The Pros and Cons of the New Ultralights

Anew class of combat vehicle is emerging. It is the ultralight, characterized by light weight (1-8 metric tons), innovative design, the latest armament, and the use of unusual materials. Armored and unarmored, tracked and wheeled, these vehicles are especially attractive because they can be strategically airlifted in large numbers and can also be carried by helicopter. Small, inexpensive combat vehicles have along history. They include the machinegun-armed tricycle, circa 1900; the Renault light FT-17, 2-man tank (6.5 metric tons) used by the French and U. S. forces in WWI; the British tracked Bren gun carrier and Soviet BA- 64,4x4 armored car of early WWII; the postwar British Ferret scout car; and jeeps armed with machineguns, recoilless rifles and antitank guided missiles. Modern tankers in their 40-to-60-ton machines may regard these lightweight combat vehicles as merely interesting oddities from the past, and the new ultralights as not much more potent. But the modern ultralights have a very low battlefield signature, along with the capability of carrying a half-dozen or so tank-killing guided missiles. They can also mount short-range surface-to-air missiles (SAM) or 20-to-30-mm automatic cannon capable of engaging light armored vehicles. The capabilities of the new ultralights as weapon carriers, coupled with their concealability and quiet operation, make them especially useful for conducting ambushes, raids, flank attacks, economy of force operations, convoy escort, reconnaissance, and internal security operations, either alone or in conjuction with heavier mechanized forces. Most ultralight combat vehicle designs are derived from military or commercial jeeps or trucks, including recreational “dune buggies”, and use commercial automotive and suspension components to save development, production and logistics costs. The list of newer ultralight combat vehicles - 8- metric tons or less - available in the West is impressive. Some have been designed to meet specific domestic military requirements while others are private ventures intended only for export. Tracked models include: Belgian ACEC (6.54’; French Lohr VPX-90 and 110 and newer VPX-600 (4.6 to 5.9); and German Wiesel (Weasel) airborne/ airmobile 2.94 TOWmissile or 20-mm gun carrier, of which 310 are on order for German airborne brigades. Foreign wheeled (all 4x4) ultralights include: Brazilian EE-3 Jararaca (5.5- t); French Lohr RPX-6000 (5.4 to 7.0- t); Panhard Ultrav-MI1 and Renault VBL; German Kontac Desert Fox (3.5- t); Israeli RBY (3.6-t) and Ram VZ, V2 (5.4 to 6.0-t); Italian Ferrari Liznrd F333E (2.6-t) and OTO-Melara R3 (2.74); Spanish BMU-2; Swiss MOWAG Piranha 4x4 version (7.84 and Spy (7.54; and United Kingdom’s Alvis Fox and Ferret 80. France also produces a 6x6, the ERC 90 (7.654). The U. S. has developed nearly as 24 march-april1985

"Small, inexpensive combat vehicles have along history" many ultralights as France (the only other Western country that has a large rapid deployment force). U. S. vehicles include: Cadillac Gage Commando Ranger1U. S. Air Force Peacemaker ( 8 men, 4.541, the Commando Scout (2-3 men, 6.64; combat versions of AM General's M998-series Hummer 1 1/24 high mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicle (HMMWV); Emerson Electric's 2-man, 1-t Fast Attack Vehicle (FAST-VI, and the Nordac NMC-40 Warrior 3-man FAST- V. All of the US. ultralights are 4x4; the FAST- Vs are virtually anew class by themselves. The above list does not include transport vehicles simply mounting weapons or, like British Land Rover jeeps, fitted with armor kits. Most of the ultralights are limited to weapon carrier roles, since they carry only 2-4 men; some, like the Belgian ACEC, Swiss Piranha 4x4, and Commando Ranger, however, can carry 8-10 men, including crew. All of the vehicles listed, except for AM General's Hummer and the two FAST-Vs, are armored to protect against small arms fire at varying distances, light artillery fragments, and antipersonnel mines. This protection level is about equivalent to that of many heavier LA Vsweighing up to 204 and is necessary to ensure mission accomplishment; survival of crew and vehicle; and an aggressive, confident crew who need not fear the first burst of small arms fire that strikes their vehicle. The Hummer and FAST- Vcan be fitted with Kevlar that provides protection against 17-or 44-grain artillery fragments. Two Warsaw Pact (WP) countries developed several early ultralight combat vehicles. The Soviet BRDM-2, 74, 4x4 reconnaissance scout vehicle and. BMD-1. tracked, airborne infantry fighting vehicle/(IFV) fielded in 1966 and 1970, respectively, are lightweight, offer impressive fighting capabilities, and have been produced in large numbers. The widely exported BRDM-2 carries a 4-man crew, is armed with turret-mounted KPVT 14.5-mm and PKT 7.62-mm coaxial machineguns, and is fitted with auxiliary belly wheels as mobility aids. Tank destroyer and air defense versions of BRDM-2 mount 4 to 6 launcher rails for various antitank missiles or the SA-9 Gaskin SAM. Hungarian FUG/OT-65 and FUG D- 944 are similar to the BRDM-2 in design. The High-Mobility Multipur-posewheeled Vehicle(HMMWV). seen above with a TOW system mounted, has a big role in the new light infantry divisions. Other U S. projects include the FAST-V, at right, and the IAV- 25, below, the Marines' Light Armored Vehicle (LAV), which is much heavier (14.1 tons) march-aprill985 25 I

