The Armored Cavalry Regiment: Catalyst for Operational Success

Catalyst for Operational Success The Armored Cavalry Regiment It has been said that “Without cavalry, battle is a rather inele-gant affair.” Some would say this is ample justification for having an armored cavalry regiment in the force structure. But as this article describes, the armored cavalry regiment is the catalyst which turns the tenets of our corps doctrine into a battlefield capability.

The operational concept of the regiment stems from the corps’ requirements for reconnaissance and security; so first, let’s review the operational concept of the corps. The Corps Operational Concept The corps is the focal point for fighting AirLand Battle. Within a corps structure, we harness the combat power of our army and apply it for decisive effect against our enemies to achieve the goals of our strategy. The corps commander is the quarterback of the fighting team. He is primarily in the business of fighting “tomorrow’s battles.”

He looks forward in time and anticipates where battles should be fought or where they should be avoided.

He plans and executes simultaneous battles in deep, close-in, and rear operations.

He assures the corps is disposed and resourced to achieve the objective of the operational plan and remains poised to exploit opportunities created by tactical success or enemy mistakes.

He synchronizes the concentration of units and logistical support of each battle to enhance the tactical success of his subordinate units.

He influences the tactical success of subordinate maneuver units by fighting enemy follow-on forces, shifting the main effort, employing corps-controlled combat and combat support units, committing the corps reserve at the decisive time and place to assure operational success or convert tactical success into operational advantage. Fundamentally, the success of the corps depends on the soundness of the corps commander’s campaign plan, the accuracy of his intelligence, and the speed with which the corps creates and exploits opportunities for decisive maneuver. In large measure, the corps’ success depends on the corps commander’s sense of timing. This sense of timing is a bit intangible, but crucial to eventual victory.

Operational Maneuver A thorough appreciation of maneuver is the key to understanding the concept of AirLand Battle. Maneuver is the essence of our fighting doctrine. Maneuver, in the operational sense, is the swift positioning of combat units to attack the enemy’s rear, strike his flank, cut his lines of communications, bog him down in non-decisive areas, fall on an isolated segment of his force, or elude his attack. Maneuver is the means to seize or retain the initiative. Maneuver is the means of concentrating overwhelming combat power at a decisive time and place. Maneuver is the means to create and exploit tactical and operational advantages. It is the means to fight outnumbered and win. Only by retaining the ability and freedom to maneuver his brigades and divisions can the corps commander achieve the requirements of our fighting doctrine. The basic doctrinal tenets of initiative, depth, agility, and synchronization contribute to this end. Facilitating operational maneuver is where the armored cavalry regiment finds its niche.

The Fundamental Role of the Armored Cavalry Regiment The armored cavalry regiment serves as a catalyst which translates the concept of operational maneuver into a battlefield capability. Performing reconnaissance and security, the regiment facilitates the corps commander’s ability to seize and retain the operational initiative and concentrate overwhelming combatpower against the enemy at the decisive time and place. Provides Fresh Information The ability of the corps commander to seize and retain the operational initiative and concentrate overwhelming combat power a t the right time and place is predicated on having fresh information about the enemy -his exact dispositions, size, composition, direction of movement, and rate of advance. Acting sooner than the enemy, concentrating units at the right time and place, keeping him continually off balance, and disrupting his operational timing, are primarily functions of having an accurate picture of the enemy’s dispositions and activities sooner than he knows about ours. Timing is everything. Victory stems from it. Precise timing of fires and operational maneuvers requires a fresh and accurate picture of the enemy’s current dispositions and operational initiatives. Concentration of units through maneuver is also predicated on the ability of divisions and brigades to move with precision within the corps area of operations. Consequently, the corps commander must also have current information about terrain and trafficability within his area of operations. These factors, more than any other, influence his ability to maneuver divisions or brigades to the point of. decision or advantage. A corps commander courts disaster without this kind of information. I The corps commander has a wide variety of intelligence sources available to him: military intelligence organizations, long-range surveillance units, artillery target acquisition systems, air defense warning systems, Air Force and Army reconnaissance and surveillance aircraft, and strategic systems. However, these sources are focused primarily on intelligence preparation m I m Figure 1 of the battlefield (IPB). Collection efforts are predominantly oriented well forward of the FLOT to identify enemy activities or operational maneuvers which could affect the corps several days in the future. This kind of intelligence information is collated, analyzed, and disseminated by the corps all-source intelligence center. Here is the point: This information is used primarily to support planning of future operations. It serves as a basis for the corps commander to dispose and concentrate his forces to meet future combat requirements. While this type of intelligence is absolutely necessary, it is not sufficient. The corps commander needs fresh combat information during the execution of current battles to be precise in his maneuvers and application of supporting fires. Precise concentration of units and supporting fires during execution of corps plans is predicated on having current information about the enemy and terrain. The primary source of fresh information for the corps commander is the armored cavalry regiment (Figure 1). Performing reconnaissance, the regiment confirms or refutes the IPB collection effort. It tells the corps commander what he needs to know to fight - the actual size and composition of the enemy, his current dispositions, where he’s strong, where he’s weak, and where the application of superior combat power could have a decisive effect. The regiment shows the corps commander how and where to move his forces despite conditions on the bat-impassable routes, blown bridges, unfordable streams, contaminated areas, refugee columns, and the enemy. The regiment can guide maneuver units into engagements with the enemy, assist in rapir‘ly massing and dispersing maneuver units, and monitor the movement of combat support and combat service support elements to support the main effort.

