Morgan’s 1862 Christmas Raid

Brigadier General John Hunt Morgan had been married only eight days when he left his beautiful new bride and led a column of Confederate Cavalry out of Alexandria, Tennessee, on the damp morning of December 22, 1862. During what would become known as the Christmas Raid, Morgan would alter the lives of many Kentuckians that fate had parceled along the path, and he would make sure thousands of Federal soldiers received their fmt taste of combat at the hands of his Southern horse soldiers. General Morgan’s mission was to drive his cavalry into central Kentucky and interdict the Union supply line along the Louisville & Nashville Railroad He was to slow the Federals’ push into the Deep South by wreaking havoc in their tear and crippling their supply line. And as in any classic cavalry operation, Morgan was not to become decisively engaged. The character and disposition of Morgan’s men made them particularly well-suited for the independent operations called for by a raid deep behind enemy lines. Always more at home on their own than under the restrictions of a tightly controlled manuever plan, Morgan’s troopers were a headstrong, independent breed of Western men, who often chafed under the saddle of strict military discipline. Still, their skill in a fight and their tenacity had been plainly demonstrated at Shiloh and in middle Tennessee, and few units could match their daring and in-tiative when given the freedom to roam in the Federals’ backyard. On December 20th and 21st, Morgan’s men had readied themselves for what they knew would be along, difficult march. With mobility and firepower their chief concerns, they pared down the usual cavalryman’s load and planned to move fast and strike hard. Most of them carried short-barreled Enfield rifles, but some had managed to procure carbines. Still others held on to the double-barreled shotguns they had joined the army with, perhaps supplementing them with one or two Colt Army revolvers. Along with Nathan Bedford Forrest, General Morgan was one of the first cavalrymen to urge his men to leave the sabre -with its added weight and limited role -behind on such a raid.

As they departed Tennessee, at least 400 of the raiders were still unarmed

- stuck pulling horse-holding duty until weapons could be captured. The troopers that chose to ride with Morgan were a young group, most of them between 18 and 35 years old, yet because of their Western lifestyle and experience in the saddle, they knew full well what hard riding and rapid execution lay ahead (Map 1). Each trooper carried three days’ cooked rations, two extra horseshoes, 12 nails, one blanket, and an oilcloth or overcoat. So they would not be slowed, Morgan chose to take no ammunition wagon, opting for each soldier to carry 40 rounds. Other than the artillery, nothing traveled on wheels. And at daylight on the 22nd of December, 1862, some 4,000 men and seven pieces of artillery, organized into two brigades under the command of Colonels Basil Duke and John Breckinridge, rode out of Alexandria, Tennessee, on a strike at the soft underbelly of the Federal supply line. Moving via Centreville to Glasgow, Kentucky, over the next three days, they coveted approximately 90 miles at apace that would scarcely be slackened throughout the raid As they reached Glasgow on Christmas Eve, the advance guard ran into two companies of the 2nd Michigan Cavalry. Following a brief skirmish, the Federals retired towad Munfordville, losing two killed, two wounded, and 20 captured. Morgan had four wounded in the encounter, two of whom later died. With this fight, Morgan lost the element of surprise, and the telegraph wires all along the Louisville & Nashville Railroad began humming with news of his approach. Morgan gained little from the skirmish, unless you count the Christmas turkeys he “liberated” from the captured Federals, but he paid dearly for them in that the Federals, now alerted, began to con- * geal the forces necessary to stop him. On Christmas Day, the rebel raiders pressed northward, encountering only slight enemy resistance south of Green River. Since no large Federal forces were as yet in a position to threaten them, Morgan’s command rested in a secure camp in the woods that Christmas night, somewhere between Upton Station and Hammondsville, still hugging the L & N Railroad. With the windfall of turkeys, courtesy of the captured sutler outfit, the men enjoyed a satifying Christmas dinnm, and they took the time to unsaddle, cmry, and rest their mounts for the night. With the mad dash yet to come, they would soon be grateful for this opportunity.

