The Armored Cavalry Regiment: Battle Proven and Future Primed

The 3d Armored Cavalry Regiment has weathered multiple organizational changes since its inception on 19 May 1846. The regiment, originally outfitted with percussion rifles and horses, was designed to have greater mobility, accuracy, range, and lethality than the contemporary infantry and dragoon units.1 The regiment fought in multiple campaigns, including the Mexican War, Civil War, Indian Wars, Spanish American War, Moro Rebellion, and World War I, earning its reputation as a decisive force. As mechanization changed the character of war between World War I and World War II (WWII), 3ACR transitioned to a mechanized force, excelling as the lead force for XX Corps, Third Army. The regiment, serving as General George Patton’s spearhead for Third Army, moved 3,000 miles in 265 days, killing or capturing 43,000 enemy troops.2 With the development of AirLand Battle strategy during the Cold War, military leaders uniquely organized and trained armored cavalry regiments (2d, 3d, 11th, and 14th) to conduct offensive and defensive security and reconnaissance missions. The ACR became the only unit capable of conducting critically important cover missions for the U.S. Army armored corps during high-intensity conflict. Both 2ACR and 3ACR gained distinction during Operation Desert Storm, conducting these missions as lead forces for VII and XVIII Corps, destroying the Iraqi 12th Armored and Tawakalna Republican Guard Divisions.3 Subsequently, 3ACR participated in security operations in Bosnia and during Operation Iraqi Freedom. Currently, 3ACR remains as the last unit organized as an armored cavalry regiment and the last unit capable of conducting a cover for an armored corps. The regiment is scheduled to transition to a Stryker brigade combat team (SBCT) after it completes a deployment to Iraq in September

2010. Converting the armored cavalry regiment to a SBCT is an organizational mistake, which ignores the effective economy-of-force missions executed by the regiment during counterinsurgency operations, destroys its ability to conduct a unique high-intensity conflict mission, and limits III Corps’ ability to conduct effective reconnaissance. The Genesis of Transformation The decision to transition 3ACR to a SBCT is largely predicated on a failed strategy rooted in a fixation with new technology. Many senior advisors throughout the 1990s believed we were witnessing an information revolution in military affairs, which would “flatten” the battlefield, allowing commanders to concen-The 3d Armored Cavalry Regiment (3ACR), a unit steeped in history and tradition, remains the premier reconnaissance organization and only unit capable of conducting a cover mission for an armor corps. Decisionmakers, operating on a mindset of Army Transformation and counterinsurgency thinking, ordered 3ACR to transition from an armored cavalry regiment to a Stryker brigade combat team in 2012. An exploration of Army Transformation illustrates that an information revolution in military affairs has not occurred and strategies based on transformation thinking have proven disastrous. When analyzed from a historical perspective, 3ACR proves to be a formation capable of excelling in both high-intensity operations and counterinsurgency warfare. Its unique task organization enables it to achieve great success across the spectrum of conflict.

THE ARMORED CAVALRY REGIMENT:

June-August 2010 17

trate the effects of combat power against the enemy. “Rather than move to contact, ‘all arms’ units essentially search and then destroy the enemy on the battlefield.”4 Policymakers believed that dominance in airpower, precision weapons, and technology would establish conditions that required less armor and fewer soldiers in combat. They initiated costly programs to create rapidly deployable platforms designed to engage based on clear intelligence to achieve strategic success. The Army would “see first, understand first, decide first, and finish decisively.”5 Dominant battlefield knowledge would lead to decisive action quickly and reduce the financial, materiel, and human cost of war. This viewpoint developed a ‘speed over mass’ mentality in which rapid deployment and maneuver was traded for the protection of heavy platforms, which led to the invasion of Iraq in 2003, with a far smaller force than that of Operation Desert Storm. The invasion force did not have the ability to find, fix, and maneuver to destroy the enemy. Information technology and precision systems did not prove decisive. The enemy used deception, dispersed, found concealment in the urban terrain, and waited for suitable political conditions before returning to fight a protracted war. Employing the ACR during the invasion, as it was employed in Desert Storm, would have increased the coalition’s ability to conduct effective reconnaissance and fix and