The Dynamo Connection

The Dynamo Connection: Major General Ernest N. Harmon and the American Armored Division During World War II by Colonel John W. Mountcastle The profane and hot-tempered filed his time during the interwar Ernest N. Harmon brought to years. The same aggressiveness that corps the rare combination of was Harmon's combat hallmark in sound tactical judgement and two world wars led him to compete boldness that together make a in the 1924 Olympic Military Pen-great commander. More than any tathlon, to serve with great success other division commander in Europe he was to become our most outstanding tank commander.. . . I - GEN Omar N. Bradley Africa and again in northwe2 Europe. His demonstrated talent for aggressive battlefield leadership dictated his selection as a replacement for the battle-weary commander of the 1st Armored Division in the acrimonious aftermath of North Africa, he was constantly and brilliantly aggressive; in the Kasserine Pass debacle. Harmon led the still-shaken 1st Armored through the successful destruction of the Afrika Korps A West Point graduate, class of 1917, 'Ernie'' Harmon was just one of many solid young men who sailed for Europe in early 1918. Assigned to the U.S. Second Cavalry, Harmon was determined to do more than his share in the struggle popularly known as the War to End All Wars. Like so many of his classmates, the young officer (a captain by war's end) spent a great deal of that followed Kasserine and took his adopted division to the deadly, dreary slugfest that was Italy. The last year of the war in Europe would see him leading his tankers, armored infantry, and self-propelled artillery on the drive for the Roer River basin and through the crucial actions that blunted the spearhead of Hiller's last great offensive in the Ardcnnes. A corps commander by war's end, Harmon participated in the final destruction oT the Third Reich. his youthful enthusiasm and some MG Ernest N. Harmon in postwar aSSig* Despite his battlefield successes, of his blood in the muddy merit BS commander Of U.s Constabulary, Ernest N. Harmon would retire in trenches and shell-churned fields the OccuPYing force in Germany after the 1948, still wearing the two stars of of France. His combat experien- WLlr was won. a major general. There was, it ces in the St. Mihiel and Argonne seems, no call for his talents in offensives led to an enduring as a leader of the Civilian Conserva-the upper echelons of the hatred of the tactical siluation that tion Corps, and caused his eventual peacetime Army. He was a fighter, was epitomized by trench warfare. decision to leave the cavalry for the first and last. The general, called A revulsion at the great losses suf-bastard child of the U.S. Army - "Old Gravel Voice' or simply, 'The fered by infantry formations and a the undermanned, partially Bull," by his troops, the armored suspicion that the day of the horse equipped Armored Force. His per-division commander who perhaps cavalry was done on the modern bat-sonal commitment to the new armor best understood the concepts of tlefield were among the mementos branch proved to be, in his case, a mechanized combat, the tough that he brought home from Europe. marriage born of conviction, nur-fighter who rode into battle in the These impressions led him to fre-tured by devotion, and fulfilled $I turret of a Sherman tank in order to quently question those solons of the combat. It was a union of dynamos.- "feel" the battle, had always been sfafiis quo he encountered in the Ernest Harmon would command ready to speak his mind, to let the troop assignments and schools that the 2d Armored Division in North chips fall where they may. He ruf- r30- ARMOR - March-April1988 I

"...Patton was to comment favorably on Harmon's personal bravery and drive in several of his diary entries ....I' fled some high-ranking feathers along the way and it all came home to roost once the lighting was done. In this respect, Harmon resembled another American tanker of WWII, George S. P a t t ~ n . ~ For a student of maneuver warfare in the age of mechanization, Ernie Harmon's story provides a classic example of a field commander who attended the birth of the American Armored Force and then matured along with the men of "Old Ironsides" and "Hcll on Wheels" as they honed their skills in the lightning war - Blitzkrieg. First Steps Ernest Harmon watched the growth of Hiller's power from a desk as he wrestled with small peacetime appropriations, while trying to modernize various branches of the Army and the Army Air Corps. During the period 1935- 1939, Harmon reached a decision that would ultimately affect his future and that of thousands of soldiers who served with him during