I F "... Mechanized airborne units are more survivable... After 14 years, the BMD-1 is still the world's only airborne IFV. It is armed with an antitank missile and 73-mm gun combination as main armament and carries a 3-man crew and 4-5 airborne infantrymen, who can fight mounted under armor and CBR protection or dismounted, supported by their IFV. The air-droppable BMD-1 and its variants equip seven Soviet mechanized airborne divisions and numerous air assault brigades and have seen combat in Afghanistan, Mechanized airborne units are more survivable and have significantly greater firepower and effective striking radius than foot-mobile airborne/airmobile infantry after being landed. These likely adversaries for Western ultralight combat vehicles already have set high combat standards, but they probably will soon be replaced by improved models. Fighting Capabilities The new Western ultralight combat vehicles can also mount formidable main armament: HOT, MILAN, or TOW antitank guided missile launchers; light or heavy machineguns, including the Mk 19 40-mm grenade launcher; or a 20-to 30-mm automatic cannon. AM General developed the lightweight, fully-stabilized Remote Electric Drive Turret (RED-T) that can mount various weapon types, including the Hughes M242 25-mm Chain gun used on the M2 Bradley IFV and the US. Marines' Piranha LAV-25, a Setter weaponslsensor suite, or Stinger SAMs for combat versions of the Hummer. But the RED-T can be fitted to many other vehicles as well. Combinations of ultralight combat vehicles armed with antitank and surface-to-air missiles and. 20-to 30-mm automatic cannon could successfully engage tanks, IFVs, foot-infantry, helicopters, and low-flying aircraft under favorable tactical conditions when their limitations, such as inadequate armor protection, are minimized. Mounting only alight machinegun that provides no more firepower than that carried by a foot-soldier as main armament on a %lOO,OOO-pus vehicle, however, is wasting capability, unless the vehicle is used by civilian police. Design Philosophies Four of the newest ultralight combat vehicles are worth discussing in more detail because of their different design derivations, protection levels, and capabilities. Two vehicles, the Hummer and FAST-V, are being procured for use in U. S. Army motorized andlor light infantry divisions; the Panhard Ultrav-MI1 and Renault VBL are competitors for French Army reconnaissance scout and antitank vehicle roles and for export (40-45 M l l shave been ordered by Mexico). Combat versions of AM General's Hummer are adaptations of its M998 series 1 112-t, 4x4 vehicles of which 55,000 are being procured in various versions by the U. S. Army and Marine Corps. The TOW and 25-mm Chain gun versions will be used in the 9th Motorized Infantry Division and by a ground reconnaissance troop in each of the new Army light infantry divisions. Marines will use the Hummer TOW version but want 44-grain ballistic protection. U. S. light infantry squads will ride in unarmored Hummers armed with alight machinegun or a Mk-19 40-mm.. weapon. As an infantry squad carrier, with or without Kevlar ballistic protection, the Hummer does not provide amounted fighting capability. And it compares unfavorably in platoon firepower, armor and CBR protection levels, capacity, cross-country mobility, and swimming capability both with Soviet BTR-60/70 8x8 LA Vs widely used by WP and many Third World light mechanized infantry units and the 9- man Piranha LA V-25 used by an LAV battalion in each U. S. Marine division. Although USAF C-130, C-141Band C- 5A transport aircraft can each carry three times as many Hummers as they can LA V-ZSs, it would require nine or 10 Hummers (and 10 to 12 extra drivers The I 8 x E were - The 6 infan years sance rnach terns prod! ARMm march-aprill985 inha 4 x 4, above, and the Marines LAV-25. an t right, bear a strong family resemblance. They veloped from the same basic chassis. iet BMD, below, is still the world’s only airborne fighting vehicle. It has been in service for 15 he BRDM-2, lower left, is a wheeled reconnais-:out vehicle first fielded in 1966. It is armed with!guns, but air-defense and antitank missile sys- e mounted on some models. Both have been din large numbers. c -