For the next two days, Morgan would shadow the L & N Railroad line northward to his major objective -the two expansive, wooden trestles, each 80 feet high and 500 feet long, that spanned the valleys northeast of Elizabethtown along Muldraugh’s Hill. Enroute, he reduced various small garrisons that he feared might threaten his escape, and by dividing his force into smaller parties, he kept the Federals guessing as to his in-LOUlSVlLLE HEPHERDSVILLE u 1 COLUMBIA

- - - -F.m Umnac;T’nn To smwlrl*. T m c L Map 1 Morgan’s 1862 Christmas Raid Morgan’s Raid disrupted Union supply routes through Central Ken-lucky that depended on the Louis-ille & Nashville Railroad. In less han lwo weeks, he crippled the ailroad from Upbn b Shepherds-tille, doing damage it would take several months to repair tended target. His official report describes his intent “...reached Hammondsville with my command at midnight. I had ordered Colonel Breckinridge, as he passed the cross-road leading to Woodson-ville, to send two companies in that direction, with instructions to drive in the enemy’s pickets, and immedately on my arrival at Hammondrville, I dispatched two companies of Colonel Duke’s command with similar instructions, in the direction of Munfordville. My object was to induce the enemy to believe that I intended to attack the fortifications at Green River, and, by so threatening him, to divert his attention from the combined attack which I intended to make the succeedng day on the stockade at Bacon Creek and Nolin” (OR. XXXII. 155).

Early on the 26th. two regiments of Morgan’s cavalry seized the Federal stockade at Bacon Creek, while the main body pressed northward to Upton. There they severed the telegraph line to the south, and proceeded to mount one of the first effective electronic warfare campaigns, i.e., im-itative communications deception. Accompanying the raiders on their soiree was a strange, young telegrapher of dubious background named George “Lightning” Ellsworth.

Having learned his craft at the hand of Samuel Morse himself, Ellsworth had the unique ability to imitate the Morse Code signature (the characteristic pattern or rhythmic timing of dots and dashes, also known as the “fist”) of a given telegrapher, thus allowing Morgan to deceive the enemy as to his intentions. Ellsworth would listen to the telegraph traffic for a few moments, memorize the signature of a given operator, then send messages as far north as the lines would carry them. John Wyeth, a respected physician and biographer of Nathan Bedford Forrest after the war, was a member of Quirk’s Scouts on this expedition. He describes Ellsworth’s technique. “After the wire was tapped, I sat within a few feet of General Morgan The L&N - Union Lifeline in the West The L&N Railroad was an engineering marvel of its day, completed just two years before the outbreak of a war that would introduce the strategic imporlance of railroads in military operations. The greatest topographical challenge along the 187-mile route was the steep ascent up Muldraugh Hill. Ill-named, it is actually a serpentine ridge that begins near West Point, Ky. and winds 55 miles southeast to Campbellsville. Two great wooden trestles carried the line up the ridge to a 2,000-foot tunnel cutting through the crest north of Elizabethtown.

Morgan’s destruction caused an immediate emergency for Federal officials, who put urgent requests in Northem newspapers for skilled carpenters and engineers and rushed them to the scene. Reportedly, the line was out of service for only three months and, in any case, alternate railroad and river routes kept Union armies in Tennessee well supplied. The contemporary magazine engraving above shows Federal m w s working on the L&N’s Bacon Creek bridge, farther south, after Morgan’s raid. and heard him dictate [to Ellsworth] messages to Genela1 Boyle [commander of Federal forces in central KentucRy] in Louisville, and other Federal commanders. making inquiries as to the disposition of the Federal forces, and telling some tall stones in regard to the large size of his own command and its movements” (Wyeth 27).