WWII:

I liked Iiorses, I liked being in tlie saddle, arid I liked polo. Biit ... I had become coitviiiced that, in ritodent war, horse cavalry was as obsolescent as the arrow artd the spear. .. I had been following Gentian, Frertcli, and British niilitan' reports on tlie dervlopnicnt of tlie tank. ... nieclt-anized irriits coiild artd slioiild take over the traditional battle jiiitctions of cavalry .... 4 Harmon's decision to leave the cavalry made no friends for him within the office of the Chief of Cavalry, hut afforded him the opportunity to become intimately acquainted with the development of the neophyte U.S. Armored Force. He served in the First Mechanized Cavalry Regiment and in Brigadier General Adna R. Chaffee's Armored Force Headquarters from 1939 until 1941. After a short stint in the Army's War Plans Division, he was again able to rejoin troops, this time as a newly-promoted brigadier general assigned to the 9th Armored Division, then just forming at Fort Riley, Kansas. Transfers were a way of life in the rapidly expanding U.S. Army of 1942 and, after less than a year at Riley, Harmon found himself flying east to assume command of the 2d Armored Division. Joining the unit on maneuvers in North Carolina, he soon put his personal stamp on the division that he would lead in combat on two continents. Within a month of taking command, (a period of frenetic activity), Harmon was tasked to select three invasion teams from within the divkion. Each team was a combined arms force capable of independent action and was supportcd by its own "slice" of the division's support units. On 8 Nov 1942, these forces were engaged in Operation TORCH as they landed at three locations in North Africa. While the troops of the "Hell on Wheels" division faced only desultory resistance from the French forces occupying Morocco, they nevertheless demonstrated a high degree of commitment and enthusiasm that fit pcrfectly into Harmon's set of guidelines for armored operations. Harmon's commander during TORCH, Major General George S. Patton, was quite pleased with Harmon's performance after such a short time in command. Patton was to comment favorably on Harmon's personal bravery and drive in several of his diary entries. One illuminating passage in the published Pattori Papers indicates just how important to Ernest Harmon the first few months of active operations would be. From Patton: Shortly before we le$' the U.S. last October, General Marshall sent for iiie arid said that lie had a ltiiiich Haniion was no good arid sziggesred that I leave hint. I said that if lie ordered rite to leave Haniton, I would, but not otherwise. He said, '011 your head be it! Tonight Ire said 'Patton, I was wmitg about Haniiott arid yoii were riglit. will he make a corps cont-niartder?' I said yes.5 In the U.S. Army, like most others, an officer's chance for greatness may well depend on the impressions drawn by a few key superiors. With the situation secure in Morocco, Ernie Harmon got his chance to make a greater contribution to the Allied effort in North Africa within a few months, this time in Tunisia, in the aftermath of an American setback. Harmon and "Old Ironsides" Ernest Harmon's introduction to the 1st Armored Division, in February 1943, came about through unusual circumstances. Responding to British complaints about inept leadership at the U.S. I1 Corps Headquarters and to disparaging remarks about the battleworthiness of the 1st Armored Division, General Eisenhower sent Harmon to investigate and report to him his findings in the I1 Corps area of operations. In essence, Harmon went from his quiet sector in Morocco to the battlefront in Tunisia as a "headhunter." After spending time with both MG Fredendall (I1 r ~~ ARMOR - March-April 1988 31 I month before being called once again to Tunisia, this time as Orlando Ward's rcplacement in the 1st Armored Division. Harmon led the division throughout the rest of the fighting, which took place in April and May. During this two-month