Armor’s First Struggle

c World War I tank corps crewmen lubricate their Renaults prior to their first commitment to combat in WWI. Armor’s First Struggle by Captain Edward G. Miller Tactics, doctrine and technology are inexorably linked; they are interdependent factors in weapons development, the level of any one depending to a great degree on that of the other two. In addition, the funding of a system, resistance by established groups to change, and the struggle for control of the proponency for a weapons system are additional factors that set the parameters within which a particular weapons system is developed. For example, the AirLand Battle, the High Technology Test Bed, new organizations such as Division 86 and the related tactical and logistical matters such as strategic deployability are all affected in numerous ways by the external forces noted above. This article will briefly trace the development of U.S. armor doctrine and the establishment of the armor branch during the period 1918-1941 as an example of what might occur within an organization when both new concepts and equipment are concurrently tested and adopted. In the first World War, the tank proved itself as a new and potentially tactically decisive weapon, even though tanks normally performed only infantry support roles - partly because of doctrine and partly because of mechanical limitations. The tank’s early supporters at influ-Wopyright by Captain Edward G. Miller entia1 levels were few, but officers at lower echelons were usually eager to prove its potential. They fought to prove the usefulness of the tank in roles formerly occupied by older weapons and arms. Because the tank was a new weapon, its backers were initially perceived as threats by the established arms. Infantrymen saw the tank as a weapon with the ability to cross trenches and offer protection to foot soldiers; many cavalrymen saw the tank as a tool to aid in restoring battlefield mobility to their arm. Shortly after the end of the war, the Army undertook a number of studies of the lessons of that war. On 11 December 1918, the Westervelt Board was established at the direction of the War Department. It was to study the use of the field artillery in the war and make recommendations on its future use. Its report noted that: “. . . mechanical transport is the prime mover of the future.” The so-called Superior Board convened on 19 April 1919, to study the lessons of the war as they affected the tactics and organizations of the combat arms. Established by Headquarters, American Expeditionary Forces, its report recommended that: “. . . tanks should be recognized as infantry supporting and accompanying weapons.” This report was endorsed by General Pershing and therefore it carried great weight in influential circles.

Also, during the immediate postwar months, officers were influenced by a paper prepared by Brigadier General Samuel D. Rockenbach, wartime commander of the Tank Corps. Dated 18 August, 1919, it called for: “a tank with a weight of 18 tons, a top speed of 12 mph and for it to be protected against AT rifle fire.” Although the specifications for the vehicle were approved by the Ordnance Committee in November 1919, Rockenbach failed to produce any additional definitive ideas for the employment of tanks. Unfortunately, for pro-tank elements, this paper became the only policy statement made by the Tank Corps. At that time, practice was for the using arm to set the tactical requirements for a weapon, based on War Department guidance, and for the Ordnance Department to design a weapon within those requirements. The Westervelt Board, a body with power to recommend guidance to the Army staff, did not offer any official statement regarding tank design. Thus, the Rockenbach paper, which, for the most part, simply reflected the tactics of 1918: an Ordnance Department guidance, and a memo prepared by Major R.E. Carlson dated 1 August 1919, were the only official Tank Corps policy statements to emerge before mid-1920. No policy was established to represent the interests of the Tank Corps as did the report of the Superior Board for march-aprill985 13

