Protection Vs. Agility: Which Is Better for Full-Spectrum Operations?

U. S. Army armored forces stormed over the southern border of Iraq in March 2003 for the second time in 20 years. Company teams, comprised of Abrams tanks, Bradley fighting vehicles and Apache helicopters in support, led the northbound “shock and awe” assault. More ground forces followed closely behind in unarmored humvees – many of them with the doors removed and the passengers riding sideways in their seats with weapons oriented out the doorframe. The only armor protecting Soldiers was relatively lightweight flak vests, primarily useful for stopping shrapnel, not bullets. They trained for years for this moment. Throughout countless gunneries, unit-Protection vs. Agility: Which is Better for Full-Spectrum Operations? by 1LT Kaleb S. Blankenship run field-training exercises and combat-training center rotations, the Army of 2003 was a highly maneuverable force that was unquestionably trained to conduct high-intensity conflict operations. Simply put, it was an agile and aggressive combined-arms force focused on assaulting objectives and maintaining the initiative with an unmatched ability to fire and maneuver to close in and destroy the enemy in close combat. Can we say this of the Army’s armored force of 2012? For many troops leaving Iraq the last few years, I believe the answer is no. The emphasis on protection at the expense of agility and detection assets has degraded our decisive overmatch and maneuver platoons’ ability to execute battle drills better than the enemy and dominate the battlefield. The state of the battlefield in Iraq, coupled with the equipment provided to maneuver platoons, forces Soldiers and junior leaders to sacrifice agility and assume a more reactive, rather than proactive, posture. This reactivity and lack of agility inherently surrenders the initiative to the enemy. Due to the political impacts of casualties, we traded the unarmored, extremely maneuverable humvee for heavy, cumbersome mine-resistant, ambush-protected vehicles. We added armored plates around our gunners and forced them to sit inside the turret, limiting their ability to detect, identify and track the enemy and destroy targets. We also traded our light flak vests for much heavier improved outer tactical vests, complete with four armored plates. The improvements in armor and protection not only save lives, but they also force reactive, not proactive, tendencies into our operations. We sacrificed the ability to move with relation to the enemy, thus losing the initiative. Worst of all, we are sending anew message to a whole generation of Soldiers – it’s better to be safe than maintain the initiative. The strength of our Army does not solely lie in our superior protection and equipment, but in the initiative and offensive spirit of our Soldiers and leaders. Although we want it all, the priority must focus on sustaining and developing the initiative of the Soldier, as that is what really separates our Army from all others. I’m not arguing that any senior Army leader is purposely sending the message to our troops that force protection is primary above all else. On the contrary, every commander with whom I have spoken has insisted we maintain the initiative and stay aggressive. However, actions speak louder than words. Our ability to seize and hold the initiative has been significantly degraded. It no longer guarantees we will have decisive overmatch against the enemy at the platoon and squad level in the current operating environment. Resources provided to fight the enemy on the given urban terrain and among the population pose significant tactical and leadership challenges to conducting complex and aggressive operations. At the heart of the tactical challenge is a lack of maneuverability. While mounted in MRAPs, patrolling the same stretch of road for countless hours in northern Iraq to secure supply routes for logistics patrols, an infinite number of possible enemy observation posts and ambush locations surrounded us. Due to poor resources, we could only conduct mounted maneuver effectively if the enemy location was next to an improved lateral route trafficable by MRAP – we lacked proper agility to gain the initiative in the event of an attack. This forced us to abide by constrained fire-control measures due to the urban population and eliminated our ability to use reconnaissance by fire as an alternative. Our best hope was to detect the enemy running away with no cover and be able to engage him with our crew-served weapons. We also lacked the agility needed to pursue the enemy, regain the initiative and destroy him in close combat. The threat of a sustained small-arms attack in our area of operations was virtually zero. If that were to happen, we were certainly capable and confident in our ability to gain fire superiority and destroy the threat. If the enemy were to attack then retrograde into a building, undoubtedly we would have been able to establish an effective support by fire, isolate and clear the objective, as any combat-ready maneuver platoon would be able to do. The enemy knew this, so his most likely courses of action were to either hastily emplace an improvised explosive device comprised of nearly ineffective homemade explosives detonated by a command wire from a relatively safe distance (150- 300 meters from the road) or fire a couple of well-aimed rounds at us before quickly driving away. Occasionally we were provided with intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance assets such as air weapons teams or scout weapons teams that significantly increased our ability to detect and track the enemy, as we were limited with the lack of detection sights with the MRAP. However, this resource was rarely available. Other ISR assets, such as unmanned aerial vehicles, were controlled at the battalion or