Armor Between the Wars

At left, U.S. tankers in French-built tanks roll toward the front line in World War I. Their commander was BG Samuel D. Rockenbach, at right. Urns. Armor Between the Wars by Major Patrick J. Cooney, Editor-iwChief The use of armored vehicles during WWI was a grand experiment to reintroduce mobility to a stagnant battlefield. But the gasoline engine was too new, and the war ended too soon after tanks were employed for the majority to see their value on future battlefields. Each main belligerent of the First War could claim a handful of visionary thinkers during the interwar years who put to paper their thoughts on employment of armored vehicles. But, except for the Germans, who steadily moved toward formalizing doctrine, organizations, and tactics heavily reliant upon the characteristics of armored vehicles, the remainder tinkered with the idea once or twice, and eventually gave it up. For the most part, they didn't take up the idea seriously again until late 1939, when the Germans unveiled their "Blitzkrieg." The story of the United States Tank Corps was typical. Within six months of signing the Armistice, a certain disdain for the war just fought and for anything connected with the military was firmly rooted in America's consciousness. In the face of Congressional purse tightening, military opinion was itself divided over the future role of armored vehicles. "How could one include in cut-and-dried war plans a vehicle that had a tendency to break down when it was most needed and to outrun the infantry when it was in good condition?" one historian wrote. The post-war Tank Corps' home was at Camp Meade, Md., commanded by Brig. Gen. Samuel D. Rockenbach. Even before redeployment was complete, cuts began to take their toll. Congress passed a law on 11 July 1919 that cut Tank Corps strength to 154 officers and 2,508 enlisted men. A War Department board, convened in 1919 to study tank employment, supported General Pershing's view that tanks should be under the control of the Infantry Branch, as was the case in the French Army. The board concluded that 'Tank Service should be under the general supervision of the Chief of Infantry and should not constitute an independent service." Rockenbach was in position to fight for the existence of the tanks as a separate arm, but "the methodical, hidebound general was not the right man for the job. He was more interested in maintaining the status quo than in promoting research, development, and training - three essentials for the creation of a vigorous, improving force." It fell to men like Maj. George S. Patton Jr. to argue the case. Writing in the May 1920 Irvarttr>, Journal, Patton said, The tank is new and, for the fulfillment of its destiny, it must remain independent, not desiring or attempting to supplant infantry, cavalry, or artillery, it has no appetite to be absorbed by any of them .... The tank corps grafted on infantry, cavalry, artillery, or engineers, will be like the third leg to a duck - worthless for control, for combat impotent." Such voices and arguments aside, Congress passed the National Defense Act on June 2, 1920, which abolished the Tank Corps as an independent arm and assigned all units to the Infantry. Comensurate-ly, all officers reverted to prewar ranks by the end of June. As one might expect, morale in the tank units plunged. Rockenbach reverted to the rank of colonel and took up duties as Camp Meade commander and symbolic leader of a branch of service that was no longer independent. Patton and Mitchell, commanders of the 304th and 305th Tank Brigades at Meade, both lost 18 ARMOR - March-April 1990

LTC George S. Patton, Jr. during WWI. their eagles and pinned on captains' bars at the end of the month. By late 1920, everyone saw that there was no future with tanks and they all began to bail out, returning mostly to the cavalry. Left at Meade was only the 16th Light and 17th Heavy Tank Battalions and a maintenance company. The rest of the force was carved up. A tank company was assigned to each infantry division across the country, and a battalion went to the Infantry School at Fort Benning. By 1927, the British were experimenting with mechanization, largely through the urging of Gen. J.F.C. Fuller. Dwight Davis, U.S. Secretary of War, returned from observing a demonstration and directed the chief of staff to organize a mechanized force of our O W . On 1 July 1928, the Experimental Mechanized Force was born at Fort Meade and consisted of the light and heavy tank battalions at Meade and various smaller infantry, artillery, engineer, and signal units from Forts Eustis and Hoyle. From Ft. Myer came the Cavalry's one and only armored cavalry troop. All told, the force, commanded by Col. I A Chiistie tank - It ran on tracks or wheels I I I Oliver Eskridge, amounted to about 3,000 men. The project was doomed to fail at the outset. There was no money to fm up the already decrepit vehicles and equipment, and the force was disbanded on September 20. The War Department decided further study was required and tasked its G3 Training Section to take up the study. Thus, this