It was 3:oO p.m. when Basil Duke’s regiment closed on Nolin, Kentucky, and the remaining forces, plus a section of artillery, remained with Morgan at Bacon Cmk. The stockade there yielded 93 prisoners from the 91st Illinois Infantry, and the bridge and stockade soon went up in flames. At N o h, Colonel Duke took 76 more prisoners from the same Federal unit and dispersed their captured weapons among the unarmed men in his command. Once the en& farce united at Nolin, Morgan ordered large fires to twist the rails of the L & N into a useless heap of iron. And as word of Morgan’s approach -both fact and Ellsworth’s special brand of electronic fiction - spread northward, Union officers in Louisville struggled to raise a force large enough to stop him. When Brigadier General M. D. Man-son, commander of Federal troops at Bowling Green said, “I cannot say with certainty where the rebels are... the opinion is they have gone north” (OR. LXIV, 57). he spoke for most of the Union commanders within a 200-mile radius of Morgan’s path. While the Confederate raiders had been enjoying their Christmas dinner that night outside of Upton Station, Colonel John Marshall Harlan was receiving orders to march his infantry brigade from Gallatin, Tennessee, to “drive from the Louisville and Nashville Railroad the rebel cavalry of Morgan.” Recognizing the uselessness of chasing cavalry with infantry, Harlan gathered railroad cars from as far away as Nashville to set his six infantry regiments, one cavalry regiment, and one artillery battery on Morgan’s heels. To act in concert with Harlan, Brigadier General J. J. Reynolds moved the 12th Division toward Scottsville and Glasgow in the event Morgan was repulsed and forced to turn back. Neither Reynolds nor Harlan was certain of the size or intention of the Confederate cavalry force that was racing through central Kentucky, though they probably suspected the trestles were on his Christmas list. Not only did incomplete intelligence hamper Colonel Harlan, but he was also plagued by delays along the rail line caused by everything from engine breakdowns, to bad stretches of track, to hesitant civilian conductors who wanted no part of chasing the Confederate cavalry. An angry, frustrated Harlan spared no blame in his report. “It may be proper also to state that the track of the railroad was, when I ltft Gallatin, in bad condition. from recent rain, though that difficulty might have been obviated had more engines been furnished. This unfortunate detention delayed the rear train, so that it did not reach Bowling Green until 10 o’clock on the night of the 26th. For that detention I am not in any wise responsible as those concerned receivedfrom me full information as to the number of men, horses. and guns for which transportation would be required. After my arrival at Bowling Green, I learned that all of Morgan’s forces was most probably north of Munfordville, beyond the points to which I had been ordered, and it was evident that I must follow him beyond that place, in order to save any part of the railroad from destruction” (OR.

XXXII, 137).

What smacks of sniveling on the coloneI’s part, must, in all fairness, be viewed as a major logistical and trans-poration nightmare. Forced to pursue a highly-mobile, independent enemy force with either late or wrong intelligence, using a railroad line that was being destroyed in front of him, was a near-hopeless task. Still, Harlan resup plied at Bowling Green and continued his pursuit; but again, the engines broke down and kept him from reaching Munfordville until December 27th. Having been cramped into railroad cars for 48 hours, Harlan allowed his men a brief rest at Munfordville, and he communicated to his superiors that he feared Morgan would attempt an attack on Elizabethtown, and possibly even attempt to destroy the trestlework at Mulhugh’s Hill. Faced with what must have now seemed a futile chase, Colonel Harlan reassessed his priorities. From here he would (a) attempt to save the trestles, and if unsuccessful, he would (b) save the bridge over the Salt River at Shepherdsville, south of Louisville. While Harlan was wrestling the railroad and running out of time, the Confederates were grappling with the Federal garrison at Elizabethtown, just as Harlan had predicted. On the 27th of December, Morgan’s men sat within one mile of Elizabethtown and demanded the surrender of the town. His approach hadn’t exactly surprised the Union troops in Elizabethtown; in fact, they had moved into town eight companies of the 91st Illinois Infantry from their original position guarding the trestlework on the L & N. Building hasty barricades at the railroad station and loopholing the brick build- --- ---- - -”-____. -- _. -.

A Stockade Site Today, this is all that remains of Union trenches, Ranked by a stone wall parapet, on the crest of a hill overlooking the LBN tracks, looking south. The entrenchments, and a stockade that once stood about 50 feet to the right, were built to protect the trestle at Broad Run. Tracks are visible at left, leading to trestle beyond brush and evergreens, center background. ings in town, the Federals were p-pared to fight house-to-house and into the streets if necessary. Lieutenant Colonel H. S. Smith, commander of the forces at Elizakthtown, had apparently underestimated the size of Morgan’s force (ame occurrence during such a running fight), so as m n as the skirmishers engaged Morgan outside the city, Smith sent the Confederate commander a rather curt demand for his surrender. Elizabethtown. Ky.

Dec 27, I862 To the Commander ’of the Confederate Forces: SIR:

I demand an unconditional surrender of all your forces. I have you surrounded and will compel you to surrender. I am, sir, your obedient servant.

