Balancing the Combined-Arms Force

The U. S. Army announced sweeping plans in Summer 2013 to reorganize its brigade combat teams (BCTs) across both Active and National Guard Components into lesser quantities of more robust organizations. Based on the 38th Chief of Staff of the Army (CSA)’s as sessment of predicted “contingency plans” and “rotational requirements,” the Total Force has since restructured to 60 BCTs with a tactical distribution of 34 infantry, nine Stryker and 17 armored.1 Moving forward, even as it faces increased national security de mands across five continents, the Army is expected to further reduce its ma neuver capacity to between 56 and 50 BCTs due to continued budgetary con straints.2 The problematic result of this reorga nization is an unbalanced maneuver structure that is disproportionately light and perilously narrowed in tactical potential. With the American joint force reorienting on emerging crises across the Middle East and Eastern Europe – operational environments that have traditionally demanded diverse combined-arms teams with dynamic operational reach and strike ability – the Army should consider moving to ward a BCT distribution with more equal allocations of light and heavy formations. Rather than prioritizing the importance of one type over the other, adopting greater balance in fighting capacity would better achieve the CSA’s imperative “to increase the Army’s operational capability and flex ibility.”3 BCT optimization The primary rationale for expanded equilibrium among BCT types, or at least prevention of further reduction in mechanized density, stems from op timized capabilities that infantry (IBCT), Stryker (SBCT) and armored (ABCT) formations contribute to re gionally aligned forces and Guard mo bilization. They each possess graduat ed degrees of mobility, protection, fire power and expeditionary rapidity, thereby providing specialized utility in landscapes ranging from open deserts and plains to restrictive mountains, jungles and cities. According to the Ar my’s 2014 Operating Concept, each BCT, regardless of posture, is mandat ed to “prevent conflict, shape the security environment, and win wars” through “joint combined-arms opera tions.” This requirement consequently demands structural depth in light, medium and heavy forces to support both contingency efforts and major cam paigns.4 Beginning with infantry BCTs, the cur rent array of six light, five airborne and three air-assault brigades on active service, in addition to 20 light brigades in the Guard, are doctrinally designed for “operations in close terrain, such as swamps, woods, hilly and mountainous areas, and densely populated areas.”5 As the lightest BCTs with majority sta tus at 58 percent of the Army’s maneu ver strength, they wield rifle battalions with high capacity for airmobile attack while fighting across immature combat theaters with minimal logistical sup port.6 Despite these strengths, the very structure that allows expeditionary rapidity also limits broader utility in high-intensity and high-consumption conflict. The IBCT’s lightened signature – which includes only an anemic organic allocation of unprotected trucks for tactical transport – precludes inclusion of armored vehicles and large-caliber weaponry. SBCTs, the Army’s medium-level BCTs, are designed to bridge capability gaps between light and heavy forces. With a modest complement of eight Active and one Guard, brigade they represent 25 and 4 percent of their respective components.7 As wheeled formations that combine moderately protected transport with rifleman density, the newest of the maneuver brigades is, according to Army doctrine, “more de ployable than the ABCT and has great er tactical mobility, protection and fire power than the IBCT.”8 Despite these strengths, the SBCT’s intermediate stature necessitates conditional disadvantages of both their lighter and heavier counterparts. While platform weight makes them less strategically deployable than infantry brigades, the Stryker’s relatively light armor and weaponry leave it vulnerable against direct-fire cannon and area-denial technology.9 The final and heaviest formation – the ABCT – represents 31 and 25 percent of Active and Guard BCTs, respectively, while serving as the Army’s premier forcible-entry force in major combat operations. As emphasized by BG Scott McKean, Chief of Armor/commandant of the U. S. Army Armor School, “the need for our armored force is increas ing” and its singular ability to “close with and destroy the enemy using fire, maneuver and shock effect” is a criti cal capability ABCTs “bring as part of the combined-arms team.”10 However, this optimization for high-intensity, high-consumption and industrial war fare creates converse limitations. Encumbered by mechanized platforms like main battle tanks and infantry fighting vehicles with intensive logisti cal signatures, constraints on strategic mobility make them the least expedi tionary combat units in the Army in ventory and often require preposi tioned fleets. The outcome of varied BCT optimiza tion – with units assigned to regional commands according to specialized capabilities – is that the Army requires balance to fulfill its self-described im perative to “allow joint force com manders” across expansive theaters “to dictate the terms of operations and render enemies incapable of respond ing effectively.”11 Even as it must have infantry and Stryker formations to fight through restrictive and complex terrain, America’s landpower institution must possess an impactful armored corps to unleash maximal and scalable destruction. This requirement for rela tive parity in operational utility – a necessary compromise to sustain over match against emerging threats in Eastern Europe and the Middle East while remaining committed to the “Pacific Pivot” – can be best assessed ac cording to the Army’score competen cies: combined-arms maneuver (CAM) and wide-area security (WAS).

