Operation Raviv: the 10-Hour War

When the Six-Day War ended in 1967, the Egyptian army established a frontline on the west bank of the Suez Canal. Israeli troops then seized the Sinai Peninsula and established their frontline on the east bank. Egypt was determined to regain Sinai, and that is the casus belli of the War of Attrition. The enemies on either side of the canal attrited each other for 3½ half years (until Sept. 29, 1970). The War of Attrition was battle position, causing a bloody and long war, mainly caricaturized by artillery attacks and local raids. The Egyptians had great superiority in manpower and artillery.1 The decision to execute Operation Raviv, a combined-arms raid by the Israeli Defense Forces on Egypt’s Red Sea coast, derived from the Israeli forces’ will to expand the frontline in the Suez Canal and steer the Egyptian forces away. They wanted to emphasize the IDF’s advantage over the enemy and cause Egypt to feel insecure in its defense line. Operation Raviv, the sole major ground offensive the IDF undertook against Egypt throughout the War of Attrition, was a good momentum-change operation. The operation planned to cross the Suez Canal undetected and operate armor raids deep into the Sinai Peninsula. Behind enemy lines, the operation also intended to destroy the Russian radar, which posed a threat to Israeli air operations in the battle zone. The spark to this operation first came from a young major by the name of Raviv (the reconnaissance company commander of 7th Armor Brigade). However, the actual plan was conducted by MG Abraham Adan (the armor-forces commander) and ADM Abraham Botzer (Israeli navy commander). Then-LTC Baroch “Pinko” Harel headed the task force to the operation.2 Operation Raviv: the 10-Hour War by CPT Imri Yuran Arab forces Israeli forces Egyptian stronghold Torpedo boat Landing craft Sunken torpedo boat Naval commando force Armor Armored infantry Helicopter landing Air assaults Landing Evacuation Ras mal ab Ras za afrana Za afrana Radar Gulf of Suez Ras matrama Ras sudar Ras a Sadat Ras Abu Darai El-knafii Figure 1. Israeli forces’ actions in raiding Egypt. 47

Raviv’s idea created a decoy using captured Egyptian tanks and BTR-50 armored personnel carriers from the Six-Day War. Disguised as Egyptian tanks and soldiers, Israeli forces would penetrate enemy lines. The plan allowed movement relatively freely until the Egyptians discovered it was actually an enemy raid. So the order was given, and six tank crews from the IDF Armor School and three crews of infantry fighters from 7th Armored Brigade’s reconnaissance company started training on a warfighting vehicle they didn’t know. Training was conducted on beach models for six weeks. Soldiers were forbidden to call their families since the mission objective was top secret.3 Vehicles were painted in an Egyptian-style desert pattern. Soldiers’ training focused on fire in movement, embarking on and disembarking from vessels, cooperation with Special Forces on the vehicle (they were augmented with “Sayeeret Matcal,” or Arabic-speaking soldiers), and specific intelligence preparation for the operation. Pinko’s force ready After those six weeks, six Tiran-5 crews, three BTR-50, engineer forces from an airborne unit, one reconnaissance platoon from 7th Brigade’s recon company, a Special Forces soldier and one military reporter were ready for the operation. “Except for the color of their eyes, we knew everything about them,” said Harel. “We knew their composition, weapon systems, vehicle amount and the number of camels they had in any position.”4 The Israelis’ two objectives for this operation were:

• Abu Darage camp – the headquarters of the “camel raiders” battalion, which was the shore-security company and a naval radar base.

