Offense,” November-December 1996) for ARMOR about the potential for the use of the Smart, Target Activated Fire and Forget round (STAFF). Is anyone listening? STAFF doesn’t need a very high velocity launch to work; and with a reduced need for a high muzzle velocity, the projectile trajectory can be curved enough to fire from a turret defilade position, making the vehicle much less vulnerable to flat-trajectory fire. Wouldn’t this be a good way to reduce the weight of the armor? I hasten to add that, yes, since the target is moving, STAFF needs enough muzzle velocity to still have a high hit probability. My only point of disagreement with CPT Pryor is that the firing vehicle he discusses is always a currently-configured tank, specifically the M1A2. STAFF doesn’t need to be fired from a tank to be effective. The variety of gun mountings shown would need both space allocation design work and some thought given to how the structural loads will be reacted. Complying with both sets of needs can result in unanticipated weight, volume, complexity, and cost growth.

Bellingham, Wash.

Clarifying the TF Commander’s Role in Fire Support Dear Sir: I have read the September-October 1996 issue of ARMOR with great interest. I was struck by several of the articles and will respond to each in turn. My first target of opportunity is LTC Leiferman’s piece, “The Task Force Commander’s Role in Fire Support Planning.”

LTC Leiferman almost has it right. Indirect fires are too important to be left solely to the artillerymen. What he doesn’t pay close enough attention to is:

- The absolute need to assign someone to execute the brigade commander’s targets,

- The use of a sequence of fires to assist in the synchronization of the direct and indirect fire battles,

- The true limits of indirect fires in a 30-minute fight

- The criticality of patience and discipline to the entire execution phase of the fight. COL (Ret.) BRUCE B. G. CLARKE

MGDL, Tabuk, KSA LETTERS (Continued from Page 4) Downsizing of Heavy Force Isn’t Over Yet I need to take a little bit of issue with your editorial in the November-December 1996 issue.

- Downsizing is not, I say again, not “near the last step.” Point in process aside, the “heavy force” is going to get smaller by at least a division if not by two by the end of FY00. That is a lot of 19Ks, Ds, and 12-series AOCs from an already reduced number. Not to mention the 11 and 13 MOS types. Fighting the war of “diminishing returns” may be tougher than any probably short- or near-term enemy. We will reach a point where training devices and weapon systems (remember the AGS) costs will outweigh their benefit because of our small number — not need. Remember what bean-counters count; it is not soldiers, regardless of what they say. They, too, have careers, and focus is awfully hard to maintain when you’re sitting on the flag pole, wherever it is planted — especially when bullets are not flying.

- Leadership/Competency at all levels cannot be measured by the Persian Gulf episode. For those who were there, it was war, and there are always individual benefits from combat, regardless of how many participated, for how long, or who the enemy was in the fight. However, as an Army, those benefits are not that great because of those same factors when compared to other wars (declared or not) we have fought. The experience factor I think you are talking about is based on the training done before the action — wherever, whenever, or whoever. Therefore, based on our most recent use, as true individual soldiers, our training methods and leadership development programs are serving us very well, as best can be judged, based on that operation. Again, we cannot let economics reduce that by even 1 percent. Having made these points, your final analysis is correct. We break things real good. That is our prime objective. We need to make sure that is understood, not only for the Armor Force, but the whole U. S. Army.

COL, AR, USAR (Ret.)

Filling Needs Quickly With Foreign Equipment Dear Sir: I read with some interest Stanley C. Crist’s letter, “Peacekeeping Vehicles” (Nov-Dec 96), referencing COL Charles Lehner’s “Bosnia Report” (May-June 96). I believe a few things need further clarification. Since the BV-206 is already in the Army inventory as the M973A1 SUSV, using the vehicle in Bosnia should not pose a maintenance and supply challenge over any other vehicle. The BV-206S uses many of the same components as the older vehicle, so that vehicle should not present a greater challenge either. As the Army’s IPOC for the Foreign Comparative Testing (FCT) Program, we are looking at emerging requirements to use the BV-206S in Korea and Bosnia. At the present, we have a proposal to conduct a FCT project with limited tests in the 10th Mountain and 2nd Armored divisions to verify the vehicle’s use for their peacekeeping and/or wartime requirements.

