Doctrine vs. Technology, A Blueprint for the Future

Doctrine vs. Technology A Blueprint for the Future by Captaln (P) Tom Arlelly “We cannot expect the enemy to oblige by planning his wars to suit our weapons; we must plan our weapons to fight war where, when, and how the enemy chooses.”

Vice Admiral Charles Turner Joy USN,

189.5-I956 This issue of ARMOR focuses on technological advances we expect to see over the next 20 years. What changes will these innovations cause in our doctrine? For that matter, what is the relationship between technology and doctrine? Volumes have been written on this subject, and this short article won’t answer these questions. Change is the natural order of things -technology will always evolve, and doctrine is not immutable. However, we must remain focused on the fundamental principles of warfare in shaping our doctrine to apply new technologies in away that allows us to execute that doctrine better. The relationship between technological advances and doctrine is dynamic. The two are so intertwined it is sometimes difficult to determine which one drives the other. Rapidly evolving weapons technology often drives initial countermeasures into the tactics, techniques, and procedures area, while the engineers work frantically to come up with technological countermeasures. This in turn drives the development of further doctrinal and technological counter-countermeasures, and the cycle begins anew. The Cold War years were defined by this type of weapons competition between East and West.

This relationship between technology and doctrine will be even more dynamic in the future. Rapid techncb logical change will pvide revolutionary weapons systems having a significant impact on the “how” of warfare. But will they radically change the “what” of warfare?

The Concept-Based Requirements System -CBRS

-is the cornerstone of the current Army acquisition system. Simply put, CBRS postulates that requirements (hardware development) should be driven by the way we expect to fight (doctrindconcepts). Is CBRS valid in today’s world? Technology advances at apace almost defying comprehension. The lethargic DOD acquisition system virtually insures that “emerging” technologies will be obsolete before incorporated into a fielded weapons system. Stealth, directed energy weapons, composites, advanced acquisition systems, and precision, long-range munitions are reshaping the dynamics of battle. Should we not focus on developing these technologies, and then formulate our doctrine to take advantage of them? Should we shift to a “Technology Based Requirements System?” The future Army and Armor Force must be capable of strategic response to crises through power projection -we must rapidly generate overwhelming force to defeat threats to our national interests globally, or in Admiral Joy’swords, “to fight where, when and how the enemy chooses.”

At the same time, we are entering an era of severely constrained resomes. Our forces will be smaller, based largely in CONUS, and have limited funds for research, development, and procurement. It is absolutely essential to focus the acquisition process on those essential systems critical to the execution of the Army’s warfighting doctrine. CBRS provides that focus of effort. If anything, we must insure we make the “C” in CBRS work.

Of course, the critical assumption in CBRS is sound doctrine, which supports the “concept“ portion of CBRS. Current AkLand Battle doctrine is sound. The ongoing revisions of FM 100-5 will be evolutionary, not revolutionary in nature, providing a true azimuth for requirements development. m e bottom line is the need to focus our technological efforts on providing us with capabilities that give us the ability to apply combat power more efficiently and ARMOR - 29 effectively. If we develop a technologically advanced system that requires more people to operate or.maintain, and/or only operates within well defined parameters, then we have wasted precious resources with no tangible increase in capability (remember the SGT York?).

The single constant in this doctrine/technology =lationship is the principles of war. These nine principles are immutable; they will always be applicable to warfare, regardless of other variables. There are those who say that technology may drive changes to the principles of war - that on the modern battlefield, some of thse principles are no longer valid. I personally disagree with this point of view, but it is one that needs exploration. Certainly, technology will impact the application of the principles of war and their inter-relationships, but they will remain fundamentally valid.

These principles are the bedrock upon which we must base requirements development. We cannot afford to become enamored with “systems” and lose sight of the fundamental essence of the application of military power. The principles of war guided Alexander and will continue to shape future wadare. We must strive to develop and acquire technologies that enhance our ability to apply these principles more effectively.

So, as weapons technologies continue to advance, will our doctrine be forced to evolve? Certainly, but the effect depends on where you sit. Armor platoon leaders and company commanders will remain focused on the violent application of combat power to destroy the enemy. The fundamental character of their fight will not radically change, although it will occur more If we develop a technologically advanced system that requires more people to operate or maintain, andor only operates within well defined parameters, then we have wasted precious resources with no tangible increase in capability (remember the SGT York?). rapidly and violently than ever before. To be an armor leader will be more challenging and more demanding. So what? If you are a tank or cavalry platoon leader or a company or troop commander, focus on learning your trade. Having your “head in the game” when it comes to the business of warfighting is far more critical to the future missions of our Army than a detailed technical understanding of a weapons system capability. Ends, not means -or in the words of Ardant du Picq, “(t)he instruments of battle are valuable only if one knows how to use them.”

As armor leaders, our responsibility is to ensure that we remain focused on the fundamental principles of warfm shaping our doctrine and tactics and that we apply new technologies in away that allows us to better execute that doctrine -in other words, to ensure we don’t become enamored with “systems” and lose sight of the fundamental essence of mobile armored combat.

Captain (f) Tom Arielly was commissioned in Armor from the U. S. Military Academy in 1980. He was assigned to the 2L1 Cavalry, 2d AD, and sewed as a cavalry platoon leader, troop XO, support platoon leader, and SI. After attending AOAC, he served as the regimental maintenance officer in 2d ACR and as H Company w m -mander in the 2L2 ACR. He is currently chief, Cavalry Doctrine and Literature, Armor/Cavalry Tactics Division, Command and Staff Department, USAA RMS.

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