Creating the OffIcer Corps of the Future to Execute Force XXI Blitzkrieg

Force XXI TRADOC Pamphlet 525-5 (known herein as 525-5) is the guidebook for the Army’s future doctrine. Its goal is to redefine the Army, creating a smaller, yet agile and powerful force. The centerpiece of Force XXI has been new technology, particularly the digital delivery of information, precision guided munitions, and surveillance equipment. Thus, as in our previous wars, technology appears to be the solution in countering our potential enemies’ tactical abilities and preparing us for the battlefields of tomorrow.4 The recent drawdown has brought out the worst in our cultural institution.5 The words “careerism,” “self-promotion, “ and “zero-defects” continually appear in professional journals and papers. There is an effort already underway to correct these deficiencies. The Chief of Staff of the Army, General Dennis J. Reimer, is attacking several of these ills, such as the zero-defects mentality and careerism.6 A task force, called the Officer Professional Management System (OPMS) XXI and led by Major General David Ohle, is currently examining future personnel policies.7 Cultural Revolution The Army’s ongoing attempts at change are a positive move toward creating a solid foundation from which to build the Force XXI army. However, we must ensure that we do not take old policies and simply place new names on them. This could spell disaster when we begin implementing Force XXI. The culture must place the development and importance of strong and honorable character as its number one priority. Those who possess strong characters are not afraid to make decisions and stand by them.8 AR 525-5 describes the characteristics of the officers the U. S. Army will need to execute future American “blitzkrieg.” It says we will need officers who possess the ability in “planning and executing independent operations within the commander’s intent — characterized by showing versatility and initiative, taking calculated risks, and exploiting opportunities.” 525-5 emphasizes a leader who “senses, learns, and responds with innovative tactics, techniques, and procedures.”9 We need officers of character who decide and act. A wide range of recent articles written by senior leaders describe a similar officer.10 They also point to a need to restructure our military culture to allow the above traits to flourish prior to the first unit executing an operation under Force XXI.

ARMOR — 25 Toward a New Institutional Culture Creating the Officer Corps of the Future to Execute Force XXI Blitzkrieg by Major Donald E. Vandergriff Over a century before the first blitzkrieg, the Prussian army developed an officer corps with characteristics strikingly similar to those in the previous paragraph.11 The Germans were able to execute blitzkrieg, with its rapid tempo and inherent complexity, not because it was taught in the classroom as a set of procedures, but because they possessed a military culture that created leaders able to understand and employ it.12 While the Army is defining its vision in well-meaning terms and acronyms, and experimenting with several new technological wonders, there is a missing aspect. What type of institutional culture is required to develop the officers to lead the Army of Force XXI? To create a suitable culture, we need to admit it’s time to change and assimilate new and different values. When the first storm troopers climbed over the trenches on the Western Front in World War I to execute “infiltration tactics,” and 21 years later, when combined arms units drove into Poland to initiate blitzkrieg, a strong institutional culture defined the way leaders made decisions. Key military concepts, such as Auftragstaktik (mission tactics) and Schwerpunkt (the focus of effort), were already in place and practiced by leaders at all levels (our translations are actually poor ones in regards to culture).13 If we are going to be as bold with our doctrine and technology as Force XXI will require, we need to take a calculated risk and create an institutional culture different from the one we have now. We cannot continue to write glowing documents advocating “agile” officers, yet subtly support peacetime practices that uphold bureaucratic qualities, rather than battlefield qualities, when officers come up for promotion.14 To dramatically raise the Army’s ability to win on the high tempo, chaotic battlefields of the future, we must:

• Reduce the Army’s bureaucracy by significantly reducing the officer corps at the middle and senior levels.

• Eliminate the up-or-out promotion system and replace it with a track or category system at the O-3 or O-4 level. In addition, we need to revise the evaluation system to involve an OER with a periodic exam.

• Channel officers at the captain and major level into distinct categories to promote their abilities, using multiple tracks that acknowledge their abilities and allow them to gain experience.

• Adopt a true combined arms regimental system.

• Do away with the all-or-nothing 20-year retirement.

