Max Recon Forces Forward: Air Cavalry and Attack Aviation’s Role in Limiting Enemy Freedom of Movement and Maneuver

“Effective reconnaissance is continuous.” 1 Cavalry/attack aviation battalion commanders need to ensure they provide a scout weapons team (SWT)/attack weapons team (AWT) mission tempo with the purpose of establishing continuous recon for the brigade combat team (BCT). Similarly, aviation S2s, ground maneuver S2s, and collection managers need to remain linked in understanding the enemy and developing reconnaissance plans that fit the ground scheme of maneuver, as well as adding SWT/AWT to the mix and redundancy of other intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance (ISR) assets. Together, aviation mission tempo and coordinated ISR planning allow aviation commanders to maintain continuous SWT/ AWT air reconnaissance missions that support the ISR plan and create a level of deterrence that limits the enemy’s freedom of maneuver and movement. Continuous reconnaissance conducted by cavalry/attack aviation units during counterinsurgency operations limits enemy freedom of movement/maneuver by interdicting enemy lines of communication (LOC) and support zones, identifying enemy and friendly patterns, and deterring enemy attacks that assist BCTs in focusing on nonlethal lines of effort (LOE). Due to the successful 2007 coalition surge operations in Baghdad and the Baghdad belts, al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) and the insurgency started to move north to regroup and conduct operations along the Tigris River Valley, in Mosul, and parts of the Nineveh Province. Violence levels in Mosul began to climb as the insurgency gained momentum in Mosul in late fall of 2007. In December 2007, the 3d Armored Cavalry Regiment (3ACR) conducted transfer of authority (TOA) and assumed operations in Mosul and the Nineveh Province, Iraq. As part of its campaign plan, the 3ACR executed a “clear, hold, build” approach with one ground cavalry squadron in Mosul focused on the combat/civil security operations LOE. The violence levels continued to increase in Mosul, which led to 3ACR receiving a U.S. infantry battalion and more Iraqi army forces in January 2008 to assist with operations. The 3ACR and Iraqi army (IA) forces continued clear, hold, build operations by clearing insurgents from neighborhoods; holding the area by establishing joint combat outposts (JCOP); and building/reinforcing traffic control points (TCPs) throughout Mosul. (See Figure 1.) As the direct support aviation unit, 4th Squadron, 6th Air Cavalry (4-6 ACS), Task Force Redcatcher, maintained an air cavalry troop (OH-58D), and by January 2008, it acquired an attached attack reconnaissance company (AH-64D) to support 3ACR units in the Mosul battle space. From December 2007 to May 2008, 4-6 ACS focused on providing security missions to protect the ground cavalry squadron, the infantry battalion, and IA units with associated military transition teams (MiTTs) as they conducted combat/civil security operations in Mosul. The 4-6 ACS commander also developed a two SWT/AWT 24-hour a day mission set, which allowed each maneuver battalion attack/cavalry aviation support throughout combat/civil security missions. During these missions, the SWT/AWT focused its missions on security for troops in contact (TIC), cordon and searches, combat patrols, JCOP construction, route clearances, as well as counter-improvised explosive device (CIED) reconnaissance to protect U.S. and Iraqi forces during the Air Cavalry and Attack Aviation’s Role in Limiting Enemy Freedom of Movement and Maneuver by Lieutenant Colonel Demetrios J. Nicholson 22 June-August 2010