General Pershing. at right, saw tanks as infantry support weapons. ’gx L&- a r 1 - _ 7 n a c p -- the infantry. This lack of legitimate policy foundation led, in part, to the disbanding of the Tank Corps under the National Defense Act of 1920 and the infantry gained control of the tank development program. In an article published in the July 1921 issue of the Cavalry Journal, Major Bradford Chenowyth stated that by 1921 the army had “. . . patiently endeavored to adjust the newly-acquired technology to the framework of pre-war principles.” Although infantry tanks were the only tanks then in the inventory, Chenowyth believed that the tactical future of the tank lay in adapting it to the cavalry, because that arm would need the tank in order to develop its ability to concentrate on the battlefield. The tank could give the cavalry greater mobility and power to accomplish its mission, and (Chenowyth, an infantry officer, might have stated this to appease cavalrymen), the tank could be employed as a “natural auxiliary to the horse.” In a follow-up article in the same issue, Major George S. Patton, Jr. - while not agreeing with every point made by Chenowyth - did cite the need for a separate tank corps as a mobile GHQ reserve. Chenowyth’s article, “Cavalry Tanks,”’ was a glimmer of farsightedness at a time when many officers were unable to comment publicly on the topic without endangering their careers. During the 1920s and 1930s, development was also hampered by limited appropriations for research and development: ideas could not be tested without funds for pilot vehicles. In addition, doctrine was in many ways dependent upon the capabilities of the vehicles then in service or under test. It also depended upon tactics, which were, in turn, dependent upon the capabilities of the vehicles. The official statement of doctrine at that time was the Army’s Field Service Regulations. According to the 1923 edition, the infantry was essentially the arm of close combat: “This role, rather than the nature of its armament, distinguished the infantry as a combatant arm.” The infantry was equipped with tanks “. . . for dealing with resistance which is protected against the effects of other (my italics) infantry weapons.” The cavalry, on the other hand, was “characterized by a high degree of mobility and by a relatively reduced firepower in proportion to the means employed.” The special value of the cavalry lay in its ability to rapidly displace firepower. Cavalry also possessed the ability to conduct delaying actions to a considerable depth, and it depended upon its “. . . rapidity of maneuver, . . . and the effectiveness of the means employed to deceive the enemy as to its own dispositions and intentions.” Thus, during the 1920s, the infantry became fully committed to the accompanying role for tanks because it was believed that they were infantry weapons whose primary role was to accompany the foot soldier and to overcome the resistance of an entrenched enemy. The cavalry was to provide security for the advancing infantryman. In 1928, the Secretary of War, Dwight F. Davis, issued guidance for the establishment of the Experimental Mechanized Force, (EMF) a unit similar to that which he observed in Britain I in 1927: “It should not be considered as a divisional unit, but rather, because of its special characteristics, as a force of special mission, in the accomplishment of which troops of infantry or cavalry divisions will cooperate.” Commanded by Colonel Oliver Eskridge, the EMF was the first post-WWI attempt by the army to organize a unit with mechanized elements as the central arm. It was established in order to develop the equipment and doctrine for the mechanization of additional units, and despite no new official policy statements from the War Department, it did have the backing of the Secretary - which was quite sufficient for at least an operational test. During the summer of 1928, the EMF practiced night marches, flanking attacks, approach marches and advance guard missions. It was realized by some that the tank was essentially an offensive weapon possessing strategic mobility which could be used to seize and temporarily hold key terrain and attack lines of communication. One officer noted in his after-action report that the object of mechanization was “increased strategic mobility (to) restore mobility to the battlefield and to provide greater speed, power and weight in a decisive attack.” The tank would, “. . . become the principal weapon which all other elements (would) support.” Although the EMF was plagued by vehicles which were mechanically unreliable and too slow for the tactics envisioned, a number of lessons were learned that summer which will be of interest to the contemporary tanker. 14 march-aprill985

French infantry ride to the front on a St. Chamond. a heavy tank for its day. The need for chemical protective clothing and masks was established, as were the requirements for air guards and 50-meter spacing between marching vehicles. Mobile CPs were used for command and control, and it was also noted that blue-filtered lights would be useful at night. Each march unit carried a day’s supply of classes I, 111, and V and another day’s supply was carried with the trains. In addition, a mission was found for the light tanks: a more heavily armed (and armored) replacement for armored cars. Major C.C. Benson wrote that mechanized forces offered: ‘‘. . . many and higher level commanders an additional weapon which would combine firepower, shock and speed to a higher degree than now exists in any one combatant arm.”2 Although the EMF was disbanded in October 1928, it represented a turning point in the mechanization issue. The question would no longer be whether to mechanize, but it would center on which branch would retain proponency over mechanized units. A base from which further policy and doctrine could be developed had at last been field tested. Soon after the EMF was disbanded, Major General Stephen 0. Fuqua, the Chief of Infantry, made it clear that the infantry would remain the primary ground gaining arm and he was determined to retain control of the tanks. The Mechanized Board, which was established in the spring of 1928, issued its final report shortly after the EMF was disbanded. The board recommended the creation of a similar unit comprised of the combined arms. Brigadier General Frank Parker, War Department G3, backed the proposal, and all branch chiefs concurred with the exception of General Fuqua. In 1929, the Chief of Staff, General Charles P. Summerall, issued a directive which ordered the creation of the new mechanized force. Although some foreign advocates called for tank-pure units, the War Department realized that tanks could not effectively operate entirely alone. The new force introduced mechanization into the entire Army and it travelled throughout the nation until it, too, was disbanded in the summer of 1931. By 1932, many cavalrymen realized that their branch would eventually mechanize and they would have to give up their horses. Summerall’s successor, General Douglas MacArthur, in his “General Principles to Govern in Extending Mechanization Throughout the Army,” stated that the cavalry should retain its traditional missions while substituting tanks for horses. He did believe, however, that, considering the financial constraints of the day, each branch should develop its own mechanization policy. Tanks could continue to be developed for the infantry, but they were to be adapted to the cavalry. MacArthur’s ideas did give some new power to the proponents of the tank, although the proponents did not immediately get a separate branch. In 1935, maneuvers were held at Ft. Riley, Kansas, which for the first time, pitted a fully mechanized unit against horse cavalry, and it was realized that the tank was capable of performing the same missions as horse cavalry. The final after-action report did stress, however, that a powerful force could be produced if both horse and mechanized units cooperated as one. In an address at the Cavalry School in the summer of 1935, then Lieutenant Colonel Jonathan M. Wainwright noted that “. . . mobility has ever been the watchword of the cavalry. This mobility must not only be the physical but as well the mental mobility of the cavalryman, combined with the mobility of the horse and of the armored fighting vehicle.” He also noted that, considering all types of terrain, the horse remained the’ most mobile mount of the cavalryman. Speaking to a class at the Army War College, Major General Leon Kromer, the Chief of Cavalry, stated that the horse could assist the tank in much the same way that tanks were of assistance to the infantryman. In a 1937 lecture at the War College, Colonel Van Voorhis acknowledged that within the Army there was indeed a wide difference of opinion as to a suitable mission for mechanized forces. He stated that the strength of these units lay in rapid movement combined with maneuver and superior firepower. Properly developing these assets was one of the major problems then facing the army. The War Department had previously stated that the value of mechanized cavalry was its ability to conduct distant reconnaissance and to provide divisional and higher level commanders with an exploitation weapon. As foreign developments, particularly those in Germany, came to light, American exponents realized that their ideas were fundamentally sound, but that limited funds and the competing interests of the cavalry and march-aprill985 15

