Camouflaging Tanks: A Lost Art?

With so much justifiable emphasis on Common Task Testing (CTT), Soldier's Manual tasks, Tank Crew Gunnery skills, and other training, it is no surprise that we tend to lose sight of some of the more fundamental soldier tasks, namely that of fieldcraft. Fieldcraft, loosely delincd, is the information needed to live outdoors and survive on the battlefield. It is the foundation of warrior knowledge handed down from generation to generation, a living history of sorely-won experience. This historical record of common sense also reflects how we have fought our past wars. The US. Army has generally enjoyed a materiel superiority and command or the air. Few of our enemies have commented favorably on the American Army's ability to camouflage vehicles and positions. In the next war we are expected to fight outnumbered and win. Thus we find ourselves relying on combat multipliers to magnify the effectice-ness of our forces. What comhat multiplier can we apply through fieldcraft skills that will assist us in getting off the first shots, thus statistically increasing fivefold our chances of winning an engagement? The answer may be partially in mastering an art for which the U. S. Army has never really been noted camouflage! FM 303-5-1 defines camouflage as "concealment and disguise to minimize enemy detection or identification of troops, weapons, equipment, Nobody enjoys the labor of erecting camouflage nets, but concealment is essential if an army is fighting outnumbered and hopes to win. and installations. It includes taking advantage of the immediate environment as well as using natural and ar-tilicial materials." To troops, that means cutting branches to shove in the infantry rails, struggling with camouflage screens that tend to stick to every protrusion on the turret, and covering up lank tracks. Simply speaking, tankers have to conceal a 10-foot-high tracked monster by blending it in with its natural surroundings: not an easy task considering the size and mobility of the object to be concealed and nature's unnerving habit of constantly varying your surroundings. The problem is further compounded because it requires a lot of hard physical labor, and, therefore, nobody really enjoys doing it. To relieve themselves of this labor-intensive task, armor soldiers have argued that in the quick-moving and fluid situations that often characterize armored operations, combat elements do not have the necessary time to camouflage with nets and foliage. Not so! The answer is to train to proper standards. We have attempted to solve the problem of concealment by devising new paint schemes. In the mid- 1970s, the U. S. Army adopted the four-color paint scheme to replace the previous olive drab and white star livery. Within a few years, flaws 10 ARMOR - became evident in this new scheme, including the fact that the gull-shaped black patterns were distinctly visible through passive night vision devices. This led to a 1978 test by the Combat Developments Experimentation Center, which evaluated the camouflage pattern developed by the U. S. Military Academy's Behavioral Science and Leadership Department. This appeared to offcr a distinct improvement over both the solid green and four-color camouflage paint schemes. What transpired was that the DUAL TEX pattern apparently escaped dctection by observers using the naked eye, but was more susceptible to detection with binoculars. These results varied even between vehicle types. DUAL TEX pattern painting also was more effective at night and against aerial observers. Howevcr, it has not been adopted Army-wide. Factors that affected this decision included that it took up to 22.1 hours to convert an MWseries vehicle to DUAL TEX, and 11.8 hours for the relatively simple ML13. Rollers and brushes were required to paint DUAL TEX, though we thought that spray paint equipment could be converted to apply the new camouflage scheme. Based on the difficulty, number of vehicles to be painted, and yearly repainting requirements, the DUAL TEX system did not offer a significant advantage to justify its adoption. What was apparent during the DUAL TEX testing was that paint alone is not the answer to the armor community's concealment needs. In afield environment, dust and mud accumulated fairly quickly and nullified the efforts of camouflage paint patterns. Dust especially had a detrimental effect because of its sunlight-reflective properties, thus causing a sharp contrast between the vehicle and any dark background, such as a treeline. Vehicles were dctected with less frequency when the crew periodically brushed off the accumulated dust with a broom. Othcr important hctors that surfaced included proximity of the vehicle to vegetation, angle of the sun and changing shadows, vehicle silhouette and defilade, and position rclative to the obscrver. Armor leaders must know correct camouflage procedures and doctrine so that they can impart this knowledge to their subordinates. The trouble is that nobody has put together a "How to camouflage" manual. This is no simple task. To train the trainer in camouflage twtics requires a thorough knowledge of effective camouflage techniques pe,culiar to armored operations. Measures that are inappropriate and time-wasting are identified and discarded from training programs. The camouflage process is aimed at concealing tanks and support vehicles from both aerial and ground observers. Additionally, armor, by design, is a mobile force, and any camouflage measures must The Dual Tex Experiment... The Dual Tex camouflage scheme, seen here on an MGO-series tank and an M113, was subjected to extensive testing in past years. ARMOR -