• Ras Zaafarne camp – the brigade headquarters of an air-defense-artillery unit with new Russian radar and combat ADA unit with surface-to-air missiles. Pinko’s force arrived at Ras Sudar in early September in a night movement to avoid detection. Shayetet 13 naval commandos conducted the first phase of the operation Sept. 7, 1969, when they executed Operation Escort. Eight operators in a pair of Maiale (Pig) manned torpedoes penetrated the other side of the canal and blew up two Egyptian navy P-183 torpedo boats. This operation served two purposes. First was to minimize the enemy’s ability to intercept Israeli landing craft. Second was to draw the Egyptians’ attention from the planned landing shore to the north. Despite a successful operation, three operators were killed after one of the Pigs’ self-destruct mechanisms accidently went off as the forces were on their way back to the Israeli side of the canal.5 The main operation started the night of Sept. 8-9. Pinko’s force, with 100 men, six tanks and three BTR-50s, embarked on the navy vessel and started across the Suez Canal. The movement began only after the Shayetet 13 secured the planned landing point. A couple of Egyptian vehicles passed on the road near the securing force, but Pinko’s force did not fire on them to allow a quiet landing.6 Pinko’s force, delivered by three landing craft, disembarked at 3:37 a.m. at the secure beachhead. The landing point at El Hafair was 20 kilometers north of the first objective. The landing site was in a very narrow place between the high mountains and the canal water, where the Egyptian patrol road was very close to the water. After the successful landing, the patrol road was destroyed to prevent reinforcement from the north. Pinko’s forces passed the beachhead and turned south toward their first objective.7 Way to Ras Zaafarne The Israeli column moved fast on the road. When the first Egyptian vehicles appeared, Pinko ordered his soldiers not to shoot them because they would block the narrow road to the pass for the rest of the column. He ordered them to wait until they moved to the front of the Egyptian tanks and then shoot them with a tank shell from the last tanks in the column. The force, laden with extra fuel and ammunition, continued to move south. The raiders met no significant resistance because the Egyptian armored-force camp was blocked 40 kilometers north of the landing point. In the first morning light, the Israeli air force started to support the raiders, and even before the arrival of Pinko’s force at Abu Darage, the air force destroyed the radar and surface-to-air missile battery at Ras Zaafarne. Pinko’s force arrived at Abu Darage at 6:12 a.m. and seized the camp in 20 minutes,8 assisted by two 130mm guns from their position on the Israeli side of the canal (32 kilometers away). The gun achieved direct hits on the camp buildings, and then the rest of Pinko’s forces cleared the camp. “(T)heir task (was) routine observation rather than repelling enemy tanks, especially when they had only small arms and anti-tank guns with a range of no more than 500 yards,” said author Lawrence Moores.9 This is the only case in history of intercontinental artillery support.10 (The Suez Canal is the border between Africa and Asia.) After his forces cleared Abu Darage, Pinko requested logistic support. Helicopters arrived at a predetermined point at 8:30 a.m. with ammunition for the tanks and medically evacuated the only soldier injured in the operation (an intel-Pinko’s force ready on the vessel. (Israeli Defense Force archive photo.) 48

ADA – air-defense artillery IDF – Israeli Defense Forces MCCC – Maneuver Captains Career Course ligence officer that, against Pinko’s guidance, got out of his BTR to collect pieces from the destroyed radar. He was shot by an Egyptian fighter but suffered only minor hand injuries.)11 After resupply, Pinko’s forces were ready to accomplish his main task in Ras Zaafarne. The raid continued south toward Ras Zaafarne with little enemy resistance, covered by close-air support provided by 109 Squadron’s Skyhawks. However, in the first attack on the radar, one Skyhawk was lost; the lead pilot, MAJ Hagai Ronen, was last seen hanging beneath his parachute above the Suez. Until this day, he is still missing in action. As Pinko’s force arrived at Ras Zaafarne, smoke was already rising from the bombarded radar. The enemy soldiers started to run away – some to the mountains, some to the water. Pinko decided that the tanks would create a surrounding ring to block any withdrawal force and destroy it, while entering two small forces in the camp to clear it. The infantry emplaced dynamite in the radar-system building and blew up the radar left over to complete destruction. The force withdrew from the camp and reorganized to further movement. According to the plan, the tanks and the BTR would camouflage themselves until nighttime and then link up again with the navy vessels to be shipped back to Israel’s side of the canal. However, in a change to the plan, Adan, from the operation room in Ras Sudar, decided that Israeli forces would come back during the day and as soon as possible. This change was because of two main reasons.12 First, the Egyptians showed no air threat to the moving force. Second, after 50 kilometers of fight and only a few technical problems in the vehicles, it was tasteless to stay on Egyptian land and risk Israeli forces any more. Pinko received the change in plan in the battalion net and started to move south to the planned embarkation point. On the IDF’sway south, an Egyptian track and armored-personnel-carrier platoon trying to disturb the Israeli forces was destroyed. At the embarkation point, the tanks established a block-and-cover position while the force waited for the navy vessels. Aftermath After 45 kilometers of unhindered movement in nine hours in Egyptian territory, Pinko’s forces linked up with the 11th Flotilla. Pinko received final approval to disengage, and from Ras Zaafarne ferried back to Ras Sudar (in the Israeli side of the canal). In the fight’s aftermath, the Egyptian army suffered an estimated 100 casualties, including a Soviet general serving as a consultant, 70 vehicles, three BTR, 27 phone poles and two radars. The Israeli force also destroyed seven enemy outposts.13 The mission’s two objectives were successfully achieved. The following day, the first reports from the canal arrived at the Egyptian presidential palace in Cairo. The reports from the raid shocked and angered President Abdel Nasser. He suffered a heart attack Sept. 10.14 While recovering, 10 days later, Nasser dismissed the Army chief of staff, GEN Ahmad Ismail Ali; the commander of the Egyptian navy, VADM Fouad Abu Zikry; the commander of the Red Sea district and number of other officers.15 CPT Imri Yuran from Israel is attending the Maneuver Captains Career Course at Fort Benning, GA. When he returns to Israel, he will be assigned as the battalion executive officer for 82nd Battalion, 7th Armor Brigade. In Israel, CPT Yuran served as an Armor officer with 7th Armor Brigade; fought as a platoon leader of Merkava, the IDF’s main battle tank, in the Lebanon war of 2006; commanded a company in the West Bank of Lebanon and served as an S-3 in Gaza. The Jerusalem native is a 2008 graduate of the Israeli MCCC. Notes 1 Mahane (in Hebrew) (equivalent to Army Times), 1994, Page 87-89. 2 Author’s phone interview with BG Baroch “Pinko” Harel. 3 Mahane. 4 Harel. 5 Mahane. 6 Ibid. 7 Moores, Lawrence W., The Mounted Raid: An Overlooked Deep Operation Capability, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 1992. 8 Mahane. 9 Moores. 10 Harel. 11 Mahane. 12 Harel. 13 Mahane. 14 Ibid. 15 Operation Raviv, Wikipedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Raviv. Acronym Quick-Scan Israeli equipment disembarks after operation. (IDF archive photo.) 49

