The Impact of German Reunification On the Future of the German Armor Forces

Reunification has created great hope and anew perspective for Germany, but it is clear now that. we have underestimated some of the difficulties. Unemployment has risen, the budget deficit has increased, interest rates are up, and taxes are up, too. The basic idea for unification is, that the people in the former German Democratic Republic are the real losers of World War I1 because they suffered 47 years under the repression of the Soviets and never had a chance to leave their country. Therefore, these people need our help and confidence, and we decided to take all of them -in any kind of job, including soldiers

- without looking at what they had been doing in the past.

As we integrate the states of the old GDR, replacing a communist command economy with a democratic system and a free market economy -we are also facing the problem of uniting two armies that radically differ in organization, tactics, equipment, and training.

Uniting Two Armies Before unification, the Nationale Volksmee W A ) of the GDR had a strength of about 170,000 men. The unification treaty fixed very unfavorable conditions on the adoption of soldiers from the east, and 40,000 mem-The New Germany with unification, Germany added the five eastern states (shaded area), which include about 16 million additional people and a 70.000 square mile area. The nation now includes about 80 million people and an area of 225,000 square miles. bers of the NVA left that service before reunification, which took place on 3 October 1990. This left 130,000 to be integrated into the 470,000-member Bundeswehr.

So far, the integration process has revealed a tremendous number of What will happen after unification? What will German unity mean for peace and security in the heart of Europe? will Germany revert to old patterns of behavior, or has it learned the lesson of history? Germany will remain linked to the United States in close friendship and partnership, which is of vital importance for Germany, and this means we will remain in NATO. Germany will be a free democratic country, with sovereignty based on our constitution and basic law. Germany will also remain a Federal state, now with five more eastern states. (See shaded area on map below.)

CrechOsbvakia oland Austria Switzerland problems that had not been foreseen:. Equipment and weapons of the NVA were less efficient than we had thought.. Barracks were in a desolate state, compared to Western standards.. The style of command more closely resembled the Russian, rather than West German, command tradition. 1 minusm0,m I German Forces 600.000 Through 1994 470,00( BW ’ NVA Irl 370,000,

- - - - - -I I m I m m m m m I:Future i m German i:Forces:

- a I m m m m m m m m m L - - -.. - d Flgure 1. Many of the Bundeswehr officers and noncommissioned officers took a decidedly negative attitude toward their countexparts in the East German Army.. The Bundeswehr West had to assume the cost of the Bundeswehr East from its annual budget.. Some of the missions of the old NVA had no counterpart in the Bundeswehr - the operation of power plants and day nurseries, for example. Added to these problems of reunification were the requirements of the ‘2-Plus4 Treaty” which will restrict the size.of the unified German Army to 370,000 men by 1994. Given that the Bundeswehr had 470,000 members and added 130,000 from the east, this will mean a force reduction of 230,000 from the Bundeswehr by the compliance date. The plan calls for the Bundeswehr to reduce its strength to 370,000, including 50,000 former NVA members (See Fig. 1). Beyond the matter of numbers, there is the problem of structure and organization. A third of the NVA members were officers: in contrast, only seven percent of the Bundeswehr are officers. (An NCO corps, as we know it, did not exist. In the NVA, NCOs were Specialists -bus drivers and cooks, for example -not subordinate leaders. Officers were! responsible for many of the duties our NCOs assume.)

Applying the Bundeswehr’s seven percent guideline to the remaining 50,000 members of the NVA results in a requirement for only 3,500 officers, not the 40.000 to 50,000 who w m members of the old NVA. Of this 3,500-officer requirement, half will m e from the Bundeswehr West, NVA officers will be needed. You can imagine the kind of social problems, acceptance problems, and organizational problems we have inherited by dismissing more than 40,000 officers representing almost the entire officer corps of the East German Army. The history and traditions of the NVA officer corps reflect along period of Soviet domination. In 1957, all NVA officers who were Wehrmacht officers during WWII were dismissed. Officers were sent to the Soviet Union for training and indoctrination. The officers were recruited from German soldiers who had deserted to the Russians during Wwn and younger men who had already been influenced by Soviet thinking. As a result, we axe faced with integrating an officer corps of almost Russian character. These differences are broad and significant, affecting tactical doctrine, style of command, and the relationships between officers, NCOs, and enlisted men. The Bundeswehr West was influenced by the traditions of the former Wehrmacht and our NATO allies.

