Highlighting the Most Significant Work of Iraq’s Social, Political, and Military History: Volume VI, Supplemental of the Multivolume Collection of Dr. Ali al-Wardi

Foreword In the quest to understand the human landscape of a military area of operations, foreign area officers, military planners, and intelligence analysts must cultivate empathy for a region and its people. Getting into the mindset of our adversaries and the population we are protecting, and developing sound counterinsurgency programs requires an understanding that transcends beyond the realm of internet searches. What is needed is an analytic immersion offered by books and a visit to the resources available at military libraries. We pride ourselves at cultivating a love of analytic research at the John T. Hughes Library, as hundreds of students pursuing their graduate and undergraduate degrees in strategic intelligence, write papers and prepare graduate-level theses based on a year of intellectual inquiry in an area of interest to the intelligence community and the individual student. Commander Aboul-Enein has been a permanent fixture at our library, maintaining a second office among our stacks, and requesting our library staff to acquire for him obscure Arabic titles needed to understand the region. The work of Dr. Ali al-Wardi, although in Arabic, represents the types of books we acquired for those whose knowledge of the Arabic language enable them to incorporate such sources in educating our future military leaders. The John T. Hughes Library staff is pleased to be part of this project. When Commander Aboul-Enein described the volumes of Ali al-Wardi to us, it took less than 6 months to acquire a set for our collection and this review essay series. Never underestimate the capabilities of military libraries located in locations such as the Pentagon, war colleges, staff colleges, and on major military installations. As we have done for Commander Aboul-Enein, we expend every effort to acquire books, even in such strategic languages as Arabic, through interlibrary loan. In defense of our Nation, no title is obscure, and I commend ARMOR for providing a forum for this important series written by the father of Iraqi sociology. — Ms. Denise Campbell Director, John T. Hughes Library Hussein ibn Ali, the sherief of Mecca’s personality is described in Wardi’s supplement to his sixth volume of the definitive Arabic language history of Iraq. As he has done with earlier volumes, which focus on Ottoman Iraq and Persia, the supplemental volume covers personalities and regions in the periphery of modern Iraq; Iraq after World War I will be absorbed in events occurring not only within the country, but in Arabia, Transjordan (modern day Jordan), and Syria. The previous review essay in ARMOR’s January-February 2010 edition covers Prince Feisal ibn Hussein’s capture of Damascus in 1918, his declaration as King of Syria, and his final eviction by French forces from Syria in 1920. This edition’s review essay covers Wardi’s views on his father, Hussein ibn Ali (hereafter referred to as Hussein), the sherief of Mecca, after World War I. It was in the name Part 7 26

Iraq’s Social, Political, and Military History: Hejaz and Sherief of Mecca, of the Multivolume Collection of Dr. Ali al-Wardi of Hussein, that the 1916 Arab Revolt occurred, and his sons Abdullah, Feisal, and Ali would lead forces, along with T. E. Lawrence (of Arabia), to undermine Ottoman forces in the Middle East. Yet, after the war, Hussein would gradually alienate many and succumb to the forces of Abdul-Aziz Ibn Saud (hereafter referred to as Ibn Saud). What Wardi lacks in detailed tactical information about tribal wars, he makes up by providing details on the personalities of the leaders, their psychology, fears, and styles of decisionmaking, which is not generally available in western accounts. This is the art of empathizing with a military leader, and to acquire the skill of empathy (not sympathy) for an adversary requires copious readings of historic accounts; in the case of the Middle East, in both English and Arabic. King Hussein ibn Ali: A Lesson in Hubris and Overexaggerated Sense of Self Hussein, descendant of the Prophet Muhammad from Ali, expected his person to be revered as such. This gave him an overinflated sense of importance, which would lead to an exaggerated hubris of his tribal enemies. He also possessed a fearsome temper, and Wardi advises that when summoned to Mecca, regardless of innocence or guilt, write your will, as Hussein was not discerning and would likely order an execution for minor offenses. Hussein was also stubborn and did not consider alternate points of view, surrounding himself with courtiers and poets that fed his delusions. He saw the world as he wanted, and not what it actually was. As King of the Hejaz (the region encompassing most of the Red Sea coast, including the holy cities of Mecca and Medina), Hussein had a difficult time delegating authority to subordinates. Perhaps the most crippling weakness was his deluded sense of importance, thinking that his political opinions, particularly those published in the newspaper, al-Qibla, were read by great powers such as Britain and France. He alienated senior Muslim clerics by declaring that his interpretation of the Quran superseded all other clerics in the realm, which went against the concept of ijmaa (consensus in matters of faith). Hussein had many delusions, such as believing all Arabs supported him, and he constantly threatened the British that he would abdicate as King of the Hejaz if they failed to acquiesce to his demands. This prompted Winston Churchill, as colonial secretary, to inquire of Hussein’s designated heir. One of the most interesting aspects of Wardi’s section on Hussein is his phobias rooted in Islamic history. It was his ancestors who were massacred in the Field of Karbala in 680 CE. Karbala is where Hussein, son of Ali ibn Abi Talib, grandson of the Prophet Muhammad, and his family, along with 70 retainers were ambushed and massacred by 10,000 of Yazid ibn Muawiyah’s forces while under a flag of truce. It is an event commemorated by Shiite Muslims every 10th day of Muharram. In 1921, more than 1,200 years later, Hussein, the King of the Hejaz, received a cable requesting his son, Feisal, as King of Iraq. The father declared his concern that his son would meet the same fate as his ancestors in Karbala. This fear reached such a level that it took from 1923 to late 1924 for Feisal to be reunited with his wife and oldest son, Ghazi, because Hussein feared they would be massacred in Iraq. Dismounted General Sir Edmund Allenby entering the Holy City of Jerusalem on foot, 1917. 27