The purpose of all of these reforms is to change the incentive system to reward strength of character, especially as manifested in a willingness to make decisions and take action, and penalize those who just get by and do nothing controversial.15 It does no good to call for promoting the risk-takers when the incentives all work the other way.16 The Evolution of Tactics and the Required Leaders Before addressing the specifics of the reforms required to build the officer corps of the future, we must consider the type of enemy we are likely to combat. Tomorrow’s world is likely to be as volatile as any in the history of mankind. Massive overpopulation will be the breeding ground of tomorrow’s conflicts. This underlying problem will be greatly exacerbated by the availability of weapons and “quick course” training programs on how to operate and employ these systems.17 Many enemies will be well armed with “strap-on” technologies, which have become the number one export of a number of countries.18 These unavoidable and unfavorable factors will be aggravated by the wide spectrum of ways in which opponents may conduct warfare. Operations in the future will not be easily divided into conventional conflicts, such as Iraq or Korea, or lower intensity operations such as Bosnia or Somalia. We must instead be prepared to fight an enemy capable of warfare beyond what we expect. We must look beyond their lack of technology.19 Linear tactics reflect the era of Napoleonic warfare, of column and line against the smoothbore musket and cannon. Fire and movement tactics were a reaction to the rifle, machine gun, and quick-firing artillery, relying on tactics of fire and movement and massed supporting fires. The tactics of fire and movement warfare remain largely linear, and are French in origin.20 Our Army currently practices fire and movement warfare, with its focus on tying in flanks and adhering to detailed graphics, with nearly every aspect of the operation centrally controlled in order to be “synchronized.”21 The revolution in warfare developed by the German Army during WWI was an idea-based reaction to the Allies’ technological and economic superiority. The Germans moved from fire and movement to infiltration techniques, but as mentioned earlier, tactical doctrine, techniques, and a professional officer corps were already in place for a half century. This allowed the Germans to adjust the way they waged war while in the middle of fighting one. Infiltration tactics were maneuver-oriented, rather than attrition-focused, and were truly non-linear. With the addition of the tank and the airplane, infiltration warfare became what we know as blitzkrieg. This concept was focused at great depths, and battlespace took on new meaning because time was more essential than space.22 The warfare of the future is a continuation of many elements of infiltration tactics, amplified by technology. It is possible that the Force XXI battlefield will encompass everything and be limited by nothing. Future opponents will use infiltration in combination with deep raids on once-safe havens, such as airfields and ports. Engagements, skirmishes, raids, and ambushes can and will occur simultaneously, erupting viciously, then quickly concluding. The purpose is to cave the enemy from within. It calls for a precise assessment of the enemy’s true intent, and rapid decisions employing the Boyd cycle, or OODA Loop (Orient, Observe, Decide and Act).23 This means an institutional culture that selects and places officers early on in their specialties, where they can make mistakes and learn from them. The institutional culture needed to create the right leaders is one which contains an air of autonomy in the atmosphere. The type of officers that will fight and win a future war must be experienced in assessing massive amounts of information without losing the focus of their particular operation. Gathering the essential information, these leaders must make rapid decisions with little or no oversight. The current bureaucratic culture, in the name of good management and perfection, diminishes and destroys these traits. Leaders of Force XXI units must be able to make rapid decisions to leverage high tempo. Winning in a future fight is about being a step ahead of the enemy.24 Slimming Down in the Right Places The first reform necessary to prepare the officer corps for Force XXI is to change the ratio of senior to junior officers. A gradual reduction of the officer corps at major and above, by around 50%, is necessary to reduce bureaucratization and centralization. Thus, existing officers would gain more experience in their duties, and could take more time to learn the art of war.25 The current “up or out” system of promotion, and the idea of a large officer corps, has evolved from historical experience with the problem of maintaining a force ready in peacetime to respond adequately to the unique demands of war.26 This system rests on two principles. First, if the system works properly, there will always be more officers qualified for promotion than there are vacancies available, permitting selectivity, the selection of the “best qualified.” Secondly, the theory holds that exposure to numerous jobs applies in a meaningful way to senior leadership positions.27 OPMS was fine when we thought we would fight World War III against the Soviet Union and its allies. The command of organizations focused on tying responsibility to numbers of personnel (the reason we continue to keep outdated organizations such as the division). The future Army will relate responsibility and experience to the ability and functions of the future unit on the battlefield. The 21st century company/team size unit will possess as much firepower and mobility as the battalion/task forces of yesteryear. Thus, future officers will need far more experience at a lower rank than they do now if they are going to effectively employ these future organizations. Responsibility aligns not with numbers, but with combat power. The seasoning of experience cannot develop if there is along line of officers waiting to get “qualified” at the few jobs necessary for retention and promotion.28 Reducing the size of the officer corps would vastly extend an officer’s time as a platoon leader, company and battalion commander, or primary staff officer.29 Today, the combat arms officer may have as little as 54 months of troop time upon taking a battalion command during his 15th year. This may include only 12 to 18 months of total platoon leader time (if he gets a specialty platoon) and the same amount of company command time (unless he gets a Headquarters Company (HHC) which gives him 24 months), plus a year as a battalion executive officer or operations officer. This equates to 24 to 36 months of time in a position of authority and experience at decision-making.