small group suddenly had the power to set the future course of mechanization in America. Enter one "lean, hawk-eyed, high-goal polo-playing cavalry officer," named Major Adna R. Chaffee, who was a staff officer in the G3 Training Section since 1927. Though Chaffee was not one of the old tankers, he could see mechanization's capabilities and battlefield applicability as an independent force. His report of December 5, 1928, for the first time set down a definite program leading to the creation of an Armored Force. He outlined a four-year, Wmillion plan for a completely mechanized, self-contained, highly mobile regiment, which would be the test bed for future similar units that would compose "a great part of the highly M1 "combat cars," tanks for the Cavalry. mobile combat troops of the next war." The backbone of this force would be a fleet of new, fast tanks, supplemented by support troops in armored cars, personnel carriers and trucks. He envisioned a combined arms team - each element carried to battle on tracked or wheeled armored vehicles. Immediately there arose cries of "expensive gadgetry." Because there was no money in the FY 1928 budget, it didn't matter anyway, but the proposal did give rise to a dog-light between the Chief of Ordnance and the Chief of Infantry over what kind of tank the Army was to buy. Ordnance wanted a 37mm-gun tank of 7.5 tons (T-1) from Cunningham and Sons, and the Infantry wanted an 8.6-ton Christie design. Congress appropriated $250,O00 in the next budget to buy six to eight T- 1s for test by the Infantry. But a change in Infantry Branch chiefs brought a change in the budget provision to buy six to eight Christies instead. The new Chief of Ordnance, however, disliked Christies, so they only bought one for $62,000, and the rest of the money went back to the Treasury. Chaffee must have taken great delight in ARMOR - March-April 1990 19 seeing his plan come together like this. Chaffee tirelessly refused to let the mechanization idea die, when lesser men would have tossed in the towel in frustration. Perhaps as a tribute to Chaffee's persistence, the FY31 budget contained $285,000 for mechanization. But, where to start? In 2930, the War Department was looking to close Ft. Eustis. Thus, one of Chief of Staff General Summerall's last directives before leaving office in October was, "Assemble that mechanized force now. Station it at Fort Eustis. Make it permanent, not temporary." Chaffee had recommended a general officer to command the mech force, but none he approached wanted the inherent risk involved. So, Chaffee picked and recommended Colonel Daniel Van Voorhi of the 12th Cavalry on the border. His organizational and administrative abilities were well known in cavalry units. Among the other first officers were Major Sereno E. Brett, and Major Robert

W. Grow. From Chaffee's position on the general staff, he continued to argue for better tanks and equipment and At left, MG Guy V. Henry, one of the Chiefs of Cavalry in the 1930s At right, two tanks ford a creek in support of infantry maneuvers at Fort Benning, Ga.. in 1939. spoke at the Infantry,. Cavalry, Field Artillery, and Engineer Schools; at divisions and at the War College in support of a combined arms, mechanized force. His typical speech ended with this challenge: "The main point is that we, as soldiers, must recognize the tremendous strides which our automotive industry has made since the last war. If we neglect to study every possible usage of this asset in our next war, we should not only be stupid, we should be incompetent." In fall of 1930, Chief of Staff General MacArthur ordered yet another study of all War Department policies regarding mechanization. Petty branch jealousies surfaced again. Infantry wanted control of mechanization, citing the Defense Act of 1920. Cavalrymen wanted to be a player, but had the jitters about losing their beloved horses. Writers became prolific in support of their own parochial views. But Chaffee began to see a mechanized force as a natural extension of the historic cavalry missions of reconnaissance, screen, guard and hit-and-run tactics. He quietly worked behind the scenes, gently but firmly pushing mechanization into the cavalry domain. This drew unexpected opposition even from people like Van Voorhis, who stayed firm in his belief that a mech force should not be p a t of any branch. Chaffee gained the support of the Chief of Cavalry, MG Guy V. Henry, who in time convinced MacArthur to assign mechanization to the cavalry. The results of the War Department study had a mixed result. The Mechanized Force at Eustis was disbanded, its elements assigned to the cavalry for reorganization. But each branch was authorized to pursue its own mechanization agenda, this leaving the Army with no clear unified direction. Chaffee knew that some of his fellow cavalrymen would feel threatened by mechanization, which they perceived as a death knell for the horse, but he was unprepared for the bitter, deliberate opposition he would encounter for the next decade. The prominent view was mechanization taking a parallel role with horsed cavalry, assisting, supplementing, supporting - but never operating independently. But Chaffee's goal was clear - only an independent armored force could get the job done. On June 15, 1931, Chaffee left Washington and reported to Fort Eustis as XO. He and Van Voor- 20 ARMOR - March-April 1990