destroy the enemy. In the aftermath, the Army “has fought for 6 years under conditions that run counter to the body of ideas that drove Army Transformation thinking.”6 Simultaneously, the nonlinear war in Iraq established a paradigm in which policymakers continue to promote medium and light organizations as better suited for the counterinsurgency fight. Accordingly, 3ACR is set to transform to a SBCT — an organization that is a byproduct of both Army Transformation and counterinsurgency thinking. Counterinsurgency Operations in Iraq A brief historical review highlights the impact of 3ACR’s economy-of-force missions in Iraq. In April 2003, under command of Colonel David A. Teeples, 3ACR deployed to Iraq and assumed control of al Anbar Province, to include the cities of Fallujah, Habbaniyah, Ramadi, Hit, Ha-dithah, and al Qaim — the only operational port of entry on the Syrian border. The regiment maintained intrastate commerce, established local governance, and coordinated with host nation forces on security operations. On completion, 3ACR’s battlespace was designated as Multinational Division–West and assumed by the U.S. Marine Corps. In March 2005, 3ACR returned to Iraq after less than a year refit and training at Fort Carson, Colorado. Third squadron was employed in an economy-of-force role in southern Baghdad while the remainder of the regiment operated in Ninewah Province. The regiment’s operations to secure “In April 2003, under command of Colonel David A. Teeples, 3ACR deployed to Iraq and assumed control of al Anbar Province, to include the cities of Fallujah, Habbaniyah, Ramadi, Hit, Hadithah, and al Qaim — the only operational port of entry on the Syrian border. The regiment maintained intrastate commerce, established local governance, and coordinated with host nation forces on security operations.”  “In November 2007, the regiment conducted a third deployment in Ninewah Province, greatly improving security in Mosul during a time when both coalition and Iraqi political and military efforts were focused in Baghdad and Diyala.” 18 June-August 2010 the Syrian Border and Tal Afar were so successful that it was distinguished by scholars as the model for counterinsurgency. The 71st Colonel of the Regiment, Colonel H.R. McMaster, designed and implemented a strategy of “clear, hold, build” during Operation Restoring Rights in the northern city of Tal Afar. The template of conducting a combined clearance operation; holding the area with host nation forces supported by coalition forces; and rebuilding the economic, social, and political structure was implemented countrywide. In 2007, military leaders used this same methodology to form the core of the “surge strategy” in Baghdad and Diyala Province. In November 2007, the regiment conducted a third deployment in Ninewah Province greatly improving security in Mosul during a time when both coalition and Iraqi political and military efforts were focused in Baghdad and Diyala. During each tour, the regiment achieved success in areas of operation far larger than those assigned to other brigade combat teams, and was subsequently relieved by a far larger force at the end of each deployment. Based in part on its heavy platforms, 3ACR was successful during its three deployments in Iraq. During 2005, in both Baghdad and Tal Afar, the protection, lethality, and accuracy of the regiment’s armored platforms proved critical. Again, in Mosul during 2007, the armored platforms emboldened Iraqi Security Forces (ISF), provided lethal fires, crushed enemy morale, and protected soldiers. The regiment’s heavy nature should have caused it to be too bulky for counterinsurgency warfare; however, stabilized weapons systems tied to advanced optics limited collateral damage. Reasoned leaders consistently demonstrated good judgment and restraint in the use of force. Equally important was a lack of sufficient dismounts in the ACR’s troop and tank companies, which caused 3ACR and ISF to develop a mutual reliance, which forced them to truly conduct combined operations in Ni newah. Coalition and Iraqi forces shared intelligence and information, conducted combined patrols, and lived together trusting each other for security. ISF needing coalition armor, firepower, aviation, and logistics expertise cooperated and compromised to reach operational goals. Coalition forces requiring additional dismounted forces, local intelligence, cultural expertise, and legitimacy were eager to work with ISF. The immeasurably important trust that developed led to mutually supporting operations and security for the local populace. In contrast, adjacent units with adequate dismounts for conducting counterinsurgency operations, specifically infantry-based organizations, did not rely on ISF and were likely to conduct operations unilaterally. It was quicker and easier for these units to operate independently because unilateral operations