In past environments, such as the one Saddam Hussein offered us, we were allowed months to deploy, train, and rehearse our actions up to the division level in a relatively secure area. This made acceptable the World War II and Vietnam war “assembly line” policy generated by the OPMS emphasis of “fairness” and the goal of producing as many “branch qualified” officers as possible. But the only way the new culture can achieve a decision as quickly as possible is through more specialized and experienced officers.30 Therefore, the new culture’s personnel system calls for increased time in key positions. Leader and primary staff positions should be three- to five-year assignments. This would allow officers time to learn their positions instead of filling up a resume. Additionally, lower turnover will reduce the current negative impact on units at all levels. We must reverse the trend of units returning from important, yet rare maneuver training events and immediately turning over officers in key positions.31 Another disadvantage of our current policies is the inability of commanders to build effective teams. 32 A battalion commander today, with two years in his position, will see, at the most, thirteen different company commanders (given that two of the commanders he knows take HHCs), and at the least, nine new company commanders (if all commanders change in the beginning and half way through his command tour, and one of these commanders he is already comfortable with, takes HHC).33 This, too, can only change if command tours are lengthened. Since we will ask even more of our platoon leaders in Force XXI, we must give them more experience in one position; yet, the current management of these key leaders is even more turbulent. It is driven by the current policy of giving them a brief exposure to several positions so they become “well-rounded,” or by the need to be “fair.”34 Under the current personnel system, driven by a multitude of laws (DOPMA) focused on programs outside line units, it is more important to get officers into nominative assignments than maintain cohesion in combat units. If the current trend continues, tomorrow’s leaders/commanders will find themselves with little experience employing our emerging technologies and doctrine. Imagine what will happen when officers are ordered to conduct the independent missions called for by 525-5, equipped with the latest in lethal weapons systems loaded with live ammunition. This scenario spells disaster at the hands of an experienced enemy. Eliminate Up-or-Out To be successful in combat under Force XXI, the officer will have to possess several qualities that only a changed institutional culture can create. The peacetime environment must champion leaders who “rapidly grasp changes in situations and conditions,” and “exercise initiative by independently planning.”35 The current up-or-out promotion system minimizes the probability that officers will have the time to develop these abilities. An officer currently spends his career on a “treadmill.”36 It also develops promotion anxiety in officers, forcing them to become competitive against their peers.

The up-or-out system also fosters the Peter Principle, where individuals tend to get promoted to their level of incompetence. Officers then get stuck in jobs because there is no possible way to advance. That job will undoubtedly be unfulfilling. Unfortunately, the Army does not generally take steps to move personnel back to a level where they can function effectively. Where the Army runs into problems is when it uses promotion to reward performance and minimize potential. These two concepts, performance or competence and potential for leadership, need to be separated somehow in the promotion 28 ARMOR — The current up-or-out promotion system minimizes the probability that officers will have the time to develop these abilities. An officer currently spends his career on a “treadmill.” system. The Army has already conducted several studies of our officer corps regarding the “up-or-out” promotion system, and has found that this system has contributed significantly to much of the undesirable and unethical conduct of its officers.37 The Leader of Force XXI Another problem is that the type of officer suited to Force XXI leadership has many qualities that cause uneasiness among superiors. A leader with strong character and imagination will always focus his unit on training for war and not waste time in the diversions called for by the up-or-out system.38 Thus, the very officer Force XXI is calling for usually gets out early. In 1991, the Air Force conducted a study of personalities (using the Myers Briggs Type Indicator — MBTI) and how they changed in relationship to rank. Air Force Academy cadets had a wide variety of personality types, but when an analysis of personalities was conducted of Army O-5s and Air Force O-5s, it showed very similar personality groupings — there was no statistically significant difference. When the O-5s were compared to the cadets, there was significant difference (using the Chi-Square statistic Chi-Square = 59.57 at the p=.05 level). When a group of 161 Army generals was studied, compared to the Army and Air Force O-5s, there was no statistical difference. When the group of O-7s was compared to Air Force cadets, there was statistically significant difference (Chi-Square=73.04 at the p=.05 level). Some 56% of the O-7s were of two personality types — ISTJ and ESTJ! These types have a preference for stability and avoiding organizational conflict. In other words, they tend to be bureaucrats, with a “don’t-rock-the-boat attitude.”