CLEAR

Physically remove, separate insurgents from target area

HOLD

Reestablish host nation government presence

BUILD

Build support/protect the population Figure 1 height of insurgent attacks as they moved and maneuvered throughout the city. By April, violence levels had decreased; 3ACR cleared more neighborhoods, established numerous JCOPs, and during Operation Lion’s Roar, the Iraqi army succeeded against insurgents in Mosul, which increased civil security. Transition from Security to Reconnaissance Missions With increased security by June 2008, 3ACR embarked on a new campaign plan to change focus from lethal to nonlethal operations, shifting away from the combat operations LOE to emphasizing other LOE such as essential services, governance, and economic development. The new campaign plan resulted in decreased violence, which reduced 4-6 ACS’s mission requirements to conduct security operations for ground forces until its relief in place (RIP) in August 2008. Meanwhile, the air cavalry squadron commander continued to provide a two SWT/AWT 24-hour daily mission set to maintain the pressure, in the form of deterrence, on the insurgency as coalition forces continued to move throughout the city. With the increase of security and reduction of tasked security missions, the commander shifted focus to reconnaissance missions in conjunction with 3ACR’s scheme of maneuver to assist in limiting the enemy’s freedom of movement and maneuver. His two SWT/AWT mission set could now establish continuous reconnaissance, tied into the ACR’s ISR plan, throughout Mosul and in Mosul’s insurgent support zones while still providing security missions when needed and enabling the 3ACR and Iraqi army to focus on other nonlethal LOE. The continuous recon by SWT/ AWT not only gained information for ground commanders, but maintained a deterrence effect that continued to disrupt enemy operations. With combat/civil security operations inside Mosul being the priority, the two maneuver battalions could not afford the combat power to conduct consistent operations in rural areas and villages in their battlespace outside the city. Additionally, some of the rural areas consisted of restricted terrain in the form of ridgelines, wadi systems, and the Tigris River, which made mounted patrols difficult. These rural areas and villages made up insurgent support zones and LOC in which to stage weapons, store supplies, and base insurgents for transit to and from Mosul. Turning squadron focus to reconnaissance, 4-6 ACS made recon missions in the support zones and villages one of its priorities. The S2, 4-6 ACS, coordinated and planned with the 3ACR collection manager, along with the S2s from both maneuver battalions, to narrow the recon focus based on intelligence and ISR focus in their area. The S2, 4-6 ACS, also used historical aircrew debriefs from crews in Mosul, as well as from squadron aircrews operating in Tal Afar, who had experience with reconnaissance in many rural areas and villages outside of Mosul and throughout western Nineveh. Combining its intelligence with 3ACR and ground battalions, 4-6 ACS developed recon objectives in the rural support zones and along LOC. These recon objectives, as well as missions assigned by 3ACR, were tasked daily to the SWT/AWTs. The weapons teams’ mission was to interdict insurgent forces and deny them use of support zones and LOC. The aircrews searched for personnel movement along roads, in wadi systems, along the Tigris River, and across ridgelines. They also searched for caches, enemy observation posts (OPs), mortar/rocket systems and launch sites, and possible improvised explosive device (IED) emplacement along main supply routes (MSRs) into Mosul. Additionally, the Iraqi army and 3ACR built a berm around Mosul called the “Ri yadh line” to canalize traffic into several TCPs entering and exiting Mosul. The aircrews also reconnoitered the Riyadh line, search ing for breaches and traffic moving through breaches. The squadron’s numerous recon objectives maximized the use of two SWT/ AWTs continuously on mission, and coupled with the speed and vision of helicopters, the teams covered much of their mission-window areas multiple times. Although difficult to measure the effectiveness of actual interdiction of insurgent movement, the aircrews were instrumental in the detection of two vehicle-borne IEDs (VBIEDs) and bomb-making material in a wadi; a katyusha rocket launcher; five insurgents hiding in a wadi with a cache and underground living areas; and two buried IEDs on a MSR. We also reconnoitered support zones to confirm or deny enemy presence and determine enemy patterns that would assist maneuver battalions in planning future interdiction missions. Since recon objectives were assigned to every weapons team conducting flight missions throughout a 24-hour period, the aviation squadron helped confirm or deny enemy presence and develop time-of-day patterns for 3ACR and subordinate battalions in the support zones, as well as Mosul proper. Again, the recon objectives were tied to 3ACR’s ISR plan, historical pattern analysis, and scheme of maneuver for both maneuver battalions. As part of 3ACR’s ISR plan, the weapons teams assisted in the mixing and redundancy of reconnaissance assets available to the regiment, as well as timely cueing in response to human and signal intelligence (HUMINT/SIGINT) reports. Finding caches, IEDs, or other weapons systems obviously confirmed enemy presence. While observing vehicle traffic, foot traffic, and boat traffic, aircrews established patterns of movement on all citizens, from neutral local Iraqis to possible insurgents. In conjunction with the maneuver battalion’s scheme of maneuver, some recon objectives were tied to coalition-imposed curfews, route-clearance and CIED missions, and future cordon and search objectives. Reconnaissance during curfew hours helped aircrews track any unusual June-August 2010 23 “Continuous recon by SWT/AWT not only gained information for ground commanders, but maintained a deterrence effect that continued to disrupt enemy operations.”