Two of the founders of the US. Armored Force, MG Daniel Van Voorhis, far left, and BG Adna Chaffee, beside him, with members of the command group at Fort Knox in the 19309. his agreed that the Virginia post was too small to test and experiment with new equipment and tactics, so they began to search for another post. The Chief of Cavalry and the Cavalry School wanted the force moved to the border where the bulk of the cavalry regiments were stationed. But Chaffee wanted Camp Knox with its 33,000 acres of rugged terrain. The War Department approved the choice, and on 1 January 1932, Camp Knox was permanently re-established as Fort Knox. The Tank School itself, however, moved to Fort Benning as part of the Infantry School. The remnants of the disbanded Eustis force arrived at Fort Knox in November 1931 and formed the nucleus of a new mechanized cavalry unit, the Detachment for Mechanized Cavalry Regiment. In December, the War Department ordered Fort D.A. Russell closed and its 1st Cavalry Regiment to Fort Knox, another skirmish won by Chaffee. Through 1933 and into 1934, Chaffee scratched out a civilized existence at Fort Knox, which was dilapidated and had no paved roads when he arrived in late 1931. He turned down the chief of staff's job with the 1st Cavalry Division at Bliis to stay with the force. He fought for money and gave new meaning to the word improvisation. At the same time, he trained his new force. Invited to participate in the spring 1933 maneuvers, Chaffee declined, "We have too big a job in front of us to get the regiment organized and trained in a basic way to be able to afford to go out and show it off. There is no use making concert engagements until you can play the piano." In the meantime, the banter about mech versus horse increased in tempo. The typical view, expressed by Major George S. Patton, Jr. in the September-October 1933 Caval- r), Joiinzal called for a mix of horse and mech units. No cavalry officer wanted to go on record as saying replace the horse with a machine. The way we have come to associate Patton with sweeping tank action makes this view all the more surprising, "It is my opinion, however, that such operations [machines acting alone] will be the aception [emphasis in original] rather than the rule and that in general mechanized and horse cavalry will operate together .... Armored fighting vehicles are ... costly machines with no commercial use. Hardly a part of them is standard. Also, they become obsolescent before they are finished. For this reason, no nation will ever start a war with many machines." Interestingly, in the same issue, Captain F.T. Bonsteel saw the future, along the same lines as Chaffee, in "The Employment of a Mechanized Cavalry Brigade." [pp. 19-2(,] "Mechanized cavalry will enable a commander to extend his powers beyond the sphere of activity of the other arms, and tactically to influence the course of events by striking a dynamic blow in a vital direction. Mechanized cavalry will achieve its greatest results when concentrated in large masses, under direct control of higher commanders, and employed in decisive action to exploit fleeting opportunities." While the discussion heated up, the last Cavalry Joiinzal issue of 1933 unceremoniously showed the 1st Cavalry (Mechanized) at Fort Knox, Ky., having assigned Colonel Daniel Van Voorhis, commanding; Lt. Col. Adna R. Chaffee, XO; and Ma,jors Robert W. Grow and William G. Simmons. And they were involved in something more than discussion. They were struggling against preconceived ideas, branch jealousies, and lack of assets to forge a new thunderbolt for the battlefield. ARMOR - March-April 1990 21

T-64s In the Field b 1 Above, early T-64~ without either "gill armor" plates or non-metallic skirts reveal suspension details. Note that the T-64 suspension, unlike that on earlier Soviet tanks, includes track return rollers. Also note shorter 125-mm gun tube on this model. At right, this T64A has the early optical rangefinder with "ear" on right side of turret. Smoke dischargers are mounted on turret front; they are moved back on later models to make space for reactive armor array. Front slope armor on this tank has been upgraded with applique plates: note oval cutouts that permit access to mine-plow attachment a Gunner's sight "dog house" details help identify the T-64 variants. On the T-MA, at left, the gunner's "dog house" is smaller and narrower, and there is a second "eat' in front of the commander's station on the opposite side. Note also the infantry handrail and "gill armor" plates on this model. In photo at right, the larger, wider gunner's "dog house" identifies the laser-rangefinder-equipped T-64. Nonmetallic skirts replace the "gill armor" plates, and the front slope has additional armor plates added. Also note early smoke discharger location, later moved to rear. 22 ARMOR - March-April 7990