period, his greatest challenge was restoring confidence in a unit that had suffered from hesitant leadership in a number of critical positions. Operating on the theory that troops fight best when they are motivated to do so, Harmon relentlessly prowled the forward areas. Coaching, ca,joling, scolding, he was always where he could "feel" the battle as his division participated in the Allied drive that would achieve victory through destruction of the Afrika Korps.6 To serve as one of the mercurial Patton's subordinates was not easy. Given very little guidance by Patton as to his initial mission, Harmon elected to change the tempo of operations in the division. Just prior to his arrival, the 1st AD had been defending against German attacks each morning; then counterattacking to regain lost ground each afternoon. The Germans, it seemed, retained the tactical initiative even though, by April 1043, thcir situation in Tunisia was desperate. Harmon records his decision and Patton's response this way: MG Harmon reviews his Constabulary troops in Germany after the war. Corps) and MG Ward (1st AD), Harmon verified the unsatisfactory state of Fredendall's leadership. George Patton subsequently replaced Fredendall. Having com-pletcd this ticklish mission, Harmon returned to his own division, then training in Morocco. He was to remain with "Hell on Wheels" only a little more than a From now on I want tis to make a limited attack even7 nioniirig, front five huridred to one tlioiisarid yards. If we itteet tlie Gentians on tlte way lip, we'll figlit it out. And we will in-fonii C o p each riioniirig that we are attacking. U'e piit this policy into effect tlie rtcri nioniirig, arid Pattort soon reacted. "Wtat in Iiell are yoti doing orit tliere?II lie roared at me over tlie "Nothing, " I replied iririocentlv. "We telepltorte. are jiist attacking liere. 'I "I told yoii to stay oii defense!" Ire slioiited. Toil didn't tell lite a danirted tliiiig. You just told lire to get tlie Itell out,' I said. ntai I cvplairicd that tlie attacks were limited, designed siitip4 to keep the Geniiaiis of balance. Patton approved the new tactic arid 7 111111g 11p. Harmon continued to press the leaders in the division to seize the initiative and maintain forward momentum. The American forces must, according to Harmon, bring unrelcnting pressure to bear on the Axis forces. On 0 May 1943, Harmon came upon the lead element of his Combat Command B whose advance had been halted by encmy forces seeking to delay the capture of Bkerte. Harmon's tactic was simply and effectively to urge the tank force commander into action. Harmon recorded later: A s I reaclied tlie front. ..I cariie iipori a cluster of tanks parked bv tlie side of tlie road, firing brarwlv but not riioviiig forward. niec was fair!), severe rtiacltirie gun fire, but I ittanaged io pick niy way to tlte lank's cornmarider; lie told lite that Iris tanks were being held tip by heavy riiacliirie gin and tank fire. "All rigltt," 1 said, "Yoti follow nty jeep forward," arid I climbed back into tlie veliicle. iliis was siifficieiitlv eiiibarrassiiig to stir the yotirig coni-iiiaiider into action; tlie tanks began to Illol'e tip. 8 Throughout the final stages of the fighting in Tunisia, Ernest Harmon strove to overcome the widely-held feelings of resistance to a new leadcr, which frcquently exist within an organization that has heen accused of below-par performance. In later years, Harmon admitted that he had, perhaps, been a bit harsh in 32 ARMOR - March-April 1988 his first meeting with 1st AD officers, fining those who were late and criticizing their past performance. But his motive was evident. Harmon was determined to restore a sense of aggressiveness to a unit that had lost heavily in both casualties and confidence. Those leadcrs who did not measure up to "The Bull's" standards were removed and, in their place, came new leaders who had demonstrated their grasp of the techniques of maneuver warfare so aptly shown by the Germans. ARMOR - March-April 1988 33 The summer of 1943 was spent reequipping the 1st Armored and training the division's units to function as well-drilled combat teams. Battle "plays" were repetitively practiced to encourage quick responses to difercnt combat situations. They analyzed lessons learned in battle and made changes in techniques. One of the most significant