The Fort Knox Navy

The Fort Knox Navy by Captain Matthew D. Morton The Fort Knox “LST Building,” at left, was built to test methods of ventilating the ships that would carry tanks and trucks ashore in the Sicily invasion.

The model below, from the Patton Museum collection, is an LST, the ship on which the building was based.

46 ARMOR — March-April 1996 Captain Matthew D. Morton is a 1991 graduate of the U.S. Military Academy. He has served as a tank platoon leader with 2/11 ACR; BMO, 3-5 Cav (Mech); and as a rifle company XO. sign. A major drawback is the traverse limitations caused by the placement of the main armament. AFAS must have 360-degree (6400 mil) traversing capabilities in order to be able to support the maneuver commander on a fluid battlefield of the future. The M1 AFAS’s 30-degree (531 mil) azimuth limitation would make it less versatile than the current Paladin. This limitation seems to be caused by the basic design of the M1 chassis, which more than likely can’t be overcome.

Ammunition resupply of the M1 AFAS by a similarly designed FARV would be difficult. Any resupply operations would be hindered by uneven or non-uniform terrain. Both AFAS and FARV would have to have a highly developed hydropneumatic suspension system similar to that found on the Bofors S-Tank. The suspension system would have to be capable of adjusting not just elevation/depression, but also adjusting vehicle cant. Once again, the amount of flexibility in the design requirements seems to exceed the M1 chassis modification parameters.

The article raised my interest in aspects of the design which were not described in any detail. Reading about the “integral ration microwave heater” is fine, but I would have liked to read more about the weapon’s fire control system. No mention was made of what the weapon’s self-location capability would be. I assume it would be equivalent to that of the Paladin, but it should be even more developed (utilizing GPS).

In the final analysis, I feel the M1 chassis AFAS has more limitations than it does advanced capabilities. I welcome the authors’ interest in this vital weapons program, but I also feel that the plan they have put forward does not fit the bill. Some of their ideas have merit and could possibly be incorporated in AFAS design. However, I feel we can get a better overall system by continuing research into new technology. As the main customers of the fire support system, infantry and armor commanders should demand more versatility in this cannon system of the future. ROBERT W. NEGRO

CPT, Infantry NCARNG

M1-based Howitzer Makes Sense Dear Sir: Comments on the cover story and kudos to your staff artist, Mr. Jody Harmon, on his excellent work. As a Redleg, I have more than a passing interest on any new howitzer system and have worried over the speed limitations of both the Paladin and Crusader systems for some time. The innovative design shown using an M1 chassis and the MACS solid propellant for the howitzer make a great deal of sense. The material-handling equipment suggested would improve high-tempo operations greatly. The consolidated crew compartments in both vehicles are logical extentions of the MLRS cab design. I’d personally add a 40mm Mk-19 grenade launcher and 7.62mm minigun (perhaps an upside-down AH-1 Cobra chin turret) on the commander’s station and a large-caliber chain gun at the second position. I’d also consider placing half the six notional antiair missiles on the left side of the turret well to allow more tranverse capability (80o off center line on either side) and to allow more flexibility in fire support. I’d also consider using a lightweight panel system to provide a stand-off portable overhead and side cover for the vehicles, something that would detonate shaped charges before contact with actual vehicle armor.

The RCLR article was excellent. If you mate the 106mm RCLR with a laser rangefinder and SACUMS, the maximum effective range can be greatly extended. 1100m is the burn-out of the .50 cal spotter rifle tracer round; maximum range of the 106mm RCLR is 7700m. Since HEP and HESH rounds are not velocity-dependent for terminal effect, any items that can extend effective range are welcome. If beehive has a time fuze mode, indirect and/or long range attack becomes more effective against light infantry and thin-skin vehicles. A hard-shell HMMWV might mount 2, 3, or 4 RCLRs (an ONTOStita?) for rapid fire on multiple targets. I’d consider converting half the vehicles in the antiarmor company to RCLR; 2 out of 20 doesn’t sound like near enough to me, considering likely foes and roles for light forces in future conflicts. If you figure that one TOW costs the same as a gun mount kit, we get more bang for the buck from RCLRs. Mr. Sparks’ comment on the lack of sea-based gunfire support is another subject I’ve worried about for years, and yes, I do have a solution. With the apparent, final demise of the AGS, the need for the 82d and 2d ACR to have some mobile firepower is past critical. I suggest the LAV with a 105mm soft recoil cannon, already developed and tested, or even using the ARES 75mm dual-purpose auto-cannon. The LAV is also amphibious, which is another pet peeve of mine, but more on that later.

