The 2d ACR - A Force for Peace Enforcement Operations

Recent events in Somalia, Cambodia, Bosnia, and Macedonia have shown the need for forces trained and ready to conduct peace enforcement operations. A U.S. Army Infantry School Draft White Paper published in August 1993, “The Application of Peace Enforcement Operations at Brigade and Battalion,” defines peace enforcement as a form of combat, armed intervention, or the physical threat of armed intervention that, in most cases, is pursuant to international license authorizing the coercive use of military power to compel compliance with international sanctions or resolutions. The primary purpose of peace enforcement is the maintenance or restoration of peace under conditions broadly defined in the international community (Draft White Paper, page 2). This White Paper lists light infantry, armored, and aviation forces as maneuver forces that are suitable for peace enforcement operations. The 2d Armored Cavalry Regiment is another maneuver force that is organized and trained for these missions and may be the best suited for these types of operations. Just as the Army leadership directed the publishing of a White Paper to provide a doctrinal foundation for future writing and training in the peace enforcement arena, the Army leadership also recognized the need to train forces that might be deployed to conduct these operations. Hence, the Joint Readiness Training Center at Fort Polk, Louisiana, conducted its first Peace Enforcement Rotation in November 1993. Units from the 2d ACR, recently resta-tioned at Fort Polk to be the XVIII Airborne Corps’ cavalry regiment and to augment the JRTC OPFOR, participated in this rotation and will participate in future peace enforcement rotations. Two cavalry troops portrayed two belligerent forces and were required to conduct certain specific tasks associated with peace enforcement operations, which included conducting screens and reconnaissance patrols, establishing and manning road blocks, conducting convoy security operations, and interfacing with non-government organizations. Based on these experiences, and considering requirements outlined in the U.S. Army’s recent White Paper on peace enforcement operations, cavalry squadrons in the 2d ACR are well suited for these operations due to their deployability, versatility, and if necessary, lethality. The units are especially suited for establishing the lodgment, expanding the lodgment, establishing conditions to stop hostilities, and establishing conditions for the exit of forces as listed in the framework for peace enforcement operations. 2d ACR Organization The 2d ACR has three cavalry squadrons, a regimental aviation squadron, a regimental support squadron, military intelligence company, chemical company, ADA battery, engineer company, and headquarters and headquarters troop. Each cavalry squadron has three cavalry troops, an antitank company, and a howitzer battery equipped with eight towed 155-mm howitzers. The cavalry troop has two scout platoons, each equipped with 10 hard-topped HMMWVs (M1025/M1026) with five M2 .50-cal heavy machine guns and five MK-19 40-mm machine guns. Each troop also has two antitank platoons, with each platoon having four HMMWV-mounted TOWs. Each cavalry troop also has two 120-mm mortars. The antitank company is organized into three antitank platoons, each with four HMMWV-mounted TOWs. 2d ACR in the Framework of Peace Enforcement Operations Establishing the Lodgment — 2d