Money Dries Up for Hussein ibn Ali Another weakness of Hussein was the reduction of British subsidies and payments after World War I, beginning in 1920. This would lead him to tax urban centers and meddle in the affairs of merchants and craftsmen of major cities. With British subsidies drying up, Bedouins paid by Hussein began to stop receiving payments and resorted to raiding caravans and setting up tolls along roads to Mecca, Medina, Jeddah, and Taif. Members of the Harb tribal confederacy attacked Iraqi pilgrims, killing 40, including four women. Hussein’s decision to compensate pilgrims harmed by tribal brigands added a further strain on his finances. Hussein’s pride also alienated members of his own family such as his son, Abdullah’s, assault on his relative, Khalid ibn Luai, ruler of Taif, in 1918. This physical assault, over a disagreement, turned Ibn Luai toward Ibn Saud in central Arabia and Wahabism. Hussein devoted scarce forces and his barely trained army of the Hejaz to securing Taif and fighting Ibn Luai and his sponsor, Ibn Saud. In 1919, when Hussein took over the Ottoman arsenal in Medina, armed with large quantities of ammunition, rifles, light and heavy machine guns, and artillery, he felt strong enough to take the fight deeper into Ibn Saud’s territory — the Najd (literally, the uplands, but describing the region of central Arabia). This particular campaign, between Hussein and Ibn Saud, demonstrates that possessing superior weapons does not assure victory. His son, Abdullah, warned Hussein that his forces were exhausted from laying siege of Medina and were reluctant to muster. Feeling confident with his weapons, Hussein ordered his son to campaign in central Arabia. Abdullah obeyed his father and took an inadequate force of 850 regulars and 1,500 tribal levies, armed with 10 artillery pieces, and 20 light and 20 heavy machine guns. Most of the regular officers sent to fight Ibn Luai and Ibn Saud were Iraqi. Ibn Saud assembled a force of 12,000 tribal levies and 1,500 Ikhwan (ultra-wahabi fanatics) as skirmishers. The Ikhwan skirmishers were commanded by Ibn Luai and Sultan Ibn Bijad. By May 1924, Ibn Saud sent a messenger requesting Prince Abdullah to withdraw from the village of Turbah; both the villages of Turbah and Khurmah were considered a tribal border between Ibn Saud and Hussein. Ibn Saud’s messenger added that the Ikhwan was on the outskirts of Turbah, which angered Abdullah, leading to him to order the death of the messenger. The attack of the Ikhwan came days later as the call of dawn prayers were being cried out, while the town of Turbah was still in darkness and the forces of Abdullah were still asleep or just waking for prayers. The skirmishers of the Ikhwan would overwhelm the forces of Abdullah. Of the 850 regulars, only 157 survived; all the machine guns, artillery, and rifles were captured. Ibn Saud’s victory at Turbah, with the fanatical Ikhwan, would reverberate in Mecca, Medina, Jeddah, and even London and Cairo. Prince Abdullah barely escaped with his life and was rescued by his uncle, Zeid ibn Shakir, who provided him a horse and camel to escape to safety. British Reaction to Ibn Saud’s Victory The British, through their consul general in Jeddah, sent a note to Ibn Saud to withdraw his forces from the neutral villages of Turbah and Khurmah and return them to the Najd. He was warned that all agreements with the British would be voided if Ibn Saud pressed on and invaded the Hejaz. Ibn Saud had pressures from England to contend with, and from his fanatical Ikhwan fighters chanting, “Onto Taif!” Ibn Saud would restrain his fighters and maintain his hold on Turbah and Khurmah. London was surprised by the quick taking of Turbah by Ibn Saud. It was hoped that the newly created and British-trained Hejaz army could keep the balance of tribal power between Ibn Saud and Hussein. Foreign Secretary Lord Curzon consulted with Harry St. John Philby, who recommended that Ibn Saud be allowed to retain Khurmah and Turbah, to placate him, but to extract an agreement from him to cease his push into the Hejaz or taking the city of Taif. London sent Philby to the Najd to let Ibn Saud know of this plan and present it as the British position on the matter. The British had pressure not only from Hussein to stop the Wahabis, but when word spread that Turbah and Khurmah were taken by Wahabis, the cities of Mecca, Medina, and Taif saw an exodus of refugees packing the port city of Jeddah. London discussed what could be done about Wahabi massacres, concluding that unless they were willing to commit British regular forces, there was nothing that could be done. Upon Philby’s arrival in Cairo, Ibn Saud had withdrawn his forces into the Najd, refugees returned to Mecca, Medina, and Taif, and he was ordered not to proceed with his mission. This was a strategic mistake as the British threatened Ibn Saud to withdraw from Turbah and Khurmah, and did not present the British follow-up position, which gave the impression that London was disinterested in the affairs of Arabia, allowing Ibn Saud to keep the two neutral villages. General Allenby, the British high commissioner in Cairo, had six biplanes shipped to Jeddah to reinforce the defense of the Hejaz against the Wahabis and Ibn Saud. Philby advised Allenby that if pilots were captured in Ibn Saud’s 28 “As King of the Hejaz (the region encompassing most of the Red Sea coast, including the holy cities of Mecca and Medina), Hussein had a difficult time delegating authority to subordinates. Perhaps the most crippling weakness was his deluded sense of importance, thinking that his political opinions, particularly those published in the newspaper, al-Qibla, were read by great powers such as Britain and France.” “The attack of the Ikhwan came days later as the call of dawn prayers were being cried out, while the town of Turbah was still in darkness and the forces of Abdullah were still asleep or just waking for prayers. The skirmishers of the Ikhwan would overwhelm the forces of Abdullah.”