By the tradition of the Wehrmacht, I mean tactical doctrine, style of command, and relations among officers, NCOs, and enlisted men. In contrast, the NVA institutionalized some of the worst characteristics of Soviet organization: so only about 2,000 of the former. The style of command in the NVA involved detailed orders from higher to lower levels of command, with junior leaders having only a very narrow range of decisionmaking. In contrast, the Bundeswehr delegates much more authority to lower ranks, reflecting German military tradition since the middle of the last century. Every leader has to decide independently on the activities being canied out on his level. He gets only broad directives explaining his objective or the desired result and has latitude to decide how that result is achieved. This is the heart of the concept of “auf-hagstaktik,” or mission orders. 0As we adopt these new officers from the NVA, we also inherit an ideological problem. All the officers of the East German Army were members of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany (SED). They were! all communists. However, since the end of the 1970s. the population of the GDR had realized that their theory of the state clashed more and more with social and economic reality, and their communist beliefs had become a hollow ritual. When you talk to these former NVA officers today, they recognize and admit that history proved the superiority of the Western conception of the world and its way of life. But in their own justification, they also say that socialism or communism was a good and noble utopia The younger officers of the former NVA will free themselves more quickly from their ideology than the older ones, and the majority of the officers of the former East German Army who will finally integrate during the next year will not be older than 35.

Weapons and Equipment Along with many former members of the NVA, we have inherited their equipment and weapons (see Fig. 2). Some of it can very well be used by us, but there are considerable problems with heavy weapons. Tracked Weapons and Equipment Absorbed from the East German Army ( Map Equipment T p

- Appronmh Totah) 2,000 Main Battle Tanks 2.400 Infanby Fighting Vehides 320 Self-propelled Howitzers 400 Towed Howitzers 270 Rocket Launchers 300 Mortars 900 Twin AA Guns 1,500 Recon Vehides 50 Cargo Helicopters 26,000 RPGs 163,OOO Submachine Guns 450 Antitank Missiles 350 Recovery Tanks Figure 2. vehicles have steel tracks, rather than rubber tracks, as the NVA did not move tracked vehicles on public roads. However, this is very often the case in the West, and the steel-tracked equipment will ruin blacktop roads. Safety standards are very different, too. For example, all of our vehicles must have dual braking systems: theirs do not have this. Their ammunition propellants have considerable mercury content, which produces hazardous vapors. To use these weapons, we would have to develop new ammunition with safer propellants. Most combat vehicles cannot exceed 7 km/hr in reverse, a fatal weakness when changing positions and unacceptable for any kind of reconnaissance use. Many of the Soviet-designed vehicles depend on large amounts of asbestos in their construction. We are taking this out of the vehicles we plan to continue using. In addition, we would have to add thermal sighting equipment to vehicles and, of course, replace all the radio systems for compatibility. All in all, the cost of many of these changes would be too prohibitive, and moreover, the Bundeswehr would become dependent on spare parts from the Soviets.

Finally, with the downsizing of forces in Europe under the CFE Treaty, a treaty which reduces levels of conventional forces in Europe, we The Bundeswehr plans, for example, to adopt 764 of the NVA’s BMP infantry fighting vehicles until enough Marder 2 Improved IFVs become available in 1994. will not need this additional equipment, except in a few cases. The Bundeswehr plans, for example, to adopt 764 of the NVA’s BMP infantry fighting vehicles until enough Marder 2 Improved IFVs become available in 1994.

We will also be able to use former NVA rifles, NBC protective clothing and equipment, shoulder-fired surface-to-air missiles, water treatment plants, maintenance vehicles, and some other equipment.