ACR

forces are organized and equipped to establish the lodgment after lead forces have secured the entry point. The cavalry squadrons are trained to conduct security patrolling, conduct force protection, establish The 2d Armored Cavalry Regiment A Force for Peace Enforcement Operations by Lieutenant Colonel Joseph G. Dodd, Jr. 48 ARMOR — March-April 1995 command, control, and communications facilities, protect the logistics build-up, and establish checkpoints and roadblocks to control entry into the lodgment area. Additionally, the 2d ACR is capable of conducting link-up and relief operations with SOF elements which will most likely be posted at key choke points in the initial stages of the operation. Expanding the Lodgment — Expanding the lodgment is the 2d ACR’s most likely METL task. In addition to security patrolling, squadrons are trained to conduct area, zone, and route reconnaissance in order to expand the lodgment to provide protection for combat, combat support, and combat service support elements that will continue to arrive in the lodgment area. Establishing Conditions to Stop Hostilities — The first step in stopping hostilities is the separation of belligerents. The squadrons in the 2d ACR are equipped to conduct combat operations that range from show of force to movements to contact or — in coordination with light infantry, armored, and/or aviation forces — conduct limited objective attacks to seize key terrain. As the belligerents are compelled to disengage through either coercion or combat, the cavalry units are trained and equipped to assume the tactical positions of the displaced forces, establish the buffer or demilitarized zones, and report this progress to all parties. Finally, the troops and squadrons are trained to conduct security and reconnaissance operations to maintain the separation of the belligerents. Establishing Conditions for the Exit of Forces — Similarly, once the belligerents separate, 2d ACR units are trained and equipped to keep them apart by conducting screen and guard operations, establishing checkpoints and roadblocks to control movement into and within the buffer zone, and conducting mounted and dismounted reconnaissance patrols. Other Requirements for Success The Draft White Paper also discusses the requirements for fire support, air defense, mobility and survivability, and logistics assets in peace enforcement operations. The 2d ACR has all of these assets in the regiment, either organic to the squadrons or found in the separate troops. Fire Support — Each cavalry squadron is equipped with eight 155-mm towed howitzers (M198s), and each cavalry troop has two organic 120-mm mortars. Furthermore, the regiment’s aviation squadron is equipped with 32 OH-58D Kiowa Warrior helicopters and 11 UH-60 Blackhawk helicopters. Air Defense — The 2d ACR has an organic ADA battery equipped with 24 Avengers. Platoons are habitually associated with the squadrons, and all units are trained for passive and active air defense measures. Mobility and Survivability — The 2d ACR has an organic engineer company equipped with six SEEs and six D7 dozers. The engineer platoons are also habitually associated with the squadrons and are trained to conduct mobility, countermobility, and survivability operations. The engineers are well trained in countermine operations to enhance mobility. For countermobility and survivability, the engineers provide expertise in constructing barricades, bunkers, and fighting positions. Logistics — The 2d ACR is extremely well suited to provide combat service support to sustain the force. Each squadron has robust logistical, medical, and maintenance resources that allow them to self-sustain for the initial phases of the operation. Additionally, the regimental support squadron (RSS) task organizes its maintenance troop, medical troop, and supply and transportation troop to provide additional support for each deploying cavalry squadron. When the RSS deploys into theater, it has an organic materiel management center (MMC) capable of resupplying all classes of supply to include Class VII major end items. The RSS also has assets to make water in locations where the water supplies are limited or non-potable. Conclusion The 2d Armored Cavalry Regiment is well suited for peace enforcement operations. Even though the squadrons do not train specifically for operations other than war, the METL training that the squadrons conduct prepares them well for peace enforcement missions. Additionally, the squadrons continuously rotate through augmenting the JRTC OPFOR, which also enhances their collective and soldier skills. The U.S. Army Infantry School’s White Paper on peace enforcement operations is an outstanding document that is well written and thoroughly researched. Readers and planners need to understand that, in addition to light infantry, armored, and aviation forces, 2d ACR cavalry squadrons are also trained and equipped for peace enforcement operations and may be the maneuver force best suited for many contingencies. ARMOR — March-April 1995 49 Lieutenant Colonel Joseph

G. Dodd, Jr., received his Infantry commission from the U.S. Military Academy in 1975. A graduate of Airborne and Ranger School (Master Parachutist); Infantry Officer Basic Course; Infantry Officer Advanced Course (Correspondence); Armor Officer Advanced Course, Army Comp-trollership Program, Syracuse University (MBA); British Army Staff College (Camberley, England); and Command and General Staff College (nonresident); he is currently attending the Industrial College of the Armored Forces. His previous assignments include rifle and weapons platoon leader, 2d ID; rifle platoon leader, company XO, and S3 Air, 2-75 Rangers; battalion XO, 2-87 Infantry, 10th Mountain Division; brigade S3, 2d Brigade, 10th Mountain Division; budget officer, Army Budget Office; squadron commander, 3d Squadron, 2d ACR (note, took command of 2-1 Infantry on 8 July 1992 at Ft. Lewis Wash., reflagged 3d Squadron, 2d ACR in April 1993, changed command of 3d Squadron, 2d ACR on 23 June 1994 at Ft. Polk, La.)

that must be fired to the tasks, conditions, and standards for that table, not a mirror of Tank Table VIII. FM 17-12’s training strategy is designed to make combat ready crews and platoons. ST 17-12 RC training strategy is designed to rehearse, teach “coursemanship,” and qualify on Tank Table VIII. Instead of changing the standards, maybe we should stop fooling ourselves and eliminate the premo-bilization Tank Tank VIII requirement for the Reserves. This would also allow commanders to focus on training, not qualifying. Then, during post-mobilization training, shoot Tank Tables VIII through XII, where the TIME, training facilities, and equipment are available.