LARRY A. ALTERSITZ

LTC, FA, USAR

Cdr, Det E (Marksmanship) 1182d Reinforcement Training Unit, USAR Don’t Dismiss External Guns Dear Sir: I found Don Loughlin’s article on the External Gun Turret to be incredibly naive. This sort of logic also opposed the machine gun and the airplane.

Contrary to Mr. Loughlin’s claim, the external gun has not been extensively tested. Such tests as have been conducted to date indicate that external gun arrangements can provide a major gain in survivability at a weight reduction that greatly enhances deployment. Such arrangements also appear to be less expensive than the usual, ordinary full-turret schemes. To dismiss those gains because of imagined vision problems and fanciful mechanical difficulties is cavalier in the extreme. What motive might prompt an attack, such as Mr. Loughlin’s, on any probable solution to cost, weight, and deployment challenges is difficult to understand. JEFFREY A. BOUCHER

U.S. Army, (Ret.)

External Guns Have Real Benefits Dear Sir: It was with great dismay that I read Mr. Loughlin’s article on external gun turrets. I have never read such a collection of misinformation, disinformation, sour grapes, and downright drivel. The author would have us believe that external gun turrets have been extensively tested and rejected, and this is simply not true. It is quite obvious that he has no experience in a real external gun low profile turret (not a remote gun as in the Tank Test Bed). This would explain why each one of his numbered points are not true and have no validity in fact. The one truth is that every new weapon design or concept has had a host of “authorities” who have condemned the new as bad and pointed the way straight to the status quo that gives us the feeling of security while we stagnate.

Warships should be of wood, not iron; sails, not steam; the soldier cannot safely handle a self-loading pistol; magazine-fed repeating rifles will cause the troops to waste ammunition; biplanes are superior to monoplanes; I won’t be able to see out of an enclosed cockpit; the guns should be in front of the pilot so he can clear any jams; the M1 will never replace the ’03 Springfield; submarines are unfair weapons only useful in coastal waters; tanks are expensive, unreliable, awkward white elephants; and the aircraft carrier will never replace the battleship! Do these sound familiar? They should, if you have studied military history to any extent.

To dismiss the external gun, low profile turret prior to the extensive testing/field evaluation that the author erroneously implies has already been conducted is to bury our heads in the sand and add ourselves to that sad list described above. The low profile turret concept provides a number of very real survival, mobility, and lethality LETTERS (Continued from Page 3) benefits, and almost none of the drawbacks attributed to it by the author. I had the pleasure to serve as the Marine Liaison Officer on the Armored Family of Vehicles Task Force under MG Robert Sunell, an officer that many considered to be the top expert on armor in the Army. General Sunell endorsed the external gun, low profile turret concept, and it did become one of the designs examined as part of the follow-on ASM program. Far from invalidating the concept, it was a recognition of the many advantages to be gained by adopting it. However, I am sure that the author knows much more about this subject than all of those experienced senior officers who examined the competing concepts presented to the AFV Task Force.

The search for increasing levels of protection while reducing vehicle weight will not be solved by some new wonder armor (unobtainium) that weighs less and keeps out more. The solution will come from innovative design concepts like the low profile turret, autoloaders, composites, hydropneumatic suspensions, electric drive, height control, modular armor, low observables, electric guns, and other upcoming technologies that will allow the designer to strike a workable compromise in the vehicle design. We must examine all of them but not from the viewpoint of “that’s the way we always did it,” for that is the least supportable answer. With that thinking, the Wright brothers would be little-known bicycle repairmen. Let’s not listen to the voice of the reactionary; let’s look to the future, even if it is unfamiliar and uncertain. Our forefathers did, and developed the weapons we have today, and we owe the future soldiers and Marines the same consideration.

R.G. DUVALL

MAJ, USMC (Ret.)