adjustments made was in the concepts surrounding the use of tank destroyer units. The Germans had destroyed the TDs in wholesale lots during the battles around Kasserine, primarily because US. field commanders insisted upon using the lightly armored, self-propelled guns as surrogate tanks. Harmon became deeply involved in reworking the tactics employed by the tank destroyers, modelling their new employment techniques in part on German practice. Henceforth, the American TDs would make full use of their mobility, but instead of assaulting German armored formations head-on, they would assume protected positions from which to engage the Germans from the flank or rear. The division's armored infantry regiment, so often employed in a static defense role for which it was poorly suited, was reoriented toward its intcnded purpose, that of assisting the tank regiments in seizing assigned objectives. The use of armored infantry to secure the An American M10 tank destroyer speeds past the Leaning Tower of Pisa during the Italian campaign. flanks of armored assaults in reslric-tive terrain had worked in May. It was practiced again and again in the hot summer months as Old Ironsides prepared itself for its next taste of combat in Italy. Assaulting the "Soft Underbelly of Europe" In September 1943, the 1st AD sailed from Oran to Naples and joined GEN Mark W. Clark's Fifth Army. Harmon had been concerned about the potential problems of employing an armored division in the dilficult terrain of Italy. After two months of grinding slowly northward toward Rome, he wrote: Z ani also treiiteitdously irtterested in the probleiii of the use of tanks in Ita& arid m i looking jorward to it with a very serioiis mind for I Ice1 that we are going irt under a treiitert-dous Itartdicap as to terrain. The antitank put, when it is able to canalize o w adryartce arid restrict it to a liar-row jroiit, has a great edge over the tank. He completed the letter by commenting upon the challenges raised by hills, gullies, narrow roads, and unfordable streams. 'We are well equipped, well trained, and morale is high, hut 1 look forward to one of the most difficult campaigns the Division has attempted to Lake part in.ft9 Harmon was correct in his assessment. The division received heavy casualties as it pushed north. But the 1st Armored was not the only unit to suffer at the hands of the tenacious Germans. So slow was the Allies' progress up the Italian peninsula that the decision was made to conduct Operation SHINGLE, an amphibious turning movement that would inject Allied troops behind German defense lines. The site selected for the operation was Anzio, only 35 miles from Rome. The major command in the beachhead, the U.S. VI Corps, was led by MG John P. Lucas." Ernie Harmon reported to Lucas at Anzio on 24 January 1944. The 1st AD (less Combat Command B) moved directly from landing craft into combat as it was pressed into the makeshift defense that had been implemented in the face of frequent and well-executed German counterattacks. It would be in this role, as the "Anzio Fire Brigade" for the beachhead's dcfenders, that the "Old Ironsides" troops would fight most of its combat actions throughout January and Februaty. Churning through muddy fields, along heavily-mined roads and trails, and across storm-swollen irrigation ditches, the tankers and armored infantrymen fought a war that was a far cry indeed from that envisioned by the founders of the armored divisions. After a month of this sort of action, which closcly came to resemble the trench warfare of WWI, Harmon in a letter to Lucas laid out the urgent need for effective counterattack planning by the VI Corps staff. Harmon's major complaint was that many opportunities for telling counter-strokes were being lost because each new enemy encroachment was dealt with on an ad hoc basis by those troops immediately threatened. Harmon felt that much more effective use of his armored strength could and should bc made if only infantry division commanders had proper guidance from Lucas and his staff." However frustrated Harmon might be, his feelings were vented on the Germans, not his own soldiers. The energetic commander stayed on the move, frequently visiting his frontline units. At Harmon's insistence, a regular schedule of rest and recreation trips to Naples was schedulcd for 1st Armored