territory they would be cut to pieces, so the planes were left in their crates at the pier in Jeddah. This was another tactical blunder that would only embolden Ibn Saud. Battle of Turbah’s Impact on Hussein’s Morale The Battle of Turbah impacted the morale of Hussein so much so that he took ill, blamed his son, Abdullah, and obsessed about seeking revenge on Ibn Saud. Instead of taking a pragmatic approach to defend the Hejaz, and making preparation to challenge Ibn Saud, he withdrew into his delusions of grandeur. Of note, Hussein would negotiate with T. E. Lawrence, wanting Iraq, Palestine, and Transjordan as part of his Arab kingdom. He wanted the Hejaz to include the southern Arabian region of Asir, up to the port of Hodeida in modern-day Aden. He demanded from Lawrence that the British recognize him as first among all princes of Arabia and force Ibn Saud to withdraw from Turbah and Khurmah. Lawrence reported Hussein’s fantasies and delusions to Lord Curzon. Despite outward appearances of obedience, Hussein’s sons, Feisal and Abdullah, disagreed with him politically. Hussein treated negotiations with British officials as “all or nothing,” and Feisal, in particular, took a “give and take” approach. The sons would cut their own deals with British officials, making Abdullah emir of Transjordan and Feisal king of Iraq, much to Hussein’s consternation. Hussein was engaged in fantasy by believing that the French would not have dared take Syria and evicted Feisal in 1920, had Syria been part of his Arab kingdom and attached to the Hejaz. From 1923 onward, Hussein spent many more days in Jordan, and in 1924, his son, Ali ibn Hussein, took charge of running Mecca and the Hejaz. It was short-lived, as Ibn Saud took Taif, with Wahabis, conducting a brutal massacre; the fear of which laid Mecca and Jeddah open to their conquest in 1924 and 1925, respectively. Hussein Declares Himself Caliph and Makes Powerful Enemies The period 1924 would see the caliphate institution abolished by Kemal Ataturk on March 1st. This was a shock to the Islamic world, as the institution had been in existence since the death of the Prophet Muhammad in 632 CE. Wardi has an excellent dialogue between Hussein and Abdullah over the issue, with Abdullah encouraging his father to declare himself caliph. Four days after Ataturk’s decision, Hussein declared himself caliph and took fealty from his sons, the rulers of Jordan and Iraq. In Iraq, Feisal even engineered the Shiite Muslims in Karbala to offer fealty to his father, the new caliph, arguing he was descendant of the Prophet Muhammad from the line of Ali, Muhammad’s cousin, and revered among Shiites. This was a major coup; the Shiites never publicly recognized the Ottoman Sultan as caliph. Hussein’s decision to declare himself caliph added powerful enemies plotting against him and his sons. His enemies included Ibn Saud in Central Arabia; King Fuad of Egypt, who did not appreciate Hussein’s cultivation of Shiites; and the British, who did not like the idea of a caliph who could agitate Muslim subjects in India, Malaya, Egypt, and the Sudan. In hindsight, there are hidden burdens and even dangers to declaring oneself caliph that were unforeseen by Hussein. This portion of Wardi’s volumes contains many lessons, such as creating modern Saudi Arabia at the expense of the miscalculations, blunders, and misjudgments of Hussein; and offers a classic tale of overreach. Hussein overreached his abilities by wanting an Arab kingdom from Iraq to Yemen, declaring himself caliph, alienating his British allies, overestimating his influence, and underestimating his adversaries. On the issue of the caliphate in the 21st century, militant Islamist groups, such as al-Qaeda, yearn for the restoration of this institution as a goal. Bin Laden also made mention of the loss of the caliphate in his early speeches, but sense of history versus knowledge of history, precludes them from understanding the burdens and complexities of whoever assumes that title, which, in essence, is a political tradition and not ordained in Islam. It is vital that America’s current and future military leaders understand this rarely studied history of the region as part of their education in defending America’s national security interests in the region. Wardi’s volumes represent an Arabic work of military significance to U. S. forces that should be fully translated, debated, and taught so our forces can acquire information dominance in the region. Part 8, on the next page, highlights Wardi’s details of the personality and rise of Abdul-Aziz Ibn Saud, and his creation of modern Saudi Arabia. “General Allenby, the British high commissioner in Cairo, had six biplanes shipped to Jeddah to reinforce the defense of the Hejaz against the Wahabis and Ibn Saud. Philby advised Allenby that if pilots were captured in Ibn Saud’s territory they would be cut to pieces, so the planes were left in their crates at the pier in Jeddah.” “The period 1924 would see the caliphate institution abolished by Kemal Ataturk on March 1st. This was a shock to the Islamic world, as the institution had been in existence since the death of the Prophet Muhammad in 632 CE.” 29

