Operation Homestead: Transitioning the Mission in Iraq from Department of Defense to Department of State

U. S. military forces in Iraq began the handover of bases and missions in October 2011 to the Office of Security Cooperation-Iraq, an organization reporting to the U. S. Department of State embassy in Baghdad, the largest U. S. embassy anywhere in the world. The 1st Battalion, 5th Cavalry Regiment, while simultaneously executing its role in the largest military withdrawal effort in decades, successfully conducted the transition of the first U. S. contingency operating base to OSC-I. The battalion was assisted by U. S. Division-North and 2nd Advise and Assist Brigade of 1st Cavalry Division, which had turned over the U. S. mission in Tikrit, Iraq, at COB Speicher to OSC-I Tikrit. These transitions from Department of Defense forces to other U. S. agencies are likely to occur again in Afghanistan and perhaps elsewhere in the near future – so our lessons-learned and perspective could be of assistance to company- and battalion-level leaders facing this challenge. While initially tasked to provide a small force of combat Soldiers for the force protection of OSC-I Tikrit trainers, we determined quickly that if the transition were to be successful, we had to create a true partnership with OSC-I to form one team of U. S. government agencies committed to achieving the goals of the post-Operation New Dawn U. S. mission. We assisted OSC-I in reaching operational capability by partnering with OSC-I staff along several dimensions. This required an effort that extended far beyond simply “guys with guns.” The 1-5 Cavalry assisted OSC-I with security, battle-tracking, medical planning, contractor support and building relationships with key Iraqi Security Force leaders before we were relieved of the mission by U. S. Forces -Iraq, to which we reported as a strategic-reserve element. Situation COB Speicher is located just north of Tikrit in the Salah ah Din province. The post hosts the Iraqi Air Force academy as well as initial pilot, air-traffic control and aircraft-maintenance training. Until the end of October 2011, the post also served as headquarters for USD-N, a garrison command, an air adviser team, two stability transition teams, several support units and a combined-arms battalion. Prior to DoD departure, IAF training and operations occurred within the 16-mile perimeter of the combined U. S.-Iraqi installation. With the departure of U. S. forces, securing the entire post perimeter was no longer practical. Therefore, OSC- I planned to transition the outer perimeter of COB Speicher to ISF and began construction of a smaller compound within the Iraqi base. This inner perimeter was referred to as the Green Zone and was secured by U. S.-contracted security. This area, with a five-mile perimeter, initially housed and supported 1,400 trainers, security contractors and administrative-support personnel. All these activities would be managed and overseen by eight OSC- I staff. Security-assistance teams, composed of contracted civilian trainers, completed the most important component of the mission. SATs trained and oversaw the IAF’s initial and subsequent upgraded pilot training. To accomplish this task, SATs needed to be escorted from the Green Zone to an area between the inner perimeter and outer perimeter guarded by ISF, referred to as the Amber Zone. Security-escort teams, who were contracted security personnel, would secure the SATs during their training and provide security of all movements out of the Green Zone. The SETs had arrived but were not operational because their weapons were “frustrated” with the Iraqi Ministry of Interior in Baghdad. Operation Homestead Ninety-six hours before our scheduled departure, our battalion received its initial warning order to leave 50 Soldiers on COB Speicher to augment OSC-I security. The battalion staff began analyzing and planning for this contingency. The USF- I deputy commanding general would make the final decision, but 1-5 Cavalry had to begin planning and necessary movement immediately. The battalion Operation Homestead: Transitioning the Mission in Iraq from Department of Defense to Department of State by LTC Barry E. Daniels Jr. and CPT James R. Vance commander was concerned about leaving 50 Soldiers without an organic headquarters behind in Iraq while the rest of the battalion moved into Kuwait. Based on the battalion commander’s concerns and the staff’s recommendations, the battalion requested to leave an entire company team augmented with elements of the forward-support company and specific elements of the battalion tactical command post. In all, the battalion recommended that USD-N and USF-I leave 100 soldiers behind at COB Speicher. The battalion and selected company – Company A, 1-5 Cavalry – began preparing for two contingencies. First, as initially planned, the company and TAC would move by ground to Kuwait if the decision was made that they were not needed at COB Speicher. Second, if USF- I decided that abridging force was needed until OSC-I was operationally capable, the forces remaining would break their vehicles down and prepare all but the most essential equipment for shipment out ahead of the battalion main body’s departure. The aim of Option 2 was to keep the 100-soldier stay-behind element transportable by rotary wing and with less than six aircraft pallets of equipment and baggage. Forty-eight hours before the planned departure, OSC-I still had not received authorization for the SETs’ weapons from the Iraqi memorandum of instruction. Thus, USF-I ordered Option 2, and the battalion worked into the night reconfiguring serials and preparing vehicles and equipment for shipment. The following morning, the TAC and A/1- 5 began preparing to execute this contingency mission. The TAC met with OSC- I personnel, and the A/1-5 commander met with the security-contractor supervisor. At both levels, we began assessing the specific problem set and developing away forward. We chose to co-locate our TAC and company command post within the OSC-I headquarters. Twenty-four hours before our battalion’s departure, the outer-perimeter security would transition from U. S. forces to the Iraqi army. This transition was complicated by the fact that the IAF ran and owned the base and entry-control point, but the actual perimeter would be secured by an Iraqi army battalion brought in from elsewhere in the province. Our battalion’s STT chief took on this challenge and personally worked to ensure occupation of the outer perimeter and then to ease friction between the Iraqi army ground force and IAF base commanders. Maintenance of the perimeter was vital, as it prevented looting and destruction of IAF equipment and infrastructure that had reportedly occurred on other installations at U. S. forces’ departure. Also, it created the Amber Zone contractually required for the SATs to continue their work training and advising the

IAF.

