Planning the Deliberate Attack

Planning by Captain John Scudder One of the greatest challenges facing a modern tank team commander is the planning, preparation, and execution of a deliberate attack mission. Primarily focusing on the team’s response once it comes in contact with the enemy at the objective, many units fail because commanders are overwhelmed by an overabundance of individual and collective task requirements. As a result, the intricate detail necessary to execute successful actions on the objective are neglected as the team succumbs to enemy fire. Additionally, many tank team commanders do not understand the spedificity involved in preparing their units for a com- I integration of ti& and infantry once the unit meets the opposition. Unfortunately with this occurrence, In order to be successful tank team must be able to combat power against the _____ 1. -_..L rn 11 - .. *--l-- -_-_ :-.- --.--.I A I

.* .. bined arms assault. Commanders a mutually supported enemy. fail to designate guidelines for the in war, a I mass its enemy’s LUIIRS receive priority arrention, me weati poinc. roiiowng me AirLand infantry is forgotten, and the team Battle tenet of synchronization, the launches a piecemeal assault against commander must combine his 76 ARMOR - March-April 1991 armor and infantry forces as well as other combat multipliers (such as indirect fire, close air, and air defense) to destroy the enemy on the objective. Thus, the purpose of this article is to discuss some essential elements that are often neglected in the planning, preparation, and execution of a tank team in a deliberate attack. With emphasis on actions on the objective, this paper will offer some command and control techniques as well as review the specifics in consolidation and reorganization. We will focus on a modern tank team composed of ten M1 Abrams tanks, four Bradley Fighting Vehicles (BFVs) and three six-man infantry squads. Planning for the Deliberate Attack Doctrinally, the Army prescribes the use of troop leading procedures tied in with the decision-making process in order for commanders to develop a sound attack scheme of maneuver. Inherent in this system is the Commander's Estimate of the Situation and the application of ME'IT-T (mission, enemy, terrain, time, and troops available). In analyzing ME'IT-T, the commander must look at the mission in terms of the task and purpose of the operation. He must delineate between the specific tasks in the operation order (OPORD), the implied tasks deduced from this analysis, and the inherent tasks that are routinely prescribed by SOP (e.g., refueling, coordination, etc.). He must also determine the limitations or constraints that may prevent the unit from accomplishing the mission. Finally, the commander should restate the mission so that it fits the team's required task and purpose for a deliberate attack. Because our doctrine gives us a handy acronym with METT-T, one might think the next segment of our analysis might be the enemy situation. However, with deductive reasoning the next logical element in our planning analysis is time. Time is probably the commander's greatest constraint. He evaluates it early to determine how much he will need to plan and issue the OPORD to his subordinates. Our doctrine prescribes the use of the backward planning sequence so the commander can budget his time and comply with the "1/3-U3" rule. In other words, this practice gives the commander one-third of the time to prepare an order, while subordinate units receive two-thirds of the time. Yet, the commander must not get strictly tied to the planning phase in his time analysis: he must consider many factors in both the preparation (e.g. rehearsal time) and execution time (e.g. smoke coverage, counterattack reaction, artillery preparation, etc.). Alterhg the METT-T acronym once again, deductive reasoning would point our analysis toward terrain because the commander cannot analyze the enemy or-his own situation without this element. Undeniably, terrain is classified "neutral" in that the force that best understands it will succeed on the battlefield. Thus, to make life simpler for commanders, our doctrine advocates the use of another acronym in probing the use of terrain: OCORA: Observation and fields of tire; Cover and concealment; Obstacles; Key terrain; and Avenues of approach. However, the commander cannot mindlessly accept a list of words without placing them in a logical order that will assist him in his estimate process. When applying this acronym to terrain, the commander must first consider obstacles as "anti-avenues of approacht because, after they are determined by looking at slope, the weather's impact, and possible locations for manmade obstacles, they will reveal avenues of approach. In this way, the commander considers mounted, dismounted, and air approaches that work for his unit and the enemy. Next, the commander looks at areas that dominate avenues .of approach and provide a marked advantage to those who control it: key terrain. Key terrain may be high ground, roads, or intersections that control or deny approaches by fire or friendly occupation. This fact evolves into the study of observation and fields of fire in which each avenue of a p proach is specifically categorized by how well it can "see and shoot." Continuing our analysis, the commander can further define what terrain is key, he can rank-order the most desirable terrain, and finally conclude with an exploration of cover and conceatment. Therefore, as a result of our deductive reasoning, we offer a new acronym in order to assist the team commander in his analysis of terrain: "OAKOC." Readjusting the acronym order to follow the discussion above, the commander is now provided a well-thought-out process that can strengthen his decisionmaking ability. Once the commander has answered the mission, time, and terrain in his METT-T formula, he now tackles the enemy problem. It is common knowledge that many companyheam leaders totally accept the task force S2's intelligence analysis when they prepare their OPORD. This can be a dangerous practice because many S2s neglect essential information that will assist commanders and keep soldiers alive on the objective. Given this ominous fact, the team commander must be his own intelligence officer. He must determine how the enemy would doctrinally act and relate this to the terrain. This situational template should reflect obstacles, vehicle positions, unit frontages, dismounted strongpoints, maximum engagement lines for direct and in- ~ ~ ARMOR - March-April 7997 77 direct weapon systems, and resulting fire sacks in the objective area. All in all, the commander must further develop the S2 templated overlay by adding graphic information that will increase his unit's chances of survival. The final element of ME'IT-T is troops available. Once the commander has received his mission and measured it by the specific criteria discussed, he must check his unit's capabilities in order to determine what needs compensation. When planning a deliberate attack, the team commander must determine what combat, combat support, and combat service support systems should be applied to the objective area. This is the point when he ultimately combines the training and maintenance abilities of his tank and infantry forces. With this accomplished, the commander can apply the deductions from his MEIT-T analysis to develop well-thought-out courses of action that allow him to formulate a concrete plan. Preparation for The Deliberate Attack Aside from falling short in their planning efforts, many company/team leaders are not aware of the importance of preparation for the attack. Often, once the OPORD is issued, commander's wait until mission execution before they become seriously involved. As the minimum, the commander must reconnoiter the battle area, rehearse necessary movements, and supervise combat inspections. Reconnaissance is vital because it forces the commander to check his planned axis of attack and verify his situational template. Through reconnaissance, he 5, spot d routc I- tions, anu t;mpmx spcwir; uis-mount or support-by-fire locations. As the most important preparation tool available to the commander, thorough reconnaissance prevents a deliberate attack from becoming a movement to contact. Rehearsals are another fundamental element in a successful deliberate attack. Although many commanders believe that mission briefbacks from platoon leaders will suffice, rehearsals ensure that tank commanders and squad leaders won't botch up a relatively simple plan. One remedy is to brief back the