avoided cumbersome planning and coordination with ISF. Battalion commanders were briefing combined operations and partnership during their battle update briefs; in reality, however, units maintained separate, walled and secured compounds at joint outposts, and subordinated ISF forces when they chose to conduct missions with them. Accordingly, rifts grew between ISF leaders and coalition forces, which limited the amount of mutual support. There was less intelligence sharing, less effective reconnaissance, and a lower level of security. Reconnaissance Capability During both high-intensity conflict and counterinsurgency operations, 3ACR remains the premier organization for conducting reconnaissance operations. The regiment is currently organized with a military intelligence company, including tactical unmanned aerial vehicles, human intelligence, and signal intelligence platforms. The regiment maintains far more manned reconnaissance and attack aviation platforms than any other brigade combat team. Each troop maintains two Raven unmanned aerial vehicles for gaining imagery intelligence at the lowest level. The optics on the regiment’s organic weapons systems, the M1A2 SEPV3 with 50-power magnification and the M3A3 with 12-power magnification, match or surpass the capabilities of any platform found in the Army. Both systems maintain day and thermal capabilities and commander’s independent thermal viewers to maximize target acquisition. The regiment also maintains long-range advanced scout surveillance systems (LRAS3) and multiple variations of smaller thermal and night-vision sights for conducting discrete dismounted observation. With these advanced and survivable systems, the regiment is capable of making contact with the enemy and fighting for intelligence. Iraq has proven that even in protracted war, an organization must be survivable and aggressive to conduct effective reconnaissance.7 More importantly, 3ACR is led by exceptionally experienced noncommissioned officers and professional field grade and company grade officers. These leaders ensure a unique training regime that focuses the organization on conducting decentralized reconnaissance. Transitioning the ACR to a SBCT will fundamentally change its mission-essential tasks and destroy its ability to conduct this form of aggressive reconnaissance for III Corps. Augmenting the corps with a battlefield surveillance brigade (BfSB) will not fill the gap; the SBCT and BfSB are incapable of conducting reconnaissance for an armored corps during high-intensity conflict. It would be catastrophic if either a SBCT or BfSB made contact with a heavy brigade. However, “Coalition and Iraqi forces shared intelligence and information, conducted combined patrols, and lived together trusting each other for security. ISF needing coalition armor, firepower, aviation, and logistics expertise cooperated and compromised to reach operational goals. Coalition forces requiring additional dismounted forces, local intelligence, cultural expertise, and legitimacy were eager to work with ISF.”  June-August 2010 19 the ACR is capable of gaining and maintaining contact with a heavy force, as H.R. McMaster did with his Eagle Troop (E/2/2ACR) at the battle of 73 Easting. Eagle Troop highlighted the ACR’s capabilities by destroying a brigade of the Tawakalna Republican Guard Division (approximately 30 tanks, 16 BMPs, and 39 trucks) in 23 minutes.8 The unit subsequently assisted with the forward passage of 1st Infantry Division to complete the destruction of the Republican Guard Division. As 2ACR demonstrated, a reconnaissance organization for a heavy corps must be able to gain and maintain contact, survive, and facilitate the passage of follow-on forces to achieve destruction of the enemy. It is obvious that the light-skinned SBCT or toothless BfSB cannot accomplish this task. Similarly, both organizations (the SBCT and BfSB) have yet to prove their decisiveness in protracted warfare. The 2d Stryker Cavalry Regiment (2SCR), organized as a SBCT, made notable contributions during Operation Iraqi Freedom, specifically, in Sadr City and Diyala Province. However, 2SCR was greatly assisted with armor from the 4th Infantry Division; attack aviation from 4th Squadron, 3ACR, in Sadr City; and 2d Squadron, 3ACR armor in Diyala Province. The 3d Stryker Brigade Combat Team, 2d Infantry Division, lacking armor support, was incapable of preventing the collapse of ISF and erosion of security in Mosul in 2005. During the same period, merely 30 kilometers to the West of Mosul, 3ACR was achieving its renowned success implementing “clear, hold, build” during Operation Restoring Rights in Tal Afar. Both locations have unique cultural, tribal, socioeconomic, and governance nuisances; however, the results of the two simultaneous operations illustrate the difference in organizational capabilities. When 3d Squadron, 3ACR assumed