troops. And, when he heard that rear echelon military policemen were harassing his combat troops on R & R, Harmon went to Naples to personally a€fect a solution. As spring came to Italy, Harmon's troops undertook a vigorous training program, while at the same timc, continuing their dcfcnsc of the Anzio perimeter. Anticipating an eventual Allied breakout, Harmon and his G3 published a series of well-written training notes that served as the basis for stepped-up combined arms maneuver training in areas not under enemy observation and lire. Ernie Harmon longed, of course, for an end to the stalemate and for an opportunity to light a tanker's maneuver war again. In a letter to his fricnd, LTG Lcslie

J. McNair, Harmon spoke candidly on a number of topics: his frustration with the terrain, the distressing lack of technical proficiency among the British officers with whom he worked, the need for improved tracks for his Sherman tanks, and the proper techniques for employing an armored division in breakthrough and exploitation. Clearly, "Gravel Voice" Harmon was ready to roll again! '?- The 1st Armored had the opportunity to take up the attack again that summer. Breaking out of the beachhead on 23 May 1944, the division fought its way to Rome, entering the Holy City on 4 June 1944, just two days bcfore the Allied landings in Normandy. Harmon did not tarry in Rome, but pushed on to the north, attacking skillfully and with great effect throughout the month of June. It was not until early July that the 1st AD was pulled from the attack to rest. During this respite, two major changes took place. The 1st AD would belatedly comply with a War Department directive that reduced the size of the division while, at the same time, causing a significant chanse in the organization and composition of armored and infantry battalions. In addition to the reorganization, the troopers of the 1st AD would have to get used to a new commander, because Ernie Harmon had been called back to the U.S. to take command of an army corps. It was with rcal emotion that Harmon bade farewell to a division that had truly fought the good fight and would continue to do so. Back to "Hell on Wheels" After 20 months overseas, the general enjoyed a short leave with his wifc before traveling to Camp Bowie, Texas, to take command of the XXlII Corps. But before he could assume his wcll-earned promotion, Harmon would receive a fresh call to combat. Summoned hurriedly back to Washington, Harmon was advised by Army Chief GEN George C. Marshall that GEN Eisenhower had sent an urgent request for Harmon's return to Europe, this time to assume command of his former division, the 2d Armored, which was fighting in France. Harmon recalled the rneet-ing with Marshall this way: Yoti don't haw to go; you have eanied your promotion, '' said Marshall. "It's tip to you." Tliere was a silcitce wltile lie wailed for rtiy replv. For rite, it was a painfir1 riioiiteiit. Oiicc again that third star of a fieuterrartt gcrreral, wliicli had seerired almost on ~ i i y slioiildec was flitting out of reach. But dow~i deeper I knew that tlie job of getting tlie war woit was more irrtponaiit to lite titair personal proriiotioii. "When do yoir want itre to go?" I asked. Marshall's face crinkled into a grin. "Sirice the day bcforeye~terday."~~ Taking over from MG Edward H. Brooks in September, Harmon rapidly began to re-establish himself with the "Hell on Wheels" Division as the unit pushed toward the Belgian border as part of Courtney Hodges' First Army. The 2d AD continued its offensive without a significant break during the next three months. Harmon's presence was soon felt throughout the division as he traveled, frequently by tank, armored car, or light plane, back and forth across his attack zone. The 2d AD soldiers understood his concepts of blitzkrieg. They demonstrated their grasp of the basic tenets of maneuver war during the 2d Armored's drive. In crossing .. 