OPORD

on a detailed sandtable model and then conduct mounted rehearsals on terrain similar to the objective. If time is scarce, focus on the numerous actions on the objective that involve moving tanks into support-by-fire positions and the orderly dismounting of infantrymen. The key to success is to rehearse with precision, emphasizing coordination and cooperation between tanks and dismounted elements on the objective. In rehearsing the coordinated effort between tanks and infantry, every infantry soldier must understand he has the duty to talk to the tanks and convey information about the objective and the enemy that occupies it. The infantry are the eyes for the assaulting tanks and the support-by-fire element. Designated arm and hand signals should be agreed upon and rehearsed. The fmal preparation effort is a complete precombat inspection (PCI). In addition to boresighting crew-served weapons, the team commander charges his NCOs with checking his soldiers' ability to go to war. However, despite a complete command followup, commanders fail to supervise infantry PCIs. Primarily focusing on the infantry's ability to dismount, commanders sometimes fail to check load plans, breach kits, (e.g. bangalore torpedoes, grappling hooks, rope serviceability, VS-17 panels, and marking devices), ammunition requirements, crew-served weapons to be unloaded, and soldier speed when leaving the carrier. As a result, once the inevitable order to dismount is given, our infantry often replicates "Spanky and the gang" as they "spill" onto the objective. Deliberate Attack Execution Because tank teams normally move adequately before enemy contact, we will primarily concern ourselves with a unit's actions on the objective. This segment aims to assist commanders by outlining the detailed execution necessary in a successful team assault. Next, we will offer some command and control techniques, concluding with what should happen when units consolidate and reorganize on the objective. Assuming the team reaches the objective unscathed, and the enemy is identified, the commander immediately orders his fire support officer (FIST) to request immediate suppression to kill, confuse, and blind the enemy. Simultaneously, the lead tank platoon will move to its support-by-fire position in order to cover. the team's assault. At this point, I recommend that the executive officer ("fighting XO") move to join his platoon in order to add additional firepower and give the support element control to the second- h-command. The commander then identifies the route by which he will lead the assault element as it bypasses kill sacks and attempts to strike at the enemy's flank or rear. When he decides to begin the assault, the commander orders the assault tank platoon to lead the BFV-mounted infantry. At the same time, he will shift indirect fires to isolate the enemy at the point of attack and will guide mutually supporting direct fire. Once the assault tank platoon reaches an enemy position it cannot destroy, or runs into terrain it cannot move through, the in- 18 ARMOR - March-April 7997 fantry platoon can assault dismounted. At this point, the commander must maneuver his vehicle assault element to create an assault line in which tanks and BFVs mass direct fire support for dismounted infantry. As the dismounts move within the objective area, they will destroy enemy infantry and force enemy vehicles to leave their original positions. As this happens, control and coordination between mounted and dismounted forces becomes paramount. The good news is that enemy vehicles will move unprotected from their original fighting positions and can be destroyed by antitank direct fire from several different directions. This "pick-and-shovel" method involves dismounted forces prying enemy combat vehicles from their fighting positions, while tank and TOW fire destroy them on the move. But it is not enough for the infantry to ar-duously sweep the objective while the tanks and BFVs "sit back" in a support-by-fire role. An example of active supporting fires can be articulated using set-go drills in which dismounted infantry and supporting elements constantly communicate while leading each other to the enemy. Infantry squad "BMP dug in 200 meters to our west." Support element: "Wait, I cannot see you." Infantry squad "Roger, I'l adjust my position." Support element (after 1 minute): "I now see you. Where is the position of the enemy?" Infantry squad "200 meters to the west." Support element: "Roger, set." Infantry squad "Moving in to assault now." Infantry squad (minutes later): "Engaging, BMP pulling out of position." Support element:

"BMP