Institutionalizing Army-profession concepts. In addition to agreeing upon criteria for professional certification, and institutionalizing what it means to be a professional Soldier, Armor leaders must set the standard for professionalism and lead by example, teaching their subordinates by word and deed the three Cs if they expect to see professionalism manifested in Soldiers’ and Army civilians’ actions. Certifying Army professionals. The study revealed that many Soldiers do not perceive as meaningful the Army’s current professional-certification criteria and the standards of their application, and they are concerned that lack of solid certification allows poor performers and poor leaders to advance. As the Army begins to correct this, certification will assess leader capacity to function effectively in both low- and high-intensity operations. Part of certification will be education and tools that will improve mentoring, coaching and counseling skills that have diminished over the past 10 years. Investing in leader development for Army 2020. Of course this will occupy the Armor School over the next few years. However, in this category as well (as the PoA study notes), “Soldiers have noted an erosion of certain interpersonal skills, such as coaching, teaching, counseling and mentoring. … As the Army transitions back to a relatively slower operational tempo, Soldiers are looking for leaders at all levels to relearn those development skills that served us so well in the decades between Vietnam and the current wars.” Expect a leader-development “how to” Army techniques publication and some realignment of officer and noncommissioned-officer evaluation reports – and Army civilians’ Total Army Personnel Evaluation System – to reflect criteria in the three Cs and the Army’s leadership-requirements model (ADP 6-22). Beyond our specific military expertise, we will have no enduring success in leader and Soldier development unless we emphasize mentorship – beyond technical warrior skills, a mentor teaches how to think adaptably and instills in the student the desire to learn. Whether officer or noncommissioned officer, leaders must be comfortable making decisions without having “perfect” information, including in complex, dynamic and dangerous environments, and they’ll base those decisions on not only their own “gut” but on what their mentors have taught them. This obli-gates Armor leaders to train their Soldiers to be adaptive, professional and disciplined in executing any mission, and to operate independently (back to mission command). To support this, the Armor School is obligated to develop, educate and inspire Soldiers and leaders to be critical and creative thinkers who can close with and destroy the enemy by fire and maneuver in a hybrid environment as part of a combined-arms team. The Armor School will also need to facilitate development of flexible and lethal armored and reconnaissance formations to prepare the future force, support an Army at war and shape the Maneuver Center of Excellence. This means that Armor leaders also need perspectives not limited to purely Armor and Army endeavors, but they also need enhanced critical thinking and innovative solutions that include other mission partners. Honorable service Honorable service reflects an institutional ethic grounded in the nation’s values and the Army’s duty to the nation. It is stated in the Armor School imperative “continuous display of the highest morals, discipline and ethics.” Honorable service upholds the Army’s ethic, captured in this quote from the PoA study: “[T]he Army profession exists not for itself but for the noble and honorable purpose of preserving peace, supporting and defending the Constitution and protecting the American people and way of life. The Army is called to perform that duty vir-tuously, with integrity and respect for human dignity as the American people expect, in accordance with the Army’s values. Army professionals are therefore fully committed to more than a job – they are called to the deep moral obligations of the Army’s duty. Under that deep commitment, they willingly maintain the Army as subordinate to civilian authorities, and they subordinate their own interests to those of the mission, being ready, if need be, to sacrifice in the defense of the republic.” Well stated by retired GEN David H. Petraeus, the Army’s ethic is lived by our Soldiers: “The essence, the core of our military is and always will be its people: men and women who raise their right hands and recite the oath of enlistment, even though they know that act may result in them deploying to a combat zone where they will be asked once again to put it all on the line, day after day, in crushing heat and numbing cold, under body armor and Kevlar, against resilient, tough, often barbaric enemies; never knowing, as they go outside the wire, whether they’ll be greeted with a hand grenade or a handshake, but being ready and capable of responding appropriately to either.” The Army must regulate itself, and that falls on the shoulders of leaders at all levels. If the Army fails to self-regulate its ethic, those external to the profession must do so on its behalf, which degrades the profession’s autonomy and the legitimacy. Therefore discipline is central to honorable service, yet the PoA study found there has been some erosion of discipline and standards. Thus “improving standards and discipline” became one of the PoA study’s focus areas. Leaders set the example and the standards, and can best inculcate them when there is a trust relationship with subordinates. However, the study reports “there is growing evidence that Soldiers are … confused as to what standards are crucial, as well as growing concerns that NCOs are uncertain which standards should be enforced in various environments. … [P]ortions of the force [have lost] skills in fundamental areas such as training management, property accountability, maintenance and counseling.” The study points out that many Soldiers think there is a different standard between home-station and deployed environments. Soldiers often place less value on standards that do not, as they see it, directly support winning on the battlefield. There must be one standard between garrison and deployed environments; leaders must not relax their standards. One of the sources of problems in lack of trust and lack of discipline is that computers and Blackberries have made it too easy to gather information and provide guidance with a minimum of human interaction. However, the study pointed out that “Soldiers want more personal involvement by leaders.” Face-to-face interactions let Soldiers know that leaders value their work. Counseling is a fundamental leadership tool. Mentoring is a fundamental leadership attribute. “Face time” is a fundamental leadership requirement. I challenge Armor leaders to be personally involved with their Soldiers. I encourage you, as does the Army PoA study, to read Tom Peters’ and Robert Waterman’s In Search of Excellence. Peters and Waterman identified as a key leadership attribute “management by wandering around”; they noted that in successful organizations, leaders spent huge amounts of time among their subordinates – talking, asking questions and demonstrating an interest in what they were doing. As the PoA study reports, “[o]ur Soldiers are saying that digital communication has made it all too easy for our leaders to stay in the comfort zone of their headquarters and neglect their duty to go out and collect ‘ground Commandant’s Hatch