- A German Leopard in snow camouflage prepares to move out of a hulldown position during Reforger ’85. take into account the need to move repeatedly and quickly. Concealment techniques should not interfere with the armament systems. The lack of subject matter experts complicates the education process. The silhouette of an armored vehicle provides the main cue to its detection. Enemy observers will use both aerial and ground platforms in their efforts to find friendly armored vehicles. Ground observers generally have more time in which to scan a selected area because aerial platforms tend to produce a distinctive signature, which draws undue attention and does not allow them to linger for extended periods. The main purpose of camouflage then would be to defeat the enemy observers by allowing friendly vehicles to blend in with their surroundings. The materials available are both man-made, natural, and issue items. Man-made objects include houses, construction site items, etc., when an armored unit may find itself in an urban environment. Natural materials, such as evergreen foliage, straw, branches, grass, and other items allow a vehicle to blend in with the outdoor, woodland, or plains environment. Army issue camouflage items, radar-scattering ammo nets for use in w d c d areas, snow, and desert, are designed to be erected over a vehicle using support poles with “butterflies” and stakes. However, armored units often custom lit or simply wrap the ncts around gun tubes and over the turrets. Only ingenuity should limit the possibilities of what materials can help conceal a vehicle or position. Each type of vehicle in any armor battalion requires a careful examination in order to dctermine what is the most effective type of camouflage, based on dcsign features, mobility requirements, and mission profile. The Mh(lA3, with its infantry rail, bustle rack, and sponson boxes, has many accessible places where natural foliage can be easily affixed as camouflage. The MI, with its smooth turret sides, side skirts, and relatively clean lines presents a problem that attached foliage cannot fully solve, thus dictating custom-fitted camouflage ncts as one solution for on-the-move camouflage measures. Infantry units use WD-1 communications wire tied in criss-cross patterns along the flat sides of the M l l 3 in order to hold natural camouflage. This has proved quite effective on numerous occasions and can be applied to the whole family of M1J3 variants. Similar measures can work with the other support vehicles found in frontline positions, the MMA1 in particular. Tree branches and netting can be hung along the sides and rear deck, with netting or branches affixed to the boom to obscure its distinctive shape in the raised position. A bit of experimentation will soon show the best camouflage configuration, which allows the mechanics unimpeded working room. As combat support vehicles ply the road networks, they should be camouflaged with radar-scattering ncts and tree branches, which allow them to quickly pull off the road and blend into the scenery when hostile aircraft pass overhead. Some units may find it dificult to adhere to these measures due to their vehicle design or mission, however, dificulty should not be an excuse to ipore concealment measures. Anyone doubting the effectiveness of even relatively unsophisticated ground attack aircraft has but to read any account of the German Army in the Battle of Normandy. 12 ARMOR -

The requirement for tanks to remain mobile and able to react quickly dictates that some thought be given to alfix-ing camouflage. It is a waste of time to repeatedly camouflage certain portions of the tank, only to have it fall or be knocked off every time the vehicle moves. Thus, most temporarily-affixed foliage or radar-scattering nets should be placed above sponson box level. The concealment of the hull is accomplished by frequently occupying hull-down positions. The tank crew has only to concentrate on blending the turret and back decks in with the scenery. The gun tube is concealed by wrapping WD-1 conimo wire and tree branches around it. When the range Camouflage is even more important in..