H. S. Smith Commanding US. Forces Whether this was a bluff, a wild gamble, or simply a function of imprecise intelligence, it must have brought quite a chuckle to General Morgan.

Colonel Basil Duke, Morgan’s second in command, called it “the most sublimely audacious [communication] I ever knew to emanate from a Federal officer” (Duke, 332). Morgan quickly informed the Federal commander that he had the situation backwards, and that it was Smith and the town who ought to surrender. Smith replied that it was not the duty of a United States officer to surrender, and thus began a brief but spirited struggle for Elizabethtown. With his guns positioned on the cemetery hill just south of town, Morgan sent Duke to the right and Breckinridge to the left, and launched his attack at 1:30 p.m. His artillery pounded the city, and sent the Federals recoiling on the center of town, where they occupied the two-story buildings surrounding the town square. The pro-Union account in the Louisville Journal, dated December 31 1862, states: “‘His [Morgan’s] firing commenced without any warning to the non-combatants, including women and children, to leave. Some of Morgan’s friends contend that he did send warning for women and children to leave in 45 minutes; but if there was such a respite offered, it is certain that no man, woman, or child heard of it; and none could leave, for some attemvted to leave town on the west I I $-I.- ¶--kr El:=- -CQJdmwImwfmnpa -.!- pa Order of Battle - The Rolling Fork Skirmish and north side, but were fired on, and driven back by Morgan’s men. And before half the time pretended to be given had elapsed, the artillery was banging away and fired 107 shots of shell and ball into the town, which lay at his mercy -almost under his feet -and, the only wonder is, that the town was not battered down.” One of those! Confederate artilleq rounds smashed into the room where Lieutenant Colonel Smith aras posted, killing a soldier and slamming into the woodwork hard enough to send a splinter into the colonel’s face. But apparently the Confederate soldiers investing the town didn’t sense the fear and urgency reflected in the above account, for as one soldier states, he found the food good and the hospitality quite cordial, even during the bombardment.

A private in Breckinridge’s 9th Kentucky, Robert

L. Thompson, describes forming in lie of battle below the present cemetery hill south of Ehbethtown, advancing on foot actoss a waistdeep, flooded creek, and hugging the buildings for cover as he advanced through the streets.

Capturing three Federals by himself, he sent them to the rear and went into the hotel they had emerged from, only to find their breakfast on the table. Joined by other Confederates, the group “ate breakfast. and during the whole time we were eating, the little battery on the hill was being worked to its full capacity. When we had finished our breayast and went out on the street again, we saw white handkerchiefs tied to ramrods hanging out the courthouse windows” (Thompson 57I).

The white flags that Thompson saw reflected the surrender initiated by a Captain Fouchey and his men. They took a vote on whether or not to fight it out, and afterward determined to show forth the white flag. When the other defenders of E-Town saw those flags, they assumed Lieutenant Colonel Smith had ordered a general capitulation, so the rest of the Federal garrison followed suit. Smith was irate upon learning of the unauthorized surrender but once intiated, he had little option but to see it through. What he called a “betrayal” by a junior officer probably saved several hundred lives. In Elizabethtown, Morgan’s men captured 652 prisoners, burned the stockade, the depot, and over 3,000 bushels of wheat. When the raiders DXed their worn-out horses, both Unionist and Southern Rights men found themselves on the losing end of the exchange, and many a southern cavalryman got new boots and overcoats, courtesy of the Federal prisoners. According to the Louisville Journal, “Morgan himself went into the store of B. Stadaker & Co., and in a very polite way said he wanted goods and would pay for them in good money; made free to open drawers and boxes and helped himself, all in a very polite way, except now and then charging the merchant with lying, and wound up with a bill upwar& of $1,200 in silks and costly merchandise. had them boxed up, and launched down the pay in confederate trash, not worth, as Stadaker says, a continental cent. Others came in, took three or four hundred dollars worth more of goods, and did not pay a cent.”