Digitization Could Exclude Allies Dear Sir: I’m coming up on the Net responding to ARMOR’s call for SITREPs from the force. I have been tracking the progress of Force XXI through the numerous articles in our professional journals and concept papers, such as TRADOC Pam 525-5, Force XXI Operations. It is difficult not to use the cliché of “working in dynamic and exciting times,” but certainly there have been few times in history when an Army has had the opportunity to conduct the intellectual staff rides the U.S. Army is doing. As an exchange student in a foreign staff college, I have had a unique opportunity to interact with many officers, representing military forces from around the world. Many of their armies are also looking inward as the decade ends. The end of the century seems analogous to a danger area, a symbolic fold in the ground, in which units have conducted a short halt to assess the situation, take stock, and attempt to scan as far forward as their sensors will let them, before launching out into unknown territory. Maybe “halt” is not the best term. We know that we can never truly halt on this battlefield.

I can report that there is a great admiration of our Army’s boldness of embracing the Information Age technology. There is no doubt that as we enter the 21st century, we will continue to be the premier land force. Our friends recognize this, but I would like to share some observations of their concerns.

Our doctrine recognizes that future operations will, more often than not, be pursued by some form of coalition. (Most OOTW missions almost guarantee that we will operate with foreign armies). We have always recognized the challenges of combined operations, and I have gained invaluable insight into their planning, especially after Operation Desert Storm. However, new challenges are emerging. Herein lies one of the great concerns. Allied armies currently do not have the resources to pursue Information Age technology, specifically digitization, to the extent that the U.S. Army is doing. Coordination between Allied units, even in the days of compatible communication systems, was always a tough nut to crack. What will happen when units cannot share the kind of battlefield information that digitization can provide? Perhaps an Allied unit only a few kilometers away, cannot share a critical SPOTREP in a timely manner. As any potential OPFOR develops courses of action, he will certainly target the physical boundary between U.S. and Coalition forces. Boundaries have always been vulnerable areas, but due to this incompatibility of battle command systems, they seem to be even more assailable, both physically and intellectually. Simply put, there is a concern that Allied forces could find themselves literally “out of the loop.”

One doctrinal answer to this challenge lies in the use of liaison officers. In my observation, we seem to overlook this critical mission in peace-time training. Honestly, most units can ill afford to put their most experienced officers in these positions. Perhaps, during operations, they can’t afford not to. Interestingly, many World War II veterans recall that, often, only the most combat-seasoned officers were LNOs. LNOs who knew their jobs permitted great flexibility in fast-paced operations. I can only offer that we need to emphasize the importance of LNOs in combined operations. We must take a hard look at the MTOE. Perhaps one LNO, a HMMWV, and SINCGARS radio is not sufficient. The Force XXI LNO Team will require a C2 hardware package that ties in with current battle command systems. This package could include a number of appliques or re-motes that an Allied CP could use on a mission-by-mission basis. There is a tough mission ahead. It will be a truly major effort just tying in the battle command systems of our sister services, let alone our Allies. However, we must recognize that coalition forces can and will operate on our flanks, front, or rear. We can assume that in the near future, they will not have the resources to field significant numbers of digital systems and thus, they cannot fully share in our technological advantage. Although we may be familiar with their doctrine and procedures, disparity of battle command systems will pose a significant challenge to the Force XXI commander.

BART HOWARD

MAJ, Armor U.S. Exchange Student Australian Army Command and Staff College MG Grow Misidentified in Photo Dear Sir: I read with great interest “The End of the Ride” by Dr. Denver Fugate in the November-December 1995 issue. As one who rode with GEN Patton and MG Robert Grow, I wonder if the photo (top) on page 11 is accurate.

I knew GEN Patton and MG Grow from 1939 on. I consider them the two greatest soldiers of WWII. I served under GEN Patton in Europe when our division was part of Third Army. I served under MG Grow from 5 May 1942 on.

I do not believe the brigadier general shown in the photo is really Bob Grow. He does not look like the Bob Grow I knew. Besides, he was promoted to major general in June 1943 and served in that grade until his retirement. If it is General Grow, he was wearing someone else’s helmet. JOHN J. FLYNT, JR.

COL, USA, (Ret.)

6th Armored Division

- Colonel Flynt is correct. Our archived photo had a label identifying the general officers as Patton and Grow. While the helmet on the man standing next to Patton appears to have only one star, the original photo indicates two, although some glare does obscure one of the stars. However, the man holding the trophy fowl is MG Ernest Harmon. We apologize and have rela-beled the photo.