The 2014 Operating Concept defines the Army’s primary mission as the pro jection of “mobility, protection and firepower necessary to strike the enemy from unexpected directions.” It achieves this effect, in a joint context, through CAM with regionally assigned units and task-organized teams against both predictive and unknown threats. Each type of maneuver brigade, ac cording to light, airmobile, motorized or mechanized profiles, synergizes with joint, interagency and multinational coalitions to “defeat enemy ground forces, seize, occupy and defend land areas, and achieve physical, temporal and psychological advantages over the enemy.”12 Despite this reality, the BCT reorgani zation plan has catalyzed an institu tional reorganization toward a lighter posture based on expeditionary re sponsiveness and economized plat form distribution. As criticized by Gian Gentile in his controversial 2012 book Wrong Turn, “the U. S. Army has al ready shifted its organizational structure toward light infantry in place of mechanized armored forces” with “two thirds of the active-duty combat bri gades” consisting of “light infantry, the shock troops of [counterinsurgency].”13 Under the current and emerging Total Force structure, this disproportional increase in infantry units, rising to 72 percent when combined with Stryker infantry, threatens to leave the Army equipped to support narrower ranges of expeditionary efforts. This transition consequently under mines the United States’ capacity to execute several crucial joint endeavors. Beginning with forcible entry to defeat intolerable regimes, large-scale inva sion remains a critical aspect of nation al power. This type of major combat operation often requires lighter ele ments to support heavier counterparts as they attack in-depth to shatter enemy fronts. As assessed by senior Army officers LTG H. R. McMaster, COL Mark Elfendahl and LTC Chris McKinney in their impactful 2013 Foreign Affairs article, armored forces with tanks and infantry fighting vehicles alone possess ability to “keep pace with fast-moving aircraft” across contested landscapes “when operating as part of an air-ground team.”14 Mechanized BCTs also possess the Army’s only cavalry capa ble of reconnaissance by force and ar tillery capable of firing while protect ed. Just as infantry brigades proved their distinctive value during entry into Granada, Panama and Afghanistan, the singular importance of ABCTs in facilitating American dominance finds re cent historical relevance in the 1991 and 2003 invasions of Iraq. First, in Operation Desert Storm, a large international coalition achieved overwhelm ing victory by enabling broad armored envelopment with a variety of support ing arms and massive airpower effects. Twelve years later, the opening phases of Operation Iraqi Freedom maximized net-centric synchronization and proved the potency of armor-centric teams at tacking along narrow axes while sup ported by precision air and naval strikes. A second, more versatile and flexible role that armored forces fulfill in CAM is providing decisive, yet scalable, overmatch in hybrid environments and high-intensity urban combat. Moving beyond sweeping confrontations of mass and scale, organizations with mechanized infantry, cavalry, engineers, artillery and tanks alone possess the mobile protected firepower re quired to move forcefully against strongpoints fortified by mined ap proaches and standoff weaponry. While infantry and Stryker forces can prove vulnerable against entrenched opponents in complex infrastructure, armor-centric teams have repeatedly proven their ability to excel against hy brid opponents in unpredictable and rapidly changing landscapes. The tactical utility of diverse fighting teams – with a nuanced involvement by light, medium and heavy formations – was definitively proven in Operation Iraqi Freedom. In addition to com bined-arms attacks that succeeded in