The Tank That Could Have Won the Next War: An Assessment Of the Soviet T-64 Premium Tank By CPT James M. Warford Historically, the Soviets have managed to successfully surprise their enemies on the battlefield by keeping their most advanced armor technology secret. In his book, Parrzer Leader, about the early days of the German armor force, General Heinz Guderian tells about a Russian military commission's visit to various German tank factories and schools in the spring of 1941. Germany and Russia were still allies, bound by the Russo-German Non-Aggression Treaty of 1939, a situation that would continue until the German invasion of Russia a few months later. Hitler had ordered that the visiting Russians see all of the latest German tank production facilities and his army's best tanks, insisting that nothing be concealed. According to Guderian, W e could reckon on our tanks being technically better than all known Russian types; we thought that this would more or less cancel out the Russians' vast numerical superiority:' When the Russian officers viewed the Panzer IV, they did not believe it was Germany's best tank. They were convinced that the Germans were hiding their newest tanks from them, and complained that they were not seeing everything. When the Russians were so insistent that they were not shown the best the German Army had to offer, the German ordnance office came to an unfortunate realization: "...The T-WB with reactive armor attachment points Russians must already possess better and heavier tanks than we do."2 This eleventh-hour realization became battlefield fact a few months later, at the end of July 1941, when the Russian T-34/76 medium tank made it's appearance in battle. It forced the German Army into the dangerous position of having to react to a technically superior enemy tank. This may have only been the first example of the Soviets' ability to beat their adversaries to the draw in tank technology. This Soviet ability - to develop technically superior armored vehicles and then keep these vehicles secret until they appear on the battlefield, or until their remaining a secret is no longer required - has been an increasingly dangerous threat to the armies of NATO. It has been demonstrated, not once, but twice in recent history. In addition to the example of the T-34/76 described above, the Soviets started to produce another very powerful and innovative tank in 1%5. The T-64 was not only superior to Western tanks of the same period, but also forced the Western armies into the position of having to scramble to react to Soviet innovations. Even in peacetime, the T-64's appearance caused a massive reaction by the armies of the West. Yet this was only a fraction of the impact this tank would have wrought on the battlefield, had a war been going on at the time. We must be prepared to identify and counter whatever develops as the next tank in the line that started with the T-34/76 and continued with the T-64. We must avoid any future "eleventh-hour" battlefield scenario that could translate into the same kind of strategic surprise that ultimately defeated the Germans on the Eastern Front. A close examination of the Soviet T-64 suggests what could have happened if war had broken out prior to the appearance of the American M1 and West German Leopard 2, as well as what might happen if the next innovative Soviet tank is allowed to surprise the West. Origins of the T-64 When the Soviet T-62 main battle tank entered production in 1960, work had already started on a newer tank, and by the time the T- 62 was first seen in public in 1%5, this still-newer tank had gone into production. While Western intelligence sources knew of the existence of this new tank, they did not appreciate how radically it differed from earlier Soviet designs. Before identification of the tank that would become the T-64, the Soviets had developed tanks in a series of progressive, evolutionary steps, from the T-34 series, through the T- 54 and T-55, and finally to the T-62, essentially an improved and upgunned T-55. The "-64 was a much more daring evolutionary step, incorporating major changes in several areas. In addition to improved armor and a bigger gun, the T-64's flat, opposed, ARMOR - March-April7990 23

5-cylinder diesel was a major departure from the diesels that had powered the earlier designs, and its much more sophisticated suspension - incorporating "live" tracks and return rollers - bore little resemblance to the earlier Christie-type suspensions that had been perfected in the T-34 design of the 1930s. The production models of the first T-64s were preceded by a number of prototypes that differed primarily in turret and hull front shapes. Several sources identified a prototype that was used for tests and was known as the T-67, but what they may have actually seen in some very grainy films of a winter exercise in 1970 was the base model T-64. This new tank was given the provisional designation of M1970, and has since been referred to as both the "-70" and the "Dvina" tank (after the March 1970 Dvina