L 4 ana gunners) to carry a reinforced motorized infantry platoon that matches the firepower of alight mechanized infantry platoon equipped with three Piranha LA V-25 fitted with dual TOW- 2 launchers. Thus, the strategic airlift advantages of ultralight combat vehicles compared to heavier LA Vs may be overrated, especially when overall capability and survivability also are considered. AM General’s Hummer was chosen from three HMMWV candidates in

1983. Using components common to its utility truck versions should make the Hummer combat version relatively inexpensive to produce and maintain. All Hummers are powered by a Detroit Diesel 6.2-liter, 4-stroke cycle, V-8 engine coupled to a 3-speed Hydramatic THM-400 transmission. The 2.3-t (empty) to 3.874 Hummer can accelerate to 80 km/h in 20 seconds and top 113 km/hon roads. It has a 563-km range, can climb a 60-percent grade or a.56-m vertical step and fords 1.52 m with a fording kit. It can be airdropped by the low altitude parachute extraction system (LAPES) or carried slingloaded by UH-6OA Blackhawk or, two at a time, by CH-4 7and CH-53 helicopters. Emerson’s FAST- Vis an even more unconventional design than the Hummer and is strictly limited to weap-i’ _-- e;=* on carrier roles. The FAST- VS tubular frame with roll cage is only 3.6m long and 1.44mm high (without armament). It can be powered by either a 94-hp gasoline or a 90 to 100-hp diesel engine coupled to either a 4-or 5-speed manual or 3-speed automatic transmission. The FAST-Vcan accelerate to 100 km/ h in less than 12 seconds and can top 116 km/h. It can climb a 0.3 m vertical step or a 60-percent slope and has a range of 500 km. It can incorporate Kevlar ballistic protection against 17-or 44-grain fragments. Empty weight is 0.68 to 0.9 tomes; armament can be a TOW launcher and optional M60 7.62- mm machinegun, a caliber. SO machinegun, or a Mk 19 40-mm grenade launcher. Two FAST-Vs can be carried by a UH-6OA, seven by CH-47helicopter, or six in a C-I3Oairplane. The U. S. Army plans to procure 583 FAST-Vs to equip two light attack battalions in the 9th Motorized Infantry Division and other light forces. Each light attack platoon will have four FAST-Vs armed with a Mk 19 40-mm grenade launcher and three FAST- Vs armed with a TOW launcher. Panhard’s Ultrav-Mll4x4 is essentially an armored “jeep” in configuration, but it offers good armor protection and a swimming capability. It weighs up to 3.55-t, combat-loaded, march-aprill985 27 and carries a 3-man crew. It can be armed with a MZLANor TOWlauncher (with 6 missiles) or a 12.7-mm or 7.62- mm machinegun. It is slightly larger than the FST-V but smaller than the Hummer. It is powered by a Peugeot XD3T 4-cylinder, liquid-cooled, turbocharged 105-hp diesel coupled to a German ZF 3-speed automatic transmission. It has independent coil-spring suspension in front and torsion bars in the rear. It has a maximum speed of 95 kmlh on roads and 4 kmlh in water. It can climb a 50-percent slope and has a range of 750-1,000 km with extra fuel. The MI’S high-hardness armor steel plate (5-1 1.5-mm thick) protects against 7.62-mm AP ammunition frontally and 7.62-mm ball ammunition on the sides. The MI1 can be fitted with CBR collective protection andlor air conditioning systems. A propeller kit for amphibious operation is optional. The Mll’s 3.4-3.75 cu. m interior is accessible by side and rear doors and three roof hatches. It uses Michelin 900 x 16 “run-flat” tires. Panhard also envisions using the MI1 as a command and control vehicle, ground surveillance radar carrier, or air defense vehicle fitted with Stinger SAMs. (See “Panhard’s New Light Armored Vehicle,” Jan-Feb 85 ARMOR Magazine. Ed.) The Renault VBL is of less conventional design than the MI1 in that its militarized commercial engine is mounted in the rear. It has lighter (4 to 6-mm thick) armor, but weighs less (2.554 empty, 2.97-t loaded) than the MIl. The French Army established requirements (in 1977) for an under-3.3- t Vehicule Blinde Leger (VBL) -Light Armored Vehicle - to replace scout jeeps and to use as an antitank missile carrier. About one-third of the 8,000 armored vehicles that will be procured to equip the recently established 5-division French Rapid Action and Assistance Command and to modernize other combat units are expected to be the winning VBL competitor. The French Army also is procuring other, heavier, armored vehicles, including AMX-IORC 105-mm gun, 6x6 fire support vehicles and VAB4x4 APCsfor its light armored, infantry, and marine* divisions as well as 900-1,000 new main battle tanks and AMX-1OP tracked IFVs for its mechanized divisions. Limitations Several years ago, a retired European general suggested that flooding the Central European battlefield with thousands of missile-armed, cheap, ultralight vehicles like the early French open-topped, tracked VPX-90 ought to be sufficient to stop (WP) armored thrusts. In a similar vein, a U. S. Army officer suggested to the author that the scenario from the TV-series “Rat Patrol” is appropriate for visualizing the U. S. 9th Motorized Infantry Division using ultralight combat vehicles on the modern battlefield. In his.euphoria over anew type of weapon system, the European officer conveniently forgot that (WP) tanks are part of combined arms forces and that ultralight combat vehicles and their crews are particularly vulnerable to artillery fragments, multiple rocket launcher barrages, light cannon and, in some cases, small arms fire, even if they are difficult to spot from “buttoned up” tanks. Likewise, the “Rat Patrol” fantasy, in which machinegun-armed jeeps sometimes defeat armored combat vehicles, is far different from WW I1 reality when British armed jeeps and light Chevrolet trucks conducted surprise raids against German rear area supply dumps, unescorted truck convoys and airfields far from front lines where the few German armor units were concentrated. Today, the proliferation of armored vehicles of many types, attack helicopters, longer range artillery, and modern sophisticated night vision devices, surveillance radars, and remote sensors make it far more difficult to roam unobserved behind enemy lines to find “soft” targets without means of defense, and to escape from enemy airlground reaction forces. Military organizations are innately conservative and their leaders are often prone to ignore new types of weapons that they have no experience with. At the other extreme are budget analysts and wargamers, who often oversimplify or ignore difficult-to-quantify complexities of the battlefield, and who may become over-enthusiastic about anew, untried weapon system as an alternative to proven, but more expensive systems. If armies are to use ultralight combat User Questions 28 march-aprill985