Barracks facilities were in a desolate state. Little had been spent to keep up the buildings - there had always been a shortage of building materials in the GDR - and barracks blocks appear a gloomy gray, with falling plaster and poorly functioning toilets and shower moms. In 1991, the Bundeswehr spent 550 million marks for renovation of barracks in the five states of the former GDR. Unfortunately, this money was obtained from the building funds of the Bundeswehr. forces in 1956, the Germans and their allies agreed that the new German forces would be used only in defense of German and NATO territory, in the event of an attack by the Warsaw Pact. Now that the threat from the old Soviet Union has changed, we need anew strategic concept. The army’s future missions will focus on three. Defense of Germany’s frontiers, mostly as an integral part of the alliance, but on occasions under national command.. Participation in actions at the periphery of alliance territory.. Participation in UN and possibly even WEU missions, once the appropriate legal foundations have been established.

The m y ’ s main task, however, will remain that of directly protecting the people and state of Germany.

areas:

Future Tactlcs and Strategy Now, what will become of what used to be the East German Army? The new Federal Armed Forces Eastern Command will have 50,000 men, including the remaining personnel of the East German Army and 1,500 officers and NCOs of the Bundeswehr. The Corps East will include territorial troops, in order to save staff and personnel. We will also combine Army and territorial troops in the West by 1994. This will be part of our reduction to 370,000 men. In spite of all these problems, we are optimistic and hopeful that, in a few years, we will have overcome the differences between East and West and emerged with a united, intact Bundeswehr.

Misslons: Then and Now Under the 1949 constitution, which allowed the reestablishment of armed To be successful in defending Germany, our forces will have to maintain strong 0penti01 reserves so that we can concentrate to prevent a successful attack. Along extended sectors, this will mean that a relatively small part of the force will perform reconnaissance, guard, and cover missions, maintaining surveillance over wide areas and being ppared to react immediately to border violations. This force must be strong enough to shape the battlefield for decisive operations, but will have to accept high risks in those sectors. We cannot deploy strong forces along our entire border as we did in the past. Once the weaker covering forces can identify the enemy’s main effort, we will have strong reserves sufficient to sustain decisive operations.

For situations at the periphery of Europe, we will need specially organized and trained military forces at a higher state of readiness than those poised to defend Central Europe. These forces will need to be mobile and sustainable at long distances.

Although the future NATO structure and the multinational corps are not decided yet, there is no doubt we will take part in the NATO multinational force structure. will do the same with military district commands (WBKs). However, they will remain in a position to split up into two separate commands to discharge their own particular functions in time of war.

Once oriented primarily toward implementing the German Defense Plan, - = SUPPORT

Peacetime Organization - Corps/lerritorial Level Figure 3 Future German Army Force Structure We are faced with a reduction in the Size of the army and a tremendous increase in the temtory it has to cover. Yet we want to retain an adequate number of major combat formations, which will increase demands on the command and control system. This problem could only be solved by adopting anew command structure, called Army Structure 5. The idea behind Army Structure 5 is to merge the Army Field Forces with the Temtorial Army, a merger made possible by changes in the overall security setting and driven by the need to reduce the number and size of commands. This fusion is reflected in the Army’s streamlined peacetime organization. Corps headquarters organizations will merge with temtorial commands to form one command in peacetime. Division headquarters organizations the Bundeswek is undergoing a transformation, gradually becoming m m oriented toward training and reconstitution. Applying the so-called principle of dividing, most maneuver brigades will be at around 60 percent of their authorized peacetime standing strengths. A limited number of the standing maneuver brigades, combined with appropriate combat sup port, logistical, and medical troops will form the backbone of a force for action on short warning.

Reservists will play a much greater role in the new German Army. Although there will be fewer reservists, there will be a need for higher quality reservists, as they will man about 50 percent of the primary weapon systems. The reservist will now be at the heart of the new German Army, rather than on the periphery.

Figure 3 shows the peacetime organization of corpsherritorial commands, and Figure 4 the organization of divisiodWF.%Ks. Each division/WBK has command of 2-3 mechanized brigades, one light infantry regiment with lraining capacity for reservists, and a varying number of VBKs.