exercise in the Byelorussian Military District). Because these first views of the T-64 were of very poor quality, (the tanks were most likely misidentified as developments of the T-62), various speculative designations were attached to the new tank. Once better quality photographs became available, it became obvious that the tank in question was clearly not a modified T-62, but was in fact the new T-64. The Soviet Army fielded the T-64 for operational trials in 1967 with the 100th Guards Tank Training Regiment? Shortly after the start of these trials, the tank was subsequently issued to the 41st Guards Tank Division. Since it's initial fielding, the Soviets have continued to develop and modify the T-64. To date, Western intelligence sources have identified seven different variants of the T-64. The variants and their major identifying features are summarized in the illustration. Evolution of the T-64 d Variation - Several prototypes were apparently tested with dif-rent turret configurations and hull fronts. At first, Western analysts entified them as variants of the T-62, some calling the tank the T-67. grainy movies of a 1970 winter exercise, the tank the analysts were ieing may have been the base model of the T-64. so called the "base model," '7-70," and "Dvina Tank," it was first seen the March 1970 maneuvers near Dvina in Byelorussia. Actually !Id& for trials in 1967. Identifying features include a shorter version the 125-mm main gun, infantry handrails along the lower part of the rret, and tool stowage box on right front fender (replaced by a fuel nk on later models.) ie T-A, or "standard model," produced in very large numbers, con-wed to use an optical, coincidence rangefinder. Identification fea-ires include a longer, thermal-sleeved 125-mm main gun, elimination 'the infantry handrails, and replacement of the tool box on the right mt fender with an additional fuel tank. Smoke grenade launchers ere added to the turret sides. Four spring-loaded armor plates rotect each side of the running gear from HEAT warheads. 4th Variation I, Called the T-64A LRF, the coincidence rangefinder is replaced by a laser rangefinder. Gunner's primary sight "dog house" is wider and larger. Optical rangefinder "ear" is covered and sealed, no longer necessary with the LRF. Nonmetallic, full skirts also replace gill armor on chassis. 24 ~~ ARMOR - March-April 1990

5th Variation Called the 1981/1, this was the early T-646, first seen on parade in Red Square in May

1985. There is an L- shaped bracket in front of the commander's hatch, perhaps to add the guidance control box for the AT-8 "Kobra" missile, if required. Like the 4th Variation, this one also has the The right-hand "eat, for larger gunner's "dog house." Smoke the earlier optical ran-grenade launchers have been moved back to gefinder is now deleted. accomodate later addition of reactive armor. There are several obvious identifying features: The K version does not mount the antiaircraft machine gun at the commander's station and carries an additional storage tube at the turret rear. The tube contains an additional antenna mast which can be mounted on the turret roof. The telescopic mast, 10 meters high when elevated, has to be guyed in place, so the tank is immobile when the mast is se UP. There is an additional ante1 na base in front of the corn mander's hatch. On this T-646, the guidance box for the AT-8 missile is mounted in front of the corn, mander's station on the turret roof. The missile, stored in two parts in the autoloader carousel, can be loaded and fired like a conventional round. I \ '. I AISO fitted for reactive armoi 7th Variation The T-64K command tank variants are assigned to battalion and regimental commanders and are not seen below battalion level. These models are converted T-64As, and have the smaller "dog house" and right-side rangefinder "eat" of this earlier model. - The T-64 was the first tank in the world to be fielded with multi-layer composite armor. This innovation, which I will discuss in detail later on, changed the face of modern tank warfare. The many .teething problems that have been associated with the T-64 over the years probably became apparent with the base model of the tank. There were reports that the T-64 was plagued by poor automotive performance. There were also reported problems with the innovative automatic loading system, a new development that permitted reduction in crew size to three men. According to these reports, the automatic loading system occasionally "ate Soviet tankers" and that "few gunners are excited by the prospect of having their arm fed into the breach of the cannon... More recent information indicates that these early reports were exaggerated and that the majority of these problems had been solved in latcr variants. 