The national security challenges the United States faces demands a continual look at new ways to teach its deploying forces. It is important to provide them with a level of understanding of the cultural, historic, and human aspects of the area in which they will operate. Having personally served in both Afghanistan and Iraq, I am convinced of the importance of educating all who intend to deploy in support of operations. Some level of awareness of the regional and local culture should be shared, not only with the military, but also with contractors, interagency, and nongovernment agencies. Since 2002, Commander Aboul-Enein has provided Joint Forces Staff College students and its faculty with a foundation of the nuances of Islam, militant Islamist ideology, and the intricacies of modern Middle East political history. Commander Aboul-Enein’s experience and perspective enhance the overall educational experience our students receive, thereby better equipping them to meet challenges they will face as they deploy to serve as critical campaign planners. I am pleased to introduce the eighth essay, which provides a historical narrative of Iraqi history from the Ottoman period to the founding of the Iraqi nation-state. This essay exposes the fascinating rise of the Hashemite dynasty of Hussein ibn Ali, the sherief of Mecca, and the seeds of the 1916 Arab Revolt. The essay also discusses the Hashemite rival in Arabia, the Ibn Sauds, whose descendants would eventually triumph and discover modern Saudi Arabia. Wardi offers details on the origins of appointing the descendants of Prophet Muhammad to govern Mecca and the Ottoman policy of selecting which of those descendants would govern Islam’s holiest site on its behalf. Readers are in for a few surprise facts, such as the first signs of Ottoman decline in Arabia did not begin in Mecca during World War I, but in Yemen in 1911. This exploration of Wardi’s history allows us to cultivate the empathy needed to operate in Iraq. I applaud ARMOR for providing Commander Aboul-Enein a forum for this work. For those readers of ARMOR who qualify during their career, I hope to see you at the Joint Forces Staff College, where we cultivate critical thinking required to conceive and apply joint solutions on the 21st-century battlefield. Understanding that battlefield includes discussing and analyzing Arabic authors such as Dr. Wardi. — BG Katherine “Kate” Kasun Commandant, Joint Forces Staff College Part 8 Volume VI, Supplemental: Weakening Ottoman Control of Arabia before World War I Foreword Part 8 of the review essay in the ARMOR series highlighting the multivolume work of Dr. Wardi concentrates on the Ottoman rise and decline of power in Arabia before World War I, which led to rebellions in Yemen and ultimately to the infamous 1916 Arab Revolt in Mecca. The final essays of this series, parts 9, 10, and 11, conclude with Prince Feisal’s short-lived monarchy in Syria, the decline of the Hashemites as rulers of Mecca and the Hejaz region of Arabia, and the final triumph of Ibn Saud, as well as the challenges Ibn Saud would face consolidating his hold on the Arabian Peninsula. As we near the end of this series, it is important to stress the need to educate our combat forces through Arabic sources. Wardi’s volumes should be fully translated into English and made available to American military leaders deploying to Iraq and those involved in stabilizing the country. It is hoped that this multipart exposé will form the basis to advocate the need to translate, highlight, and discuss Arabic works of military significance. Finally, you may wish to review all of the essays in the series and join the debate in ARMOR regarding Iraq, its past, future, and impact on America’s fighting men and women. The Sheriefs of Mecca: Rulers of Islam’s Holiest City from 939 to 1925 Iraqi leaders are tied tribally by a network of alliances reaching into Arabia. During and after World War I, these leaders would see the emergence of two factions as the Hashemite and Ibn Saud struggled for dominance of the Arabian Peninsula. The rivalry between the two was not only over territory, but also over an ideological difference. The Hashemite vision was of a Pan-Arab dream encompassing Arabia, Jordan, Iraq, and even Syria, united by descendants of Muhammad. Ibn Saud wanted to consolidate his rule as absolute leader of the Arabian Peninsula, with a tacit agreement negotiated for legitimacy by Ibn Saud’s forefathers, to propagate the Wahabi form of Salafi Sunni Islam. Wardi discusses Islamic viewpoints on the status of the descendants of Prophet Muhammad and thereby the authority of the created position of sherief of Mecca. Sunni Muslims generally respect the Prophet’s descendants; whereas, Shiite Muslims revere Muhammad’s descendants. However, Islam and Muhammad himself opposed a class system, and ala Muhammad (family of Muhammad), or more precisely ahl-al-bayt (family of the household), could represent Muhammad’s family or the followers of Muhammad and not his immediate family (Quran 33:33). The position of sherief of Mecca, derived from Muhammad’s descendants, was established in 969 CE, more than three centuries after Muhammad’s death, by the Fatimids, a Shiite dynasty that ruled from Egypt. The first person descended from Muhammad to assume position of sherief of Mecca was Jafar ibn al-Hassan, who would also assume the position wali (governor) of the Hejaz, the entire Arabian Red Sea coast. The Fatimids created the position in a political maneuver, cultivating Mu- 30 hammad’s descendants and thereby undermining their rivals, the Abbasids, governing from Baghdad. The