After a hot meal that night, the command moved northeast the next morning to accomplish the ultimate mission of the raid. Colonel Breckinridge attacked the Federal fort covering the lower trestle of the L & N over Sulphur Branch Creek, and Colonel Duke struck the fort guarding the upper trestle over Broad Run. Unfortunately for the Federals, these modest forts, designed to overwatch the two critical railroad trestles, were incomplete and poorly armed. What was designed by Brigadier General C. C. Gilbert, commander of the troops along the L & N, to be artillery platforms with protection for infantry, had far too little infantry and no artillery at all. Gilbert was gambling that the small garrisons of infantry, divided between the two forts and Elizabethtown, could somehow delay Morgan until Colonel Harlan’s pursuing infantry could overtake him. The forts held only about 700 infantry, composed of the 78th Illinois, the 71st Indiana and remnants of the 91st Illinois hastily removed to defend Elizabethtown. Under command of Lieutenant Colonel Matson, they prepared to withstand a siege, but such a time-consuming effort was not in Morgan’s plan; and in his official report Morgan proudly declares, “After two or three hours shelling, both places surrendered. and at 7 o’clock that evening, I had the satisfaction of knowing that the object of the expedition was attained, and the railroad was rendered impassable for a least two months. These two trestles are the largest andfinest on the whole road, being, each of them, some 60 feet in height and from 300 to 350 yarh in length. Neither of them had ever before been destroyed during the war. Seven hundred prisoners, including 27 officers, were captured, and a large and valuable amount of medical, quartennaster’sand commissary stores were destroyed’ (OR. XX? Ul, 156).

Had Elizabethtown and the trestle forts been able to hold out a few hours more, Morgan might have been caught by Harlan’s approaching infantry, and the trestlework saved, for Harlan reached Elizabethtown on the 29th. the morning after Morgan had destroyed the trestles. Eating the enemy’s dust and having to listen to irate Unionist citizens hammer him for failing to protect the countryside was taking its toll on the Federal commander, and Harlan was extremely frustrated at continually showing up just a little too late. So, when Colonel Harlan leamed that Morgan’s command had moved toward Bardstown last night and camped not ten miles away, he was ecstatic. If he moved immediately, he might yet get a chance at the raiders; and though his men were tired and stiff from the long, cramped train ride, he sent them marching east along the Bardstown road.

At their camp on the Rolling Fork River that morning, the Confederates were attending to unfinished business. While the majority of the command was across the river by 9:00 a.m. and enroute to Bardstown, Morgan, his regimental commanders, and about 300 men remained on the west side. As he had done at Bacon Creek, Morgan divided his force to wreak havoc with the nearby Federal garrisons, sending R. S. Cluke’s 8th Kentucky, with one piece of artillery, to attack and bum the bridge over the Rolling Fork near Lebanon Junction. Once this was accomplished, they were to cross the river (the ford being held by a rear guard) and continue to Bardstown. Colonel D. W. Chenault’s 11th Kentucky was sent across the river with one piece of artillery to burn the Federal stockade and trestle at Boston. Three companies of Breckinridge’s 9th Kentucky were dispatched southeast with a mountain howitzer to defeat the garrison at New Haven. Because the Rolling Fork was swollen with winter rains, it had taken Morgan longer for his main body to cross that he anticipated. There now remained some 300 men, including pickets and a few detachments, to hold the ford until Cluke’s regiment returned from Lebanon Junction. Also remaining on the west side of the river was an elite group of Morgan’s officers, busily involved with the court-martial hearing of a Lieutenant Colonel Huffman, accused of violating surrender terms with the prisoners at the Bacon Creek Stockade. Basil Duke gives this account of what happened that morning. “Both brigade commanders, and three regimental commanders, Cluke, Hutchinson, and Stoner, were oflcers or members of this court. Just after the court had finally adjourned, ac-quitting Colonel Huffman, and we were leaving a brick house, on the southern side of the river and about six hundred yards from its bank, where our last session had been held, the bursting of a shell a mile or two in the rear caught our ears. A few ve-dettes had been lejit there until everything should have gotten fairly across. Some of them were captured; others brought the information that the enemy was approaching. This was about I1 a.m.” (Duke 336). Finally, Colonel Harlan had caught them and, had he known how close he came to capturing Morgan’stop field commanders, perhaps he might have pressed toward the river more quickly. But Duke and the others raced for the crossing site and took command of the rear guard. As he formed the men into line of battle, Duke was womed about two matters: How much cavalry did Harlan have? If his men made a rush to cross the river, would they be pursued and struck down, possibly even drawing the main body into a protracted fight? What would happen to Cluke’s regiment at Lebanon Junction? Cut off from the main body and unable to cross the river, they would likely be captured Duke wrongly believed at the time that Harlan had “nearly 5,000 infantry, 2,000 cavalry and several pieces of artillery” (Duke 337) -afar cry from Harlan’s actual strength of 2,900 men. But, based upon his estimate, Duke sent a courier to tell General Morgan he would hold the ford as long as possible.

