Armored Forces: An Indispensable Component of Strategic Deterrence

Armored ground forces have long been a central component of America’s landpower dominance. Despite a decade of predominantly light, motorized and de centralized security operations in Southwest Asia, Russian aggression in eastern Europe has again reminded the world that combined-arms teams of mechanized infantry, Armor, Cavalry, artillery, engineers and air-defense as sets – and associated support systems – will remain a decisive factor in shaping the 21st Century geopolitical landscape. Coalition efforts in defeating the Islam ic State in the Middle East, which will undoubtedly include robust ground of fensives to retake fortified cities like Fallujah and Mosul, will likewise emphasize armored primacy. This focus on concentrated maneuver and joint syn ergy, incorporating the dynamic confluence of mobility, survivability and lethality found in armored brigade combat teams (ABCTs), finds greatest relevance in the irreplaceable strategic deterrence that only a robust mechanized force can provide. Unified land operations of this scope consequently requires capabilities specific to ABCTs, complementing those of equally crucial infantry and Stryker for mations, to allow multi-faceted scal ability in nation-state deterrence. In the context of joint operations, this utility emerges prominently along two important dimensions of expeditionary power: combined-arms maneuver (CAM) by networked formations to de feat or neutralize opponents, and the projection of ground presence to serve as scalable instruments of national influence – both tangibly and symboli cally to bolster allies or intimidate opponents. While arguments against reduction of the army’s mechanized corps, which is planned to comprise 30 combined-arms battalions (CABs) across 10 armored brigades by 2017, often empha size historical necessity, the unrivaled shock effect of mobile protected fire power, and the recently proven value of heavy platforms in wide-area secu rity operations, the greater imperative of strategic deterrence and the armored force’s singular role in unleash ing it, offers the most compelling of justifications. Deterrence through CAM The first and most dynamic aspect of armored deterrence, often culminating in decisive action, allows the United States to wield the ultimate expression of land dominance against intolerable organizations and nation-states. While the American defense arsenal contains a customizable panoply of threatening instruments, ranging from devastating air power to cyber warfare and Special Operations Forces interference, the Ar my’s wide range of combined arms and joint potential remains the most comprehensive and irresistible means for definitively shaping security environ ments. Though hostile and rogue leaders stand acutely aware of the United States’ multi-faceted capacity to desta bilize and degrade their standing with rapid attacks by aerial and motorized formations, it is the potential of forc ible entry by the Army’s III Corps, now the greatest concentration of mecha nized forces in the free world, that fo cuses attention on the realistic possi bilities of regime change in many con tested regions. Influence of this scope, unchanged in its effect since the eras of Caesar, Na poleon and Eisenhower, and now con firmed again by Russian positioning and provocations in the Ukraine, re mains the most compelling instrument for coercing nation-state behavior. It is the expeditionary invasion – which must usually contain large-scale ground formations to deploy, close with and destroy the enemy through both physical and psychological shock effect – that allows joint forces the ability to prosecute limited offensives against specific structures or compre hensive campaigns against unstable re gimes. While the 1991 Gulf War – where an American-led coalition destroyed the Iraqi army with sweeping CAM – exemplifies the former, the 2003 opening phase of Operation Iraqi Freedom – where the United States and its allies invaded Iraq with unprecedented joint synchronization and syn ergy – provides a conditional example of the latter. Just as the very existence of a robust armored force allowed the United States to forcefully conduct the decisive phases of these land wars, and the same prowess has facilitated coercive leverage against belligerent opponents since World War II, the absence of such strength would result in a conversely proportional weakening of influence. No longer able to threaten atrocious regimes in appropriately maneuver able regions with the imminent potential of mechanized invasion – as opposed to the often unrealistic option of massively destructive bombardment and the more conditional impacts of precision strikes and lighter ground at tacks – the nation would eventually forfeit a significant measure of its glob al leadership status. This possibility alone, in addition to the diminishment of high-intensity tactical dominance that would ensue, is reason enough to argue for the preservation of an im pactful quantity of heavy brigades. For evidence of this reality, observers need look no further than East Europe and Mesopotamia, where military advances by belligerent powers have directly benefited from reduction in American presence. Deterrence through armored presence A second aspect of strategic utility unique to armored forces is the option of forward-posturing ground formations in targeted locations to allow pre emptive deterrence. Serving as a more graduated and passive measure than the finality of offensive operations, the positioning of armored brigades in appropriately maneuverable regions of fers both a psychological and physical presence that no other BCT or military asset can match. While naval and air components generally influence with stand-off effects, and light, Airborne and Stryker organizations lack com mensurate implications of permanen cy, penetrating operational reach and survivability, the heavy formations communicate a definitive statement of national resolve that cannot be ig nored. Even within the ABCTs themselves the deterring effect is adjustable, as Figure 1. An M1A2 Abrams Main Battle Tank from 2nd Armored Brigade Com bat Team, 4th Infantry Division, encounters a camel during a weeklong bilateral exercise in February 2014. (Photo by SGT Marcus Fichtl) Figure 2. SPC Cody Winder, an M1A2 System-Enhancement Program Abrams loader for 2nd ABCT, 3rd Infantry Division, conducts bore-sighting procedures during live-fire accuracy screening. (Photo by SGT Richard Wrigley) various task organizations can offer greater or less degrees of intimidation and support. While main battle tanks – such as the M1A2 Abrams with its in herent implications of maximum lethality – serve as universal symbols of aggression and offensive capability, more versatile platforms, such as the M2A2 Bradley Infantry Fighting Vehicle and other armored personnel carriers (APCs) reveal a moderated posture that allows more nuanced communica tion of American intent. Taking the organizational customization further, maneuver brigades can be readily empowered with greater ranges of internal combined-arms potency by task-organizing light, aerial, motorized and mechanized battalions under single commands. In this manner, the gradu ated utility of projecting heavy assets to buttress diplomatic endeavors, scaled to convey specific levels of pre paredness, can produce a multiplying effect. The positioning of armor-centric forces with combined-arms potential can thus be highly effective in bolstering allies in contentious regions. In long-term se curity agreements, like those the Unit ed States has maintained with South Korea, Germany and Middle East allies, the enduring presence of survivable and lethal ground formations transmits the depth of American commitment. In other situations where rapid deter rence is needed on behalf of a threat ened partner, as exemplified by the developing crises in Ukraine and Iraq, the positioning of armored brigades or more diverse task organizations for al lied training and readiness operations can have a powerful stabilizing effect. Going forward, this type of support will be extremely beneficial under Brigade Regional Alignment, as the deployment of CABs with tanks and APCs will con tribute an empowering impact on relations with partnered relations. If the bolstering of host and allied nations is beneficial to American allianc es, then the conditional intimidation factor of armored forces is equally valuable. The sheer presence of formations with superior survivability, mobility and lethality in density across traf ficable landscapes carries a degree of passive military and political intimida tion that cannot be replicated by any other national asset and severely lim its a belligerent state’s offensive op tions. Once in position, even if aggressive maneuver operations are not mil itarily or diplomatically viable, the mechanized combined-arms force be comes a capital asset that cannot be attacked without risk of massive retal iation by superior American strike power. Consequently, the forward placement of heavy formations in ma neuver proximity to hostile or rogue regimes allows a potent and coercive effect without resorting directly to ki netic action. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s Operation Atlantic Re solve, which is intended to establish a strategic cordon against Russian influ ence in 2015, perfectly represents such limiting endeavors. Figure 3. A Soldier assigned to 3rd Armored Brigade, 1st Infantry Division, pulls security next to an M-2 Bradley Infantry Fighting Vehicle during a training rotation at the National Training Center, Fort Irwin, CA. (Photo by SGT Eric M. Garland II) Figure 4. PFC Adrian Echeverria, an indirect-fire infantryman with 2nd ABCT, 4th Infantry Division, prepares to load a 120mm mortar round during gunnery qualification near Camp Buehring, Kuwait. (Photo by SSG Andrew Porch)