- Ed. The Devil’s Adjutant: Jochen Peiper, Panzer Leader by Michael Reynolds, Sarpedon Publishers, New York, 1995. 320 pages. $27.50. Decisive, ruthless, and fanatical, Colonel Jochen Peiper was the consummate panzer leader of the German Army in World War II. In the forests of the Ardennes in 1944, Peiper reached the high-water mark of his remarkable career as he led the spearhead of the German armored attack in the Battle of the Bulge. His tactical accomplishments are still studied by tankers today, but his other battlefield actions earned him a death sentence at the 1946 war crimes trials at Dachau. Michael Reynolds’ new book, The Devil’s Adjutant, is a journeyman effort to portray Peiper as a dedicated soldier and a hapless victim. Reynolds is a retired British general officer, a reputed expert on the Battle of the Bulge, and an able writer. He has put together a well-crafted and detailed story, backed by excellent photographs, maps, American and German orders of battle, and other addenda.

Most of the book focuses on Peiper and his powerful kampfgruppe in December 1944, but it is actually his earlier years that are more interesting. Peiper quit high school in 1933 to join the “Liebstandarte Adolf Hitler,” the regiment known as Hitler’s bodyguard. Later in the war, the LAH became a full division, the 1st SS Panzer Division. Peiper quickly rose through the ranks to become an officer, serving as Heinrich Himmler’s adjutant during the Polish campaign. His service with the infamous Himmler earned Peiper the label of “The Devil’s Adjutant.” With the LAH, Peiper fought in Holland, France, and Russia, distinguishing himself as an outstanding combat leader.

By 1943, the LAH had earned a well-deserved reputation for battlefield proficiency and courage, as well as a vicious reputation for brutal excess and atrocity. Peiper was groomed in this environment. Unfortunately, Reynolds does not spend much time with Peiper during these years, instead devoting his efforts to Peiper’s involvement in the Ardennes. In December 1944, Colonel Peiper commanded Kampfgruppe Peiper, the division’s strongest regimental task force. Peiper’s task was to lead the 6th Panzer Army’s breakthrough attack through the Ardennes to the Meuse River. Here, the author reveals the strength of his research as he painstakingly details every aspect of Peiper’s attack, as well as the frantic American countermeasures. The German attack was a complete surprise, and it initially gained momentum as it smashed weak, unprepared American units. Reynolds provides expert analysis of German and American forces’ strengths and weaknesses, plans, equipment, intelligence, terrain and weather, as well as leadership and morale factors. Hour by hour, jumping from place to place on the battlefield, Reynolds moves the reader as the German attack slows and “friction and the fog of war” assume more dominance over the Germans and Americans. Peiper reacts as expected — decisive, resourceful, and imaginative, always focused on his objectives — despite bad weather, unfavorable terrain, missed opportunities, and an extra helping of bad luck. Peiper ’s leadership pushes his kampfgruppe of tanks, armored infantry, pioneers, and artillery over 100 kilometers in 72 hours, deep behind American lines. It is during this push that Peiper’s name would be indelibly linked to the horror of war, for it was Peiper’s panzergrenadiers who executed unarmed American POWs at “the Malmedy Massacre.” Peiper would ultimately be tried and sentenced to death for this atrocity.

Peiper survived the war, the trial, and prison, retiring to rural France and trying to live in obscurity. His remaining years are filled with controversy, highlighted by the violent and mysterious circumstances of his death in 1976.

This book is a well-researched account of one of World War II’s most interesting combat leaders. Sadly, it is also a vehicle for the author to wearily debunk hundreds of previously accepted details and facts regarding the Battle of the Bulge. The constant correction of other authoritative sources is distracting and tiresome. The author’s bias regarding Peiper’s treatment by the Allies after the war is also an ill-disguised (and unconvincing) attempt to portray Peiper as an unwitting victim of war’s cruelty and injustice. Despite these flaws, however, this is a fascinating story of inspired courage, battlefield flexibility, and combat leadership.

WILLIAM D. BUSHNELL

COL (Ret.), USMC Harpswell, Maine Ticket to Hell by R. Frank Harwood, Southern International Research Press, P.O. Box 1323, Oxford, Miss. 38655, 162 pages. $21.00.