With his artillery, Colonel Harlan opened up on the ford to prevent further crossings, and he sent his regiment of cavalry under Colonel Shanks forward to fix the enemy and determine their strength. He ordered his infantry forward at the double-quick to form two battle lines.

“I went to the front in person, and from a high hill, I saw quite distinctly a very large body of cavalry formed in line of battle near the river. Their oflcers were riding along their line, apparently preparing to give us battle. Knowing that Morgan had a larger force than I had, I proceeded cautiously, and yet as expeditiously as the nature of the ground and the circumstances admitted (OR. XXXII I39). This “cautious” approach by Harlan’s forces bought the Confederates valuable time. For even though Harlan had 2900 men and artillery in line of baffle by noon, opposing no more than 300 men whose backs we= quite literally against the river, he did not attack. Skirmishers advanced slowly, the battle lines crept forward, only to hesitate as the Confederates opened fire. Amazed, yet delighted by Harlan’s hesitancy, Duke had expected at any moment to be “swept... into the turbid river at our backs” (Duke 337).

“Fortunate as this was for us -indeed, it was all that saved us -the suspense yet became so sickening, as their long line tediously crept upon us and all around us, that I would almost have preferred afier an hour of it had elapsed, that Harlan had made a fierce attack” (Duke 337). Part of Harlan’s delay must be attributed to the Confederates’ successful deception effort, As the Federals began slowly pushing the enemy skirmishers back, they came upon a defensive line stretched across a meadow about 300 yards wide. A slight depression across the meadow, and roughly parallel to the river, formed a natural breastwork, and the flanks of the Confederate position were anchored by thick woods and rugged washouts. From here the Confederates judiciously moved their few defenders so as to be barely visible to the Federals, popping up from various points along the line, thus creating the impression of greater numbers. The Union Parrot guns peppered the crossing with shrapnel and stalled the retreat across the Rolling Fork. Mean-f The Rolling Fork Skirmish Site From the high ground at lower left, Federal troops marching from Elizabethtown along the E-Town-Bardstown Road spotted elements of Morgan’s rear guard as they attempted to cross the Rolling Fork while, Major Bullock, at the head of Federal artillery with the newly ar-Cluke’s regiment, came riding hard rived howitzer, he realized that the from the northeast, and managed to six-pounder had no chance of re-rush his men and their six-pounder sponding in kind to the enemy’s fire, gun into the safety of the tenuous and he feared tlieaction might “warm Confederate line. Although Basil the affair up into a hot fight” (Duke Duke considered trying to answer the 338). As a cavalry leader, Duke had, in effect, declined decisive engagement, an inherent task of the raid. Five fresh companies from Cluke’s regiment joined the line, raising the Confederate strength to almost 800. Quirk‘s Scouts had located another ford nearby, and by digging down the sides of the bank, the six-pounder gun was gotten across the river just before the Federal shelling completely obscured further passage. When Colonel Duke received word by courier from General Morgan to withdraw, he would have been glad to follow the order; however, the Union artillery was well-served and accurate, and the remnant of Morgan’s command was trapped. “...when the enemy moved upon UT again, his infantry deployed in along line, strongly supported. with a skirmish line in front, all coming on with bayonets glistening, the guns redou-bling their fire. and the cavalry column on the right flank (of their line) apparently ready to pounce on us too, and then the river surging at our backs, my blood, I confess, ran cold” (Duke 338).

Just when it appeared the Confederates would be overrun, they raised the Rebel Yell in defiance all along the line. The eerie, shrill, howl floated through the meadow and echoed from the wooded hollow behind the Union advance as Duke’s men opened fire. Suddenly, and inexplicably to Colonel Duke and his men, the almost 3,000 Federals checked their assault, and the Union troops began to withdraw. What had looked like an overwhelming Federal attack certain to drive the enemy into the raging river, had simply melted away.

