The vehicle commander was killed in 1987

when this M113 hit an unmarked culvert while moving in heavy dust. Eleven soldiers lost their lives in tank accidents in fiscal years 1986-

19888. The total impact of the loss of these lives is immeasurable. The loss is felt in both the unit and the family. The unit experiences disruption in operations, lowering of morale, and a reduction in confidence and esprit. The families of the soldiers are scarred for life. Tank accidents during the same period cost the Army $6.3 million. Accidents involving Mls were the most expensive, costing $3.6 million. The money used to pay for accidents would have been enough to purchase 30,582 rounds of 105-mm ammunition. "Our record for preventing tracked vehicle accidents is not a good one. This poor record, in turn, may reflect operational weaknesses in our planning for training and, by extension, our ability to plan for deployment and combat," according to MG Thomas H. Tait, Chief of Cavalry and Armor (See ARMOR, November-DecemberlY8). No officer or noncommissioned officer wants to see soldiers killed or maimed, or the excellent equipment fielded in the last decade lost to accidents. Military leaders are professionals who focus on the mission, but at the same time protect all soldiers and resources. They work hard every day to provide a safe work environment for their soldiers. These leaders would like to make the Army even safer. However, in most units the training schedule is full - the last thing leaders need is another special emphasis program. Fortunately, no new program is needed. The ingredients necessary to make a safer Army are in place. Safety awareness among leaders is excellent. Leaders and supervisors of all ranks accept their responsibilitics as safety officers for their vehicles, squads, and platoons. But safety awareness and the desire to save lives and dollars will not guarantee a safer Army anymore than a desire to be number one will guarantee a winning football team. Success will come from a carefully thought-out training plan executed with tough discipline and adherence to published standards. "As comrnandcrs, we must ensure thiit we plan safety into all of our training," said MG Tail, in his column in ARMOR. Safcty must be totally integrated into everything the Army does, at all levels of the chain of command. The key is integration, not lip service. Leaders must prepare the operations so that units can reach their objectives safely. A poorly Slde B W.& nWV. Im

<3l*w>w v-59. UP-79- 1-h n&v. Lr niib -

667% 80.100% Using a risk assessment sheet like this one can Figure 1. help leaders think objectively about training safety. ARMOR - 37 designed operation may mismatch soldier skills, equipment, and conditions. When this happens, soldiers will be placed in situations in which success is unlikely, but accidents are likely. Conversely, operations that are thought out in detail, with a risk assessment (see Figure l), conducted prior to development of the concept of the operation, can contribute significantly to mission accomplishment. The following hypothetical tactical situation demonstrates two approaches to mission planning. A tank company is to conduct a night tactical road march. Two platoon leaders receive the company operations order and prepare their platoons to execute the mission. The first platoon leadcr reviews the company OPORD, notes his assigned route and march table, briefs his platoon, and, as he concludes the briefing, reminds his tank commanders to be safe. The platoon leader wants to be safe, but has no strategy to analyze the mission and design safety into his operation. The second platoon leader also receives the mission from the company commander. He discusses the following items with his platoon sergeant: 0 Time available for preparation and rehearsals. The fact that the road march 'will be executed at night. 0 The amount of night-driving ex-prience of each driver, and how long each of the crews has been together. 0 Weather and light data (moonrise and set, percentage illumination, and cloud cover). 0 Type of terrain (reconnaissance is requested). 0 Maintenance posture, including night vision devices. 0 Fatigue. Based upon his risk assessment, the second platoon leader recommends the following to his company commander: countermeasure development as they are with using the factors of

MET-T.