Preserves Combat Power Performing security, the regiment carries out missions which protect and preserve the combat power of the corps until the corps commander determines where forces need to be concentrated and until forces can be maneuvered into battle with the enemy. In offensive operations, well in advance of the corps main body, the regiment prevents premature deployment and attrition of the corps until it reaches its operational objective, due to the influences of terrain or enemy forces. In defensive or retrograde operations, the regiment provides early warning of enemy approach, counters enemy ground reconnaissance activities and effectively screens the corps from ground observation, and protects the corps from surprise attacks and unanticipated engagements.

Operating at a distance from the corps main body, the regiment develops the situation and, hence, prevents the corps from fighting at a disadvantage (e.g. unwarned, poorly deployed, not poised to fight). In the process, the regiment permits the corps commander to see Provides Time and Space The regiment provides time for the corps commander to assess the situation, develop a course of action, issue orders, and maneuver units. The regiment also provides space to maneuver brigades and divisions by creating the flexibility to respond to unanticipated enemy initiatives. Performing reconnaissance and security operations at a distance from the corps’ main body, the regiment provides the corps commander time and space to synchronize effectively maneuver with supporting fires, and logistical support.

An Economy of Force Option A corps commander will probably have to fight a bigger opponent. Outnumbered in the macro, he must be stronger in the micro at a decisive point. The only way he can do this is accept risk somewhere in his area of operations. Organized as a powerful, combined-arms team, the regiment provides the corps commander an economy-of-force option to free other combat maneuver units in the corps for concentration elsewhere in the area of operations. Disruption of the Enemy’s Operational Timing There is decisive benefit to disrupting the operational plan of the enemy. The Soviets are rational players who construct top-down, scientifically-based, and highly-detailed plans. Any disruption in the execution of their plan will break the tempo of their- operation and dissipate their combat power before tlefield which stand in his way: opportunities and exploit them. "...Though offensive cover is a security operation, it primarily entails the performance of reconnaissance ..." it can be concentrated and applied in overwhelming strength against the corps at the time and place of their choosing. Disruption sets the stage and provides the corps commander an opportunity to seize or retain the initiative. Deception at the operational level is a key element of the corps' disruption effort. The regiment is a central player in deception operations. It can easily be made to look like a division or portray a false combat operation in the form of a feint, demonstration, or supporting attack. With this as a background, let's look in closer detail at the missions performed by the regiment in support of corps operations.

Corps Offensive Operations The corps undertakes offensive operations when the commander sees an opportunity to take the initiative or when a higher command orders an attack to be conducted. Within a corps offensive scheme of maneuver, a variety of operations are usually conducted by subordinate maneuver units. Some may perform a deep attack, a deliberate attack, a movement to contact, a hasty attack, reconnaissance in force, a spoiling attack, or a raid. Others may conduct a feint, demonstration, or display in support of corps deception operations. Others perform security operations, such as screen, advance guard, flank guard, or offensive cover. Others may defend in an economy of force role to allow the corps commander to concentrate combat power elsewhere within his area of oDerations. What does the regiment I -@I= COVER i

Figure 2 CORPS @

RESERVE

do for the corps commander? The regiment, a versatile and powerful combined arms team, can perform several missions required for operational success of the corps in offensive operations. In terms of mission frequency, offensive cover and flank guard operations will predominate. However, the regiment is also well-suited to defend or delay in an economy-of-force role, to conduct a supporting attack, or to perform deception operations if the corps commander chooses. Here's the important point: The regiment's versatility provides the corps commander a lot of options. When attacking, the corps commander usually leads with the minimum necessary force to cover the corps advance. In most cases the nod will go to the regiment. Though offensive cover is a security operation, it primarily entails the performance of reconnaissance (Figure 2). The DurDose of the offensive forces, develop the situation, identify tactical or operational resewes, provide for the uninterrupted forward movement of the main body, provide reaction time and maneuver space, and prevent the premature deployment of the corps main body. To achieve this purpose, the covering force deploys well-foi-ward of the main body and provides follow-on divisions-an oppor--tunity to change their direction of movement if necessary without suffering a loss of momentum. To create the time and space necessary to alter the course or objectives of follow-on divisions, the regiment operates independently, well outside the range of supporting fires in the corps main body.

