The S3/S4 Interface

The S3/S4 Interface: Operator and Logistician Must Work Together In Formulating Orders ,by Captain C. S. Barnthouse On the 29th of April, 1945, the 23d Cavalry Reconnaissance squadron crossed the Danube River near Neustadt, Germany, in pursuit of remnants of the Wehrmacht fleeing before the American onslaught into Bavaria during the closing days of WWII. The squadron commander had been made aware by his squadron maintenance officer and S4 that supply lines had reached their limit through the rapid advance since crossing the Rhine and that, because of this, resupply of fuel and repair parts would be problematic at best for the foreseeable future. The logistical situation, however, was not taken into consideration when the operation was planned, nor was there a well-thought-out plan for resupply. Indeed, supply of fuel was so short from the beginning, that the squadron’s self-propelled cannons were left behind at the line of departure (LD). The squadron did receive a supply of fuel on the evening of 29 April, but by the next evening, two troops had been halted by shortage of fuel; on 1 May, the squadron found itself hopelessly bogged down outside the village of Dorfen, not by enemy resistance, but by fuel shortages and maintenance breakdowns. The operation had come to a halt because inadequate logistical support plans had led to inadequate support of the operation. The S3 and the S4 had not developed a unified plan, and this failure had stopped the unit when the disintegrating enemy army could not.1 This situation, of course, is not the only example of failure to integrate logistical and operational planning at either high or low levels. Our history books are full of them. Well-known are the logistical failures that led to the dissolution of the French and German armies in Russia. Less well-known is the failure in British logistical planning that ultimately led to their defeat by the numerically and ma-terielly inferior Continental Army. In December of 1776, the Continental Army under General George Washington, having suffered a series of defeats, was being pursued through New Jersey. With the British Army to his front and the Delaware River to his rear, Washington ordered all boats along the river seized and thereby made his escape into Pennsylvania with what was left of his Army. The Delaware should have posed no obstacle to the British since their army normally carried collapsible boats in its supply trains when campaigning. Upon arrival at the river bank, however, the British discovered that the quartermaster had not brought any boats along on this campaign. With all available boats held by Washington’s forces, the British found themselves unable to pursue an enemy that for all intents was already defeated and merely waiting for the death blow. American control of these key transportation assets (boats), coupled with a historical European distaste for winter campaigning, led the British to break off their pursuit and go into winter quarters in New Jersey. This failure in coordination between the British tacticians and their quartermaster gave General Washington the breathing space he needed to reorganize and rejuvenate his little band sufficiently to re-cross the Delaware and deal the British a startling defeat at Trenton barely two weeks later.2 So, from its beginning, the lesson of the American Army has been that logistics and operations go hand in glove, and that operations planned without logistical considerations are almost certainly doomed to failure. In the same way, logistical operations planned without considering the operation they are to support may do little to further their cause. Nowhere is this more apparent than in the operational planning of most heavy battalions (armored and mechanized). Planning time, always at a premium, has led to the S4 writing his Paragraph 4 at the same time as the S3 is preparing Paragraph 3. Often, these two critical staff officers fail to coordinate their planning and, as a result, produce plans that, if they are not at cross purposes, are at least not well-disposed to support each other. In the end, the company commander receives two sets of overlays, one operational and one logistical, and an operations order containing uncoordinated Paragraphs 3 and 4. The commander, pressed for time, hands the logistical plans and ~ ~~ 34 ARMOR: The Magazine of Mobile Warfare March-April 1987

Figure 1 - Map of operation overlays to his executive officer or first sergeant and goes about his battle planning without taking logistics into consideration at all, trusting in a combination of Divine Providence and a creative first sergeant to sustain his effort. This leads, all too often, to disaster. What we need to alleviate this situation, and to reduce the time to prepare and present operations orders, is forthe S3 and the S4 to work together on all orders. In so doing, they should both work off of the same graphics and produce an operations order in the form of an execution matrix that addresses both operations and logistics. In order to illustrate this point, I provide the following example of such a process used by a task force staff in planning an operation. In this example, a balanced task force of two mechanized and two tank teams has received an order (Figure 1) from its brigade commander to cross the LD on.the Ander River, attack northwards, clear all resistance in sector, and seize bridgeheads over the Aur River. Although prepared enemy positions are in the sector, enemy resistance is expected to be light,

LOGISTICS ESTIMATES IAW RB 101-999

CLASS V

ESTIMATED

DAILY

EXPENDITURE

rnqww TINY

RESISTANCE

DEFEND

TOTAL:

ATTACK

TOTAL:

52 29 10 2sd 7 4 2 a g

RDSITRKRKI

HEAW

MODERATE

2 I 1 I 21

RDSIINF PLT

HEAW

13 I I

PER DAY

MODERATE

7 6 3 2 1 A

.50 CAL M2

RDS/INF PLT HEAW

PER DAY

MODERATE

472 396 ) ( _ h p L l

LIGHT

I 5 6 132 79 2 40MM

RDSIIWF PLT

HEAW

156 I32

PER DAY

MODERATE

84 72 X ~ L T

LIGHT

30 24 f r y

CLASS 111:

FUEL

UTILIZATION

TYPE UNITS:

QTV UNITS

GALIKM DF2

GALlKM TOT

GL/KM/MOG

GALIKM TOT

MECH C0.S

2 5 10 0.11 0.22

TANK C0.S

2 13.5 2 7 0.4 0. 8

EGR PLTS.