SFC CONRAD C. HINKEL

Armor Assistor, Master Gunner Readiness Group Dix Ft. Dix, N.J. The Combat Arms Leader Dear Sir: Three recent articles in ARMOR — LTC(P) Dempsey’s “The Green Tabbers of Force XXI” and MAJ Morrison’s “Armor Officer 2000” from the September-October issue, plus CPT Salerno’s “Is Well-Rounded Actually Better?” from the May-June issue — offer informed insights into the shortfalls that exist in our current professional development and assignments system and the challenges posed to that system in a future of reduced force structure and increasing demands on those remaining. Assuming that the Army’s post-Cold War restructuring will ultimately change how we train and manage our officers, I believe we need to keep in mind the fundamental characteristics that define great leaders and strive to foster those in whatever revised system takes shape. FM 100-5 gives some very clear guidance on what the Army expects from the officers chosen to lead today’s force-projection soldiers. The manual states that competent, confident leadership is the most essential dynamic of combat power... Leaders inspire soldiers with the will to win. They provide purpose, direction, and motivation in combat. Leaders determine how maneuver, firepower, and protection are used, ensuring these elements are effectively employed against the enemy.”1 Given that mandate, our doctrine also describes some of the qualities we must develop to succeed. Initiative, agility, flexibility, and versatility are all offered as essential qualities in leading our forces on future battlefields. The officer who develops and applies these primarily mental qualities will be the winner in highly fluid maneuver warfare. The manual further states that “...command is more an art than a science. In battle, it is often guided by intuition and feel gained from years of practice and study.”2 Our professional responsibility is to make sure that our training program and selection process results in the best practitioners of this art at all levels. To achieve this end state, I am on the other side of the specialization debate from CPT Salerno. My personal view is that although our tools of combat may change due to technological, doctrinal, and/or organizational development, the principles controlling their application are unwavering. I agree completely with CPT Salerno that “experience carried from one assignment to the next will be a key element in maintaining readiness.”3 However, I draw a different conclusion. Rather than gaining that experience only in tank battalions, cavalry squadrons, light or mechanized infantry battalions, or any other subset of the combat arms world, the combat arms officer needs the widest possible exposure to all the tools and tactics of maneuver warfare so that he can become an expert, not in the tools’ technical operation, but in their tactical application. I don’t agree with the vast disparity that CPT Salerno points out between, for example, armor and cavalry tactics. The principles are the same and the missions are all simple variations or components of the only two things combat arms forces do: attack or defend. “...One of my cardinal rules of battle leadership — or leadership in any field — is to be yourself, to strive to apply the basic principles of the art of war, and seek to accomplish your assigned missions by your own methods and in your own way.”4 This guidance does not change with the TOE. The idea that we can delay combined arms pollination until our leaders achieve high rank is losing its relevance. As a young lieutenant, I saw my company commander faced with maneuvering a force consisting not only of tank platoons, but of mechanized infantry, engineer, chemical smoke, and air defense platoons as well. He was also responsible for putting fire support on target through his FSO. Of course, my experience is the norm. Was it possible for my commander to be an “expert” on all of the systems suddenly arrayed in his team? Certainly not. Would his specialization in armor vs. cavalry or mechanized vs. light infantry help him apply this wide range of capabilities any better? As force structure goes away and equipment capabilities increase (through digitization, firepower, etc.), I believe the integration of combined arms systems will devolve to progressively lower echelons. Any specialization of the combat arms officer, however junior, that degrades his ability to orchestrate maneuver warfare is to the overall detriment of the force. If, as I do, you determine that a combat arms officer’s primary role is to apply the Army’s tools using maneuver warfare tactics, a valid question arises regarding “technical proficiency.” I maintain that the combat arms leader’s role in our Army is not to be the technical master of the wide array of equipment he is charged to employ. The Army provides its leaders with all the expert technical advice needed in the form of first sergeants, platoon sergeants, master gunners, armorers, supply sergeants, maintenance technicians, maintenance team chiefs, operations sergeants, administrative specialists, etc. The officer who finds himself forced to become the technical expert on any system is either not enforcing proficiency and training standards or is not properly delegating authority and responsibility to the soldiers he leads. The combat arms leader cannot allow himself to be “...forced into a cult of detail and made to master the intricacies of logistics and administration. Professionalism becomes equivalent with the ability to memorize tables of organization and equipment, and if one officer displays his knowledge of details, the next will show his expertise by asking for more. But I submit that technical expertise in the combat arms officer is irrelevant, profligate, and even harmful if it is not linked directly to his ability to outthink the enemy.”5 As I explained to a new platoon leader confused about his role in the maintenance process, the leader’s role is not to fix equipment, but rather to cause equipment to be fixed. The same principle applies to the other “technical” aspects of the combat arms profession. For the combat arms officer to achieve “tactical proficiency” generally requires nothing more than education, effort, experience, and the ability and inclination to think creatively. Again, the tools he controls will continually change, and the amount of exposure our leaders have to the capabilities and limitations of those tools will directly impact his ability to employ them effectively. I agree with Leonhard that war is a thinking man’s game.6 “Genius is attainable by the average leader who disciplines himself to learn subtlety and craft. The emphasis, then, is on the historically demonstrable fact that a clever leader can routinely whip a force larger than his own.” Therefore, combat arms leaders “...must groom their ranks in order to produce bold, well-read, dashing battlefield leaders, adept at outthinking their foes.”7 Educating combat arms leaders to think creatively is the keystone to winning the thinking war in two clear ways. “First, by developing creativity in future leaders, we shed the constraints (a focus on process and method) that have fostered management at the expense of leadership. Creativity implies a broader view of the world, freedom to be intuitive, and the willingness to take risks... The second outcome is better reactions to the ever-increasing rate of technological change — creativity fosters an entrepreneurial spirit, a vision of the future that ensures flexibility in problem-solving. Our military leaders must be capable of such vision if we are to remain an effective fighting force.”8 Fostering these qualities through training and education is the challenge for senior leaders, CTCs, and the schoolhouse, which today, in my view, focus too much on process and method at the expense of exploring and applying creative tactical thought. LETTERS (Continued from Page 3) 50 ARMOR — March-April 1995