Colonel John Harlan, still uncertain of the enemy’s strength, and perhaps unnerved by Cluke’s daring reinforcement, hesitated to press his attack. Halting his infantry, he continued the artillery barrage over what was now two crossing sites and waited for the situation to develop. The situation developed, all right, for Duke took advantage of the lull to seize the intia-tive from Harlan. Quirk’s Scouts had discovered yet a third ford, offering a route of escape uncovered by the Union guns. So ordering Captain Pendleton, with three companies, to attack the Federal artillery position on a hill at the right of the Federal line, Duke also sent a force in a feigned attack against the center of the enemy force. His actions not only occupied the entire Federal line, but by making the artillery defend themselves, effectively distracted their guns while the remaining Confederate troops could mount up and dash across the river. Harlan, in his report, gave this view of the action. “...after awhile... they then made some demonstrations to occupy an eminence upon my right. To meet this the Tenth Indiana (Colonel Carroll) was ordered to occupy that eminence, from which four companies were ordered to clear the woods on the right of my line.... a section of the battery was ordered to occupy the eminence, and the Tenth Kentucky, Lieutenant Colonel Hays, ordered to support it... The firing now became general all along the right of our line of skinnish-ers; but the rebels, after an obstinate resistance, broke and fled precipi-tately in every direction. Some struck out into the woods; some went up the river as far as New Haven; some swam the river with their horses” (OR. XXXII, 139).

What doesn’t seem quite right about this account is that, if the Confederates were as disheveled as Harlan described, why were not some of them captured? Harlan had Shank‘s cavalry regiment in good position to round up any stragglers. Not only were none captured, but Duke’s rear guard slipped from Harlan’s grasp with only three men wounded: Captain Pendleton, Colonel Duke (hit by shrapnel while preparing to cross the river), and one private. The Federals lost three killed and one wounded, but they lost something probably more important: a solid chance to disrupt Morgan’s raid by tying up his command in a decisive fight. Had Harlan been able to force Morgan to return and extract the rear of his command from a decisive engagement, he would have bought valuable time for other Federal commanders to put together a force large enough to challenge Morgan later in the course of the raid. Morgan had escaped and Harlan knew it, so he camped that night near the battlefield, taking some satisfaction in knowing that his attack had diverted Cluke’s regiment from its mission of destroying the Rolling Fork Bridge at Lebanon Junction. The following day, Harlan would proceed north with his command to defend Shepherdsville, the suspected next target for Morgan’s men.

On the evening of the 29th.

Morgan’s entire command reached Bardstown, including Chenault, who had destroyed the Federal stockade at Boston. On the 30th, Morgan moved to Springfield, where he was joined by the force sent by way of New Haven. That attack had failed to overcome the Federal garrison. In Springfield, Morgan learned that a trap was being prepared near Lebanon, as approximately 2,000 men from Danville, Burkesville, Campbellsville, and Columbia, under command of Colonel William A. Hoskins, were gathering to stop him. Since neither force was certain of the size of the other, both opted for caution. Although there were more than 8,000 Federal troops in striking distance of Morgan, they were not consolidated, and Morgan wasn’t about to give them time to orchestrate a concerted action. A p proaching Lebanon, he scouted for and found a little used road west of the town; and after building large, extended campfires to deceive the enemy into believing they intended to remain for a daylight attack, the Confederate column swung around Lebanon at approximately 11:OO p.m. Driving straight through to St. Mary’s was difficult, as the raiders faced a stormy, night march along a rough road. It was 1:OO p.m. the following day, December 31st, before they crested another increment of Muldraugh’s Hill, and well into the afternoon by the time they reached Campbellsville. Throughout the return march, Colonel Hoskins was nipping at Morgan’s heels, occasionally getting close enough to shell small detachments of the rear guard, but never closing on the main body. In less than a year, Hoskins would again pursue the elusive Morgan, only with different results. Morgan had reached the safety of Smithville, Tennessee, by the evening of January 5, 1863, where he filed this assessment of his raid: The results ofthe expedition may be summed up as follows: The destruction of the Louisville and Nashville Railroad from Munfordville to Shepherdsville, within I 8 m’les of Louisville. rendering it impassable for at least two months; the capture of 1.877 prisoners, including 62 commissioned officers; the destruction of over $2,000,000 of United States property, and a large loss to the enemy in killed and wounded. The loss of my entire command was as follows: Killed, 2; wounded. 24; missing, 64 (OR. XXXII 1.58).