1 2 2

ADA PLTS.

1 2 1

HHC

1 9 3 3

TOTAL KM

ON ROAD

THIS OPN:

KMONROAD

E CO

3 : +A 0.11 + 0 . 2 2

TOT GALIKM

TOTGALlKM 4 3

KM X-CTRV

X2.5 +6s

KMXCX2.5 +A

FUEL CONSUMPTION EST.

6 3 6 3 FUEL EST. X GALlKM DF2 3765 M‘jAS 2 6Gf igure 2 - P re-tabulated logistical requirements The brigade commander explains that he wants at least one crossing ”.- .The lesson Of the captured quickly and the route to it ~~~~i~~~ has cleared of resistance so that he can exploit any penetration of the Aur with an armor-heavy task force currently in reserve. The S4 is immediately called forward to the TOC to assist in planning. Upon arrival there, he analyzes the brder. He estimates logistical requirements by using pre-tabulated data for the task force (Figure 2) and determines which of the proposed courses of action (prepared while he was enroute to the TOC from the combat trains) he can support and which he cannot. Taking the S4’s advice into consideration, the task force commander determines that he wants to make his main effort against the bridge over the Aur River in the western part of his sector, since he does not wish to get bogged down in a lengthy fight for the village of Grauberg. The western bridge may be captured more rapidly and achieve the brigade commander’s intent, even if Grauberg is not captured. The 53 and the battalion com-been that logistics and operations go hand in glove.. . mander study the brigade graphics and the map and place their own graphics over the brigade’s (Figure 3). The task force commander then settles on a course of action where a mechanized-heavy team (Tm. Alpha) crosses the intact bridge over the Ander at Checkpoint 11 and attacks Objective Able. Once Able is secure, a tank-heavy team leading (Team Tank) with a mechanized-heavy team (Team Delta) following will attack along Axis Blue. At PL Hawk, the teams will pull abreast, with Tm. Tank attacking to seize OBJ Baker South, and TM. Delta attacking to seize OBJ Baker North. Check Point 22 is a contact point. Upon OBJ Baker being secured, the remaining armor-heavy team (Team Armor) will pass through the objective on Axis Blue to continue the attack against the bridge over the Aur River at OBJ March-April 1987 ARMOR The Magazine of Mobile Warfare 35

Figure 3 - Commander and S3 add graphics Figure 4 - S4 adds his logistics controls Charlie. When T e a m h o r reaches Phase Line Eagle, Team Tank will move off OBJ Baker South, following Team Armor on Axis blue and supporting in the attack on OBJ Charlie. Simultaneously, Team Alpha will move out along Axis Orange in a support attack on OBJ Delta. Team Delta is to remain on OBJ Baker North, orient fires on Objective Charlie, and be prepared to support the attack on OBJ Charlie by fire or maneuver, to assist in the seizure of OBJ Delta, or to clear any resistance out of the forest between OBJ Baker and the Aur River. Once the S3 has placed his graphics on the map, the S4 - having been involved in the planning from the beginning and having determined that the proposed operation can be supported - asks that several additional checkpoints be added to the graphics as logistics control measures. Once these are added (Figure 4), the S4 presents his support plan. When Team Alpha crosses the LD, all logistical support assets will be in the current combat trains position (not shown). Once OBJ Able is secure, he will push maintenance and medical assets forward, behind attacking teams Tank and Delta and establish a forward maintenance collection point and aid station at the farm complex at CP 12. He also designates the farm complex as a logistics release point (LRP) in case any of the units need an emergency resupply. Once OBJ Baker is secure, the combat trains will follow Team Armor across the Ander River and occupy CP 12, absorbing the assets that have collected there during the early phases of the battle. CP 21 will then become the LRP since it services Objectives Able and Baker equally well and is shielded from the direct observation of enemy positions along the Aur River. As PL Eagle is crossed, the task force will begin an attack along two axes, so the S4 will split his support assets, pushing some maintenance and medical assets forward to CP 22 to support the main attack on OBJ Charlie and retain some assets in the combat trains at CP 12 to support the attack of Team Alpha along Axis Orange. As OBJ'Charlie is seized and Team Alpha crosses PL Eagle, the combat trains will displace to CP 22, follow the main effort, and again absorb any assets which have collected there during the battle. At the same time, maintenance and medical assets will move to CP 21 to continue the support of Tm Alpha's attack on Axis Orange. Two LRPs are again designated, each supporting a different axis of advance. As Team Alpha reaches OBJ Delta, assets supporting its advance will be pushed forward to the woods at CP 36. Once the task force has secured its sector up to its limit of advance at PL Owl, the maintenance and medical assets will move to the edge of the village of Grauberg in order to make use of any facilities which may be available there. LRPs are at CPs 34 and 35 to support both objectives with Class I, 111, and V resupply at the close of the operation. Main supply routes (MSRs) and alternate supply routes (ASRs) throughout the operation are designated by axis names, thus avoiding additional graphics. Once the task force commander has given his approval for this plan, the S3 and the S4 enter all information, both operational and logistical, onto a single execution 36 ARMOR: The Magazine of Mobile Warfare March-April 1987