I n Peacetime Organization - DivisionMlBK Level Figure 4 Army Structure 5 calls for 28 maneuver brigades, three of them standing, two fully cadred, one standing mountain infantry brigade, the standing Franco-German brigade, and three airborne brigades, two of them standing (Fig. 5 ) The German Armor Farces will be affected most by the reductions in the German Army. Two active (parent) tank battalions will belong to each of the three active mechanized infantry brigades. Two more tank battalions, one an active unit and one a partly active build-up unit, will belong to each of the 18 partly active mechanized infantry brigades. Two cadre tank battalions will belong to the two cadre mechanized infantry brigades. Overall, under Army Structure 5, the Armor Forces will go from the current 74 tank battalions to 46

- 24 active, 18 partly active, and four cadre (Fig. 6).

The structure of armored reconnaissance forces in Army Structure 1 R F R G E m 2 @ 2X LEOPARD2

German Armor Forces ACTlVl 18 - -1 Army Structure 5 - Maneuver Brigades 3X @ LEOPARD2

Figure 5 5 is not f m yet, but there are indications this branch will retain at least the same strength as it had under the previous army organization because of the greater need for reconnaissance to protect flanks and overwatch areas. We will also need a stronger air-transportable component given the future potential missions of German forces. lox 1OX LEOPARD2

W LEOPARDlA5

Figure 6 In summary, Structure 5 leaves the army with:. The same number of corps and territorial commands.. Eight divisions and WBKS, rather the current 12 divisions and five WBKS.

. A total of 28 maneuver brigades instead of the current 48.. The elimination of 115 fully or partly active battalions.. The elimination of 166 cadre battalions. (Fig. 7) Under Army Structure 5, there is sufficient flexibility to task-organize on short notice, combining standing airmobile and mechanized units and necessary combat support and combat service support elements. Integrating Active and Build-up Batt a I io ns field trials helped us decide how to integrate parent and cadre battalions in the armor forces and mechanized infantry. In peacetime, the “build-up battalion” remains under the control of the active battalion, which is responsible for mobilizing its non-active counterpart when needed (Figs. 8 & 9). The active battalion’s commander is responsible for both units, and his active unit includes the cadre for the build-up unit. On mobilization, the active battalion commander moves to command the build-up battalion, while his subordinate takes over the active unit. Conclusion Faced with the problem of a substantially smaller German Amy and fewer Allied forces stationed in Germany, we must be able to accomplish much more difficult missions over a larger area. Planning is clearly determined by the intention to ensure full integration into the Alliance. With the reorganization, the German Army will have adequate standing forces to enable participation in IRF/RFW and UN missions.

Within the Bundeswehr, our major challenges are downsizing, building up II Corps in the East, and integrating the NVA forces into the Bundeswehr. The basic features are one m y, a streamlined command structure, and greater importance of reservists. We know that neither the Germans alone nor the West Europeans together can manage these challenges. Only with close cooperation from our allies, particularly our American friends, we can meet these challenges. We can only hope to have the kind of success you have had in your 200 years of history. In my opinion, our greatest advantage is that we all want a united Germany as won as possible.

Amy Stnrcture 4 S corns 3 3 I Terkorial Command 3 1 WBK

5 8 I I 12 I:newer Brigades 148 I 28 Battalions (A&e/Partly Active) 385 270 Battalions (Cadred) 1 515 I 349 I Figure 7 r-7 "Bulld-up" Through Partltloning,, pq 3 15 NCOS.25 EM -43TOTAL

Features: -BuikiupbaMbnnotaclive

- One battalion commander.

Mobilization with one organization

- Integrated cab

- NCO training company

- Parent bn cmdrbeawnes btitd-p banb

- Deputy an& takes command of parent bn Figure 8 PARENT UNIT crisis Figure 9 Lieutenant Colonel Wolfgang Hahne, German liaison officer to the Armor School, has over 30 years of active commissioned service, beginning as a tank platoon leader of a Leopard I unit. He has served as tank battalion commo officer, company commander, battalion XO and S3, and tank battalion commander. At various times in his career, he has also served as an instructor at the officer school and the Combat Arms School.

ARMOR - March-April1992