If the corps assigns the covering force mission to a division, the regiment will usually be assigned a flank guard mission for the corps. Flank guard is a security operation whose purpose is to provide early I coverind foke is to find enemy warning of enemy approach, reac-Figure 3 BUL

F lBA Figure 4 tion time and maneuver space, and prevent enemy ground observation and direct fire engagement of elements of the corps main body (Figure 3).

Flank guard is a complex operation which requires performance of several missions simultaneously by subordinate units of the regiment. Zone reconnaissance is performed between the regiment’s route of advance and the flank of the corps main body from the line of departure to the objective. Upon enemy approach into the flank of the corps, the regiment screens, defends, delays, or attacks, if required to accomplish the mission. Unlike in the covering force mission, however, the regiment normally remains within range of corps supporting fires in the main body.

Corps Defensive Operations A corps defends when it is not possible to attack or to facilitate an offensive elsewhere in the theater of operations. Fundamentally, a defense is usually organized to defeat an enemy attack, but the underlying purpose is to create the opportunity to change to the offensive. The basic concept for corps defense calls for simultaneous defeat of enemy first echelon units in the close-in fight and second echelon forces in deep operations, to disrupt enemy movement of units and fire support, break up the attacker’s momentum, and disrupt, delay, and destroy command and control and logistical support operations in the enemy rear area. Since the corps will probably be outnumbered, the corps commander must attempt to engage isolated parts of the enemy force by operation within interior lines and striking at exposed enemy forces at every opportunity. Within a typical defensive scheme of maneuver, subordinate maneuver units of the corps will perform a variety of missions. Some will defend in sector, some will delay. Others will attack or counterattack. Some will guard, some will cover. Some units will defend in an economy-of-force-role to allow the corps commander to concentrate combat power somewhere else in his area of operations. Some may attack deeD into the tactical and operational depth of the enemy’s zone of action. Others perform deception operations. What does the regiment do?

In terms of frequency, defensive cover and defend in sector in an economy-of-force role are missions which the regiment will most often be tasked to perform. Defensive cover is a security operation (Figure 4). As a covering force, the regiment deploys far enough forward of the main battle area (MBA) to protect the units from premature engagements and the concentrated fires of enemy medium range artillery forces.

The purpose of defensive cover is to slow the enemy’s advance, force him to deploy and begin an attack prematurely, dissipate his combat power, disrupt his operational timing and synchronization, and identify his main effort for the corps commander. The regiment is expected to defend -rather than delay to destroy the lead regiments - cause the premature commitment of second echelon forces, and disclose his main effort. To create the time and space necessary to achieve the purpose of this mission, the regiment deploys at least 20 kilometers forward of the main battle area (MBA) (Figure 4).

If the corps commander believes he needs to generate a large operational reserve or concentrate his maneuver forces in a particular section of the MBA, he could task the regiment to defend in sector in an economy-of-force role. The regiment is well-suited for this mission, and with some reinforcement, it can successfully defend an enemy division-size zone of attack. If the regiment is employed in this role, divisions will normally provide their own brigade-size covering force (Figure 5).

Corps Retrograde Operations Retrograde operations are conducted by the corps when it is necessary to move away from the enemy to reposition forces on more favorable terrain, husband resources for future operations, gain time, or avoid combat under unfavorable situations. The three types of retro-I s( s( ,-x .?

X x Figure la-+-5 COWS RISIRVC drawal, and retirement. The regiment is ideally suited to provide security for the corps as it moves away from the enemy; the regiment protects the corps from enemy exploitation and pursuit ventures. Defensive cover, delay, rear guard, and flank guard operations are the high frequency missions for the regiment during retrograde operatio%ommand and Control Because of the corps commander’s pressing need for fresh information during the execution of his plan, the regiment operates predominantly under his personal command and reports to him directly. If the situation demands, the regiment may be placed temporarily under the operational control of a subordinate division.

The Regiment Today Several of the roles and missions which the regiment performs for the corps are traditional. Others have evolved to satisfy the requirement of corps operations and AirLand Battle doctrine. Others have evolved in response to changes in our enemy’s doctrine, operational concepts, and capabilities. The regiment is a versatile combined arms maneuver force which increases the corps commander’s options. It facilitates his ability to seize or retain the operational initiative, achieve depth and flexibility, retain agility, and synchronize the concentration of units with supporting, fires and logistical support. The regiment also facilitates the corps commander’s ability to preserve, and then concentrate overwhelming combat power with precision where it will produce victories.

In the next issue we will describe the operational concept for employment for the armored cavalry squadron of the heavy division. scouts Out! ~- ~ This article, which reflects current doctrine. was prepared by the Cavalry Branch, Command and Staff Department of the Armor School. The article was written by Major John D. Rosenberger and Colonel Thomas E. White of the Combined Arms Center. grade operations are-delay, with-