I I -.am I -.- - 1 - 1 - WDaE

WSS

W. OaTA W Y a.

I. IO. v -

CUE

Figure 5 - S3 and S4's information combined matrix (Figure 5) in order to simplify preparation of the written order. Although both Paragraphs 3 and 4 of the operations order will be read as written above during the presentation, the subordinate unit commanders will receive only copies of the operationsllogistics overlay and the execution matrix. In this way, planning time is maximized while reproduction time is minimized and written materials are simplified. Summary Using this method of planning and presenting operations orders, fully integrating Paragraphs 3 and 4 into a single, all encompassing plan is possible. Additionally, it saves time and reduces possible confusion by placing all graphics on the same overlay and eliminates the need for preparation of the often-lost and usually-ignored logistics overlay. Of course, axes of advance may not always be selected as control measures. In this case, a single overlay may still be produced if the S4 draws his MSR and ASR on the operational overlay (Figure 6). Adoption of this technique carries with it the additional Figure 6 - S4's MSR and ASR added to overlay ". . . It saves time and reduces possible confusion by placing all graphics on the same overlay.. . .. benefit of establishing within the task force a well-ingrained SOP as to where task force logistical assets may be found at any given phase of a battle. In this way, should the S4 for some reason be unable to participate in the planning of an operation, or should the logistics plan not be disseminated, companyham CSS personnel will be able to determine, from the operational graphics, roughly where task force service support assets will be located, and be able to pinpoint them through directions received over the A d l h g net. The execution matrix shown in Figure 5 can be easily prepared ahead of time by drawing blank matrices on stencils and, once a plan is made, by typing or writing in the information and then running off copies on a hand-cranked mimeograph machine. If all of the information necessary for the operation cannot fit onto one matrix (as will almost always be the case) several matrices can be used. Indeed, it may be preferable to place all service support information on a separate matrix at all times, so that the commanders can pass that matrix to their XOs or first sergeants and let them do the companylteam logistics plan while the commander plans the maneuver. Should the situation arise where stencils and mimeograph sheets are not available, the execution matrix can be reproduced, at a greater expenditure of time and effort, through the use of industrious March-April 1987 ARMOR The Magazine of Mobile Warfare 37 soldiers, carbon paper, and observed firing charts (grid sheets) used by 4.2” mortar and field artillery FDCs. In any case, such a matrix allows the commanders to follow the flow of the battle in sequence with the flow of logistical support for that battle and his relationship to both throughout the planned operation. Conclusions The key to success on the modem battlefield is dependent not only upon careful operational planning, but on detailed logistical planning and the integration of the two into a single, understandable plan. Also critical to success is the timely dissemination of that plan to subordinate commanders. In the past, the Army has gone by the 1/3-2/3 rule of planning time. That is, from receipt of an order, the higher headquarters must use only 1/3 of the time remaining prior to the beginning of the operation in planning the operation, allowing the subordinate headquarters 2/38 of the time for preparation. Although this is a goal that is not often reached, it is even now under attack as allowing insufficient time for subordinate elements to prepare for an operation. In the 4th Infantry Division, for example, the standard is now a 1/5-4/5 rule. This can only be achieved if brigade and battalion staffs alter the way they do business. Such time frames can never be achieved if the attempt is made to produce operations orders with lengthy narratives and with several overlays. They can only be achieved if the staff presents its operations order orally and hands subordinate commanders a written order consisting of a single overlay and a hard copy only of the task organization, situation, mission statement, and execution matrix. Indeed, we may find that such actions make operations more understandable to commanders and therefore reduce their planning times. More importantly, however, it may t‘each the operator and the logistician that their plans are interdependent and that victory can be achieved only if both plans are synchronized and understood by all. Footnotes ’Schaudt, Howard P., “The Operations of the 23d Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron in the Vicinity of Munich, Germany, 29 April - 4 May 1945.” A personal experience monograph written at the United States Army Infantry School, 1948. *Daniel, Hawthorne, For Want of a Nail. New York Whittlesey House, 1948.

CAPTAIN CHRISTOPHER

S. BARNTHOUSE enlisted in the Army in 1972 and served with the 7th Special Forces Group. He subsequently served with the Louisiana National Guard and graduated from Nicholls State University. Since then, he has served as mortar, rifle, andsupport platoon leader and as company XO in the 8th Infantry Division and in various staff assignments at Ft. Carson, to include BMO and Battalion S4. He is currently Assistant S3 of 1st Brigade, 4th ID. 38 ARMOR: The Magazine of Mobile Warfare March-April 1987