- the defense because the position is static and the enemy has plenty of time to look it over prior to the attack. card is finished, the 105-mm is depressed so it blends in with the ground, leaving observation lo the tank commander’s binoculars or to selected tanks’ thermal sights. Main guns are a dead giveaway if they protrude horizontally over a ridgeline or out of a shadowed treeline. To use terrain effectively to conceal the hull eliminates the need to spend time camouflaging the suspension, and contributes to the vehicle’s survivability by providing cover from direct lire and lowering thc tank‘s profile. This linlitation to the placement of on-board camouflage also cuts down the amount of time needed to tactically conceal combat vehicles and lo replace camouflage material when it is lost or damaged. Armor soldiers should note that BELOW the sponson box is the cutoff point. The top of the hull should remain camouflaged to deceive aerial observers wheA it is not feasible to erect netting. In an offensive situation, camouflage is generally limited to keeping the vehicle hull- or turret-down while moving, and camouflaging the turret, back deck, and gun tube in order to break up the silhouette. This provides a more difficult target for enemy gunners as they try to obtain the correct sight picture. Camouflage requirements in a defensive situation are more exacting. This is because the defender is usually stationary, at least initially, in a generally known location that may be subjected to intense scrutinization prior to any attack. This calls for stringent camouflage discipline in order to dekat photo reconnaissance, patrols, etc. Because the defender is usually numerically inferior, it behooves him to remain undetected in order to preserve his combat power from preparatory fires and to achieve surprise. Tanks can be concealed most effectively by driving into woods, buildings, or by using the camouflage screening systems. One drawback of these methods is that they limit fields of fire. The speeds at which modern armored vehicles can travel cross country demand quick reaction times and good fields of traverse for defending tankers. To position a tank on a hillside within a not-too-heavily vegetated area offers an ideal defensive position. A hidden tank on a ridgeline may or may not have a sky background. It must conceal its manmade angles with foliage or netting. Branches are inserted upright into the bustle rack area and around the infantry rails, taking care not to obscure the laser or sighting systems. Camouflage should be placed in front of the loader’s hatch and the wind sensor. This conceals the sensor mast and decreases the movement signature of anyone enter-ingexiting through the loader’s hatch. Natural camouflage, easily removed, should be placed on the forward part of the turret roof and cupola. Always walk out in front of your positions, if possible, to check out the effectiveness of your work. A limited number of ideal positions may force some tankers to be ARMOR - March-April1989 13 tem consists of nets (either diamond or hex), support poles, ‘butterflies,” stakes, and rope. The more complete the set, the easier it is to correctly conceal a tank. The key is to camouflage the vehicle and allow it also to FIGHT that position. In this situation, the tank is oriented toward the most likely enemy avenue of approach. The netting should conceal the vehicle from the mantle1 rearward. This allows observation, limited turret traverse, and firing of the main gun. The forward portion of the tank can be hidden with foliage or by draping a smaller diamond net over the front slope. Too many times I have seen tankers putting the nets over the sighting system and main gun while leaving the relatively broad and visible rear dcck exposed. I can only assume this is to aid withdrawal upon enemy contact. WRONG! Take the time to obliterate the tracks leading into any battle position. We have taught other armies that this contributes to survival. In the next conflict, we may not have air superiority or even parity. During peacetime, it is a great way to conceal yourself from the brigade commander’s helicopter. One important aspect in training like we are going to fight is to include carnounage procedures into tank prep-to-fire checklists. So why do we go down Table X11 without TA-50 and uncamouflaged? This deprives our crews of learning where to put camouflage, and where not to put it. In this case, altered radar-scattering nets draped over the turret may prove to be more effective than natural camouflage for shooting on the able to traverse freely, with branches and hanging nets providing no impediment to movement. The crew should be able to see, lase, and shoot while buttoned up. Do not allow branches, etc. to obscure the gunner’s primary or secondary sights, the laser ran-gefindcr, wind sensor, or commander’s optical systems. The main gun blast may set fire to camouflage too near the muzzle itself or alter the position of poorly secured natural foliage and screening nets. Learn these lessons in a safe training environment rather than during the first battle of the next war. Lastly, urhani7ation is thrusting city camouflage techniques to a position of greater priority. Most U. S. Army systems