Survivability Is the Best Argument For a Two-Man Tank

Is The Best Argument For a Two-Man Tank by Captaln Mlke Newell The recent decision to disconnect the Block III tank program from the Armmd Systems Modernization program, and to scale back tank research and development efforts, has created a window of opportunity to explore new future main battle tank (FMBT) concepts that incorporate future technologies and have combat capabilities that far exceed those of the Block IlI tank.

Electromagnetic guns, active armor and protection, voice activated computers, automatic fire control, and head-up displays are just a few of the technologies available for exploitation in the future main battle tank. Some of these technologies could lead to reducing the number of crewmen required to operate the tank. There are a number of significant advantages that evolve from a two-man tank design. They include: increased survivability, the possibility of decreased total combat casualties in an engaged tank unit, and, depending on the design, increased agility and deployability. My intent in this article is to show the advantages and the feasibility of a FMBT concept with a two-man crew.

Any future MBT design is likely to place a reduced crew in the tank hull, mount an external gun, have an automatic loader, and depend on indirect optics for viewing. On a conventional turreted tank, the most exposed area of the tank, the turret, contains the maprity of the crew. In the future, especially with the advent of smart top-attack weapons, it will be prohibitively expensive (both in weight and cost) to continue to protect the turret of a tank. The best answer seems to be to put the crew down into the hull, the most protected part of the tank. This will require an external gun with an automatic loader. This crew position and the proliferation of blinding battlefield lasers will force us to use indirect vision optics to view the battle area Because there isn’t enough room for four crewmen in the hull of a tank, the crew will be reduced to two or three. This is the basic FMBT design used throughout my discussion. The basic rationale for a two-man tank is brutally simple. A two-man tank is potentially m m survivable than a three-man tank Survivability is the critical issue. Two-man tanks may not be cheaper to build, operate, or man. Sliding off into these arguments dilutes the hue advantages of a two-man tank -it saves lives and is more combat effective!

The question hounding the two-man tank design in the minds of doubters is: can two men effectively fight the tank in sustained combat operations? The ability to fight a tank well is a component of tank survivability. If a two-man tank can’t be fought effectively, all the survivability advantages in the world won’t make it an effective combat system.

The increased srwivability of a two-man tank is a product of reduced crew compartment sue and a smaller tank silhouette. In 1991, The Rand Corporation completed a study on future tank systems designs called “An Exploration of Integrated Ground Weapons Concepts for Armor/Anti-Annor Missions.” Included in this study is a two-man tank design and a number of three-man tank designs, all incorporating neat term (4-5 years) technologies and equivalent capabilities. This study indicates that the crew compartment of a two-man crew, seated two-abreast, is significantly smaller than any three-man crew configuration. This should be apparent to most of us. Generally, the two-man crew compartment design is 30 percent smaller than the most workable three-man crew compartment design, two crewmen up and one crewman back. This reduction in size occurs in the length of the crew compartment, reducing the probability of an antitank weapon striking the crew compartment from frontal oblique, flank, and overhead (the most vulnerable angles) attacks. If the probability of around hitting the crew compartment is reduced, the probability of crew casualties is also reduced. In the Rand study, the two-man tank was 30 inches, or 10 percent shorter than a three-man tank. This-presents a 10 percent smaller flank and top aspect (the most vulnerable) target to the enemy. This reduced target signature makes a two-man tank more difficult to acquire and more difficult to hit. The combination of a reduced probability of acquiring the tank, hitting the tank if it’s acquired, and striking the crew compartment if the tank is hit equals greater survivability.

Another potential advantage of the two-man tank is it can be more heavily armored than a three-man tank of equal weight, In other words, a 45-ton, two-man tank can have more armor protection than a three-man tank that weighs 45 tons, and still have a smaller silhouette. This smaller silhouette allows consequently more ARMOR - World War / World War I1 RENAULT P-MAN CREW armor protection for a given tank weight. The weight savings incurred by reducing the length of the tank by 10 percent can be turned around and put back in the tank in the form of more armor protection. The weight savings gained enables the two-man tank to have roughly 10 percent more armor protection by weight than the three-man tank. The use of very high density armors enables the two-man tank to add additional armor protection without losing the size advantage. This obviously makes it more difficult to penetrate a two-man tank if it is acquired and hit. This additional armor protection, combined with the increased survivability brought about by the smaller tank silhouette and crew compartment, should result in potentially even greater tank survivability. Alternatively, an advantage of the two-man tank design could be a lighter tank with the same protection levels as a larger three-man tank. In the Rand study, although all the tank designs where developed with equal armor protection levels, the two-man tank design was 10 percent lighter than the lightest three-man tank design. Given equal protection levels, the smaller, lighter tank has a number of potential advantages. The two-man tank could have increased cross-country, road, and dash speeds as well as having reduced fuel consumption. A major argument for the lighter two-man tank would be the increase in tactical mobility and strategic deployability. All these advantages are gained while still retaining the survivability advantages of a smaller crew compartment and smaller tank silhouette.