The West German Wiesel (Weasel), far left, packs a TOW missile or 20-mm autocannon on a 2.9-ton chassis. It will be used by the nation's airborne brigades. At left, Marines demonstrate the swimmability of their

LAV-25.

British Fox, at right, mounts a powerful Rarden 30-mm cannon on its ultralight chassis. vehicles effectively, they must finL a middle ground between exaggeration of their capabilities and total neglect because they may seem unconventional compared to heavier combat vehicles. Three pertinent questions need to be asked before procuring ultralight combat vehicles: (1) What functions/missions can they best perform? (2) What protection level should they provide? (3) What type/size unit can best exploit their potential? As to the first question, ultralights with light armament can scout in conjunction with heavier-armed recon-fire support vehicles; patrol against guerrillas, smugglers, etc. as military/civilian police vehicles; replace unprotected jeeps and motorcycles for liaison roles in combat units; perform engineer reconnaissance, and serve as training vehicles. Combinations of antitank missile and cannon-armed ultralight combat vehicles, supplemented by ultralights mounting short-range SAMs for protection against helicopters, would make a potent combat force for raids, ambushes, combat outposts and flank and rear-area security missions to counter enemy airborne assaults, raids, guerrillas, etc. Their capabilities to be carried sling-loaded by medium helicopters or internally in heavy cargo helicopters, and to be air-dropped would make them especially suitable for airborne/airmobile operations behind enemy lines or reinforcing surrounded friendly forces. Second, to perform these missions, ultralight combat vehicles and their crews must rely on stealth to achieve unobserved approach, surprise, and safe withdrawal. To accomplish their missions with at least a reasonable chance of surviving to fight another day, ultralight combat vehicles ought to incorporate enough armor to protect against the most common but least powerful military weapons; small arms and light machineguns beyond pointblank range, and antipersonnel mines. Protection against hand-held antitank weapons is not possible today in under 40-tonne armored vehicles, and even -that is only in front. In regards to protection, French Army VBL requirements are more realistic than U. S. Army protection requirements for the Hummer and FAST-V, which are supposed to enable U. S. motorized and light infantry divisions to fight Soviet-style armored, mechanized infantry, and mechanized airborne divisions effectively. Using Units Lastly, the types and sizes of using units are important factors in deciding what type(s) of combat vehicles should be procured. Ultralight combat vehicles can neither mount medium or large-caliber machineguns or 75-to 120-mm cannon and substitute for tanks, nor can they carry an 8-to 10-man infantry squad/crew and mount the necessary 20-to 30-mm automatic cannon as main armament. And even most 1040 154 armored vehicles do not carry infantry squad, automatic gun, and antitank missiles (although a 4-to 5-man platoon commander's LA V-25 could be so modified and carry up to 12 missiles). Thus, ultralight combat vehicles cannot substitute for main tanks, heavy fire support vehicles, or tracked IFVs; and they should not be used to substitute for adequately-armed, wheeled infantry squad carriers that provide adequate room for a 2-man crew and six or seven soldiers who can fight dismounted; armor and CBR collective protection; a swimming capability; and, if fitted with firing ports, amounted fighting capability for the infantry squad. All modern Soviet infantry squad carriers: BMP-1 and -2, BTR-60PM/70, 8x8, and BMD-1 provide these capabilities. The BMP-1 is used by 20 other armies, and the BTR-60PB also has been widely exported to Third World countries. American misuse of capable, specialized units dates back to 1776, when American riflemen, who could not reload quickly and had no bayonets for their long rifles, were virtually annihilated by British and Hessian line infantry, who reportedly even pinned some Americans to trees with their bayonets. At Saratoga, only