Given the bewildering variety and scope of the combat arms leadership skills I’ve touched on, I agree with MAJ Morrison that in the future our professional development models should focus on developing a leader’s warfighting skills and that only those demonstrating proficiency be selected to orchestrate our future combined arms fights.9 I also believe that the cut will have to be made earlier in an officer’s career than it is now. A broad range of assignments is key to developing the kind of leader I’ve discussed, but that range must confine itself to developing warfighting skills and teaching those skills to others. Authorizations in the Officer Distribution Plan discussed by both LTC(P) Dempsey and MAJ Morrison appear, in my view, to be the inhibitor to this end, not the number of officers the drawdown has left behind to fill them. Hopefully, as authorizations are eliminated, the criteria will be how well that particular authorization contributes to developing the combat arms leader I’ve described. LTC(P) Dempsey hinted at one possible outcome of our current restructuring that would drastically impact the way we do business and, in my view, help the combat arms leader succeed. “We are not simply downsizing in the manner of past postwar periods. We are truly restructuring... It may even challenge our understanding of branch.”10 I have deliberately avoided describing my hypothetical leader as an armor, infantry, artillery, or any other branch of officer because the combat arms leader of the future may not get any more specialized than just that — combat arms. Whereas now we do not make that distinction until the general officer level, future tools (digitization, for example) and what I hope will be the creation of truly combined arms organizations at lower echelons (as reduced force structure dictates) will demand a great deal more agility, flexibility, initiative, and versatility from our leaders than what our current branch-specific combat arms officers are trained to possess. Therefore, our critical challenge is to devise a system that lowers the generalization threshold, as opposed to building more specialization barriers. As professionals, we have to be sufficiently open-minded to put aside our biases and consider the possibilities. “The good military leader will dominate the events which surround him; once he lets events get the better of him, he will lose the confidence of his men, and when that happens, he ceases to be of value as a leader.”11 In our current restructuring, unlike those of recent history, we must leap past our institutional inertia to create the leaders our soldiers need to dominate tomorrow’s battlefields. Notes 1FM 100-5, Operations, HQDA, June 1993, p. 2-11. 2FM 100-5, p. 2-15. 3Captain George Salerno, “Is Well-Rounded Actually Better?,” ARMOR, May-June 1994, p. 47. 4General Matthew B. Ridgway, The Korean War. Garden City: Doubleday & Co., 1967. 5Robert R. Leonhard, The Art of Maneuver: Maneuver Warfare Theory and Airland Battle. Novato, Calif.: Presidio Press, 1991, p. 250. 6Leonhard, p. 248. 7Leonhard, p. 249. 8Robert L. Taylor and William E. Rosenbach (editors), Military Leadership: In Pursuit of Excellence. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1984, p. 211-212. 9Major Douglas J. Morrison, “Armor Officer 2000,” ARMOR, September-October 1994, p. 47. 10Lieutenant Colonel (P) Martin E. Dempsey, “The Green Tabbers of Force XXI,” ARMOR, September-October 1994, p. 49. 11Field Marshal Viscount Montgomery of Alamein, The Memoirs of Field Marshal Montgomery. Cleveland: The World Publishing Co., 1958.