In reference to Tom Buonaugurio’s comment, “If a requirement for the (armored) BV-206S does emerge,” yes, I agree with Mr. Crist’s statement, that vehicles in a scouting and patrolling role need armor protection, and while this is obvious, it does not make it official. That requirement needs to be in writing at an Army level such as a CINC Mission Needs Statement or a TRADOC Operational Requirements Document. Even that sometimes does not always ensure that, once tested successfully, the Army will procure it. I can refer to a recent FCT project for the 25mm Breakup Ammunition manufactured by NWM De Kruithoorn B. V. of the Netherlands. This cartridge allows the live firing of the 25mm Bushmaster on a much reduced live-fire range, offering some new opportunities for training, especially at the National Training Center, and check firing the Chain Gun. This project began with a signed requirement from the 24th Infantry Division. As the project progressed to testing, sponsorship of the requirement was withdrawn. The project proceeded, considering that much of the cost was not recoverable, and anew user could be solicited. The cartridge completed the testing successfully, and has a lot to offer the Army and Bradley Fighting Vehicle users, but there have been many stone walls encountered in the search for an alternate user. The problem right now is generating an interest in the user community to procure this cartridge, especially when the user has so many other things to worry about, one of them being the funding of their ammunition budgets. That problem has already been resolved at the Deputy Chief of Staff-Ammunition level. Funding to procure the cartridge is guaranteed for the user who comes forth with a written requirement justifying the need for this cartridge. The user will benefit from the capabilities gained from this item, and the United States will gain on the political front from the foreign purchase. We will continue to work the issue with the BV-206S. Funding will always be an issue in these austere times. Mr. Crist is correct: we should provide our soldiers in the role of international policemen in peacekeeping operations the right tools for the job, and do it now. The user community can help do that with justified and supported requirements, and the FCT program can help by providing equipment, albeit foreign non-developmental items, that meet those requirements in the shortest time possible.

Aberdeen Proving Ground, Md. Clarifying the Components Of Bosnia’s TF Eagle Dear Sir: In the May-June 1996 issue of ARMOR, you published an article written by Colonel Charles Lehner (Ret.) entitled “Task Force Eagle’s Armor and Cavalry in Bosnia.” The article was very interesting, but there were some mistakes, which we would like you to correct.

It was mentioned that the Swedish Battalion is responsible for the NW sector of the Task Force Eagle AOR. However, this is not true. In fact, the Nordic-Polish Brigade, to which the Swedish Battalion belongs, operates in this area. The NORDPOLBDE is a multi-national brigade containing approximately 3,500 soldiers from 10 different nations (Denmark, Finland, Norway, Sweden, Poland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Iceland, and the USA).

The brigade consists of:

- A multinational HQ

- A multinational HQ company (M113 and SISU XA-186 APCs)

- A multinational MP company (M113 APCs)

- A Danish mechanized infantry battalion (M113 APCs, Leopard 1A3 MBTs)

- A Polish paratroop battalion (BMP-1 CIFVs and BRDM-2 recce vehicles)

- A Swedish mechanized infantry battalion (PBV302 and SISU XA-180 APCs, BV-206 SUSVs)

- A Finnish construction battalion (SISU XA-180 APCXs, NASU SUSVs)

- A Norwegian logistic battalion (SISU XA-186 APCs)

- A Norwegian medical company (SISU XA-186 APCs)

The Danish Leopard tank squadron was attached to a Swedish UN battalion in the area prior to 1996, but during Operation Joint Endeavor, the squadron has been part of the Danish battalion.

LTC, ACoS G2

NORDPOLBDE Maneuver Warfare Initiatives Are Still at Risk CPT Bateman, in his article, “Force XXI and the Death of Auftragstaktik” (from Issues in ARMOR homepage), raises a very critical concern to the maneuver warfare community. We may soon lose the one thing that truly sets us apart from those on the attrition side of the table: independence of action by the subordinate commander. It would appear that the wealth of information available to the battalion and brigade commanders would allow them to make better, safer, more effective decisions and place the forces necessary to defeat the enemy where they are needed most without the input of the company commander. This, on the surface, is a great leap forward in tightening the OODA loop. However, if we are not institutionally careful, it may prove to become our Achilles’ heel.