Psychologist Otto Kroger has been holding seminars on the Myers-Briggs at the National Defense University since 1979. Kroger states that. if his students switched uniforms for business suits, it would be impossible to distinguish them from the corporate executives he also tests. Somewhere between the O-3 and O-5 levels, it is postulated that there is a significant shift toward these preferences; some are either weeded out by the up-or-out system or they get out because they do not want to conform to the bureaucratic mindset of “playing the game.”39 This is the very reason to rid the Army of the up-or-out system, which drives officers to transform, a result particularly troubling if we are to have the type of military required to execute Force XXI warfare. We invariably lose far too many of our warrior-leaders and innovators, which will lead to disaster as the first units move to combat, rather than providing stability in peacetime.

Responsibility of Getting Promoted Under a revised system, if an officer wants to be promoted, he will ask for it.40 Officers who did not want to be promoted would not automatically be obligated to leave the service. Rather, the Army would test and evaluate their performance yearly, ensuring they continue to gain proficiency at their current work.

Additionally, all commanders would have to participate in objective force-on-force evaluations. Staff officers would be given timed exams in which they would have to solve tactical, operational, or logistical problems. After their third to fifth year in command or primary staff position, officers would rotate to instructor assignments. They could have the option of returning to command or staff positions as long as Proposed Officer Tracking Plan they pass yearly comprehensive boards and tests.41 Under this system, the Army would be able to spend substantial time on the development, assessment, and evaluation of its officers, instead of the “minute-and-a-half” look-over that officers currently receive on promotion and selection boards, or the search by officer personal managers for one “discriminator” when deciding on assignments.42 An officer’s entire file would be weighted objectively, versus looking at “mere stacks of perfect performance ratings.” At the same time, due to the three-tier evaluation and testing system, the Army could be far more objective in its personnel decisions. Highlighting an Officer’s Abilities Currently, an officer’s career exposes him to several aspects of the Army. He moves from leader positions to staff positions, and then back again, with intervals in management, as an aide-de-camp, or as an instructor.43 Only officers in medicine and law are allowed to “ single track,” and since law and medicine generally do not demand the ultimate sacrifice of death, they are professions of a different order. As noted earlier, the Army inefficiently places talented officers in a multitude of jobs for brief periods with little time to apply whatever level of expertise they achieve at each position. The first serious test of an officer’s ability to pass on to the next rank in the up-or-out system is company command. Talented staff officers may be cast aside by this process because of an inability to command. Likewise, great commanders are forced to serve in roles that require staff skills. Many succeed in both areas, but this may be due more to the very inflated nature of the evaluation system than to their mastery of the art of war.44 The new personnel system would divide officers into a multitude of categories after their initial 3-5 years in their respective branches. These specialties would highlight an officer’s strength as a commander, a staff officer, a teacher, a technician, etc.

The immediate response under current cultural thought will be, “but everyone will want to be in the operational track.” The new culture will stress each category’s importance, by redefining success within that respective track. An officer would serve his initial three to five years as a platoon leader, and then as a senior lieutenant/junior captain, doing three years with a battalion or brigade staff or a nominative assignment. During his fifth to seventh year of service, he would request a track in one of the above specialties, and he would be placed in a specialty by aboard. The board would examine his efficiency reports, the result of “stiff examinations,” which include the results of a Myers-Briggs Type Indicator or other personality test.45 Again, the responsibility would rest with the officer himself in choosing which path to take, assisted by tools which accent his strengths and disclose his weaknesses early.

The first category, the operational track, would be with most troop assignments (it includes more than just combat arms). After selection to the operations track, an officer will attend a tactical course which focuses on decision-making and how to think about tactics. It will consist of a general course for all commanders and branch courses for their specialized fields. His success at this initial command would be based on objective, free play, force-on-force tests, or, for combat support and combat service support companies, several objective-based missions accomplished in force-on-force environments. The officer would then move on, as an instructor or perhaps a reserve advisor, then seek another company and serve out his time as a captain with pro-rated pay.

He may opt for promotion to major. As a major, he will serve as either a commander of a larger company, such as a headquarters company, or advance to an operations officer or executive officer position of a task force. Promotions and remaining in the operations track, will largely depend on performance in free play force-on-force evaluations or comprehensive exams.46 Officers scoring well on exams and noted by superiors as possessing the necessary traits, may seek advancement to the Army and National Staff after their initial tours at battalion and brigade level staff positions as personnel, operations, and logistical officers.

These officers will become operational and logistical experts. The Army and National Staff will consist of only a small percentage of the officer corps. They will occupy plans and operations cells at the division level and higher, or serve as chiefs of staff at division and higher. These officers ensure adept performance in all types of operations.