CPT KENNETH H. WEBB

2-72 Armor, Korea AD Missing from Light Cav Plan Dear Sir: In his article, “Light Armored Cavalry — The Right Force at the Right Time” (Jan-Feb 95), CPT David Nobles outlines his concept of the ideal light armored cavalry regiment, both in terms of equipment and organization. It is his proposed organization of the regiment that prompts this letter. CPT Nobles’ organization chart seem reasonable enough, until one notices that several Battlefield Operating Systems are missing, namely fire support, air defense, and chemical (a portion of mobility/countermobility/survivability). Any concept without the King of Battle could be critiqued on that alone, but I would like to focus on CPT Nobles’ omission of air defense. I will begin by highlighting some of the key points that CPT Nobles makes in his article. He refers to his light cavalry as being a highly flexible, deployable organization, able to fulfill missions in a mid- or high-intensity scenario. He states that our future enemy is more likely to be poorly to moderately equipped, but plays down the importance of low-intensity operations, implying correctly that a unit should not be tailored for low-intensity scenarios only. CPT Nobles also frequently refers to corps assets that would be available to this light cavalry organization, allowing it to make a contribution on all battlefields in any contingency. My disagreements with this article center on three main issues. First, a light, deployable force is more than likely going to be one of the first units into an area, before corps or any of their assets arrive. This unit would be deployed into theater with no air defense or field artillery. Let us suppose, however, that they were provided corps assets. Non-habitual relationships have frequently resulted in disaster in our training centers (not to mention during real conflicts), which brings me to my second point. Habitual relationships, especially in the cavalry, are a must. A unit that is required to do so many unique missions needs to have slice elements that work with them on a regular basis. This is of special concern to air defense units, who frequently must “adjust” their doctrine in order to provide proper air defense for the cavalry (as has been the case with the 2d Armored Cavalry Regiment). The platform of this habitual relationship must be an air defense battery (as opposed to a separate section or platoon). This not only provides the perfect vehicle for the desired relationship in the regiment, but also allows the unit to sustain itself by providing the necessary support to maintain its highly sophisticated air defense weapon systems. My final point concerns CPT Nobles’ comment about our poorly to moderately equipped future enemy. Even a poorly equipped enemy can be highly lethal, as operations in Somalia and Chechnya have shown. From an aerial standpoint, it has been proven time and time again that one or two armed enemy helicopters can wreak havoc on a unit without air defense capabilities, and the proliferation of worldwide Russian helicopter users alone is enough to nullify anyone’s false sense of security regarding the capabilities of our future enemies. I cannot legitimately critique CPT Nobles overall concept, but I feel I am qualified to say that he gives no acceptable justification for omitting air defense from the light cavalry regiment. In fact, I do not think such justification exists.

ERIC HOLLISTER

1LT, AD

Regimental ADCOORD Cav Air Defense Battery, 2ACR Combat Accounts Requested Dear Sir: I have been commissioned by my publisher to write a book of combat stories from all wars in which American tanks fought. I’m asking that your readers harvest their memories — from all wars, 1917 to the present — and send the results to me at the address below.

RALPH ZUMBRO

Route 5, Box 722 Ava, MO 65608 PH: (417) 683-5503 ARMOR — March-April 1995 51