The captain is correct in assuming that the dimension of independent leadership at the front line will atrophy, much like old-style land navigation skills have as the broad use of GPS has become more popular. We must be very careful to exercise the competence and self-esteem of the junior leadership so we do not lose this valuable resource.

We must not pooh-pooh the idea that battalion and brigade commanders will indeed leave their subordinates in the lurch and become directive micromanagers. I have seen by my own account that battalion and brigade commanders have little time, energy, or patience as it is to nurture and train junior leaders to thrive in a maneuver warfare environment, even before the advent of Force XXI technology. They just have little or no trust. Rare are the commanders today who give a mission, an intent, and allow their finely trained subordinate leaders to run with the ball. Force XXI will kill that notion outright. If we surrender the independence of action for subordinate leaders completely, and develop them into nothing more than so many robots waiting on the next program from the master operator, what will happen when General Murphy and the Gremlin brigade descend upon U. S. Force XXI elements in the next hot conflict? What will happen when the comlinks fail? What will happen when the enemy turns our high-speed technology into expensive junk via his REC assets? Where will the LT Rom-mels and CPT Pattons be? They will be sitting in their turrets with their ears pressed firmly to the radio awaiting the next commandment from a battalion commander whose plan went out the window when his 30-inch color LCD screen went belly up. Their entire OODA loop will be shot to hell and we will probably be handed our next Task Force Smith.

We must now, more than ever, strive as an institution and as individuals to develop junior leadership that will lead from the front, with or without orders. We must slap the wrists of the commanders who lapse into micromanagement in garrison and in the field. We must not only pay lip service anymore to maneuver warfare tenets and truly practice them. If we do not, the death of Auftragstaktik may prove to be our death.

Arkansas ARNG Correction A caption on page 15 of the January-February issue incorrectly identified the M60A3 tank as using the Shillelagh missile system. The M60A2 tank used this system, not the A3.

— Ed.

ARMOR — Cavalry Branch Update As a result of the recent revision and publication of FM 17-95, Cavalry Operations, Cavalry Branch, Directorate of Training and Doctrine Development, in coordination with 16th Cavalry Regiment will begin to revise the Mission Training Plans (MTPs) of cavalry units from troop through regimental level. We request your input in developing these important training manuals. The Armored Cavalry Troop and the Divisional Cavalry Squadron MTPs are under revision at this time and Cavalry Branch solicits your specific comments or suggestions for improving these manuals. The timeline for these and other Cavalry Branch publications is as follows: MANUAL

Armored Cavalry Troop MTP Nov 96 Feb 97 Jun 97 Dec 97 Mar 98 ARTEP 17-385-MTP

Divisional Cavalry Squadron MTP Jan 97 Apr 97 Sep 97 Mar 98 Jun 98 ARTEP 17-485-MTP

Armored Cavalry Squadron (Regt) MTP Mar 97 Jun 97 Nov 97 Jun 98 Aug 98 ARTEP 17-442-MTP

Armored Cavalry Regiment (CMD GRP) MTP Jul 97 Sep 97 Feb 98 Aug 98 Oct 98 FM 17-97 Armored Cavalry Troop Sep 97 Dec 97 Jun 98 Dec 98 Feb 99 Note: SD=Start Date, OL=Outline, ID=Initial Draft, AFD=Approved Final Draft, CRC=Camera Ready Copy The current MTPs and the initial drafts when published can be viewed by accessing the Cavalry Branch Home page on the Internet at http://www.entelechy-inc.com/docs/knoxdoc/cavdiv.htm. In addition, any comments can be e-mailed directly to Cavalry Branch by accessing this page or through the following e-mail address: CAVBRANC@Knox-emh1.army.mil. Additionally, Cavalry Branch recently sponsored the Cavalry Symposium 28-29 February 1996 and the Reconnaissance Symposium October 1996. Both of these symposiums were hosted by Ft. Knox and the resulting After Action Reviews are accessible at the Internet site listed above.