On the surface, this book seemed to offer a good story: a biography of a hotdog P-47 pilot who grew up in the rural South, went to flight school, flew close air support for Patton’s Third Army, and was shot down during an attack on the Mannheim railroad yards during the Battle of the Bulge. He was a prisoner of war from December 1944 until liberation in April 1945. Unfortunately, that about covers it. The book, which could have told a great deal about each of these aspects of L. Thomas Easterling’s life, is amateurishly written and lacks any sort of depth. By the time the reader develops an interest in one phase (his trials as an underclassman in flight school, his aerial gunnery training, his experiences flying close air support in built-up areas of Eastern France and Western Germany), the author moves on to something else. The result is an unsatisfied hunger for more of what was just covered but is now a memory.

To make matters worse, the author includes “romantic” interludes (presumably based on fact) intended to spice up the tale. These do not add to the story. Instead, they tend to distract while contributing to the amateurish impression of the rest of the work.

However, after completing this book and thinking about it, I was struck by an image of my father and his generation that served in World War II. This image grew with reflection, and is the book’s one redeeming strength. It gives a very strong impression of the simpler, more straightforward life and times of the people who fought in that war. More specifically, it shows the background of a “typical” man who could come from a rural, one-horse town, barely finish high school, and become a pilot in one of the toughest aircraft of the war. He did not have a lot of technical training, but did have a lot of experience driving cars, being self-reliant, and having suffered hardships through the Depression. Consequently, when Easterling breaks both legs bailing out of his aircraft over the rail yards in Mannheim and suffers through six months of captivity with no medical attention, we know how he manages to maintain the will to survive. More importantly, we know something of what is necessary to develop soldiers of character who could survive similar trials in the future. Consequently, the book would be a good one to take on a long airplane flight: not too much meat, not too long to read, but an interesting picture of another generation’s world and how it prepared them for war.

FRAME J. BOWERS III

LTC, Aviation IMA, SARD-Aviation, Pentagon Savage Peace: Americans at War in the 1990s by Daniel Bolger, Presidio Press, Novato, Calif., 1995. 420 pages. $27.95.

As American military forces deploy to the former Yugoslavia, Daniel Bolger’s Savage Peace offers some timely and pertinent conclusions about Operations Other Than War (OOTW) that leaders from lieutenant to lieutenant colonel should wrestle with. Bolger’s message here is especially pertinent for the tank/heavy infantry community: BOOKS he concludes they have a real and necessary part in operations that have been mis-leadingly labeled as something other than war. After an introductory chapter describing how small unit leaders along the DMZ in Korea confront situations fraught with peril, even in time of “peace,” the author takes a quick look at the New World Order and the United States military’s training to confront the new challenges. Case studies illustrating success in OOTW include PROVIDE COMFORT in Northern Iraq, and the initial U.S. actions in Somalia as part of UNITAF. Case studies illustrating failure include the 24th Marine Amphibious Unit’s (MAU) mission in Lebanon, which culminated in the disastrous and tragic bombing of the marine barracks in Beirut, and Task Force Ranger’s mauling in the streets of Mogadishu during UNISOM II’s undeclared war on Muhammed Farah Aidid. Along the way, Bolger derives some fundamental conclusions concerning the reasons for success, and failure in OOTW. Savage Peace’s message, that leaders from sergeant to lieutenant colonel are on the cutting edge of all this and their actions can have strategic implications, is hardly new, but Bolger’s basic thesis challenges the fundamental definition inherent in OOTW and may prove to be the book’s greatest contribution. The author contends that these leaders in the field, and their military and political masters, must realize that “OOTW are wars pure and simple — to believe otherwise is to court disaster.” Thus, the 24th MAU’s fundamental failure, Bolger argues, was that its leadership did not believe their mission was military in nature, so they didn’t consider standard battlefield tactics applicable. PROVIDE COMFORT stands as a counterpoint wherein conventional forces, by doing the regular shoot, move, and communicate METL stuff, allowed the engineers, medics, and logisticians to do the bulk of the humanitarian work, and do it well.