Leaving his base of supply, striking deep into the enemy’s rear, and disrupting his hes of communication and supply, General John Hunt Morgan executed a classic raid. The force dispatched to meet him was inadequate from the beginning; and hampered by inaccurate intelligence, it was frequently overcautious, leading to lost opportunities. It took a civilian, Governor Morton of Indiana, to recognize what it would take to stop another such incursion... Morgan’s force is simply mounted infantry. Very few of his men have sabers. and they fight on foot. Their horses are used only for rapid marching. They m u r be met by the same kind of force. I recommend that a number of regiments of infantry be mounted as soon as it can be done... Unless this is done speedily this roving, predatory warfare will instantly destroy our communications and wear out our armies (OR. LXII 9.56). 34 Ihe Federal army would for several months suffer from Morgan’s blow; yet in spite of the damage he had wrought, and the warnings of men like Governor Morton, the Federals still did not prepare a suitable plan from protecting themselves; and Morgan would dash through Kentucky the following summer for his most famous raid of all. works CRed Duke, BMil W.. Hutoty @Morgan’s Cavalry, The Louisville Journal. Decunber 3 1, 1862. Oficial Recordr. War of the Rebellion, Series I, VOL XXXII.

Oficial Records. War of the Rebellion, Series

I. VOL LXII.

Ramage. James. Rebel Raidcr, University plas of Kentucky, 1986. ’Ihanpm, Robert L. ‘Morgan’s Raid Into Kentucky.” Co#e&rate Veterun, V d XIII.

Wyeth. Jotm Allan, “Morgan’s Christmas Raid 1862-1863,” taken fran The Cuvalry. edited by ’Ibeodore F. Rodenboogh. Fairfax Press, New Yorlr. N. Y.. 1983, p. 148. Offwial Reconlr. War 4 the Rebellion, Series

I. VOL LXIV.

University Press, Bloomingtm, Ind., 1960. 1905. p.

571-72.

Author’s Note: May of the battle sites described in this story arc within a 3O-mimtc drive of Fort Knox and comprise an important part of the history of Hardin County. Radcliff. and the Elizabahtown a m The next time yo0 come to the Annor Center for ANCOC, AOAC, or sane other training, yo0 might mvest a few hours with topographical map in hand doing a staff ride to gain a bener appreciation of the still current tactical considerations of Morgan’s Christmas Raid. Topographical map sheets awering the general area include 3859 IJI,III,lV; 3860 11. III; 3960 ID; and 3959 III and IV. Major James D. Brewer, ediior-inchief of ARMOR, has published widely on Civil War subjects and recently helped organize a reenactment of the Battle at Britten’s Lane in Westem Tennessee. He has studied the Rolling Fork skirmish for the past eight years.

Postscripts...

Like the fire-twisted rails left behind by Morgan’s raiders, the lives of the three prominent Kentuckians that crossed near the Rolling Fork that winter morning in 1862 took many an odd turn for the remainder of the war and in the days Mer Appomattox.

John Hunt Morgan w a born in Alabama, but was a planter and businessman in Lexington, Ky. when the war broke out, After the 1862 raid, he took the fight to the North in July, 1863, crossing the Ohio River into Indiana and Ohio, panicking Cincinnati, and drawing Union cavalry and militia in a running chase. On July 26, he was captured while preparing to re cross the Ohio. He was confined in the then-new Ohio State Penitentiary at Columbus with many of his men. They tunneled out in a daring escape four months later. Morgan returned south to command in East Tennessee and Virginia, and was killed near Greenville, Tenn. on September 4,1864. Basil W. Duke, his key lieutenant and brother-in-law, w& also captured in Ohio, did not escape, but was exchanged in August 1864. He rejoined Morgan and took over his command after Morgan’s death, rising to the rank of brigadier general. Returning to law after the war, he served in the Kentucky legislature and - ironically - in the legal department of the Louisville & Nashville Railroad.

John W. Harlan, a WS-ville lawyer before the war, returned to the practice of law and rose to the highest court in the land as an Associate Justice of the U. S. Supreme Court. His independence earned him the nickname, “The Great Dissenter”.

ARMOR - March-April1993