For further information concerning Cavalry Doctrine and Training Development, please contact Cavalry Branch at (502) 624-6235/3154 or DSN 464-6235/3154. World War Two Armoured Fighting Vehicles & Self-Propelled Artillery by George Forty, London: Osprey Books, 1996. ISBN: 1-85532-582-9. 208 pages, 230 black and white illustrations, 30 color illustrations. 8"x11" hardbound. $29.95.

This book by military historian and author George Forty is certain to please hobbyists, re-enactors, and students of World War II who are interested in a concise, generously-illustrated survey of WWII fighting vehicles. The book’s strength lies in its nearly 300 photographs, many of which are color presentations of vehicles that have been lovingly preserved in museums. To complement this visual collection, Colonel Forty, a specialist in armored warfare and ex-curator of the Tank Museum in Dorset, England, has written succinct, coherent text for this volume, one of three in a series covering WWII military vehicles. Forty discusses AFVs by country of origin, thus dividing the book into nine chapters that adequately cover both Allied and Axis powers. Unlike many books about military hardware, this one is unencumbered by technical jargon. Vehicle specifications are here, but collected in brief tables that do not interfere with the text. An index arranged by vehicle nomenclature easily guides readers interested in a specific vehicle to the proper page.

There is little here that is novel or new to the military historian. Yet beyond the expected collection of reconnaissance cars, self-propelled artillery, and tank destroyers, Forty includes unique vehicles such as Russian armored trains, complete with tank turrets from T-34 and KV-1 tanks; or the Bison, a rolling, concrete pillbox that saw (deservedly) limited service with British forces. Throughout, Forty’s narrative reminds readers of the diversity of military vehicles that saw wartime service.

Forty achieves here in breadth what he does not attempt to accomplish in depth. This is not the last word on WWII military vehicles, but neither is it intended to be. Rather, this book is an able survey that is greatly enhanced by the high quality of its photographs.

United States Military Academy West Point, N. Y.

They Were All Young Kids by Aaron

C. Elson, Chi Chi Press, Hackensack, N. J.

1996.

Softcover, 160 pages, $10.00.

Subtitled, “The story of Lieutenant Jim Flowers and the first platoon, Company C, 712th Tank Battalion, on Hill 122,” this book is a gripping account of one tank platoon’s actions on July 10, 1944, on the Cotentin Peninsula in Normandy, France. Lieutenant Flowers’ platoon, attached to the 3rd Battalion, 358th Infantry Regiment, 90th Infantry Division, was given the mission of rescuing the 1st Battalion, 359th Infantry, cut off on Hill 122. After attacking through the German lines and linking up with the battalion, 1st platoon breached the German lines again to allow the battalion to break out. All four of the platoon’s tanks were destroyed in an anti-armor ambush. Nine of the 20 crewmen were killed. This book is the story as told to the author by the survivors. This book should be in every tanker’s professional library, especially the new platoon leader’s.

Mr. Elson is a former newspaper editor and author of another book on the exploits of the 712th Tank Battalion, Tanks for the Memories. He has spent ten years compiling an oral history of the 712th, motivated by his father’s WWII service in the battalion. His father’s story is not part of this book, so there is no bias on the author’s part.

The book opens with a brief history of the 712th Tank Battalion. Part I is the author’s compilation of the story of the fight on Hill 122, based on the interviews with the survivors, which are often contradictory. This brief story is not well-organized and sometimes difficult to follow, especially without an accompanying map at a scale large enough to show the individual tanks (this map is hidden on page 154, in one of the interviews. Mark it; it will help immensely in visualizing the battle). Part II is the heart of the book: the transcripts of interviews with six of the survivors, as well as interviews with a tank commander who was wounded prior to the battle and not present, the brother of one the soldiers killed, the company motor sergeant, and one of the infantrymen rescued by the platoon. These interviews are gems of information, not only on the battle itself, but on the nature of men in combat, the history of the fledgling armored force, and of lessons learned at the lowest level of tactical combat. Part III contains additional transcripts of interviews with a wardmate of Lieutenant Flowers in England, the battalion surgeon who first treated Lieutenant Flowers, who lost parts of both legs, and the text of Lieutenant Flowers’ original account of the battle in support of his recommendation for the Congressional Medal of Honor. There are minor mistakes, such as the author defining “TOE” as Table of Operation. A photo which allegedly illustrates the story of how some soldiers ate under their tank under mortar fire is actually a photo of a T-34, and the unorganized first chapter don’t detract fatally from the survivors’ gripping stories. Books on armored warfare at the platoon level are difficult to find. This one is worth grabbing while you can. They Were All Young Kids is self-published and available for $10 plus $2.50 postage and handling from Mr. Elson at 1-800-807-8265.