Abbasids responded to this maneuver by sending an emissary, Hussein ibn Musa, to Fatimid-controlled Mecca to represent Iraqi pilgrimage interests. Hussein ibn Musa’s primary mission was to convince Jafar ibn al-Hassan to resume reading his blessings from Mecca on the household of the Abbasids, as well as the Fatimids. Part 8 of Wardi’s writings continues to discuss every person occupying the position of sherief of Mecca and mentions Abu al-Futuh, who ruled Mecca in 994 AD, as one of the greatest sheriefs of Mecca — a poet, warrior, and religious scholar. Al-Futuh fought his uncles in Medina and Yemen, consolidating his authority over the Hejaz region. He coveted being the single absolute caliph and viewed with disdain three caliphates in the Muslim world of the period — the Fatimids in Egypt, Abbasids in Iraq, and Umayyads in Spain. Abu al-Futuh was a Shiite and would rebel against the Shiite caliphate in Egypt, leading a large Bedouin army in an attempt to conquer the Levant. His army would be pushed back. Of particular note, in 1023 CE, an Egyptian pilgrim attacked the Black Stone, the only stone of the Kaaba (the house built by Abraham for the worship of one God) original to Abraham, and split it into three pieces before being killed by a Yemeni onlooker. This would lead to a riot between Egyptian pilgrims and others in the vicinity of the Kaaba. As a result, in 1042 CE, the sherief of Mecca, Zeid ibn Muhsin, banned Shiites from Mecca, and until 1743, Shiites were viewed as defilers of the Kaaba. The Ottoman caliphate by that date controlled the lands in what was once known as the Fatimids and Abbasids, to include Mecca. Persian ruler, Nadir Shah, concluded an agreement with the Ottomans to resume Shiite pilgrimage to Mecca in 1743. The sherief of Mecca, Masood ibn Saeed, received the Shiite religious dignitaries; however, the public was not ready for Shiite preachers in Mecca, and the Turkish administrator of Mecca called for the death of Shiite religious representatives. Sherief of Mecca and the Wahabis Sherief Masood ibn Saeed would determine Wahabi doctrine as heretical, and bar them for making the hajj (pilgrimage to Mecca), a ban that would last until 1788. It would be sherief of Mecca, Ghalib ibn Masood, who would conclude a truce with the Wahabis, allowing them access to Mecca. In 1802, with a truce concluded on their western flank, and access to Mecca, the Wahabis raided northward and sacked Karbala. With the riches looted from shrines in Karbala and general looting of markets in the city, the Wahabis felt confident enough to break their truce with the sherief of Mecca. They would take over the city of Taif and carry out a vicious massacre of the populace. Before 1798, the sherief of Mecca, Ghalib ibn Masood, led military incursions into central Arabia to demonstrate his military power among the Wahabis. In 1802 and onward, Saud ibn Abdul-Aziz, ancestor of the modern founder of Saudi Arabia, wanted to exploit his gains in Taif to take Mecca and the seaport town of Jeddah. The Wahabis briefly took Mecca in 1803, demolishing the tombs of Prophet Muhammad’s companions and birthplaces; destroying the tomb of Muhammad’s first wife, “In 1802 and onward, Saud ibn Abdul-Aziz, ancestor of the modern founder of Saudi Arabia, wanted to exploit his gains in Taif to take Mecca and the seaport town of Jeddah. The Wahabis briefly took Mecca in 1803, demolishing the tombs of Prophet Muhammad’s companions and birthplaces; destroying the tomb of Muhammad’s first wife, Khadija; and leveling many domes.” 31

Khadija; and leveling many domes. Saud ibn Abdul Aziz ordered the destruction of water pipes, tobacco, and musical instruments, and banned burials with headstones. They would impose the teachings of Muhammad ibn Abdul-Wahab (1703-1792), founder of Wahabism, on the populace. The Wahabis held Mecca for only a few months before being driven out, forcing them to lay siege to the holy city. The Wahabi siege of Mecca would fail and Saud ibn Abdul Aziz withdrew his forces back into central Arabia. In 1804, he attempted to lay siege to Mecca again and failed. In 1806, Sherief Ghalib ibn Masood concluded a truce with the Wahabis, but they began to force their doctrine on the populace and Mecca’s leaders. When the pilgrimage season came, the Wahabis warned Egyptian pilgrims, carrying the ceremonial covering of the Kaaba, not to bring this annual tribute next pilgrimage season. The kiswa (cloth covering of the Kaaba) was made annually in Egypt and placed in a ceremonial carrier, called the mahmal. This would then be ceremonially escorted from Egypt to the Levant and finally to Arabia and Mecca at the start of the pilgrimage season. True to their word, in 1807, the Wahabis, then in temporary control of Mecca, attacked the mahmal procession, burning the carrier and the ceremonial cover of the Kaaba. The Wahabis then imposed further bans on pilgrims entering Mecca who had no beard. Egyptians, Syrians, and Iraqis boycotted Mecca, and Ibn Saud, along with the Wahabis, would destroy tombs in Medina, leaving the Prophet’s tomb, but robbing it of all its tribute. Destruction of the First Saudi State (1744-1818) Ottoman Sultan Mahmood II ordered his Egyptian Viceroy, Muhammad Ali Pasha (in Ottoman, pasha equates to lord and bey equates to sir), to address the Wahabi nuisance. In 1811, Muhammad Ali Pasha’solder son, Tousson Pasha, would secure