Renaults come off the assembly line in France during WWI. infantry were inhibiting progressive development. In late 1938, the Mechanized Cavalry Board was established at Fort Knox, Kentucky, and it initiated an orderly system of establishing technical requirements, consulting with the War Department staff, and the field testing of prototypes. Many officers felt that the limited funds which were appropriated for research and development might be better spent on designing and testing of pilot vehicles with the belief that when and if war came, a useful vehicle, based on prototype designs, could be quickly mass-produced. Major General Kromer retired in 1938 and he left the decisions about the mechanization of the cavalry to the General Staff. The power vacuum which was produced, coupled with the lack of a firm tank/horse doctrine and a definite TOE for such a unit, led Van Voorhis and others to believe that a separate mechanized arm might have a chance of acceptance if it was soon established; i.e., before conservative forces had a chance to react. Van Voorhis realized that he must act quickly, because a new debate was brewing which concerned the basic roles of the cavalry. Proponents at Ft. Knox favored a battle role, while elements within the War Department favored an auxiliary role. The new Chief of Cavalry, Major General John K. Herr, supported the idea of a few mechanized cavalry units as long as no horse units were disbanded to support the conversion. (Even after the German campaign in Poland, Herr stated that the machinegun would not eliminate horse cavalry.) In late 1939, as the lessons from the recently conducted maneuvers near Plattsburgh, N.Y., were being studied, consideration was finally given to the establishment of a mechanized cavalry division. The next year, a panel consisting of Brigadier General Adna R. Chaffee and others recommended the establishment of a separate armored force. Herr, upon being given these recommendations, stated that he would accept armor as a part of cavalry, but again, he would not sacrifice any horse unit in favor of a mechanized unit. Chaffee and the others were not deterred, and on 10 July, 1940, the Armored Force was created, and Herr had missed his chance to retain tank units as part of the cavalry. Shortly before his death in 1941, Chaffee, during testimony before Congress, noted that the 1940 German campaign in France was an excellent example of the use of an armored army. “The tactical action of the armored division is based on the fire and the movements of the (combined arms). This tactical action is not comparable to the cavalry charge as so many erroneously believe. It is the natural use of. . . firepower to assist. . . the movement of the maneuver element.”3 He felt that the lessons of that campaign centered on the efficient use of armored assets, because tanks were an additional weapon, not a substitute for the basic arms. He also noted that during the 1920s and 1930s, the Army should have defined a mission for tanks and created a force to accomplish that mission - rather than just fit a mission to whatever equipment might have been on hand. He noted that by 1935, the mechanized force had developed into an organization with organic reconnaissance and machinegun units, and that by 1941 the force had developed into an organization in which the maneuver units were combined arms organizations. It was also realized that mechanized reconnaissance units had a great long-range value and that commanders should place their reconnaissance assets well to the front of the main body until contact was made. To win, mobility did not just only imply maneuverability but rather, mobility was a form of maneuver within the battle area by highly mobile forces. In the new Field Service Regulations, published in 1941 under the title FM 100-5, “Operations,” tanks were to be employed to assist the “. . . advance of infantry foot troops, whethe; preceding or accompanying the assault echelon.” (my italics). Cavalry, characb terized by high mobility, could bring a new depth to the battlefield with its mechanized units which could intervene at the decisive point and exploit any breakthroughs made by the infantry. By the time of the entry of the U.S. into WWII, mechanization had been fully forced upon the Army, but some believed even then that its effects had not been fully realized. Thus, the Army entered a new era of warfare, finally, but perhaps not totally realizing the potential of the tank. Doctrine and weapons systems which have been designed to employ that doctrine, are sometimes incapable of supporting one another - that is, they are mismatched. In the case of the Mechanized Force and later, the Armored Force, the tanks designed and under service testing during the interwar years were seldom capable of 16 march-aprillQ85