Fallujah, Ramadi and Mosul, the 2008 Battle of Sadr City offers instructive lessons for such impact. Initially, ac cording to a 2013 RAND study, Stryker forces attacking into the dense urban setting of East Baghdad “suffered heav ily from [explosively formed penetra tor] and other anti-armor systems” and lost six platforms in six days. The task force then galvanized success by aug menting with tanks and mechanized infantry to allow a critical “degree of tactical overmatch” while Strykers and ri flemen provided “needed overwatch and security.”15 As proven in previous American wars, customizable combinations of heavy armor, motorized trans port and dismounted soldiers proved ideal for negotiating fiercely contested terrain. A final argument for empowering CAM through more equal distribution of BCT types is the reality of increasing anti-access and area-denial capabilities by potential opponents. As the U. S. military encounters both conventional and hybrid foes, advanced aerial and ground interdiction may stymie both airborne and motorized attacks. These threats, encompassing both emerging technologies and unsophisticated de vices, find greatest concern in the pro liferation of third-generation surface-to-air missiles like the Russian-built S-400 and in improvised explosive de vices (IEDs) employed in recent years in Lebanon, Chechnya, Iraq and Afghanistan.16 The 2006 Israeli invasion of Lebanon, in particular, provides a cautionary ex ample for modern militaries – including the U. S. Army as it completes BCT reorganization – of how attacking pre pared opponents without adequate combined-arms diversity can retard strategic success. In this case, accord ing to RAND analyst Dr. David Johnson, the Israeli Defense Force (IDF) “be came generally incapable of the joint combined-arms fire and maneuver capabilities generally associated with major combat operations” and there fore “paid a heavy price in casualties for their lack of preparation.” The re sulting lackluster ground campaign re vealed for a global audience perils of embracing disproportionately light combat profiles with predominant orientation toward stability functions. Later, in the 2009 Israeli offensive into Gaza called Operation Cast Lead, are focused IDF attacked a similar hybrid threat with a more varied combined-arms mix. In addition to incorporating more Merkava tanks and armored infantry carriers to allow rapid advances through enemy obstacles and stand-off fires, they synchronized heavy engi neers, artillery effects and air strikes to enable maneuver brigades to clear and suppress entrenched defenders.17 As the U. S. Army completes realignment, it should learn from Israeli interven tions – in addition to its own experi ences with combined-arms success in Southwest Asia – to prioritize and re source a truly full spectrum-capable force.

The second major Army competency is directly empowered by expertise in CAM. Doctrinally defined as “the appli cation of the elements of combat power to protect populations, forces, infra structure and activities to deny the en emy positions of advantage and to consolidate gains to retain the initiative,” WAS requires forces to pursue ranges of stability and partnered operations. As important elements in the Army’s regional-alignment strategy to both ro tationally and permanently deploy for ward elements to bolster allies and intimidate opponents, armored forma tions remain critical for meeting its mission to provide “the joint-force commander with reaction time and maneuver space.”18 The importance of maintaining balance in projection of light, medium and heavy elements has thus gained re newed importance as the joint force reduces presence in Afghanistan and repositions to engage new threats. Even as elements of American national power “pivot” toward the Pacific the ater, where China and North Korea maintain large armored corps and improving area-denial capabilities, American commanders have been compelled to refocus on crises across the Middle East and Eastern Europe. Expeditionary operations in these regions – where combined-arms teams with mechanized capability have proven decisive in previous conflicts – demand preservation of a sizable, resourced and forward-deployed armored presence. The redeployment of heavy units to settings where mechanized importance was recently de-emphasized, if only in prioritization of resources, illustrates the continued need for diversity within the larger panoply of U. S. military power. Task-organizing multi-faceted ground forces to conduct WAS of fers customizable solutions for stabiliz ing crises and deterring foes. Among Army combat formations, ABCTs in particular possess the most scalable ability to, as defined by Johnson, “scale up” to face “high-lethality stand-off threats” or “scale down to confront irregular adversaries as part of a bal anced force that includes light infan try.”19 This singular versatility has been recognized during stability efforts even in regions with restrictive terrain like Afghanistan, where the U. S. Marine Corps, the Netherlands and Canada de ployed tanks to support patrols, at tacks and defenses. As argued by MAJ Trevor Cadieu, a Canadian Army officer who commanded a Leopard II compa