34 ARMOR - March-April 1988 the Albert Canal in Belgium, Harmon displayed his mastery of maneuver by sending one third of his combat strength on a looping, turning movement that quickly collapsed the previously stubborn German defense of the water obstacle. A proud commander reported, "As the dust settled two days later, the 2d Armored had bagged several thousand prisoners, suffered only a handful of casualties, and controlled all the land between the Albert Canal and the River Meuse."14 In November, the W Armored served with distinction in what was to be the last major Allied offensive before the onset of winter. Now assigned to Simpson's Ninth Army, the 2d AD drove toward the Roer River basin inside Germany's border. From 16 November until the end of the month, Harmon drove his forces forward. Despite rain and sleet that mired tanks and made maneuver across open ground difficult for tracked vehicles, and all but impossible for trucks, the division continued to seek out weaknesses in German defenses, open a hole, then punch through with attacking tanks and Cast-moving armored idantry. By the end of Operation QUEEN, "Hell on Wheels" division had destroyed 86 German tanks, ' killed an estimated KW Germans, and captured an additional2,385. Having demonstrated its ahility to attack with great e k t , the 2d Armored reverted to a temporary defense while the weary troops rested, and equipment received much needed maintenance. The division was largely recuperated from the rigors of its offensive when, on 16 December 1944, word came of the German offensive in the Ardennes." The Bulge and Beyond Harmon's 2d Armored went on alert for possible movement from its positions along the west bank of the Roer River in Germany late on 16 December 1944. The unsettled conditions attendant to the German advance in the Ardennes region kept the "Hell on Wheels" troopers and their commanding general waiting until, on 21 December, Harmon received orders transferring the 2d AD from control of Simpson's Ninth Army to Hodges' beleaguered First Army. The 2d Armored Division history states: With ody time hoiilrrs advance notice, tlie entire Division packed iip, hinied its Roer River line over to tlie 29th Infamy Division, and staged an ariiazing forced rttarcli by night on 21- 22 Decernber to vicini@ of Hiiy, Bel-giiiiii. AI1 combat eleiiicrtts covered the 75 miles over strange roads witliin 22 lioiirs, in spite of a shortage of maps and a riiirtiiitiirii of previous reconnaissance. Von Riirtdstedt's spearheads were threatening Liege, Dinant, and Nariiiir at the time. Upon amval in Bclgiiiitt, patrols irir-niediatel?) moved orit to tlie soiitlt and east, riiakirig contact with the enenty on 23 December, ncar Haid Belgiiini, iincoritforlably close to Nannir. ... In the fiw-da?) battle, 24 December to 28 December, in wliicli "Hell on Wheels" gained the iipper hand by iinrelenting sltock attack, the division eflectivcr?) destroyed tlie German 2d Panzer Division, wliicli Itad paced the eneniy 's 60-niilc westward advance. nte American VI Cops siinimarized the division 's sriiaslting victory as one that hiay well be remembered as having one of the most far-reacttirig effects of any action of World War IZ. *lo As indicated in the published history, Harmon's troopers made a superb road march and rapidly occupied their new assembly areas in Belgium. Harmon's personal influence was felt everywhere during the period 21 December 1944 until 19 January 1945 when he bid farewell to the 2d Armored for the last time, in order to assume command of the XXIl Corps. Although ostensibly on the defensive, the 2d Armored took every possible opportunity to carry the fight to the Gcrmans. In this respect, Harmon had made his single greatest contribution lo the division because he had instilled in it the fierce desire to close with and destroy the enemy through the use of maneuver, firepower, and shock. Awessive patrolling by 2d AD units resulted in the first report of enemy contact near Haid, Belgium, about mid-day on 23 December. Harmon's response was typical. Running from his headquarters to a tank company assembled nearby, he gave the order to move at once to blocking positions near the town of Ciney, in the path of the German advance. The company was rolling in less than five minutes. Harmon's troopcrs knew he meant it when he shouted, "Move out, now! I'll have the whole damn division coming right behind you!"" Despite instructions from Field Marshal Montgomery (then in temporary command of all Allied forces on the northern shoulder of the Bulge) to withdraw farther west on 24 December, Harmon felt that the time was ripe for a full-blown counterattack. Second AD scouts had brought him word of a major German concentration near Celles which appeared to be halted for lack of gasoline. Harmon's appeals to his corps commander, J. Lawton Collins, for permission to attack reflect the nature of the man called "The Bull" perfectly: 1430 - Harmon to VI1 Corps: "One of my patrols just spotted I ARMOR - March-April 1988 35 I