Fort Knox, Ky.

Follow Me I: the Human Element in Leadership by MG Aubrey “Red” Newman, USA (Ret.), ISBN: 0-89141-612-9, Copyright 1981, Presidio Press. 1997 edition, $15.95, softcover. Follow Me II: More on the Human Element in Leadership by MG Aubrey “Red” Newman, USA (Ret.), ISBN: 0-89141-613-7, Copyright 1992, Presidio Press. 1997 edition, $15.95, softcover. Follow Me III: Lessons on the Art and Science of High Command by MG Aubrey “Red” Newman, USA (Ret.), ISBN: 0-89141-614-5, Copyright 1987, Presidio Press. 1997 edition. $15.95, softcover.

“Get the hell off the beach!... get up and get moving — Follow me!” commanded Colonel Aubrey “Red” Newman as he led the soldiers of the 34th Infantry Regiment across Leyte’s Red Beach on October 20, 1944. That moment in time, captured in the famous “Follow Me” statue, has stood for the past 53 years as the representation of the essence of leadership. This year, Presidio Press has reprinted Follow Me I, II, and III, three books previously written by BOOKS

Great Photos Enrich New Book on WWII Vehicles MG Newman which capture his thoughts on the art and science of leading soldiers

— thoughts based upon a career of nearly 40 years that included three company commands, three regimental commands, and division command. These books deserve a place in every leader’s professional library. When MG Newman entered West Point July 1st, 1921, Douglas MacArthur served as Superintendent of the Military Academy. The Army has changed during the last few years, and in many ways it is a very different Army than the one about which Newman writes. The impact of technological advances upon military affairs, downsizing and budget constraints, the advent of an all volunteer force, changes in organizational design, the conduct of peace operations, the expanding role of women in the Army, anew world order, shorter careers, fewer opportunities for command, unknown threats, and a host of other topics that occupy today’s professional journals and discussions would seem to render the advice of a leader who served long ago — just a bit after WWI, during WWII, and the Korean War to the early sixties — quite dated and of marginal utility. In fact, the opposite is true, for two reasons. First, the focus of these books is the unchanging nature of the human dimension in leadership. Soldiers remain soldiers. Second, Newman’s early military experience was, in many ways, quite like that of a lieutenant in 1997. He also served during cycles of buildup, drawdown, technological revolution, peace, war, and societal change. Each book in the “Follow Me” series is made up of short chapters that teach specific lessons regarding the human element in leadership and lessons about other facets in the life of a professional soldier. MG Newman, drawing on his personal experience, uses anecdotes, both humorous and serious, with great skill to prepare the reader for learning points which conclude each chapter. His writing style is clear and conversational, giving each book the coaching tone of a mentor, rather than that of a teacher presenting a lecture. Many of the observations in “Follow Me” will be familiar to military readers as they are collected from the hundreds of articles MG Newman published in Army Magazine, Infantry Journal and Armed Forces Journal over the years.

The three primary topics covered in Follow Me I are: command presence, command techniques, and command in battle. Follow Me II, also divided into three major sections, details: company level topics, principles for all levels of command, and reflections on combat situations. The final volume, Follow Me III is organized with a section covering company grade officers, a section about field grade officers, and a third discussing general officers. General Newman’s counsel regarding the nature of the military profession and the requirement to always regard duty, honor, and country as the motivating force of service remains valid today. He emphasizes the necessity for commanders to earn the trust and confidence of soldiers by personal ex-emplification of compassion, competence, and dedication to the core values of the profession of arms. He provides valuable insight regarding the skills required of an officer to achieve a successful career and the common pitfalls that a leader can avoid along the way. His discussion of preparation for command is excellent. Newman outlines his deliberate process of self-assessment and reflection on past experience and the duties at hand, which allowed him to determine, in advance, the goals, objectives and leadership style that would prepare him to assume command with absolute confidence.