ny in Kandahar Province in 2008, heavy armor “restored tactical mobility to the combined-arms team in Afghanistan through its ability to penetrate grape and marijuana fields, clear mine and IED belts, and breach mud walls and compounds that were previously impassable to the [Light Armored Vehicle] III.”20 Furthermore, ABCTs alone possess unique support assets such as tracked engineers, medics and personnel transport that lighter units organically lack. Since IEDs endure as proven “low-tech” weapons of choice for guerrilla and hybrid resistance, these en ablers will remain in high demand. Another doctrinal aspect of WAS en deavors is forward positioning by re gionally aligned and partnered forces to “preempt enemy actions and retain the initiative.”21 The re-emergence of territorial aggression in Europe, in par ticular, has compelled re-emphasis on the central role that survivable combined-arms teams hold in projecting credible strategic deterrence. As ex plained by McMaster in his recent Military Review essay, “the forward posi tioning of capable ground forces elevates the cost of aggression to a level that the aggressor is unwilling to pay and prevents the aggressor from doing what Russia has in Ukraine – posing to the international community a fait accompli and then portraying its reac tions as escalatory.”22 Among the entire U. S. arsenal, heavy brigades, typically task-organized with light and wheeled formations, telegraph unique implications of perma nency while demonstrating resolute in tent to support allied interests. Revers ing recent trends that saw the com plete withdraw of American mecha nized battalions from Europe, multi-national activity sets that include imposing Abrams tanks and Bradley Fighting Vehicles have returned under NATO’s Operation Atlantic Resolve in numbers. More realistic than threat of strategic bombardment, and less transitory than naval reinforcement, this type of ar mored presence, even in relatively small densities, communicates defini tive strength of national will. Given the need to preserve stability in former Soviet-bloc states, the Middle East and across East Asia, armored forces are once again proving their strategic value. As McMaster, Elfendahl and McKinney argue in their Foreign Affairs article, the emergence of desta bilizing territorial aggrandizement – ex emplified by Russia’s mechanized invasion of Georgia in 2008 and motorized occupation of Crimea in 2014 – re quires the United States and its allies to “retain sufficient armored forces to deter and, if necessary, confront large, well-armed ground forces.” Taking the analyses further, the authors assess that America must maintain a “balanced force able to overcome their countermeasures – and [ABCTs] are a fundamental component of that bal anced force.”23 Toward a more balanced force When appreciating hard-won lessons from previous conflicts and requirements for tactical diversity among re gionally aligned Active and Guard BCTs, the imperative becomes clear: the United States needs a robust armored corps to complement infantry and Stryker capabilities against complex challenges. This means it must be structured, as directed in the Army’s Operating Concept, to maneuver over “dispersed over wide areas” and “develop situational understanding through action while possessing the mobility to concentrate rapidly.”24 Only balanced availability among light, medium and heavy formations, each with specialized optimization, can prose cute and dominate unified land opera tions against non-state, conventional and hybrid opponents. Given these demands, the Army should first and foremost preserve its 17 re maining ABCTs and, if necessary, apply future force reductions to the 34 infantry brigades that comprise the Total Force majority. The reduced stature of the American mechanized corps, even as traditional allies like the United Kingdom have drastically downsized their own, already compels the U. S. joint force to accept risk in the eventu ality of a major land war.25 As a further, albeit more fiscally challenging, measure to improve institutional capacity, Army decision-makers should consider converting two IBCTs to ABCT status to allow increased operational flexibility. With multiple brigade-sized mecha nized fleets remaining from recent BCT deactivations, these reorganizations would enhance strategic readiness while proving marginally cost-neutral.26 In 2011 the 18th Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff – an Armor officer who commanded varied formations in com bat – wrote that “success in future armed