114 Armament Innovations The T-64 is fitted with the 2A46 D- 81TM Rapira-3 125-mm main gun. It is the largest main gun mounted on any tank in the world, and it's destructive power is enormous. There are, however, some reports of dispersion problems with the gun's ammunition. These problems were probably caused by poor quality control in ammunition manufacture in early generations of 125-mm rounds. The gun's maximum effective range is somewhere between 1,500 and 2,OOO meters. For engagements beyond this range, the T-64B can fire the AT-8 antitank guided missile interchangeably with the conventional HVAPFSDS, HEAT-FS, and FRAG-HE ammunition. The gun is fed by a "korzina" (basket) autoloader that allows the vehicle crew to be reduced to three, and 25 ARMOR - March-April 1990 enables the tank to fire six to eight rounds per minute. One drawback of this main gun was identified during the Iran-Iraq war, in which the 125-mm was fitted to Iraqi T- 72s. According to the Iraqis, the main gun had a barrel life of only 120 rounds. Later models of the T-64B also incorporated a major technical innovation in the armamenl system: the 125-mm gun could fire not only the normal range conventional ammunition, but could also launch and direct the AT-8 "Kobra" antitank missile, which uses radio-frequency guidance and can be loaded directly from the autoloader carousel like a conventional round. The AT-8 ATGM is a two-piece missile carried in the tank's ammunition carousel alongside the conventional 125-mm rounds. When the automatic loader loads the missile, the two sections are joined in the breech and the missile is fired. A boost motor apparently launches the missile to a designated range, then a cruise motor ignites and carries the missile to its target. The cruise speed of the AT-8 is probably 500 meters per second, with a maximum effective range of 4,000 meters. The secondary armament of the tank consists of a coaxial 7.62-mm PKT machine gun and a 12.7-mm NSVT antiaircraft machine gun. The NSVT machine gun, mounted at the commander's position, can be fired when the tank is buttoned-up. Innovations in Fire Control Another dramatic change in the T- 64 was a modem fire-control system, based on the TPD-2 coincidence rangefinder. It gave the T- 64 capabilities that previously had been reserved for Soviet heavy tanks. It is very likely that the deployment of a tank with the capabilities of the T-64 convinced the Soviets that the highly regarded heavy tanks were no longer required. Accurate, long-range fire could now be provided by a true main battle tank. These capabilities evolved further as the T-64 was fitted with a laser rangzfmder on later models. Improved Armor Protection The M198V1 was also the first photographed T-64 variant to be modzed for the future application of reactive armor. When elements of the 141st Tank Regiment, 13th Guards Tank Divisio!i were photographed leaving Hungary as part of the reduction of forces in the Soviet Southern Group of Forces (SGF), M198Vls wtre fitted with reactive armor. The T-HB, produced in large numbers, included innovative new multilayered armor on the turret front and sides, according to Iittenta-tiortal Dejieitse Review. The later hulls are reinforced at the front, while earlier models are being progressively retrofitted with additional armor plate.' Any examination of the T-64 will uncover the most controversy in the area of armor protection. According to Soviet Military Power, 2986, the latest models of Soviet main battle tanks (to include the T-64) are fitted with improved armor incorporating laminates and composites. This innovation should not have been a surprise, because the Soviets had been working on composite steel-ceramic laminate armor since as long ago as 1940. The U.S. Army had also experimented with composite armor and tested it during the same period in the T-95 prototype from 1958 to 1960. These U.S. developments apparently were non-conclusive, while the Soviets' work was successful enough to be included in the T-64's design and fielded with the tank in 1%7. While the exact design and composition of the T-64's armor is classified, the defense press has published enough unclassified information to make a discussion of the armor possible. Several sources agree that, in order to limit weight to 38 tons, the inherently heavy composite armor was limited to the turret front and glacis plate. The y e of a cast turret design, as opposed to the slab-sided, welded construction of more modern composite- or laminate-armor-equipped tanks, does not in any way rule out the use of composite armor. According to Weapons and Tactics of the Soviet Amiy Fiilly Raised Edition, The turret is reported to be cast with a frontal cavity that could accommodate a variety of fills, most probably alternating layers of ceramic or other material with steel.tt8 In 1985, The Japanese magazine TANK also published a drawing of a seclioned view of a modem Soviet tank turret. The drawing included large squares or boxes (not to be confused with reactive armor) inside the turret frontal armor on either side of the main gun. With the exception of the missile capability, the T-64B is very similar to the M1981/1; and with both tanks fitted with reactive armor, they are very difficult to tell apart. The T- 64B is the last and most modem variant of the T-64 to go into production. It is interesting to note that the shape of the turret fronts of the different variants of the T-64 (like the members of the T-72 series), has undergone a subtle reshaping and redesign since the tank was originally fielded. It seems likely that as the T-64 evolved, the tank's original turret composite armor was modified to meet more powerful threats. As 26 ARMOR - March-April 1990 far as the glacis armor is concerned, most sources agree that it consists of some kind of composite armor. According to Soviet Tanks arid Cornbat Vehicles, 1946 to the Present, "the hull glacis plate incorporated a layer of ceramic armor beneath the initial layer of conventional steel armor.it9 International Defense Review also published a copyrighted drawing of a sectioned view of the Soviet T-80 and T-64B glacis armor in February