Jeddah, Mecca, and Medina, with the help of European-trained forces and cannon. Captured Wahabi leaders were sent to Cairo. Viceroy Muhammad Ali Pasha visited the Hejaz region, and Ibn Saud offered ransom money of 100,000 silver riyals for the return of Wahabi prisoners. Muhammad Ali Pasha sent word to Ibn Saud that he would release the prisoners if Ibn Saud returned the treasures looted from Prophet Muhammad’s tomb. Muhammad Ali then sent some of the Wahabi prisoners to the Ottoman Sultan; they were paraded in the streets of Istanbul and then executed. The Sherief of Mecca, Ghalib ibn Masood, was exiled by the Ottoman Sultan to the island of Salonika, off the Greek coast, for making a truce with the Wahabis, which is where he died in 1816. Also dying from illness in 1816, was Tousson Pasha, while on military campaign to subjugate the Wahabis. His younger brother, Ibrahim Pasha, would arrive in the port town of Yenbu, utterly defeating the Wahabis in 1818. He used a combination of force and swayed tribes to switch alliances. Ibrahim Pasha obeyed his father’s order to level the capital of First Saudi State Diriyah in Central Arabia a year later. Egyptian rule over the Hejaz, and dominance of Arabia, would last from 1819 to 1840. The Ottoman and Egyptian rulers would alter the power structure of Mecca’s rulers; the sherief of Mecca would share rule with an appointed Ottoman vali (governor). They also had two branches within Muhammad’s family, the Zawi Zaid and the Zawi Awn, compete amongst themselves for Ottoman and Egyptian favor and the appointment of sherief of Mecca. The Ottomans ensured compliant sheriefs ruled Mecca, a system that would last until Ottoman Sultan Abdul Hamid II appointed Hussein ibn Ali as sherief of Mecca in 1908. Hussein would send his older son, Abdullah, to be among two representatives of Mecca in the newly established Ottoman parliament. In 1910, the conflict between Sherief Hussein ibn Ali, of the Hashemites, and Abdul-Aziz Ibn Saud, the founder of modern Saudi Arabia, would begin. Wardi discusses how the initial rivalry between the two was one in which Ibn Saud played a weaker and subordinate role while he consolidated his power in central Arabia. Both would observe Ottoman reaction to the Idrisi rebellion in Yemen to gauge how autonomous they could be in their relationship with the Ottoman Empire. Asir (Yemen) Expedition to Suppress the Idrisi Rebellion In 1904, Yahya ibn Muhammad was installed as Imam of the Zaydi sect of Shiites in Yemen, and began a rebellion against Sunni Ottoman domination. Although the rebellion was contained, the Italians began arming the rebels. This undermined the Ottomans and led to a renewed momentum in the rebellion. This is a little-studied aspect of pre-World War I power rivalries between the Italians and Ottomans as played out in Yemen. Yemeni Saydi Muhammad al-Idrisi led a robust insurrection against the Ottomans, supported from the sea by Italian naval gunfire. This rebellion was suppressed in 1911, but also resulted in more autonomy for the Idrisi clan. Yemen eventually declared an independent imamate in 1918. The Ottomans would continue to rely on regular forces, supplemented by tribal levies provided by Sherief Hussein. While Sherief Hussein’s forces were occupied in Yemen, Ibn Saud attempted to seize Mecca, and three Ottoman regular battalions had to push back Ibn Saud’s incursion in 1910. The way the Ottomans handled the insurrection proved to Sherief Hussein that they were not reliable guarantors of his power in Mecca; Ottoman forces barely thwarted the Wahabi “Muhammad Ali Pasha sent word to Ibn Saud that he would release the prisoners if Ibn Saud returned the treasures looted from Prophet Muhammad’s tomb. Muhammad Ali then sent some of the Wahabi prisoners to the Ottoman Sultan; they were paraded in the streets of Istanbul and then executed.” 32 incursion into the Hejaz and Mecca; the Ottomans marginalized his authority in favor of the Turkish civil-military governor of Mecca; and with an infusion of Italian support, the Yemenis gained autonomy from the Ottomans, despite Yemeni tribal forces being defeated in the field. It became apparent that the Ottomans were weakening, leading tribal confederations, such as Ibn Saud and Sherief Hussein (the Hashemites), to re-examine their relationships with the Ottoman Sultan. Wardi discusses the train of thought that would lead to Sherief Hussein contacting the British in February 1914. First British Contact with Sherief Hussein of Mecca First contact with the British, leading to the 1916 Arab Revolt, would be a series of meetings, correspondence, and messages between Hussein, his sons, and British officials in Egypt. In 1914, Hussein’s son, Prince Abdullah, made a trip from Mecca to Istanbul and stopped in Cairo to pay his respects to Egypt’s ruler, the Khedive Abbas Hilmi II. Egypt’s ruler hosted Abdullah in Abdin Palace. Egypt had been a British Protectorate since 1882, so the British high commissioner in Egypt, Horatio Kitchener, and his oriental secretary, Ronald Storrs, arranged a meeting with Abdullah to discuss the affairs of Arabia. These initial conversations centered on Ottoman relations with Prince Abdullah’s father and Turkish plans to replace Hussein as sherief of Mecca. Abdullah asked what the British position might be if his father rebelled against the Ottomans. Being months before the outbreak of World War I, the