Continued from Page 3 50 truth.’ Soldiers are asking to see more of their leaders ‘wandering around.’” We need to emphasize mentorship as part of our leader toolkit. Another part of the leader toolkit is to reward outstanding performance, to hold up as an exemplar those who exceed the standards and who live and breathe discipline. “Discipline must not be only of the type that is crucial to success on the battlefield,” the study says. “For the professional Soldier, discipline is the core of his or her being and is continuously manifested in all environments, from the battlefield to the home-station motor pool.” Stewardship of the profession Effective “stewardship of the profession” means the Army is prepared for future conflicts with the “right practices and expert knowledge.” As I’ve already alluded to, to do this, the Army must self-regulate and self-generate, creating its own expertise and ethic that it continually reinforces through mentorship. In fact, there can be no stewardship without mentorship, as love of the profession is best learned in Acronym Quick-Scan ADP – Army Doctrine Publication CAPE – Center for the Army Profession and Ethic NCO – noncommissioned officer PME – professional military education PoA – profession of arms an ongoing relationship through a mentor’s teaching, dialogue and challenge(s) of his students – the essence of mentorship. “The Army … will maintain its status as a profession with the American people if its leaders at all levels, both military and civilian, serve daily as stewards investing in the Army’s future – in its evolving expert knowledge, the development of Army professionals and units to use that expertise, and in self-policing the institution to maintain the Army ethic,” said the PoA study. “Because of this unique responsibility, Army leaders are the sine qua non of the Army as a military profession.” It should be abundantly clear that stewardship cannot be learned except through leaders – they are the indispensable and essential action, condition or ingredient of professionalism. Leaders, as stewards of the Army profession, have a responsibility to read PoA campaign materials; participate in a studies, forums or professional-development sessions; dialogue with comrades and coworkers and send feedback to CAPE; and inculcate PoA concepts in their unit or organization. In summary, we must emphasize not only the three Cs but include three more: culture, coaching/mentoring and communication – the face-to-face kind. The future success of our Army depends on it. As I close, I say farewell as commandant of the Armor School and 46th Chief of Armor. It’s been a great ride, but the Army has called me to serve as the deputy commanding general for maneuver of 1st Cavalry Division, Fort Hood, TX. Please give the 47th Chief of Armor the support you have given me and add your efforts to the challenges and needs I’ve outlined above. Forge the Thunderbolt!