1987. This drawing clearly shows the armor to consist of an outer layer of steel, a middle layer of glass-fiber, and an inner layer of steel. The actual thickness of this composite array is given as 200 millimeters. The T-64's glacis armor, like the frontal armor of the turret, has gone through some subtle changes over the years. Most likely the original base composite armor has been upgraded to increase the tank's capabilities against improving potential enemies. The T-64 was also the subject of a continuing applique armor program, a high priority effort designed to increase the level of protection of tanks already in the field. To date, four different types of applique armor have been identified, although only three have appeared on the T-64. While the mounting of non-metallic blanket armor and the various patterns of reactive armor are well known, the most recently observed applique is still a bit of a mystery. It consists of passive "face plates" added to the tank's original glacis plate. These 'face plates," also fitted to T-72Mls and T-80s, add an additional 30-40- mm-thick layer of armor to the T- 64's original glacis plate. The new applique armor can be identified by the "cookie cut-out' holes cut in the glacis to allow it to be mounted over tow hooks and mine plow attachment points. Such modifications and improvements have enabled the ~ ~~ aging T-64 to remain a potent threat on the modern battlefield. T-64K Command Tank Variant The T-64K command variant, has an additional radio antenna bas: mounted in front of the commander's position, the lack of an antiaircraft machine gun at the commander's position, and an additional tube fitted to the turret bust15 box and containing a special antenna mast. When the 10-meter-tall mast is mounted on the turret roof, the tank is immobilized by the mast support cables required to hold it in place. lnltial Deployment The T-64 was first seen in the West when it was deployed to the Group of Soviet Forces Germany (GSFG), now known as the Western Group of Forces (WGF), in 1976. NATO's surprise at the appearance of this innovative and very powerful tank is amplified by the fact that it was already 11 years old. The reaction this deployment caused in the armies of the West was massive. Suddenly, NATO tank forces faced a Soviet tank, which, in spite of some well-publicized shortcomings, was better than anything NATO had to offer. The T-64 was superior to its potential adversaries in firepower, mobility, and protection. The T-64'~ Unusual Engine The engine is one of the most radical aspects of the tank's design. The !XDF flat, five-cylinder, horizontally-opposed, 750-hp diesel has been the subject of speculation since the tank went into production 24 years ago. There have been reports that this engine was plagued by problems and subject to frequent breakdowns. These problems were reported to be so severe that the T- 64's initial deployment, with the 100th Guards and 41st Guards, was dictated by the units' proximity to the T-64 tank plant at Kharkov.' These problems, like other reported serious deficiencies, most likely refer to the base model of the tank and have been exaggerated over the years. However serious these automotive problems actually were, they were not severe enough to stop production and forward deployment. If the T-64's performance was not up to the standards set for it, i.e., below the level of its new stablemates, the BMP-1 and BMP- 2, it surely would not have been allowed to proceed. Apparently, the Soviets were satisfied with the combination of this engine and the new suspension system, which incorporated both track support rollers and small stamped road wheels. Strategic Surprise We can still see today the impact the T-64's fielding on NATO. As soon as the capabilities of this new tank became known, the Western armies initiated crash programs to develop and field weapons to counter it. This effort has not only continued over the years, but has increased in intensity with the appearance of T-64s fitted with reactive armor in 1984. This 24-year-old tank, still mistakenly referred to as a failure by some sources, remains dangerous enough to help drive the U.S. Army's current high priority armor/antiarmor program. Had the T-64 come as a surprise in combat, as did the T-34/76 of World War 11, NATO tank crews would have been faced by a truly innovative and previously