Every new leader entering the profession of arms will benefit from Newman’s observations and can put his advice to good use throughout a lifetime of service. More experienced leaders will enjoy the series as well, and will find General Newman’s insight and steadfast focus on the human dimension of leadership on the mark. LTC CHIP WENTZ

Ft. Knox, Ky.

The Battles of the Somme by Martin Marix Evans, Motorbooks International Publishers, Osceola, Wis., 1996. 95 pages. $19.95 (hardcover). On July 1, 1916, elements of the British Expeditionary Force under the command of General Sir Douglas Haig went “over the top” and began the ground attack phase of the Battle of the Somme. By day’send, the estimated losses to the BEF totaled approximately 60,000, prompting Winston Churchill to subsequently refer to this action as “the greatest loss and slaughter sustained in a single day in the whole history of the British Army.” There is no question that there exists already a plethora of studies regarding military operations on the Western Front. One could rightfully ask why we should welcome yet another to the collection. I submit, however, that Martin Evans’ work is a welcome addition to the historiography for two reasons. First, by reviewing the actions of multiple units in several locations, he reminds us that the carnage was not limited to just the first day, but extended over a period of time and a series of battles. Secondly, and to my mind most importantly, his objective is not to present anew interpretation of already recognized and accepted data (his narrative lacks citations of any type and his bibliography is admittedly “a personal one,”) but rather the depiction of the human side of this battle to a level that I have not seen in previous studies. His inclusion of contemporary photographs, maps, and eyewitness accounts serves to remind the reader that each and every one of the thousands of casualties was a real human being, and the sense of humanity and reality that the author brings to his telling of this tragic story is the essence of the value of this work. In sum, Martin Evans has succeeded in that most difficult of historical endeavors: he has added to our understanding of a timeworn topic by telling the story of the Somme with a balance of statistical accuracy leavened with vivid photographs and poignant eyewitness accounts. This book will prove a valuable addition to the collection of beginning students of WWI as well as for those who find themselves in a position to lead discussions or teach on the topic of WWI operational maneuver stalemate on the Western Front. MAJ DAVID P. CAVALERI

Ft. Leavenworth, Kan.

Fight or Flight, An Inspiring History of Courage Under Fire – True Battlefield Accounts of Extraordinary Acts at the Moment of Truth by Geoffrey Regan, Avon Books, New York, N. Y. 1996, 277 pp. $12.50 (paperback).

Nearly all soldiers are afraid in battle. Only the good ones can control their fear. In Fight or Flight, Geoffrey Regan explains how this control, or lack of it, causes some men to fight and others to flee in combat. If this sounds interesting, this book is for you. The first section explains why soldiers fight when the consuming passion is to “lie in a ditch and stay there until it is all over.” This part is reminiscent of Marshall’s Men Against Fire and Keegan’s The Face of Battle in its earnest attempt to get at the core of why men fight or flee. Regan writes with great understanding of those soldiers “who could never get out of the ditch” and join their comrades in battle. A large portion is devoted to explaining why PVT Eddie Slovik and others failed when placed under fire. Either because of lack of discipline, training, or even individual personality flaws, these soldiers should never have been put in harm’sway. Seventeen historical vignettes of men in combat make up the book’s second section. This is where Fight or Flight is at its best. First-hand battlefield accounts from the lowest ranks are fascinating for their sincerity and horrific detail. Unfortunately, only about half of the vignettes include substantial personal observations from the soldiers involved, and the ones on the British Army appear more thoroughly researched than the rest. Still, each one offers a different lesson and reinforces the author’s earlier conclusions.

Fight or Flight is easy reading and offers many useful lessons – and warnings – to those interested in why soldiers choose to fight rather than flee.

Ft. Irwin, Calif.