Disciplined execution must follow disciplined planning. 0 Earlier movement time to complete the move prior to moonset. 0 Slower speed to compensate for low percentage illumination and driver inexperience with night vision devices. (Due to equipment shortages, the tank commanders do not have night vision goggles.) 0 Night-driving training for selected crews prior to move-out. The platoon leader and platoon sergeant accomplish the following within the platoon: 0 Sand tahle rehearsal ol the road march, emphasizing emergency procedures, such as what to do if there is a break in the column. 0 Physical check by the platoon sergeant of night vision device instd-lation and operation. 0 Night-driving training for anew crew prior to move-out. The platoon leader's wingman will conduct the training. The goal of each platoon leader is to be both successful and safe. One platoon leader tells his soldiers to be safe. The other analyzes the mission, assesses the risks, develops countermeasures, establishes checks, and builds safety into the execution paragraph of his operation order. Our goal is for soldicrs and leaders to have a sixth sense of safety. But simply stating the goal will not develop the sense of safety. A disciplined, detailed approach to mission analysis and operation preparation fully involving subordinates in risk assessment and countermeasure development will ensure safer units now.. And future officers and NCOs will be as familiar with risk assessmcnt and "Leaders must instill in their people a strong sense of individual responsibility for safcty in training, in working, and in living," said General Carl E. Vuono, Chief of Staff of the Army, in a recent article. Leaders in the company headquarters and higher establish the environment in which junior officers and NCOs operate. The environment will either encourage safety o w discourage safety; rarely will it be neutral. Demonstrated policies and reactions of senior commanders toward goals missed and achieved establish this environment. For example, a battalion commander who warns of harsh treatment for subordinates who fail to achieve movement table times, no matter what, may indirectly encourage speeding. Improper interval, size, weight, and sped top the list of task errors leading to armor vehicle accidents. Based on risk assessment work conducted by his staff, the battalion commander can avoid demanding compliance with an unreasonable schedule. Junior leaders, in turn, must provide feedback for the battalion commander. Don't blow the road march and then tell the battalion commander the timetable was unreasonable. Senior commanders must check to ensure that subor-dinatc commanders conduct rcalis-tic risk assessments, ask for feed: back, and thcn develop and implement countermeasures. Within this environment, units will be both Safer and more effective. Disciplined units maintain standards. They stay in uniform, salute, clean weapons, and maintain local security. Standards are enforced by the NCOs. Violators of established 38 ARMOR - March-April 7989

F P The Price of Failure... An engine fire in this M1 ultimately destroyed the tank, at a cost of $1.6 million. The accident happened in 1988 at the National Training Center. stidards are corrected before an improper procedure can become the new standard. In armor, there should be no discipline problems because every tank, scout track, mortar carrier, and most other vehicles are commanded by an ofllcer or NCO. Armor units that fail to follow their SOPs and operator's manuals have a leadership problem. Some units require the first NCO in the chain of command to give Friday afternoon safety briefings. The intent is to reduce accidents, especially accidents involving the soldiers' private vehicles. These briefings remind soldiers of safety considerations, remind them that their sergeant is concerned about safcty, and remind the sergeant that he or she is a safety officer. The NCO who works with a soldier daily is best able to determine if the soldier is having problems and may be unsafe. For example, a soldier might be too fatigued to start along POV trip. The squad leader counsels the soldier to gct some sleep and depart early the following morning. Senior leaders can brief soldiers on command policy and provide general safety tips, hut the squad lcader evaluates individual soldiers, determines specific risks, and takes specific actions to counter the risks. This is called tough caring. Safety really is first-line-supervisor business, and leadcrship by example is essential. Soldiers tend to emulate their NCOs. If NCOs strictly adhere to SOPs, regulations, and technical manuals, so will their soldiers. Similarly, soldiers will know i l their NCOs violate the rules, such as firing an M1 tank with the ammunition doors locked opcn, or firing an MlAl with the stub-catcher missing. Every lime an NCO allows a safety violation to go uncorrected, the NCO sets anew safcty standard. Every time an NCO violates accepted standards and procedures, both the NCO Corps and safety suffer. We have good equipment, good soldiers, good NCOs, and good officers. Leaders are interested in safety. Risk management (risk assessment and countermeasures) works. As NCOs and junior officers become increasingly skilled and disciplined iIt employing risk assessment and countcrmeasure development, and as we become more disciplined about enforcing compliance with operator's manuals and SOPs, we will better protect our soldicrs and preserve our equipment. Lieutenant Colonel Paul

0. Terry, Jr., was commissioned at West Point in 1970 and served as a tank platoon leader, scout platoon leader, and battalion S3 in the 3d Armored Division. He commanded Company 6, 1-37 Armor, 1st Armored Division: and was XO and commander of 3-37 Armor, 1st ID. A graduate of the Armor Officer Basic and Advanced Courses, he is the Armor Team Chief at the U. S. Army Safety Center, Fort Rucker, AI. He was recently selected for a senior service college. ARMOR - March-April1989 39