Kraut tanks coiled up near Bclgians say the Krauts are gas. They're sitting ducks. I take the bastards!' 1435 -Harmon to VI1 Carps: "We've got the whole damned 2d Panzer Division in a sack! You've got to give me immediate authority to attack!" Despite his misgivings, Collins authorized the Harmon attack. 1625 - Harmon to VI1 Corps: "The bastards are in the bag! In the bag!"'* Harmon was right. The 2d Panzer Division, a unit which had fought to the outskirts of Moscow in 1941 and threatened the Allies' control of the River Meuse in December 1944, ceased to exist as an organized fighting force. Harmon's forces enveloped the German units, many of which could not maneuver because of fuel shortages. A determined attempt by the 9th Panzer Division to rescue its sister unit was beaten off with heavy German losses. The remainder of December and the first three weeks of Celles. out of ,et me showed the Germans that they too undcrstood the blitzkrieg concept." On January 1945, Ernest N. HarAs V-E Day came and went, Harmon was itskcd to stay on in Europe to command the Army's portion of the Occupation Forces, the Constabulary. He undertook this mission, so different from the battle commands he had known for the last four years, in good faith and gave it his all. He would hold his post until late in 1947 before returning to the United States. Finding no worthwhile assignment forthcoming, Old "Gravel Voice" retired, still a major general, still recognized as one of America's foremost practitioners of blitzkrieg warfare. January found the 2d AD advancing through near-bliz- Harmon enjoys a hunt in Germany after the war. zard conditions- to secure ground lost in the early stages of the mon assumed command of the tles won; not in terms of stars Gcrman offensive.

XXII

Corps, an organization pinned upon his shoulder straps. designed to exercise tactical control Harmon was truly a product of his Repeatedly, the 2d AD over combat divisions in field opera-times. Not a brilliant student at demonstrated its ability to find the lions. But for Ernie Harmon, the West Point, he was commissioned in enemy, fix him in position, then war as he had known it was nearly the Cavalry (a distinctly "sweaty" ser-maneuver to strike his flanks and over. Saddled with a staff composed vice), not the intellectually-prom-rear. Assisted by Allied aircraft largely of superannuated also-rans inent Corps of Engineers. A veteran flying close air support sorties when-and assigned duties more in keeping of the Great War, he shared the dis-ever the weather permitted, and by with administrative housekeeping, illusionment of the trench warfare self-propelled artillery noted for its Harmon chafed at the bit like an participants, but took all of 20 years responsiveness, the Americans old cavalry horse put out to pasture. to finally cut himsclf loose from the 36 ARMOR - March-April 1988 Anyone who reads the history of the U.S. Army during WWII must eventually reach the conclusion that the army that contributed mightily to the defeat of the Axis was essentially a small army that had swollen so quickly !o meet wartime requirements that its primary stabilizing factor was its leaders. And, having grasped this truth, the basic question must be addressed: What made a successful leader? In Ernest Harmon's case, success must be measured in terms of batanachronistic caviilry that he loved. When he did make the break, he swore allegiance to the new combat arm of decision, the Armored Force. Striving to make a success of and in his adopted service, Harmon Grst studied those more advanced than he, then applied the concepts preached by Guderian, Liddcll-Hart, and Rommel. The fact that high level commanders continuously sought Harmon attests to his progress as a tank leader. Full of light, Harmon was a small, stocky fellow who pcrsonified the man who goes through life struggling to overcome a "runt complex," demonstrating his manhood through aggressive behavior. But thcrc is more than that to Harmon, the professional officer. He understood soldiers, their wants and fears. He liked being with them. And he