The argument that a two-man tank is capable of reducing total armor crew casualties is self-explanatory. The concept of a two-man tank crew reduces the number of tank crewmen in a tank unit by a third, versus a three-man tank. Futm tank units equipped with two-man tanks would have fewer total armor crewmen exposed to enemy fire and therefore have the potential for a third less casualties than units equipped with three-man tanks. There are two main questions about the two-man tank concept we don't have the complete answer to yet. (Two-man tank detractors would call these potential disadvantages!) Can a two-man tank crew maneuver the tank, acquire and engage targets, and exercise command and control of the tank (and tank unit for leaders)? And, can a two-man tank crew remain combat effective during sustained combat operations? Although we don't have the complete answer to these two questions, there is a body of research that strongly suggests that a two-man tank design is fully capable of executing all assigned tactical missions. During the summer of 1990, the German Ministry of Defense conducted the first round of the VT 2x2 Experiments. These experiments, sup ported by some personnel from the DESERT STORM

.-I -* WESTERN MBTs HAD WAN CREWS

U. S. Army, tested the concept of a two-man tank using modified Leopard 2 two-man tank demonstrators. The VT 2x2 Experiments are field trials with maneuver, gunnery, and force-on-force tests of two-man tanks from single tank level to platoon level. During the test the two-man crews successfully demonstrated the ability to maneuver, acquire and engage targets, command the tank, and control a tank platoon simultaneously in scenarios lasting up to 24 hours.

After the fmt round of experiments, the German Army concluded the two-man tank concept was feasible and warranted further testing. The second round of VT 2x2 Experiments are scheduled to begin in early 1993. Also in 1990, a joint PM-TRADE/NTC study was conducted at TACOM using the Vetronics Crew Display Demonstrator (VCDD). The study involved OPFOR personnel from the NTC and was designed to test the feasibility of using two-man combat vehicles in the NTC. The study concluded that two-man tanks were feasible if automated gunnery functions were incorporated in an OPFOR vehicle.

Both tests concluded that a tweman tank is feasible through at least platoon leader level and for at least 24 hours of continuous combat operations. Some existing and near-term technology improvements are required The VT 2x2 tests found that 360-degree vision is required for both ARMOR - crewmen, as well as duplicate driving, viewing, and weapons controls. These technologies exist today. The PM-TRADE/NTC study found that an automated acquisition and engagement system was required. Automatic target tracking and engagement technology is being developed for the LOSAT program and has been demonstrated in the Close Combat Test Bed (CCTB) at Fort Knox, Kentucky. The U. S. has a working autotracking program, and the Japanese have already included automatic tracking on their new Type 90 tank. The technology is here! We have the capability to build an operationally effective two-man tank prototype within five years -a tank that all of our research says is fightable for at least 24 hours of sustained operations and suitable for command and control activities through at least platoon leader. The question we know a lot less about is how well will a two-man crew perform in continuous combat over an extended period of time. Very little has been done to study the effects of continuous operations greater than 24 hours on two-man crews. The 1979 British ENDURA 2 test (UK CONFIDENTIAL) is the only test that has taken a hard look at reduced crew capability in continuous operations. They determined that there were no tasks required of a tank crew that can’t be executed by a two-man tank crew; the smaller the crew is, the more time it takes the crew to complete all the required tasks. In a 96-hour tactical mission profile, used to test M1A2 performance, a three-man tank crew with current tank technology would expect to get less than three hours a day to eat, sleep, and do personal hygiene. A two-man tank crew would get even less. We all realize this is unacceptable. The most time consuming tasks that a tank crew must perform are:. Maintain air, ground, and NBC se-. Maintain communications. Perform vehicle maintenance curity. Rearm the tank. Refuel the tank There are near-term technology improvements that can increase the free time of tank crewmen to a desired level. For example, automating the ment increases the free time for a tank crew member to slightly more than six hours a day. Active vehicle defense systems are being developed that include these automated security capabilities. An enhanced M1A2 style Intervehicular Information System (IVIS) can give the crew an automated radio watch capability. An active vehicle defense system and IVIS, in conjunction with the new “cordless” Combat Vehicle Crewmen helmet technology, may do away with security and radio watch as we know it now. In the future, tank crewmen will have the capability to monitor an automated security and commo system while they perform other crew tasks.

Vehicle maintenance tasks will be reduced through the use of maintenance prognostic and diagnostic modules. These are not exotic new technology, they are current systems that are included on the MlA2. These modules warn the crew of impending component failures, so the component can be replaced before it fails. This saves the crew time performing unscheduled maintenance on the tank. air, ground, and NBC seclrrity require-A two-man crew would require some type of on-board power tools to accomplish quickly difficult crew maintenance tasks (changing track!). Automated rearm and refuel systems are a reality today. (If the Air Force can do automated refueling at 300 mph at 10,OOO feet, we can certainly do it stationary on the ground,) Extra crews and maintenance crew chiefs may not be necessary. With basic, near-term technology improvements, we give the crewmen of a two-man tank over eight hours of free time a day. That’s more than a mwman on a four-man tank gets now!

Arguments against a two-man/high tech tank most often revolve around the perceived inability of a two-man crew to perfm all the tasks required of the crew in combat or the reliability of all the ‘high tech gadgets” on the tank. These shouldn’t be the most important issues. The issues we need to focus on are the potential survivability, mobility, and deployability advantages of a two-man tank design! High technology, which has some risk, is necessary to enable a two-man crew to fight the tank as effectively as a more robust three-man crew could. Every indication says they’ll do just that. If technology is critical to realizing the tremendous potential advantages of the two-man tank, then we have to make it reliable. And we can! Remember when laser rangefmders, digital fire control computers, and turbine engines were “unreliable” high tech “gadgets?

In each of these cases, high technology has demonstrated that the real benefits gained are worth the potential risks. It’s time to quit fighting a good idea just because we’re uncomfortable with the technology involved. If we don’t accept some technological risk, and push the outside of the tank performance envelope, we will never capture the tremendous future combat capabilities of this thing we call a tank! Captain Mike Newell was commissioned from the United States Military Academy in 1980. He served as a platoon leader, troop XO, and squadron maintenance officer at Fort Hood, Texas; as a tank company commander and HHC commander in Germany; and as a small group instructor at the Armor School. He is currently an ORSA project officer in the Directorate of Combat Developments at Fort Knox.

ARMOR - March-April1992