We task-organized the company. One platoon served as the quick-reaction force and security escort from the inner perimeter to the Iraqi ECP. Another platoon executed security escort of blackwater trucks from the Green Zone to a blackwater pond seven times daily. Another platoon escorted and secured the SAT of instructor pilots, aircraft maintainers and air-traffic-control advisers from the Green Zone to three locations within the Amber Zone. Our company headquarters manned our company CP, where we battle-tracked unit movements and personnel locations. Our maintenance Soldiers worked to make and keep the fleet of OSC-I unarmored sport utility vehicles operational. As most of our battalion departed COB Speicher for Kuwait, the security contrac-Red Zone (Unrestricted access) Amber Zone (Secured by Iraqi Security Forces) Green Zone (Secured by U. S. contractors) Legend Training zone Entry-control point Figure 1. Depiction of zones. 38 tor raised new concerns over the acceptability of UASs. As we discovered, the contract between the U. S. government and security contractor had specific requirements for the vehicles the government was contracted to provide. There were some obvious requirements like serviceable ballistic armor, but some requirements were a bit of a surprise. For example, the vehicles had to be a 2007 or newer model and had to be diesel-powered. Word that the security contractors were refusing the vehicles spread to the SATs, culminating in their refusal to depart the Green Zone, thus stopping all training for IAF pilots. This uneasiness on the SATs’ part peaked the day before the departure of our battalion, along with all our vehicles and equipment. It could have delayed training considerably, but the 1-5 commander, A/1-5 commander and OSC-I officer in charge briefed the SATs on the concept for security the following day. The SATs found this concept agreeable, and we began our first set of security-escort missions the next day. During the next several days, 1-5 Cavalry secured the SATs, escorted basic life-support personnel and manned the QRF. At battalion level, the TAC continued to work with OSC-I to build capacity with mission-command systems, introducing OSC-I personnel to a few key local Iraqi leaders and arbitrating between the Iraqi army and IAF to preserve the Amber Zone. After seven days of executing this mission set, the security contractors’ weapons and weapons cards arrived. The only point of contention remaining was the UASs’ acceptability. During this time, the U. S. government’s contracting agency at Rock Island, IL, negotiated with the security contracting firm’s corporate office in London and worked toward resolution. Concessions were ultimately made on both sides. The only questionable issue remaining was the UASs’ mechanical state. The entire fleet was in fair condition upon receipt at COB Speicher and, without a maintenance contract in place to fix issues like brakes that needed adjustments and doors that would not open, we reached another impasse. To fill this gap, our company’s combat-recovery team mechanics went to work making repairs and controlled substitutions, bringing 11 UASs to mission-capable status. Together with the five UASs the contractors initially accepted, they could now assume their role as SETs. With the final hurdle behind us, we began a deliberate relief in place. At the company level we transitioned our equipment as well as the standard operating procedures and tactics, techniques and procedures we had developed over the 10-day period. The company headquarters and battalion TAC continued to coach OSC-I operations-center personnel. We conducted one day of operations where we led with their key leaders riding along in our patrols. Then we conducted one day with them in the lead and our key leaders riding along. On the third and final day, we remained in tactical overwatch from the operations center for a full day before beginning preparation for movement. Each night we conducted nightly after-action reviews with OSC-I and the security contractors, addressing shortfalls like training on some of the communications equipment we transferred to OSC-I. With the mission complete, we closed out our living areas and CPs, boarded two sets of CH-47s, and flew to Baghdad and eventually to Kuwait, where we rejoined our battalion main body. TAC’s role After our initial analysis, it became apparent that this mission would grow beyond “guys with guns.” The battalion staff conducted detailed mission analysis to best determine in what other areas or efforts OSC-I may need assistance. We decided it would be best for the company commander to focus solely on securing the various contractors on COB Speicher. We decided to develop a task-organized TAC, complete with the battalion commander and a STT commander. This approach provided much needed organizational capacity as the problem set evolved. The TAC interfaced directly with OSC-I headquarters, relieving the company of reporting requirements and direct interaction with OSC-I, allowing the unit to focus solely on the security mission. The TAC also assisted OSC-I with the development of mission-command systems and SOPs. For example, TAC personnel trained the OSC-I base-defense operations-cell personnel on patrol-tracking and battle drills. Also, we decided to include the battalion’s physician assistant in the TAC to assist in developing the OSC-I medical-evacuation SOP and mass-casualty plan. OSC-I required this