FY92 Abrams Vehicle Fires: An Improvement

The subject of combat vehicle fires has always been an extremely Critical area to the Army and especially to the Armor force. This concern is in the most part focused at protecting operators and maintainers from serious injuries or death. The effects associated with vehicle fires can also be extremely costly in tms of equipment damage, combat effectiveness, and overall soldier confidence in his equipment.

The Armor Center receives the fire and accident reports on all Armor proponent systems and analyzes the information to identify potential trends and possible safety issues. In recent years, many agencies have exerted numerous efforts to reduce the number FY91 average cost per fire. Hard work, risk assessments, and sound leadership provided the payoff. This information highlights an extremely important fact which needs to be stressed: continual safety awareness and sound safety practices save human lives and other valuable resources, which in hm reduce costs. The major cause of Abrams vehicle fires continues to be human e m. Fifty-four percent of the fires reported during FY92 were directly related to crew and maintenance shortfalls, which is an 11 percent decrease from the previous FY. Even though this was an improvement, we can strive for greater reductions. The following report summary is from an actual Abrams fire caused by human error. It could have resulted in a very serious situation to the soldiers and unit involved: An MllP tank was on the firing line being prepared for gunnery. The personnel heater was in operation, providing heat to the crew dm’ng a cold January day. The turret was positioned such that the hot air from the personnel heater was ducted directly onto four propane cans which were stowed in the loader’s station. The propane cans were being used to fuel a portable gas stove. The propane cans exploded, causing afire within the turret. Three crewmen suffered smoke inhalation injuries with one receiving gash burns to his face and of vehicle fires on Abrams series main battle tanks. The Abrams has received this emphasis because fire analyses have revealed definite trends and fire prevention measures. This article highlights some of the vital information obtained.

There were 31 Abrams ve hicle fires reported during fscal year 1992 (FY92), the least number of fires in recent years (Figure 1).

These vehicle fire reports have been analyzed very carefully and compared to earlier fire reports in terms of fire cause and location, vehicle type and age, means of extinguishment, etc.

Many interesting facts were identified and improvements noted. First, the average cost of an Abrams fire during FY92 was $38,709, comDared to the $155.000 38 I Abrams Vehicle Fires I 60 50 840 E LL 8 30 U W m f 20 z 10 0 FY85 FY86 FY87 FY88 FY89 FY90 FY91 FYE2 (27) (32) (39) (60) (59) (39) (441 (31 1 Figure 1 ARMOR -