official British position ruled the matter as an Ottoman problem; however, Storrs and Prince Abdullah engaged in endless hours of nighttime discussions on Arabic literature, and pre-Islamic poetry. Abdullah asked the British to provide heavy machine guns; Storrs responded that the British could indeed supply such weapons to friendly allies for selfdefense, if his father so requested. This was a nuanced answer, basically saying that the British would arm the sherief of Mecca, as they would technically be equipping an Ottoman vassal for self-defense. Of course, should relations with the Ottomans and British change, as they would in 1914, this cloak could be lifted ever so slowly, and the sherief of Mecca could be a British ally in what would become World War I. Each time Abdullah visited Egypt, he saw Storrs and they discussed Arabic poetry, chess, and options Britain would take if certain scenarios played out with the Ottomans. These talks occurred in the Egyptian ruler’s palace and in aside room located atop the Egyptian newspaper, al-Muqatam, and would be the initial seeds of the Arab Revolt. World War I Breaks Out and Sides Are Taken August 1914, the start of World War I would lead to a solidification of these talks between Storrs and Abdullah. Lord Kitchener would be vacationing in England at the outbreak of the first world war, and would be named war minister. Storrs wrote Kitchener, asking for consideration in Britain supporting the Arab cause for autonomy from the Ottoman Empire, should they side with Germany against Britain and France. Kitchener’s answer came a month later. Storrs was authorized to approach Abdullah’s father, Hussein, to ascertain the position of sherief of Mecca should the Ottomans side with the Germans. Between 1914 and 1915, Storrs detailed an Egyptian messenger, Ali Asghar, as a courier and communications conduit between he and Hussein. Having access to Mecca, Asghar would deliver messages personally to the sherief and these exchanges would result in an understanding that should the Ottomans violate its neutrality, Britain would provide material support for the Arabs to gain autonomy from the Turks. In November 1914, the Ottomans sided with the Germans in a ruse involving the transfer of German battle cruisers that began shelling Russian ports in the Black Sea. The Ottomans called on the sherief of Mecca to declare a jihad on Britain. The sherief prayed for an Ottoman triumph over the infidels, but expressed concern that a public declaration would lead the British fleet to shell Red Sea coastal towns. The British could easily blockade ports along the Red Sea. A blockade would lead to starvation, which could cause a general riot and even tribal uprisings. The Ottomans grew impatient with Hussein and sought to remove him as sherief of Mecca. In February 1915, Weheb Pasha, the Ottoman civil-military gover- “In 1914, Hussein’s son, Prince Abdullah, made a trip from Mecca to Istanbul and stopped in Cairo to pay his respects to Egypt’s ruler, the Khedive Abbas Hilmi II. Egypt’s ruler hosted Abdullah in Abdin Palace. Egypt had been a British Protectorate since 1882, so the British high commissioner in Egypt, Horatio Kitchener, and his oriental secretary, Ronald Storrs, arranged a meeting with Abdullah to discuss the affairs of Arabia.” “Lord Kitchener (shown at right) would be vacationing in England at the outbreak of the first world war, and would be named war minister. Storrs wrote Kitchener, asking for consideration in Britain supporting the Arab cause for autonomy from the Ottoman Empire, should they side with Germany against Britain and France. Kitch-ener’s answer came a month later. Storrs was authorized to approach Abdullah’s father, Hussein, to ascertain the position of sherief of Mecca should the Ottomans side with the Germans.” 33 nor of Mecca, lost his personal bag as he traveled from Mecca to Medina. The bag was found by a Bedouin, who brought it to Sherief Hussein of Mecca. It was an intelligence coup for Hussein, containing personal papers outlining Ottoman intent to remove him from his position as sherief of Mecca. Hussein sent his other son, Prince Feisal, to the Levant to assess the strength and seriousness of the Arab nationalist movement. Feisal was to continue his journey, from the Levant to Istanbul, to present his complaint before the sultan of a conspiracy by Weheb Pasha to remove him. After spending four weeks in Syria, talking to Arab nationalists of secret societies, such as al-Ahd, Feisal also spent time with the commander of the Ottoman 4th Army and governor of Syria, Djemal Pasha. Feisal’s mission in Istanbul, presenting his father’s case against Weheb, was a success and Weheb was replaced by a more pliant and passive leader, Ghalib Pasha. Among Syria’s Arab nationalists, six leaders swore fealty to Sherief Hussein and worked to sway the officers of the 12th Ottoman Division, which had the greatest concentration of Arabs, to support the nationalist cause. Feisal, in keeping with protocol, requested permission from Ottoman Djemal Pasha to leave the Levant, travel from Damascus to Jerusalem, where Djemal was, and request his leave. McMahon-Hussein Correspondence In modern Middle East political history there are certain agreements, declarations, and letters that stir up much controversy. There is, for instance, the 1916 Sykes-Picot Agreement that carved up the Ottoman Middle East into