secret weapon. These same NATO tankers might have fought valiantly from their inferior tanks with gloomy results. Today, however, NATO main battle tanks like the M1, MlAl, and Leopard 2 are certainly superior to the T-64. This com-ARMOR - March-April1990 27 parison, however, is one of apples and oranges. A more accurate comparison would be between those same NATO tanks and the next Soviet innovative and secret premium tank. This still-secret tank, known as the Future Soviet Tank-2 (FST-2) was surely what the Soviets were working on while the M1 and Leopard 2 were being developed in the West. The FST-2 has been described as "representing a radical leap forward in the destructive power and survivability of Soviet tanks."" According to unclassified sources, the FST- 2 should be fielded in the mid-to-late 1990s. This time frame, however, should be kept in perspective. As stated above, when the T-64 was deployed to the WGF in 1976 it was already 11 years old. This precedent could be maintained with the FST-2, and this new tank might actually become a threat years before the anticipated time frame. Several sources on both sides of the Atlantic will probably argue that the Soviets are simply not capable of producing a tank with the very sophisticated characteristics attributed to the FST-2. We should keep in mind, however, that the same sources once believed the combination of a large caliber main gun, an innovative engine, and the use of composite armor was too sophisticated for the U.S. Amy to field at the same time the Soviets fielded the T-64. While the technology is very different from some of the claimed capabilities of the FST-5 the combination of new main gun technology, engine designs at least equal to those of the West, and h..l.. :....,\.mr;..n n e * * &..PI*?_

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l l l l l v * 4 L l * L . al lUUl uL.vL.1uy ments have already been ac complished by the Soviets. There is therefore, no reason to assume tha .. * I _ _ 1 3 -3.. * - I . '9 S me aowets are suuaeniy incapame of achieving what they have already achieved twice before. Several sources claim that NATO has underestimated Soviet tank technology. According to Sovier Milirary Power 1989, Soviet tank technology is not only equivalent to that of the United States, the relative technology level is in fact changing significantly in favor of the Soviet Union. "We discovered ... that things we had predicted they would have 10 years from now, they already had."" Whatever the actual capabilities of the FST-2, it appears that the U.S. Army has already started to react to the possibility of it carrying a new 135-mm main gun. Unclassified sources reported in 1988 that a new type of tank armor incorporating depleted uranium has been developed. U.S. MlAls fitted with this new armor, unofficially referred to as "heavy metal tanks," may be the first reaction to the appearance of another technically superior Soviet tank. The historic appearance of the T- 34D6 seems to mark only the first example of the Soviet Army supris-ing its enemies with a new and very innovative tank. This capability was seen a second time with the fielding of the T-64. Had the T-64 gone into battle against the NATO tanks of the '60s and OS, it would have certainly ruled the battlefield. Although the fielding of the T-64 was directed at only the potential enemies of the Soviet Army, it's impact was even more dramatic and is still being felt today. The fielding of the FST-2 may represent the third time the Soviets have been able to surprise their adversaries by fielding a technically superior tank. We must identify this new threat, counter and beat it, before it is allowed to surprise and defeat its potential adversaries on some battlefield of the future. If we are surprised again, as the Germans were with the T-34/76, and the NATO armies were with the T-64, ~ ~~ the Soviets may achieve an advantage that is non-recoverable. Like the T-64, the ET-2 may be the tank that can win the next war. Footnotes 'Guderian, . General Heinz, Panzer bade November 1957, p. 143. 21Md 'Zaloga, Steven J. and Loop, James W., soviet Tanks and Combat Vehicles 1946 to the Present, 1987, p. 61. 4Warford, Captain, James M., "TgO: The Soviet Solution," ARMOR, January-February, 1987, p. 32. I 'lbid, p.35. 'Schneider, Wolfgang, 7-64 Update," ternational Defense Review, September, 71sby, David C., Weaoons and Tactics of the Soviet Armv Fullv Revised Edition, 1989, p. 1146. 1988, p. 140. ?bid, p. 149. 'Zaloga and Loop, p. 61. 100onnelly, Tom, "Soviets Ran Exotic Tank for the '90s; ARMYTIMES. October 10, 1988, p. 31. "'A Failure Of Intelligence," Newsweek. May 16, 1988, p. 21. Captain James M. Warford was commissioned in Armor in 1979 as a distinguished military graduate from the University of Santa Clara, California. He has served as a tank platoon leader, and a sup port platoon leader; and has also commanded D-1- 66 Armor, A-2-66 Armor (COHORT), and HHC 2-66 Armor. He is currently assigned as a Small Group lnstructor/Team Leader for the Armor Officer Advanced Course at Fort Knox, Ky. 28 ARMOR - March-April 1990