conflict requires the Army to sustain the expertise we’ve developed in [WAS]” and “rekindle our expertise in [CAM].”27 Since then the march of hostile armies in Crimea and Mesopotamia, in addition to continued insta bility in Africa, along the Pacific Rim and in Persia, have proven him pro phetic. To meet these threats, the U. S. Army requires balance among IBCTs, SBCTs and ABCTs to ensure breadth of capability in mobile protected firepow er. Looking toward the 21st Century, let America’s landpower institution re main tactically diversified and maxi mally prepared to defeat the enemies of the free world through full-spectrum dominance. MAJ Nathan Jennings is a student at the Command and General Staff Officer’s Course, Fort Leavenworth, KS. Previous duty positions include assistant professor of history, U. S. Military Academy, West Point, NY; commander, Headquarters and Headquarters Troop, 4-9 Cavalry, 2nd BCT, 1st Cavalry Division, Fort Hood, TX; commander, Troop C, 4-9 Cavalry, 2nd BCT, 1st Cavalry Division, Fort Hood, TX, and Kirkuk, Iraq (deployed 2009); platoon leader, Company B, 1-34 Armored Regiment, 1st Brigade, 1st Infantry Division, Fort Riley, KS, and Baghdad, Iraq (deployed 2006- 2007); and 19D Cavalry scout, 2-2 Armored Cavalry Regiment (Light), Fort Polk, LA. His military schooling includes Air Assault and Airborne schools, Maneuver Officer Basic Course, Maneuver Officer Advanced Course and Cavalry Leader’s Course. MAJ Jennings holds a bachelor’s of arts degree in history from Northwestern State University of Louisiana and a master’s of arts degree in history from the University of Texas at Austin. Notes 1 GEN Raymond Odierno, Pentagon press briefing June 25, 2013; this quantity includes 14 infantry, eight Stryker and 10 ABCTs in the Active Component and 20 infantry, one Stryker and seven ABCTs in the Guard. 2 Mathew Cox, “Army Must Shed 6 BCTs to Meet Proposed Budget Cuts,” Military. Com News, Feb. 12, 2014. 3 Ibid. 4 TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-1, The U. S. Army Operating Concept: Win in a Complex World, Oct. 31, 2014. 5 Ibid. 6 Michelle Tan, “Army outlines plan to in activate 7 brigade combat teams,” Army Times, May 5, 2014; this percentage excludes 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment, 75th Ranger Regiment and Special Operations Forces. 7 Ibid. 8 Field Manual 3-90.6, Brigade Combat Team. 9 Staff, “M1126 Strykers in Combat: Experiences & Lessons,” Defense Industry Daily, Oct. 11, 2005; “Study Faults Army Vehicle,” Jeffery Smith, Washington Post, March 31, 2005. 10 BG Scott McKean, “Chief of Armor’s Hatch,” ARMOR, October-December 2014. 11 Army Operating Concept. 2 Ibid. 13 Gian Gentile, Wrong Turn: America’s Deadly Embrace of CounterInsurgency, New York and London: The New Press, 2013.

Acronym Quick-Scan 14 LTG H. R. McMaster, COL Mark Elfendahl and LTC Chris McKinney, “Why the U. S. Army Needs Armor,” Foreign Affairs, June 2013. 5 Dr. David Johnson, M. Wade Markel and Brian Shannon, “The 2008 Battle of Sadr City: Reimagining Urban Combat,” RAND Arroyo Center, 2013. 6 John Gordon and John Matsumura, “The Army’s Role in Overcoming Anti-Access and Area Denial Challenges,” RAND Ar royo Center, 2013. 7 Dr. David Johnson, “Preparing for ‘Hy brid’ Opponents: The Israeli Experience in Lebanon and Gaza, RAND Arroyo Center, 2011; Anthony Cordesman, “Preliminary ‘Lessons’ of the Israeli-Hezbollah War,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2006. 18 Army Operating Concept. 9 Dr. David Johnson, “Heavy Armor in the Future Security Environment,” RAND Ar royo Center, 2011. 20 MAJ Trevor Cadieu, “Canadian Armour in Afghanistan,” Canadian Army Journal, Vol. 10.4, Winter 2008. 21 Army Operating Concept. 22 LTG H. R. McMaster, “Continuity and Change: The Army Operating Concept and Clear Thinking About Future War,” Military Review, March-April, 2015. 23 McMaster, Elfendahl and McKinney. 24 Army Operating Concept. 25 Jack Simpson, “British Army Reduced to One Single Tank Regiment,” The Independent, March 11, 2015. 26 While conversion of Active Component IBCTs to ABCTs would be ideal to allow maximum readiness, reorganization of Guard IBCTs would provide similar benefit at less cost. 27 GEN Martin Dempsey, “Win, Learn, Focus, Adapt, Win Again,” ARMY Magazine, March 2011. ABCT – armored brigade combat team BCT – brigade combat team CAM – combined-arms maneuver CSA – Chief of Staff of the Army IBCT – infantry brigade combat team IDF – Israeli Defense Force IED – improvised explosive device SBCT – Stryker brigade combat team WAS – wide-area security