spheres of British, French, and Russian influence; and the 1917 Balfour Declaration that established a Jewish state in Palestine, but not at the expense of the indigenous peoples. The correspondence between British high commissioner in Egypt, Sir Henry McMahon, and Sherief Hussein of Mecca would rank among those controversial documents in the tragic history of the modern Middle East. Wardi outlines the ten letters exchanged between the two, five from McMahon and five from Hussein, riddled with flourishes and platitudes, and lacking any real commitment to Arab nationalist aspirations. Hussein read these platitudes as British acceptance of an Arab national homeland in Arabia, Jordan, Palestine, Syria, and Iraq. This miscommunication would have dire consequences and is a lesson in the need for occasional clarity in diplomacy. In Early 1916, Prince Feisal departed for Damascus with 50 horsemen, which was the contingent that would participate in an assault to gain control of the Suez Canal, Britain’s lifeline to India. Djemal Pasha viewed this contribution with contempt and made Feisal his permanent guest (read “glorified hostage”) until his father sent more troops. Feisal would spend five months in Damascus; however, he did not waste his time. Instead, managing the criticisms against his father by Djemal Pasha and visiting War Minister Ali Fuad Bey, he diverted attention from Hussein’s talks with McMahon. Despite being a hostage, Feisal held a massive banquet in honor of Djemal Pasha. Feisal was not entirely in the British camp and hoped for reconciliation with the Ottoman sultan; however, several Arab nationalists were caught and Feisal interceded, along with Djemal Pasha, to free them. However, seven were hung in Damascus and fourteen in Beirut, which transformed Feisal and he became even more committed to ridding Arabia and the greater Middle East of Ottoman suzerainty. Feisal received word from his father to depart Damascus as the revolt against the Ottomans was about to start. Feisal left Damascus under a ruse, telling Djemal Pasha he had to meet fighters amassing in Medina and ride at their head to Damascus in preparation for the second Sinai assault. The first assault occurred in 1915, during the first months of the Ottoman declaration of war, and pitted 25,000 Ottoman troops against 30,000 British Expeditionary troops, who pushed the Ottomans back. Djemal did not trust Feisal or his father and sent General Fakhri Pasha to take over the garrison of 3,000 troops in Medina. Djemal also ordered those troops to remain in Medina and not deploy to Yemen, as originally planned. Mecca thus had 1,200 troops when the Arab Revolt occurred in June

1916. The revolt would be sustained by the British, to include famous officers such as T. E. Lawrence (of Arabia), who advised Prince Feisal; John Glubb, who advised Prince Abdullah; and Harry St. John Philby, who advised Ibn Saud. Wardi concedes that much has been written about the 1916 Arab Revolt; therefore, he limits his own writings to the events leading up to the revolt. He points out that many of the Ottoman regulars who defected to the Arab nationalist cause were Iraqis and would form the core of returning officers who would create Iraq’s modern army. There are many recent books recommended for anyone interested in gaining a deeper understanding of the Arab Revolt and Lawrence of Arabia, to include the unconventional tactics used in tying down tens of thousands of Ottoman forces and neutralizing their threat on British Egypt. The revolt also allowed General Edmund Allenby to push toward Jerusalem and Damascus and defeat the Ottoman 4th Army in the Battle of Megiddo in September 1918 (the Arab Revolt secured Allenby’s right flank). Wardi focuses much of Volume 6 (Supplemental) on Prince Feisal’s short-lived rule over Syria. Arab and British forces arrived in Damascus simultaneously and anew phase of the conflict would begin over control of the Levant. This history is vital in teaching America’s combat forces, as it provides a sense of the human terrain in an area of strategic importance to the United States. Commander Youssef Aboul-Enein is a U. S. Navy Medical Service Corps Officer and Middle East foreign area officer. He currently serves as a senior counterterrorism advisor, warning officer, and instructor on militant Islamist ideology, Joint Task Force for Combating Terrorism, Washington, DC. He received a B. B. A. from the University of Mississippi (Ole Miss), an M. B. A. and M. A. from the University of Arkansas, and an M. S. from the National Defense Intelligence College. His military education includes the U. S. Naval War College, the U. S. Army War College Defense Strategy Course, the Marine Corps University Amphibious Warfare School, and advanced analytic courses at the Joint Military Intelligence College. His most recent assignments include country director for North Africa and Egypt, assistant country director for the Arabian Gulf, and special advisor on Islamist Militancy at the Office of the Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, Washington, DC. “Mecca thus had 1,200 troops when the Arab Revolt occurred in June 1916. The revolt would be sustained by the British, to include famous officers such as T. E. Lawrence (of Arabia), (shown at right), who advised Prince Feisal; John Glubb, who advised Prince Abdullah; and Harry St. John Philby, who advised Ibn Saud.” 34