activity prohibited during curfew, or even patterns of permitted movement, which included the movement of local Iraqi emergency services. During route clearance operations, the weapons teams conducted route reconnaissance before and after route clearance to confirm or deny IED emplacement or mounted/dismounted enemy activity on side streets or alleyways. Route clearance and CIED were closely tied, but aircrews, mindful of former IED emplacement locations and time patterns, continually reconnoitered for IED emplacement and changes in insurgent patterns. Likewise, during CIED operations, the ability to find, or not find, IED emplacers in designated tier 1 hotspots, combined with 3ACR IED trends, redefined CIED recon objectives. The battalions also submitted objectives for possible future missions, which laid the groundwork for SWT/AWTs to conduct photo recon and video recon, as well as recon of possible VBIED factories, historical cache sites, historical mortar/rocket points of origin, or possible insurgent meeting locations. To avoid our own recon pattern, while simultaneously adjusting to enemy patterns, the aviation squadron S2 varied the times and objectives throughout each weapons team mission window — they adjusted tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) during reconnaissance, and avoided establishing set patterns around recon objectives. Reconnaissance of friendly objectives also became a focus of the regimental commander. The SWT/AWTs were assigned recon objectives in Mosul that were linked to maintaining civil security and developing friendly and enemy patterns. One set of objectives included reconnoitering Iraqi police and Iraqi ar my TCPs to observe traffic flow and force protection posture of policemen and soldiers, which helped identify possible future insurgent targets or transition points. Combat outposts (COPs) were also used to identify traffic, monitor pedestrian movement patterns, and detect force protection issues in and around the COPs. During Iraqi voter registration, the voter registration centers became recon objectives for scrutinizing force protection measures and observing movement patterns around the centers. We made moderate use of establishing friendly recon objectives focused on identifying friendly and enemy patterns in Mosul economic areas, to include sheep markets, open air markets, and other industrial centers. Deterrence: The Secondary Effect The two weapons teams’ continuous reconnaissance mission, which covered numerous recon objectives in support zones, along LOCs, and in Mosul proper, also maintained a continuous attack aviation presence that afforded the second-order positive effect of deterrence. This deterrence had a significant impact on limiting the enemy’s freedom of movement and maneuver. During its initial missions, 4-6 ACS aircrews learned, based on previous lessons learned, prior combat experiences, and recent experience in Mosul, that the presence of armed helicopters helped deter insurgent attacks. Other sources of intelligence, primarily HUMINT and SIGINT, describe how the presence of armed helicopters also deterred the enemy’s movement to positions to begin an attack or conduct further attacks after initial contact. This deterrence effect is more prevalent in security missions and in a TIC situation where the SWT/ AWTs are focused on protecting a ground force. During many TIC situations, when SWT/AWTs arrived, on station the enemy stopped shooting; as soon as the aircraft departed the area for refueling, the shooting resumed within minutes. Another example of the weapons teams’ success occurred during operations in Mosul when a catastrophic IED detonated and destroyed a Bradley Fighting Vehicle (BFV), killing two U.S. soldiers. Hearing the explosion and seeing the smoke, a SWT immediately flew to the area to provide area security as ground forces reacted to contact and conducted recovery and casualty evacuation. No further enemy contact occurred following the IED attack. Several days later, intelligence sources reported that insurgents had planned a further ground attack with small arms and rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs) as part of an ambush following the IED attack, but decided against it because of the arrival of coalition helicopters. In one instance of limiting enemy freedom of movement, the intelligence report revealed that an IED emplacer refused to emplace an IED due to the threat of armed helicopters and the fear of being engaged. “Combining its intelligence with 3ACR and ground battalions, 4-6 ACS developed recon objectives in the rural support zones and along LOC. These recon objectives, as well as missions assigned by 3ACR, were tasked daily to the SWT/AWTs. The weapons teams’ mission was to interdict insurgent forces and deny them use of support zones and LOC.”