Bolger asserts that our opponents have only to look at the historical record, from the Ia Drang Valley to the desert of South-west Asia, to see the fate of those who try to fight the United States military in an operational and strategic manner that is inside the tidy box we like to call warfare. Bolger concludes that we must be ready to fight, but outside the box at the operational and strategic level. However, since Bolger’s OOTW are really wars with a different face, we must still employ a force package prepared mentally and structurally to fight in the traditional style at the tactical level. Thus, OOTW force packages should be combined arms and joint — not just airpower, not just SOF, not just light infantry. Several warnings fall out of Bolger’s analysis that are especially pertinent in light of the debate over potential deployments. One recurrent theme is the interaction between the American military, the media, the people, and our politicians. The author warns that media-driven policy can result in commitment of military forces without due consideration of such questions as purpose, method, end-state, and level of risk. Bolger contends that “civilian policy makers often do not think in these terms, and it is up to the military to ask, and keep on asking, these tough questions.” Another, and more controversial, warning concerns the quest for easy answers to hard problems. The author argues that, much like airpower advocates in the ’30s and ’50s, the Special Operations community offered Task Force Ranger to policy makers as a quick and easy solution to the problem posed by Aidid in Somalia. Once the element of surprise was compromised by media coverage, this solution was essentially doomed to failure, despite the Task Force’s endeavors, which were in keeping with the highest traditions of American military arms. Televised images of the bodies of American servicemen being dragged through the streets of Mogadishu caused a collapse in the will of the American people and the President and serves as an example to support another of Bolger’s conclusions. Since the seemingly omnipresent electronic media serve as a direct link between “trigger pullers” and policy makers, journalists “play a huge role in giving tactical events operational and strategic significance.” After pointing out the significance of this relationship, Bolger moves on with little comment, even though the situation seems to bode ill given the current adversarial relationship between the American military and our own media.

Bolger’s writing style makes it somewhat difficult to determine the target audience. Savage Peace is certainly pertinent for any leader from platoon to battalion level heading to Bosnia or another OOTW/war. However, his analysis of larger issues, such as the integration and implementation of national interests, goals, and objectives, makes it equally valuable reading for military/civilian policy makers and students at the war and staff colleges. Unfortunately, the book is replete with glib phrases such as “the final sanction — one between the eyes,” and “the day of the ninja had come.” While such verbiage may make the message more appealing to junior officers and NCOs, it runs the risk of alienating the higher level audience, which would be unfortunate. Daniel Bolger is one of our foremost soldier/historians and freely admits he runs the risk of analyzing events so current that they hardly merit the label history. Further examination may refute some of Bolger’s conclusions, but he warns that “great powers must study small wars to stay great,” and analysis of these recent wars offer lessons of immediate utility so the effort cannot be left undone. STEVE C. HAWLEY

MAJ, Infantry Ft. Leavenworth, Kan.

A Short History of the Civil War by James L. Stokesbury, William Morrow & Company, Inc., New York, 1995. 354 pages, $25.00.

It is with great pleasure that I recommend A Short History of the Civil War as an addition to the professional library of the armor/cavalry corps. This book is extremely informative, and yet most enjoyable to read. The author, who is a professor at Acadia University, has seven other books, five of which are A Short History of...’s, to his credit. The book is indeed a handy, useful reference, as well as an introduction to the American Civil War, for students of military history. This book will undoubtedly be used as a text in many colleges and universities.

The book opens with the election of Republican Abraham Lincoln as president of the United States. From there, the author discusses the causes and events which led to Lincoln’s election, the subsequent secession of the Confederacy, and the war itself. He is very logical as he discusses each of the war’s five years. For each year, the author explains the what, where, when, why, and how events transpired. His answers to these questions are clear and concise, and seem to be accurate. Likewise, the reader will become very acquainted with the men who fought in this war. Additionally, the author is careful to stress how society and war are not mutually exclusive, but rather have enormous impact on each other.

The eleven maps, which are relevant to the issues being discussed, are understandable, but lack detail. This is the only shortcoming I could find with this text. An index is provided and is very complete. Additionally, he provides a section entitled “Suggestions for Further Reading,” which includes commentary.

A Short History of the Civil War does not bore the reader with too much detail; rather, the quick pace grips the reader with anticipation and excitement. I enjoyed reading it very much.

ROBERT E. LEVERINGTON, JR.

1LT, Armor, CA ARNG 1-149 Armor Salinas, Calif.

OPERATION DESERT STORM: Allied Ground Forces Order of Battle by Thomas D. Dinackus, (Self-Published), Alexandria, Va., 1995. The author, a former Armor officer and ARMOR contributor, has self-published a comprehensive order of battle listing all U.S. combat arms units, down to the smallest TOE element, and major non-combat arms units. This will meet a need for those students of the conflict that cannot wait for