operations in Mosul in December 2007, the city was still controlled by al Qaeda, former regime loyalists, organized crime, and political dissident groups. By April 2008, 3d Squadron, 3ACR, had restored security, arrayed ISF, and initiated the transition to reconstruction. In 2008, the BfSB, located in Ninewah, struggled to gain actionable intelligence because its lack of maneuver formations prevented it from gaining placement with the local populace. It often produced inaccurate intelligence, sending it directly to Baghdad to advise the corps commander, conducting limited operations on its actionable intelligence. It is difficult to imagine either a BfSB or SBCT achieving the same results as 3ACR did in Iraq; it has not happened to date. Unique High-Intensity Mission The 3ACR is the last organization in the U.S. Army capable of conducting an offensive cover for an armored corps. This uniquely complicated mission requires a covering force to “locate and penetrate the security zone and forward defenses of an enemy force” and “destroy enemy reconnaissance, advanced guard units and, as required, the first-echelon regiments of a moving enemy force.”9 The 3ACR maintains a unique task organization that emphasizes combined arms at the lowest tactical level to achieve this task. The regiment, comprised of three ground cavalry squadrons (1st, 2d, and 3d Squadrons), is designed to array itself across the entire front of a deployed armored corps. Each squadron is structured to array three cavalry troops with a tank company in reserve. The squadrons maintain an organic howitzer battery with two fire direction control centers, allowing the squadrons to provide fires along their vast fronts. Each troop maintains its own 120- mm mortars section, allowing the troop commander to employ fires in an extremely timely manner. The squadron maintains an organic and robust headquarters and headquarters troop that provides necessary logistics, maintenance, personnel, and lift support. The regiment maintains a support squadron to facilitate additional combat service support. The organic aviation squadron (4th Squadron) is comprised of 24 AH-64 Apache Longbows, which provide significant armed reconnaissance capable of identifying and attacking enemy positions. Broken into three air troops and an aviation maintenance troop, 4th Squadron dedicates one air troop (eight AH-64s) to each ground squadron, which enables commanders to develop habitual relationships and hone their tactics in training. It also provides ground commanders greater direct control of air assets during planning and execution of combat operations. The regiment maintains a separate chemical, military intelligence, and engineer company. The 43d Engineer Company has a unique modified table of organization and equipment (MTOE) found nowhere else in the Army. It is organized with three sapper platoons to support each of the three ground cavalry squadrons, and an assault and obstacle platoon. Further, 3ACR is uniquely trained to conduct cover missions with leaders skilled in employing fires and combat multipliers across the breadth of a deployed corps. Combined arms leaders are taught to make decisions and conduct decentralized operations based on clear commander’s intent. As U.S. Army soldiers from 2d Stryker Cavalry Regiment make their way through outlying fields to patrol and clear houses in the Diyala Province of Iraq, January 2007. “The 2d Stryker Cavalry Regiment (2SCR), organized as a SBCT, made notable contributions during Operation Iraqi Freedom; specifically, in Sadr City and Diyala Province. However, 2SCR was greatly assisted with armor from the 4th Infantry Division; attack aviation from 4th Squadron, 3ACR, in Sadr City; and 2d Squadron, 3ACR armor in Diyala Province.” 20 June-August 2010 taught by Colonel H.R. McMaster, “The only unforgivable sin is to say that you were waiting for orders.”10 It is an organization that expects initiative from junior leaders. U.S. Army Field Manual 17-95, Cavalry Operations, suggests that a heavy organization, such as a heavy brigade combat team (HBCT), could conduct cover missions with considerable augmentation and time to train.11 The HBCT would require an additional combined arms battalion (CAB) to cover the same front as the ACR’s three ground cavalry squadrons. It would also require an attack aviation battalion with associated maintenance support, and additional field artillery assets with additional fire direction control centers, associated maintenance, and radar capabilities to support the CAB. The HBCT commander would then organize these units and provide clear command relationships to support the decentralized CABs during cover missions. Lastly, logisticians would be required to reorganize the maintenance and supply structure of the HBCT to support the decentralized operations of its CABs and enablers. Additional time would be necessary