could lead. In limes of deepest peril, Harmon could blend firepower, maneuver, and shock action - that maelstrom of whirling, slashing action overlaid with fire -into a full-blown tank attack. Ernie Harmon had a feel for the relationships of time and space: he knew how long it would take a tank company to move from its present position to the designated line of departure and then close with the enemy. He was, in fact, a dynamo married to a dynamic creation, the American armored division. Full of fight, robust, energetic, and leading a perfectly melded winning team, Ernie Harmon was the Dynamo Connection. Notes 'Omar N. Bradley, A Solder's Story (New York: Henry Holt, 1951), P. loo. While praising Harmon, Bradley also chided him for sometimes failing to make optimal use of his infantry. ing up to WWII. See Ernest N. Harmon with Milton Macraye and Willlam Ross Mac Ka ye, Combat Commander, (Englewood Cliffs NJ: Pren-tice-Hall, 1970). Look especially to Chapters 1-4. 3Harmon's ability to upset more clr-cumspect soldiers (like General George

C. Marshall or General Ben Lear) is commented upon in Combat Commander, pp. 4647, and pp. 142-143. Harmon's collected papers contain correspondence files that provide real inslght into the thoughts and feelings of "Old Gravel Voice." See the Ernest N. Harmon Papers, US. Army Military History Institute, Carlisle Barracks, PA (hereafter referred to as Harmon Papers, USAMHI). 4Combat Commander, pp. 56-57. 5Martin Blumenson, The Patton Papers, 1940-1945, Vol.ll (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1974), p. 258. The vote of confidence from Patton was beneficial, but Marshall became irritated with Harmon the next morning and cast doubts upon his fitness for corps command. 'George

F. HOW, The Battte ~istow of the 1st Armored Division (Washington, D.C.: Combat Forces Press, 1954), pp. 11 7-252. See also The Panon Papers, pp. 172-177s. 'Combat Commander, p. 125. 81bid., p. 136. 'Letter, Harmon to MG E. J. Hughes, Dep. Theater Commander, HQ, NATOUSA, 13 Nov 1993. Harmon Papers, USAMHI, Correspondence April-December 1943, Box 1. "For an appreciation of the difficulties faced by Allied forces in Italy, see Martin Blumenson, Y.S. Armv In World War II: Salemo to Cassh (Washington, D.C.: US. Army OCMH, 1969). 'lLetter. Harmon to MG John P. Lucas, CG, VI Corps, 12 Feb 1944, Harmon Papers,

USAMHI,

Correspondence JanuaryJuly 1944, Box 1. 12Letter, Harmon to LTG Leslie J. McNair. CG, Army Ground Forces, 23 March 1944, Harmon Papers, USAMHI, Correspondence JanuaryJuly 1994,Box 1. ." l3S Combat Commander, p. 206. 'Harmon's own biography provides a . I- Ibid., p. 210. wealth of information on the years lead-ARMOR - March-April 1988 '!%he advance to the Roer is covered in Harmon's book, but look also to Edward A. Trahan, ed., A Histow of the Second United States Armored Division (Atlanta: Albert Love, 1947) Chapter VI. An excellent overall treatment of this phase of the war in Europe is found In Charles B. MacDonald, ' - (Washington, D.C.: US. Army OCMH, 1953). For readers with less time to spend, look to another book by MacDonald, The Miahtv Endeavor (New York, Oxford University Press, 1969). . . . "Trahan, op cit. Chap WI. 17Combat Commander, pp. 233-234. '*John Toland, Battle: The Stow of the (New York: Random House, 1959), pp. 242-245. The decision-making process surrounding the decision to unleash Harmon's attack Is covered In a number of sources. An excellent treatment is found in J. Lawton Collins, & nina Joe (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1979), pp. 286-294. "The 2d AD was credited with destroying the 2d Panzer Division by LTG Courtney Hodges. In a memo dated 5 January 1945, Hodges describes the "Enemy Equipment Counted in CELLES (P-0675) Pocket." The memo was heartily endorsed by MG Colllns and sent with a note from Field Marshal Montgomery stating, "my very best congratulations to the 2nd Armored Division." Harmon Papers USAMHI, After-Action Reports November 1944January 1945, Box 1.40- Colonel John W. Mountcastle taught history at West Point after graduate studies in history at Duke University. He has served in armor units in Germany,

CONUS,

and the Republic of Vietnam, and commanded 3-63 Armor in the FRG. He is presently serving in HQ, DA as division chief of the institutional training division, OCDSCOPS Training Directorate. 37