Y ‘ . fully executing the mechanized doctrine under study. The technical limitations of U.S. tanks of the period were caused by a number of factors including limited appropriations for research and development, and the automotive technology of the time. In addition, even the size of the vehicles was limited by the capacity of engineer bridges. Doctrine and technological limitations were thus caused by a number of factors both within and without the Army. The other major obstacle confronting American armored theorists and designers of the period was the struggle for the proponency of the tanks as an arm. Initially, the infantry controlled tanks because of contemporary doctrine and because it won control of the tanks after the passage of the National Defense Act. As doctrine developed to what we now associate with mechanized arms, progressive cavalrymen and other officers sought to adopt tanks for their own branch. While conservative officers battled among themselves for the proponency of what they recognized as an entirely new branch, Chaffee, Van Voorhis and others recognized an opportunity to establish the new branch. Nevertheless, it would be some time before the U.S. developed an adequate medium tank to use a doctrine which had developed at a far faster pace than did the weapon with which the doctrine would be used. Even new and potentially decisive weapons are often misunderstood in the rush to develop doctrine for their use - or to justify their existence. The early developmental period of U.S. armor offers contemporary soldiers an excellent study of what often happens to a new, developing organization when both its concepts and its equipment are concurrently developed and evaluated in a rather unfriendly atmosphere. Futher Reading Additional sources available to the student of the development of US armor include: Organize a Mechanized Force, by Colonel (Ret.) H. H. D. Heiberg, Patton Museum Library, Ft. Knox, Ky. A condensed version appeared in ARMOR Magazine, Sept-Oct. 1976. “The Demise of the Tank Corps and Medium Tank Development Program,” by George F. Hoffmann, Military Affairs, February 1973. “Tactics vs Technology,” by Hoffman, ARMOR Magazine Sept-Oct. 1973. In The Wake of the Tank, by General Sir Gifford Martel, Sifton, Praed & Co. Ltd., London 1931. The Blitzkrieg Story by Charles Messenger, Charles Scribner’s Sons, New York, 1976. “The Development of American Armor 1917-1940,” by Timothy K. Nenninger, four parts, Jan to Oct 1969 ARMOR Magazine. “Mechanization of the Army,” by Lieutenant Colonel A.R. Chaffee, unpublished typescript, USAARMS Library, Ft. Knox, Ky. “Mechanized Cavalry,” by Lieutenant Colonel Willis D. Crittenberger, unpublished paper dated 17 Nov. 1938, USAARMS library, Ft, Knox, Ky. “Report of the Experimental Mechanized Force, 1928,” by Colonel Oliver

S. Eskridge, unpublished, USAARMS Library, Ft, Knox, Ky. Footnotes khenowyth, Maj., Bradford, “Cavalry Tanka,” CawlryJournol, July 1921. *Benson, Maj., C.C.. Memorandum to the Corn. monder, tkperimental Mechanized Force, 21 Sept.

1928. USAARMS Library, Ft. Knox, Ky. ’Chaffee, MG, A.R., Stotement of Maor Gemml A.R. Chqffce. the Commanding Generol of Armor& Forces, US. Army, to the Congewionol Subcommittee on Appropriotlons, Unpublished, Washington, D.C. 14 May 1941. USAARMS Llbrrty. Ft. Knox, KY.

CAPTAIN E D W A R D 6 .

MILLER is a graduate of Western Kentucky Universl-ty. He served 88 a tank platoon leader and company XO In the 194th Armored Brigade and as aide-decamp to the CG, 2ROTCR. In 1983 he received a branch transfer from armor to ordnance. He is a graduate of the AOBC, JOMC and the Ordnance Officer advanced c o u r s e , He w a s later assigned to the Aberdeen Provlng Ground and is now eervlng with 2d Support Command, USAREUR.

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