to train these missions and allow soldiers to adapt to the new systems and operating environment. Similarly, leaders would have to learn to command and control decentralized combined arms operations with units dispersed over great distances.12 This is not a quick process and seems impractical if faced with imminent armed conflict. In transforming the 3ACR to a SBCT, the Army is making a critical organizational mistake. The Army is demonstrating the beliefs that we will either not fight another armored conflict in the future or we will dominate with intelligence and precision weapons. Proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, state sponsored terrorism, a destabilizing middle east, and belligerent states, such as North Korea and Iran, make future conflict likely. The decision ignores the necessity for armor in both high-intensity conflict and protracted war, and is rooted in belief that Stryker organizations will provide the speed for a quick and clean victory. The transformation concepts of “rapidly decisive operations” and “speed over mass” enabled the Iraq war to take its nonlinear course.13 The idea of a surgical war based on dominant battlefield knowledge is delusional; it is evident that policymakers have not internalized the lessons of the Iraqi invasion. The emphasis on light and medium forces for counterinsurgency operations minimizes the multiple successful campaigns conducted by a combination of heavy units and host nation forces. The Army praised 3ACR’s innovation and adaptability by adopting its “clear, hold, build” methodology while simultaneously deciding that the organization is no longer necessary. Tal Afar, Mosul, and Baghdad provide a proven template of heavy formations operating with ISF to achieve lasting security. Ultimately, leaders would better prepare the Army for both high-intensity and counterinsurgency operations by shifting its focus from materiel to the professionalism of the force. As professionals, we must “keep the lure of technology in perspective, and realize that the human component is key to adaptability.”14 Decisionmakers are either selecting what lessons they choose to learn from Iraq’s protracted war or are still paralyzed by the inauspicious glow of Army Transformation. Either way, the Army is about to lose its premier reconnaissance organization and the only unit capable of providing both early warning and protection for America’s armored corps. Captain Cole C. Pinheiro is currently serving as the assistant operations officer, 1st Battalion, 67th Armored Regiment, 2d Brigade Combat Team, 4th Infantry Division, Fort Carson, CO. He received a B.S. from the U.S. Military Academy and is a graduate of the Maneuver Captain Career Course, Cavalry Leader Course, and Armor Officer Basic Course He has served with the 3d Armored Cavalry Regiment in various command and staff positions, to include operations officer, current operations officer, and assistant operations officer, 3d Squadron; and XO and tank platoon leader, K Troop, 3d Squadron. He completed two tours in Iraq with 3ACR, serving in Baghdad and Mosul. June-August 2010 21 1Third Cavalry Museum, BLOOD AND STEEL! The History, Customs, and Traditions of the 3d Armored Cavalry Regiment, Third Cavalry Museum, Fort Carson, Colorado, 2006, p. 1. 2Ibid, p. 20. 3Robert A. Doughty and Ira D. Gruber, Warfare in the Western World Volume II: Military Operations Since 1871, D.C. Heath and Company, Lexington, MA, 1996, pp. 990-994. 4Douglas A. Macgregor, Breaking the Phalanx: A New Design for Landpower in the 21st Century, Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington D.C., 1997, p. 49. 5Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA), U.S. Army Field Manual (FM) 6-0, Mission Command: Command and Control of Army Forces, U.S. Government Printing Office (GPO), Washington, DC, 2003, p. 1-8. 6Brigadier General H. R. McMaster, “The Problem of Future War,” Speech at the Hoover Institution, 28 August 2008. 7Ibid. 8Tom Clancy, Armored CAV: A Guided Tour of an Armored Cavalry Regiment, Jack Ryan Limited Partnership, 1994, p. 260. 9HQDA, FM 17-95, Cavalry Operations, 1996, pp. 4-43. 10Colonel H.R. McMasters, “Verbal in-brief to new 3ACR lieutenants,” December 2004. 11FM 17-95, Cavalry Operations. 12Major George A. Stewart III, Monograph “The Last Cavalry Regiment: The Corps Commander’s Requirement for the 3d ACR,” School for Advanced Military Studies, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, May 2007, online at www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?Location=U2 &doc=GetTRDoc.pdf&AD=ADA471143. 13Brigadier General H.R. McMaster “The Human Element: When Gadgetry Becomes Strategy,” World Affairs: A Journal of Ideas and Debate, Winter 2009. 14Brigadier Nigel Aylwin-Foster, British Army, “Changing the Army for Counterinsurgency Operations,” Military Review, November-December 2005, p. 15. Notes