assistance from 1-5 Cavalry because they were manned for an enduring mission and not properly staffed with the additional personnel it would take to make the site operational. Eight staff members essentially replaced a garrison headquarters with its administrative, life-support and base-defense functions. They also replaced a maneuver-battalion headquarters with two attached STTs that operated in the area and maintained key relationships. The enormous daily requirements of simply operating the OSC-I footprint for 1,400 personnel overwhelmed the OSC-I staff and prevented the development and implementation of enduring solutions. They were, in essence, stuck in the close fight and could not focus on the mid- to deep fight. Soldiers from HHC- 1-5 CAV stage vehicles prior to departure from COB Speicher, Iraq for Kuwait. (Photo by 1-5 CAV PAO) 39

Two significant shortcomings hamstrung the OSC-I team’s efforts from inception. First, the entire OSC-I team was not assembled in time to develop cohesion prior to the COB Speicher transition. In fact, the entire team was not in place until after 1-5 Cavalry had left for Kuwait. Obviously, having this team in place well in advance of the transition, perhaps even allowing them to go through initial training together, would have helped immensely. As it was, they were trying to build a team while “in contact.” Secondly, the OSC-I staff had no U. S. Army personnel. While this would not be an enduring requirement, inclusion of Army staff during the period leading up to and through the transition would have greatly facilitated the relief of 1-5 Cavalry. The few team members on hand were either U. S. Air Force officers or civilian contractors. Consequently, communication was difficult, as we often did not know the right questions to ask of each other, let alone the answers to those questions. Deliberate transition Having lived and operated from COB Speicher for the previous six months, it would have been easy to understate how different the new mission and operating environment would be with the departure of all other maneuver forces. To limit potential oversights, we conducted a whiteboard session at the company level to discuss the ways our mission and the operating environment had changed, as well as how our different set of vehicles and equipment would affect the way forward. From a mission perspective, our role changed from a full-spectrum force to one narrowly focused on the security of the SATs and immediate security threats to the Green Zone. For six months, the company team conducted platoon-sized operations in and around Tikrit. The operations allowed Soldiers to close in on and destroy threats with precision and good judgment. There were no areas we felt we could not quickly dominate. In contrast, our new mission set was to secure the SATs and nothing more. No further action to gain ground, or to protect property or other personnel, could jeopardize the SATs’ security. Given the limitation of our new vehicle platforms and almost non-existence of enablers, we needed to rework our battle drills to ensure we did not overcommit our forces and jeopardize the safety of those in our charge. While the platoons worked to develop SOPs and TTPs to fight, survive and recover from the turret-less UAS, the company and TAC worked to develop criteria for our eventual release to Kuwait. We realized we needed to define the exact composition of a patrol to accomplish the mission in this new operating environment. This gave us away to communicate capacity to OSC-I and served as a control measure to ensure each element outside the Green Zone had an acceptable baseline of capability. We settled on eight personnel with two UASs. We required each patrol to have redundant communications, a mix of squad organic weapons and a minimum medical and recovery capability. Then we defined some organizational conditions that had to be in place before a patrol departed the Green Zone. First, we dedicated a 15-man, three-UAS QRF with a 10-minute response requirement. We established a redundant communications network using OSC-I’s very-high-frequency radios, backed up with our tactical line-of-sight and satellite-based communications. For emergencies, we outfitted each patrol with red-star clusters and briefed the tower guards on this emergency signal. To battle-track our forces, we reverted to analog means and developed overlays complete with routes and checkpoints that each patrol reported while in the Amber Zone. Finally, we developed a set of return-to-base criteria, including contingencies like the QRF’s committal, contact in the Amber Zone, loss of communications and others. Key relationships The relationships we built with key OSC-I and contractor leads allowed candid discussion of issues and mediation between parties critical to getting the site operational. As in most instances, the relationships we build and maintain can be instrumental to our success. This is particularly true where one organization has no formal authority over another. Once leaders acknowledged the importance of relationships, the next step was to determine which relationships to focus effort, time and resources on. The key personnel we identified were OSC-I’s contracting-officer representative, the security-contractor lead and the force-protection officer. The COR’s importance cannot be overstated. With the sheer number of contracts a mission like this requires, it is important that a unit gauges the