Conclusion The Army Chief of Staff recently stated definitively that the U. S. Army’s mis sion is “about deterrence and compel ling others not to do things.” To achieve this value, the nation’s premier landpower service must be composed with enough armored density to support American interests in unified land op erations across diverse environments. Following the Army’s restructuring, one-third of its planned 32 maneuver brigades will remain mechanized across 1st Armored, 1st Cavalry and 1st, 3rd and 4th Infantry Divisions, reflecting a 21-percent reduction in ABCTs since

2012. Given the need to maintain a balanced force amid competing fiscal priorities, while still recognizing their replaceable versatility that infantry and Stryker BCTs provide in topograph ically restrictive regions and urban set tings, the Army must resist the temptation to further downsize the heavy force from this historically low stature. To do so would not only restrict America’s strategic options but also place its capability to dynamically influence populations and resource initiatives in jeopardy. In the final analysis, the imperative of American expeditionary land domi nance will always fall to the national army. In pursuit of this mission, the ground force needs to maintain a ro bust armored corps that amplifies joint capabilities and is capable of meaning fully shaping operational conditions and outcomes through strategic deter rence. In the dimension of combined-arms warfare, the nation must have a maneuver component that can unleash shock effects against opponents with the highest intensity of mobile protect ed firepower. In the more graduated realm of strategic posturing, it requires an arsenal of mechanized brigades to serve as impactful instruments for bol stering allies and intimidating opponents. Given the potential damage that attrition to the remaining heavy formations would have on the nation’s stra tegic and tactical capabilities, the im perative is clear: the Army must maintain a decisively capable armored force, and it must be sized to meet the security challenges of the 21st Century. From ARMY Magazine, Vol. 64, No. 8, August 2014. Copyright 2015 by the Association of the U. S. Army and reprinted by permission of ARMY Magazine. MAJ Nathan Jennings is a student at Command and General Staff Officer’s Course, Fort Leavenworth, KS. Previous assignments include assistant professor of history, U. S. Military Academy, West Point, NY; commander, Head quarters and Headquarters Troop, 4-9 Cavalry, 2nd BCT, 1st Cavalry Division, Fort Hood, TX; commander, Troop C, 4-9 Cavalry, 2nd BCT, 1st Cavalry Division, Fort Hood and Kirkuk, Iraq (deployed 2009); platoon leader, Company B, 1-34 Armor, 1st Brigade, 1st Infantry Division, Fort Riley, KS, and Baghdad, Iraq (deployed 2006-2007); and 19D Cavalry scout, 2-2 Armored Cavalry Regiment (Light), Fort Polk, LA. MAJ Jennings’ military schooling includes Cavalry Leader’s Course, Maneuver Officer’s Advanced Course, Maneuver Officer’s Basic Course and Airborne and Air Assault schools. He holds a bache lor’s of arts degree in history from Northwestern State University of Louisiana and a master’s of arts degree in history from the University of Texas at Austin. Acronym Quick-Scan ABCT – armored brigade combat team APC – armored personnel carrier BCT – brigade combat team CAB – combined-arms battalion CAM – combined-arms maneuver