Admission to the Army and National Staff will require recommendations, rigorous testing on the operational art of war, and foreign language skills. After three years of graduate study in the art of war, these officers will then rotate back and forth from divisions, corps, and theater level commands to the Army or Joint Staff.47 Other categories relate to the inherent technical abilities associated with the technologies employed by Force XXI units and the management of the supporting base Army. In addition to the medical and legal branches, the field includes positions which require graduate-level, civilian-related education, or technical training in such areas as acquisition, academic instruction, operations research, finance, computer programming, communications, and facilities management.

Officers in this category would remain captains — again, with pro-rated pay — but would have to demonstrate their proficiency with periodic examinations, combined with reviews of their efficiency reports. Promotions to higher rank would follow the same guidelines as other specialties: the officers would ask to get promoted into vacated or available positions. Majors would serve as the technical experts at division level, while the appropriate higher ranks would correspond with higher headquarters and responsibilities. Cohesive Units — The True Regimental System Adoption of a Combined Arms Regimental System will promote unit cohesion, which will become a must when executing Force XXI blitzkrieg. The intense tempo of operations executed by Force XXI units will necessitate a remarkable level of teamwork. Unit cohesion will be of vital significance. The present personnel policies, with their emphasis on short-term rotation be-30 ARMOR — As noted earlier, the Army inefficiently places talented officers in a multitude of jobs for brief periods with little time to apply whatever level of expertise they achieve at that position. tween jobs, were first adopted under General Maxwell Taylor, strengthened by Secretary of Defense McNamara, and finalized in the OPMS studies of the ’70s. They make the conduct of Force XXI warfare impossible. Constant job rotation prevents the teamwork necessary to execute Force XXI warfare, and is the principal reason the Army has remained with attrition/firepower-based fire and maneuver tactics.48 Shape the Environment Around COHORT To organize and build cohesive combat units, our Army will have to institutionalize a program in conjunction with the new personnel policies. The program will be similar to the original version of the Cohesion, Operations, Readiness, and Training (COHORT) program and the British Regimental system. Each unit, at task force level, will be stabilized so it is together for three to five years without an influx of new personnel. Soldiers who leave the unit for various reasons will not be replaced. This stability must include officers; it is important that unit leaders remain with the units with which they have formed cohesive bonds. An officer or NCO who is promoted will keep his position, serving in it at his new grade. Staffs of these units will also be stabilized. More emphasis will be placed on unit-level staffs. Soldiers in task forces must come to know and trust their staffs, just as they do their commanders. The first consideration in assignment policy will be cohesion and the personnel stability that cohesion requires.49 The COHORT cycle will determine a unit’s deployment pattern and its readiness. Units early in their cycle will be exempted from major deployments and exercises. Units that are in the latter stages of their cycle will be considered at the highest state of readiness and will deploy to fulfill operational requirements. Only units with cohesion, quality, esprit, and high morale can remain effective in future warfare, especially as called for by the writers of 525-5.50 All or Nothing The last element in forming a strong foundation for the building of Force XXI is to change the retirement system. The current system, with its focus on all or nothing at 20 years, undercuts moral courage in those with 12 to 20 years of service. Moral courage requires daily practice. Instead of the 20-year all-or-nothing concept, we should adopt a retirement system which allows an officer to retire at 10 years with benefits beginning at age 55. The policy of vest-in-10, with benefits at 55, would allow officers to focus entirely on warfighting skills. They could retire anytime after 10 years as long as they remained competent in their fields. Retirement pay would increase for each year the officer remains after ten.

There are several reasons to change the Army’s retirement system. The first is cost. Retirement allotments paid to retired officers in 1995 totaled 5.1 billion dollars.51 The second reason is that, with almost one fourth of officers retiring in their late thirties to early forties, the Army loses a lot of experienced talent. This will have an impact on units in Force XXI, which can only be led by seasoned officers. Officers naturally use their last years to prepare for a second career. Instead, officers could be continually concentrating on and studying war as it continues to evolve.52 Conclusion: People Make the Difference Effectiveness for the Army is not an option — it is imperative. The officer corps of the future needs to execute the type of tempo Force XXI writers envision. Many officers and civilian leaders believe technology makes the difference, but it is the people that make the difference, especially when there is effective leadership. The personnel system is the linchpin that will directly affect combat effectiveness, doctrine, and a host of other critical issues pertaining to the Army of the future. The culture must adjust its course before the Army can execute the high tempo and rapid changing warfare of the future.