a year later, however, American riflemen distributed in small squads acted in concert with Continental line infantry, who supported the riflemen when they fell back, to achieve a concerted, decisive victory over the British. Technically, they are far different, but like those rifleman, ultralight combat vehicles possess distinct capabilities that should be maximized, and limitations that must be minimized in march-aprillQ85 29 u P Versions of the Commando armored car were used in Vietnam, mainly for convoy escort. order to ensure success and reduce combat losses. Because of their inadequate protection and their inability to carry both modern main armament and an infantry squad of reasonable size, ultralight combat vehicles should not substitute for 10-to 154 LAVsin the squad carrier role in “line” infantry units that perform a variety of offensive and defensive missions. LA Vs, e.g., French VAB, Piranha LA V-25, and numerous other, similar, vehicles are better suited by design for this important role. Another disadvantage of using ultralights in line division sub-elements (other than for reconnaissance, liaison, or other support tasks) is that they would too often be used in assault or “stand and fight” situations when their limitations would make them most vulnerable. Combat capabilities of the ultralights would be maximized if they were assigned to independent, specialized brigades or battalions, such as Rangers, which employ unconventional tactics and which are commanded by officers who would better understand the vehicle’s limitations as well as their potentials. Independently organized and trained light attack battalions equipped with FAST-Vs, for example, would be much more effective conducting hit-and-run attacks on the enemy’s flanks or rear in conjunction with operations by a “line” light mechanized infantry division equipped with LA V-25 infantry squad carriers and LA V-90 or LA V- Well-armed and adequately-protected ultralight combat vehicles also would be ideal for increasing the firepower, tactical mobility, endurance, and survivability, and extending the effective ground radius of airborne and airmobile infantry after landing. In addition to ultralight weapon carriers, slightly heavier LAVs, such as the Piranha LAV6x6 (two of which can be carried in a C-130). ought to be considered as airborne squad IFVs to match the Soviet BMD-I. The Soviets have been airdropping BMD-Is for along time, using parachutes equipped with retrorockets to cushion the landing. Instead of relying only on LAPES, which requires the transport aircraft to descend to very low altitude, vastly increasing its vulnerability and limiting the choice of drop zones, isn’tit time for the U. S. Army to try the Soviet method? Ultralight combat vehicles possess considerable combat potential, which can be exploited at relatively low cost in small, specialized units where their unique capabilities and limitations are most likely to be appreciated. If, however, some army miscasts them in the wrong role and/or misuses them in combat for the first time, then they will have to overcome a bad and undeserved reputation before achieving wider acceptance. Footnotes * Weights shown are for combat-loaded vehicles I05 fire support vehicles rather than exceptwhere noted. providing direct Support to light motorized infantry fighting dismounted. 2 The 9th Marine Infantry Division is part of the French Amy.

march-aprill985 EDWIN W. BESCH is a 1960 graduate of the US. Naval Academy (Annapolis) and received his master’s degree from George Washington University. H e served as a Marine infantry officer commanding an Ontos antitank battalion on Okinawa and headquarters and rifle companies during ten combat operations in Vietnam, before being retired for wounds. Later, h e was a CIA intelligence analyst i n Washington and Saigon. He served as a ground forces analyst at the U. S. Army Foreign Science and Technology Center and as a professor of scientific and technical intelligence at Defense Intelligence College, DIA. Later, he became Chief, Asia Branch, U. S. Army Intelligence and Threat Analysis Center. H e is the author of more than 40 articles, mostly about light armored vehicles.