acquired ... Engaging now." The key to this example is that both the infantry and supporting element must see each other in order to take immediate advantage of the tactical situation. A recurrent theme is infantry forcing the enemy to evacuate its fighting position only to have the support element not in position or not alert to capitalize on this window of enemy vulnerability. Continuing the attack on the objective, if the commander has close air support available, he can request A- 10 gunships to destroy the retreating enemy. If the unit must breach an obstacle, dismounts secure the far side by clearing a footpath using grappling hooks and wire cutters, call for indirect smoke to obscure enemy observation, and place antitank fires on any enemy that can engage friendly breaching operations. Next, the remaining infantry squads breach the obstacle (if necessary, with assistance from the tankers) using explosives or grappling hooks to physically remove surface laid mines. Once the obstacle is reduced, the infantry marks a lane, using engineer tape, colored smoke, and recognition panels at the entrance of the breach site. The mounted assault element then comes forward, while the XO adjusts the position of the support-by-fire location. Once the objective is taken, consolidation and reorganization begin as the infantry remounts, and the assault element occupies defensive positions, scanning for enemy flanking fire or counterattack. They develop range cards, determine target reference points (TRPs), and develop a team directlindirect fire plan. The first sergeant moves the trains forward to evacuate casualties. Platoon sergeants turn in status reports on all classes of supply, to include personnel and equipment. This will hasten cross-leveling and replacement resupply. Techniques for Command and Control As Samuel Huntington proclaimed, the purpose of a professional officer is to manage violence. To do this, our doctrine provides us with control measures to help us safely maneuver forces on the objective. However, some commanders disregard these necessary instruments designed to save soldier lives. Repeatedly, units reach the objective only to become lost, shoot each other, or be killed by a repositioned enemy that could have been destroyed earlier. In this section, I will offer some command and control techniques that will "save the force" on the objective. Initially, the commander must devise a tactical plan that includes easy to understand graphic control measures. Our doctrine provides and recommends control measures on the objective that will maintain the force and avoid the fratricide of dismounted infantry. In the case of our supporting fires, the support-by-fire tank platoon must treat the objective like a defensive engagement area. The platoon leader has control measures such as TRPs, engagement areas, and no-fire areas in order to enhance fire control. In the example of our assault element, both tank and infantry platoon leaders should receive detailed offensive control measures that include checkpoints, platoon phase lines, and platoon objectives. In this sense, commanders should not complain about complex overlays; separate overlays can suffice for platoon maneuver. Next, the tactical plan should include specific signals on the objective. In other words, paragraph five of the OPORD must give more in- ~~ ARMOR - March-April 1991 19 formation than the position of the task force commander or the succession of the chain of command. The company/team leader cannot rely solely on FM communication - radio nets can be jammed. Detailed visual and pyrotechnic signals are required. Some examples include: an illumination artillery round assists in land navigation; aircraft 'recognition panels distinguish friendly vehicles on the objective; a green star cluster signals the deployment of dismounted infantry and that fires must be shifted; green smoke indicates an obstacle is encountered; violet smoke means the obstacle is breached; and a white parachute flare is launched once the objective is secure. Finally, the tactical plan must address the greatest command and control challenge: tank and infantry teamwork on .the objective. Unfortunately, our doctrine has become somewhat obsolete with the advent of the M1 tank and the Bradley Fighting Vehicle. First, the M1 tank has no external telephone to help dismounted infantry communicate with tank commanders. Second, because of safety restrictions, dismounts may no longer move behind a tank without the danger of being burned. Finally, many of our "how-to-fight" manuals have failed to review the arm and hand signals necessary for tanks and infantry to communicate on the ground and in