person’s level SGT Orlando Candelaria converses with a SET prior to a mission brief on COB Speicher, Iraq. (Photo by 1-5 Cav PAO) 40 of involvement and provides assistance if needed. Developing a relationship with the COR to allow candid discussion is key. If this person is anew COR, it is important to impress upon them how powerful intimate familiarity of the contracts can be. We needed the COR to know all the details of the contracts. If the COR conducts a detailed review of his contracts, he can identify shortfalls and make early moves to amend reducing or preventing negative mission impact. In our case, the COR was overwhelmed with his other duties and thereby had limited understanding of the scores of contracts he oversaw. This misunderstanding created delays, obstacles and induced false assumptions. The details of the security contract requiring OSC-I to provide UASs to the security contractor with specific capabilities were unknown until identified by the SETs themselves. Had the COR known the vehicle fleet did not meet the specifics of the contracts, he could have worked a remedy and avoided a delay of the mission. The force-protection officer also served a broader role encompassing the duties of an operations officer. This person worked the day-to-day requirements of our patrols and eventually the patrols for the security contractor in accordance with the OSC-I OIC’s priorities. This person was also integral to the installation of all the force-protection enablers at the ECPs and on and around the perimeter. Another key personality was the security-contractor lead. Our security-contract lead was a retired British army captain working his first private-security contract job. We found him to be knowledgeable and professional. He had the most experience with security issues within the OSC-I organization and had more than 300 personnel under his supervision. This person was ultimately with whom company headquarters coordinated most closely and eventually conducted its RIP. Developing a relationship allowed for candid conversation to determine points of friction between the security contractor and OSC-I. With this relationship established, we were also able to provide assessments of the security contractor’s scheme of maneuver to secure the SATs and contingency plans in both the Green and Amber Zone. Through this relationship and candor, we developed an understanding of contractor issues like their unwillingness to accept the UAS as delivered. We initially thought they were just being picky until they explained how the types of vehicles were also specified in the insurance policy that protected their firm. Unlike the U. S. government, security contractors are not protected under sovereign domain and can be sued by their employees or protectees for negligence. Key lessons-learned The transition from U. S. military forces to OSC-I and DoS was ultimately successful. However, as a result of this challenging non-standard mission, many lessons-learned emerged that could assist similar transitions in the future. Some of these lessons are: Focus on what needs to be done as part of the transition and then task-organize accordingly. Any battalion tasked to conduct or support a transition of this kind should be prepared to conduct detailed mission analysis to determine exact requirements for success. Only then can the commander decide which capabilities he will require. The inclusion of a TAC in an operation such as this builds more capacity and enables security elements to focus solely on their task at hand. An important part of the transition is learning about partner organizations. Units need to be prepared to educate the relieving agency on Army systems and methodologies to help them ask the right questions of the right people. This is a two-way street. The military unit should also spend some time learning how the non-DoD agency is organized. Some mentoring may be required to help the agency design and manage systems as the organization forms and undergoes the daunting tasks of establishing SOPs. Military planners must understand there will be no one-for-one personnel RIP with anon-DoD agency and thus the RIP will not follow traditional models. Instead, the planners should focus on the endstate of what a person or system does and attempt to best determine how it will apply to the new agency. Be deliberate in assistance to reduce the disruption upon eventual departure. We deliberately decided to assist OSC-I Tikrit with one-time tasks as opposed to enduring tasks. We choose to assume and complete one-time tasks like cataloguing and consolidating the vast non-tactical vehicle fleet they inherited in an effort to allow them to focus on developing their long-term systems. This got them out of the knife fight. In the short term, it would have been easier for us to have kept our mine-resistant, ambush-protected vehicles and used our systems and equipment. However, it would have made the eventual transition for OSC-I more difficult. In our case, we went to painstaking lengths to use as much of OSC-I’s equipment and as many of their systems as possible. This proved beneficial to their organization’s enduring success, as it proved their equipment and exercised their systems. This provided an opportunity for unbiased feedback and joint problem-solving as needed. An example of this was our identification of their lack of redundant communications. To remedy this issue, we transferred several line-of-sight and