are designed for operating in the countryside and are sometimes incompatible with situations. Canvas tarpaulins can be stretched over alleyways where tanks are parked to conceal them from aerial observation. Materials such as plastic or canvas sheeting, aluminum siding, and corrugated tin are available at construction sites and lumber yards for camouflaging tanks in a built-up area. Houses and barns offer protection. lr you choose to drive a tank into a house, do not be overly inlluenced by war movies. Take off 5 0 caliber machineguns and wind sensors, close the ballistic shield, and depress the main gun before you decide to crash through a wall. More important, first check to see if the house has abasement! Needless to say, this practice is highly discouraged during peacetime. Growing urbanization in Europe may call wiien uo you n e w io iuuy camouflage a tank? seems to be the most frequently asked question. The chart below may be used as a guide to avoid the wasted times when camouflage nets are painstakingly erected only to receive the ordcr to move out in five minutes: Battlefield Against Against Location Air Threat ground Threat Deep Attack YeS No

No Yes Battalion Area Yes Yes Fwd of M e Rear Yes Yes Fwd of Div Rear Yes No

Yes No When do you use nets? 0 Air Parity exists - if y mare immobile in a relativcly open area for one hour or more. 0 Enemy Air Superiority - if you are in a relatively open area for more than 30 minutes while halted. 0 Friendly air superiority - why change history? Whenever you feel you wish to avoid enemy artillery fires. If these time frames are revised, then perhaps they may be revised downward for wartime and upward for peacetime (realism versus training value). We must devise a training program to correct our shortcomings in this area. We need to teach our soldiers how to do it, noncommissioned officers how to supervise, and officers how to check their efforts. How many lieutenants know that the camouflage screen, when erected over a vehicle, should be 12- 18 inches away from the object it is concealing? Those deficiencies that 14 ARMOR - are the most prevalent should have the most corrective emphasis. Common shortfalls include the tendency to camouflage against ground or air detection but not both, when and how to put up nets, how to fight from a camouflaged position, prep-to-fire checks, and compromising the job after it has been done. Many tankers don’t know how to put camouflage materials on that will stay on when their vehicles are moving. All these things occur on a daily basis during field exercises. The mentality that the Combat Arm of Decision and shock action does not NEED to camouflage, needs lo be dispelled, and soon. How can commanders institute an effective camouflage program? By teaching soldiers how and why they should camouflage. The following principles should apply: 0 Take combat-loaded vehicles down range on gunnery exercises to teach prep-to-fire in conjunction with camouflage.. Have enough nets to conceal each company effectively. Commanders frequently inspect screening systems. If you operate in an area that experiences snowfall during the winter months, an additional set of snow camouflage netting will. prove worthwhile. (It’s Class IX.) eView positions from the enemy’s perspective to correct deficiences. Do not allow mistakes and bad habits to go uncorrected. Insist on high standards. Encourage ingenuity. Use common sense and don’t acquire camouflage materials fr6m your immediate surroundings. 0 Change to suit the e.nvironment. Break up man-made outlines. nx.. M113 with nets erected blends into nearby tree during NATO exercise. 0 Understand how shadows, dust, and camouflage paint deceive the human eye’s perception. *Learn to fight from under camouflage nets. The goal of all Commanders should be to prove the dictum “if you can be seen, you can be hit, if you can be hit, you can be killed by first denying the enemy visual acquisition. This denies the enemy the initiative in many cases. Because no known armor can totally defeat attack, and speed in itself is no guarantee of survival, armor leaders should enforce a commonsense program of concealment for all combat and combat support vehicles, be they moving or stationary. This will help preserve the force and contribute to its ability to continue the mission. This relatively inexpensive combat multiplier may prove to be the diffcrcnce between success and failure in some future tactical engagements. ARMOR - March-April1989 Captain Mark J. Reardon was‘ commissioned in Armor from Loyola College of Baltimore in 1979 and is a graduate of the AOBC, Airborne and Ranger courses. He served with 2d Armored Division as tank platoon leader, scout platoon leader and company XO. He attended the AOAC, motor officer course, and the joint firepower course and was assigned to. 2d Infantry Division as battalion S3 (Air) and a company commander. At the time he wrote this article, he was assigned as a combat development analyst with the Concepts Branch, Fort Rucker, AI. 15