MOPP 4.

Consolidation and Reorganization Our discussion of the deliberate attack would be inadequate without covering consolidation and reorganization, the most critical phases of the attack. Many commanders feel the urge to rest on their laurels, pat themselves on the back, and congratulate their unit on a job well done. At about the time the team reaches this point of inattention, the enemy counterattacks and the unit is subsequently destroyed. We can overcome this temptation by focusing our efforts to eliminate the enemy and prepare for future operations. A r m y doctrine states that when a unit consolidates on the objective, it must eliminate'the enemy, prepare for a counterattack, and continue the mission. This is a time when leadership becomes paramount. The commander must start the intricate planning cycle again, concentrating on troop-leading procedures and the decision-making process. Challenged with a mission to either defend the previously taken objective or continue the attack, the commander must remotivate his unit, regain the initiative, maintain the momentum, and destroy the enemy. He must also concentrate on his use of dismounted infantry. At a minimum, the infantry should continue sweeping the enemy positions, rounding up prisoners, set LP/OPs out forward at night for early warning, and assist with overall security between vehicles. However, with the proper plan and a detailed rehearsal, the tank team commander can overcome these problems when radio communication breaks down. For safety purposes, and if the situation demands it, the commander may elect to require dismounts to assault between tanks. Finally, while consolidation occurs, he may decide to use wire to "hot-loop" vehicles in their occupation of hasty defensive positions. In the reorganization phase, leaders must ensure that subordinates replace key leaders; man key weapon systems; evacuate KIAs and WAS; report losses, ammunition expenditure, fuel status, and vehicle conditions; redistribute supplies, equipment, ammunition, and personnel; restore communication with units out of contact; perform maintenance checks and emergency repairs; and continue refueling and rearming as METI'-T allows. Again, tank-infantry cooperation should be stressed during this phase: infantrymen can help the tankers by carrying tank rounds and assisting them in the redistribution of tank ammunition. By following this process, a commander can get his act together before his next mission. However, unless he applies forceful leadership and his unit has a desire to succeed, all effort to defeat the enemy will be wasted. Conclusion Judging from experience at the National Training Center, tank team commanders are not specific enough in planning and executing a deliberate attack. As leaders, we have neglected a complete understanding of the deliberate attack from its inception to essential tasks on the objective. Soldier lives can be jeopardized by both friendly and enemy fire unless leaders fully understand and specifically plan the details of the deliberate attack. We owe our subordinates the confidence that we can plan and violently execute any deliberate attack mission. Captain John Scudder is a 1979 graduate of the U.S. Military Academy. He has served as a tank platoon leader, tank company XO, and support platoon leader with 2- 33 Armor, FRG; S3 Air, HQ company commander, tank company commander, and battalion S3 with 1-77 Armor at Ft. Carson; and as a tank team observer-controller and S3 observer-controller with Operations Group, NTC. He has a masters degree in public administration from Golden Gate University and has attended AOB, AOAC, Ranger School, Airborne School, and CAS3. He is currently assigned to the 3d Armored Division. 20 ARMOR - March-April 1991