satellite-based systems to OSC-I, and provided training to OSC-I and the security contractors. Deliberately forecast and constantly reassess the changing mission and operating environment before, during and after the transition. A unit preparing for this type of mission needs to conduct its own assessment of the mission and operating environment, and validate their systems, SOPs and redlines. Determining and projecting these changes allows the unit to be proactive and agile. Identify the key personnel within the other organization. With the key role the COR plays in the mission’s success, it is important a competent person is assigned and ideally dedicated to this task. This should be one of the first people brought onto a team and brought forward to the site well in advance of the transition. A unit should do as much as possible to enable this person’s success and allow them to focus on their job. Build and maintain relationships with key personnel. We learned most of the contracts had explicit and implicit freedom of maneuver built in for both parties. For example, the security contractor agreed to escort blackwater trucks in lieu of one SAT, though not contracted to perform this function. Since this task did not require more manpower and was no more risky than their contracted mission, they were able to meet this request. The willingness of the contract lead and COR to make use of this freedom of maneuver is directly correlated to the strength of the relationship. Conclusion Nearly two weeks after the mission began, 1-5 Cavalry had conducted more than 100 security-escort patrols into the newly designated Amber Zone and had successfully assisted OSC-I Tikrit to achieve an initial operational capability by helping develop several systems, conducting a deliberate transition to anon-traditional mission and building relationships with OSC- I staff, contractors and Iraqis alike. The original mission’s scope was to simply provide “guys with guns” who would secure the OSC-I trainers as they conducted their mission in the Amber Zone. However, it became clear – even before the departure of USD-N headquarters – that an 41 element of battalion-level leadership, in the form of a TAC specifically designed to provide certain capabilities, would be required to complete the transition. In the end, we assisted OSC-I with tactical patrol planning and tracking, medical evacuation and treatment planning, contractor support, key Iraqi leader engagements and even intelligence collection. While this transition was ultimately successful, it came at a cost in organizational energy, manpower commitment and money. By applying these lessons-learned, our hope is that tactical-level units that must transition a mission to anon-DoD agency will be better prepared to be successful. If the “whole of government” approach is one to which the United States will truly subscribe, we must improve our interagency cooperation at the national-agency level. Until then, the people on the ground from all agencies must solve any challenges that arise in an effort to accomplish our national goals. LTC Barry “Chip” Daniels is division G-3 for 1st Cavalry Division, Fort Hood, TX. Previous assignments include command of 1st Battalion, 5th Cavalry Regiment, Fort Hood, TX; aide to the III Corps commanding general, Fort Hood; S-3 operations officer and executive officer, 1-5 Cavalry; S-3 operations officer, 2nd Brigade Special Troops Battalion; assistant professor, U. S. Military Academy; Headquarters and Headquarters Company and tank company commander, 1st Battalion, 66th Armor; and troop XO and scout and tank platoon leader, 1st Squadron, 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment. His military education includes Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, KS; Combined COB – contingency operating base COR – contracting-officer representative CP – control point DoD – Department of Defense DoS – Department of State ECP – entry-control point IAF – Iraqi Air Force ISF – Iraqi Security Forces Arms Services Staff School, Fort Leavenworth; Armor Officer Advanced Course, Fort Knox, KY; Ranger School, Fort Benning, GA; Scout Platoon Leader Course, Fort Knox; and Armor Officer Basic Course, Fort Knox. He holds a bachelor’s of science degree in management from Virginia Tech and a master’sin business administration from Duke University. CPT James Vance commands Company A, 1-5 Cavalry. His previous assignments include commander, Company C, 1st Battalion, 50th Infantry Regiment, Fort Benning, GA; and rifle and weapons platoon leader, 2nd Battalion, 27th Infantry Regiment, Schofield Barracks, HI. His military education includes the Maneuver Captains Career Course, Fort Benning. He holds bachelor’s of business administration and bachelor’s of arts degrees in finance and economics from Texas Tech University. Acronym Quick-Scan OIC – officer in charge OSC-I – Office of Security Cooperation-Iraq QRF – quick-reaction force RIP – relief in place SAT – security-assistance team SET – security-escort team SOP – standard operating procedure STT – stability transition team TAC – tactical command post TTP – tactics, techniques and procedures UAS – unarmored sport utility vehicle USD-N – U. S. Division-North USF-I – U. S. Forces-Iraq XO – executive officer Manuscript deadlines 2012-2013 Edition Suspense for manuscripts September-October 2012 July 2 November-December 2012 Sept. 7 January-March 2013 Oct. 25 April-June 2013 To be determined 42