With an increase in reconnaissance missions, the 4-6 ACS commander wanted to maintain the same deterrence effect seen in security missions tied to reconnaissance missions, ultimately limiting the enemy’s freedom of maneuver and movement in the same way. To maintain deterrence, the commander ensured two priorities: maintain the presence of SWT/ AWTs continuously over a 24-hour period; and ensure reconnaissance objectives were tied to the friendly scheme of maneuver. For SWT/AWTs to create deterrence, they should have objectives that not only focus on enemy forces, but on friendly forces as well. As mentioned earlier, 4-6 ACS, in conjunction with 3ACR, developed friendly recon objectives, which focused on COPs, TCPs, voter registration centers, and economic areas. Though the primary purpose was to identify force protection measures and “patterns of life” around those objectives, the second-order effect was to deter insurgents from attacking those areas. Another form of deterrence resulted from successful sensor-to-shooter operations during CIED reconnaissance. From December 2007 through April 2008, 4-6 ACS was highly successful in using unmanned aerial sensors and manned fixed-wing ISR platforms to find and engage IED emplacers. The IED emplacers usually operated during the same time, evening and early nighttime, to emplace large, deeply buried IEDs, consisting of homemade explosive-filled propane tanks and large military-grade munitions, as well as smaller pressure plates and pipe bombs. After numerous successful engagements over several months, IED emplacers greatly reduced the amount of large IEDs emplaced during the evening and at night. The SWT/AWTs continued CIED recon during that time period to deny the enemy the ability to emplace large IEDs under the cover of darkness. A combination of increased 3ACR COPs and TCPs, along with continuous engineer route-clearance missions and successful sensor-to-shooter operations, greatly reduced deeply buried IED emplacements at night by denying freedom of movement and maneuver to emplacers. The insurgents transitioned to daytime-phased emplacement, sometimes hastily, of smaller IEDs on lesser traveled roads. The 4-6 ACS used the enemy’s shift in IED tactics as a measure of effectiveness (MOE) of successful CIED reconnaissance. Measuring Effectiveness By using shifts in enemy tactics as one indicator of success, 4-6 ACS developed other MOE based on intelligence reports, decreased levels of violence patterns, and seized enemy caches, weapons, and personnel to gauge the SWT/AWTs’ deterrence methods and their effectiveness on limiting enemy freedom of maneuver and movement. The 4-6 ACS used HUMINT and SIGINT reports to measure the effectiveness of deterrence. These intelligence reports usually detailed the effect of helicopters against pending insurgent attacks and the inability to move and conduct follow-on attacks from the enemy’s point of view. Whether the reports came in sparingly or several at a time, they confirmed a level of effectiveness of helicopter presence not only in security missions, but also in reconnaissance missions and associated reconnaissance objectives. The squadron also used intelligence reports associated with COPs, TCPs, vehicular radio communications (VRCs), or any other friendly recon objectives to ensure they remained tied to the friendly scheme of maneuver and possible threats against it. Another MOE was tied to 3ACR’s scheme of maneuver and compared to the level of violence patterns and security infrastructure. The aviation squadron analyzed levels of violence patterns, which were measured by 3ACR based on enemy weapons systems used, time of day, and locations. The levels of violence were also tied to levels of security in neighborhoods as compared to areas where COPs and TCPs were located. The 4-6 ACS, in coordination with the maneuver battalions, established recon objectives based on levels of violence and tied them to the ground unit’s established security plan. Decreased levels of violence measured the effectiveness of not just the SWT/AWTs’ deterrence, but the total effect of SWT/AWTs’ recon objectives and how they tied into the ground unit’s scheme of maneuver, COPs, and TCPs, and possible layers in between. When levels of violence or enemy activity increased in certain areas, the weapons teams shifted to other recon objectives. A final, more concrete MOE was when the teams actually located enemy caches, weapons systems, and personnel. As mentioned earlier, SWT/ AWTs found caches, VBIEDs, rocket launchers, and enemy hideouts in support zones, which, combined with the maneuver battalion’s intelligence on the area of operations, helped refine reconnaissance objectives. Measuring the effectiveness of continuous reconnaissance and deterrence does not always produce an immediate impact or a single spectacular event. Except for the lethal aspect of sensor-to-shooter operations during CIED, there is not always a flash-to-bang result with continuous recon and deterrence. The fruits of continuous recon in certain objectives could take days, weeks, or months as part of the BCT’s scheme of maneuver to show constant impact. Likewise, effective deterrence may be occurring consistently, but can be difficult to measure or not always apparent on a daily metric. Aviation commanders, maneuver commanders, and aircrews need to maintain discipline, patience, and resolve to ensure continuous recon and deterrence are successful. The ultimate effect is the ability of the weapons teams to limit the enemy’s freedom of maneuver and movement over time, which permits BCTs to maintain civil security and focus on nonlethal LOE. In the end, whatever the MOE, continuous armed reconnaissance conducted by SWT/AWTs is an invaluable asset to the BCT commander when tied to the ground scheme of maneuver and imbedded in his ISR plan. Colonel A.T. Ball, former commander, 25th Combat Aviation Brigade, has a favorite quote, “fly, recon, report, shoot.” During phases of high-levels of enemy activity and violence, it is easy for maneuver brigade and aviation commanders to keep attack/cavalry aviation focused on executing security missions to protect ground forces, especially for TIC response. Usually, when security improves and ground units transition to nonlethal lines of operations, aviation units tend to reduce flying missions based on reduced security missions, reduction in TIC, or minimal tasked reconnaissance missions. As evident in Colonel Ball’s quote, SWT/AWTs need to fly and conduct continuous reconnaissance to gain information on the enemy and deter and interdict enemy operations, while limiting enemy freedom of movement and maneuver, thus enabling ground commanders to remain focused on the nonlethal lines of operations. Notes 1Headquarters, Department of the Army, Field Manual 3-90, Tactics, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, DC, 4 July 2001, p. 13-1. Lieutenant Colonel Demetrios J. Nicholson is currently an instructor, Center for Army Tactics, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, KS. He received a B.S. from the U.S. Military Academy and a M.S. from Central Michigan University. His military education includes the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College and Aviation Captain Career Course. He has served in various command and staff positions, to include XO, 4th Squadron, 6th Air Cavalry (4-6 ACS), Mosul, Iraq; S3, 4-6 ACS, Fort Lewis, WA; chief, Exercise Control, Operations Group B, Battle Command Training Program, Fort Leavenworth; future operations officer, V Corps, Camp Virginia, Kuwait; and commander, B Troop, 3d Squadron, 17th Cavalry, Fort Drum, NY. June-August 2010 25