brigade level and often only pushed to platoon level after the platoon had made contact. Without these additional assets, it was extremely difficult, if not impossible, for us to detect, identify and track the source of the threat and fix the enemy. Even if we did, our ability to close in and destroy it was limited with the MRAP and its inability to conduct cross-mobility maneuver. Our lack of mounted maneuverability off the main supply route limited our ability to pursue any suspected enemy. Our dismounted capability was not much better. Although I had some very motivated Soldiers who desired nothing more than to do their job and engage the enemy, by the time the ramp lowered on the MRAP and we were able to begin maneuvering over the sandy terrain toward the threat, it was long gone. The head start the enemy had by maintaining a standoff distance of at least 150 meters, coupled with degraded rate of movement caused by our heavy armored vests, made it very improbable that we would be successful in our attempt to gain contact and execute any form of Battle Drill 1A on him. We were not equipped with any sort of forward-looking infrared or long-range advanced scout surveillance systems that increased our ability to detect, identify and track targets or threats prior to entering contact. The advancements in equipment the Army has made during the last eight years of conflict focused primarily on our protection and ability to sustain an attack. They did nothing to increase our ability to proactively locate threats and neutralize them before they successfully conducted a hasty attack on us. Many strides have been made to increase protection for our Soldiers at the sacrifice of our agility and mobility. All our resources were designed to protect the Soldier after an attack. The enemy followed effective tactics, techniques and procedures that exploited our weaknesses and allowed him to escape without detection nearly every time. I would have preferred equipment that would allow us to be more proactive and agile, such as a remote weapon system equipped with a FLIR or thermal-imaging system mounted atop a vehicle that provided the mobility to pursue the enemy. Many attacks were preventable had we been equipped with systems that allowed us to detect, identify and track the enemy, thus allowing us to assault identified threats prior to being engaged. Using a more maneuverable vehicle would have allowed the necessary agility required to regain the initiative in the event the enemy was successful in conducting an attack. It is safer to ensure ample mobility for our Soldiers to allow them to successfully conduct their doctrinal warrior tasks and battle drills even though it could create potential loss of protection. The particular style of fighting that most U. S. forces in forward theaters of operation are now executing brings with it leadership challenges which come from above and below. Commanders at all levels continually remind you to maintain an aggressive offensive posture, to maintain the initiative. The way this most readily manifested itself throughout our tour was scanning – from the time we left the wire to the time we returned, our turrets were constantly moving and our weapon systems lowered and ready to engage targets. Beyond this, however, there was little offensiveness in the nature of our platoon-level operations. You are essentially conducting a movement-to-contact on each patrol without more detailed intelligence of the enemy or a great ability to detect and identify one. Although this is doctrinally an offensive operation, to the Soldier on the 27 ground conducting it in the Iraqi theater, it felt wholly defensive because it usually resulted in reacting to contact. We were rarely able to detect the enemy prior to contact. We knew the enemy was near by hearing the sound of bullets flying by or observing an explosion in our patrol element – forcing us to react. Leadership challenges also come from below as Soldiers ask questions to clarify the confusing messages they are receiving. Operations above the platoon level, such as working with Iraqi Security Force partners to pressure violent extremist networks and preplanned force-protection operations throughout the operational environment were offensive. However, many Soldiers and junior leaders at the tactical level had difficulty seeing this. How can we be on the offense when we lack the mobility and agility needed to gain or maintain the initiative against this specific enemy and his TTPs? During my mission briefs, I stressed the importance of being aggressive, taking the fight to the enemy and staying on the offense. I constantly articulated this message to both of my platoons. On multiple occasions I was asked, “Sir, how is this offensive in any way? It seems like we are just going out to get blown up. All we do is react to contact.” I did my best to explain our role in higher-level offensive operations, but the bottom line remained: We were conducting missions that felt very defensive to the Soldiers on the ground. It is difficult to convince Soldiers with little ability to detect the enemy prior to engagement or regain the initiative afterwards that they possess the initiative and are conducting an offensive operation. Soldiers want to keep the enemy on their heels – maintain the initiative – but they must be properly resourced and equipped to accomplish this. We now have a generation of Soldiers who have not experienced what it truly means to maneuver on the enemy, fix him with direct, indirect and aerial fires and assault through the objective. From their perspective, the Army has covered them and their vehicles with armor, forced them to be a primarily reactive force, yet demand they seize and hold the initiative. As we withdraw from Iraq and begin to refocus our training, we must be conscious of the messages we are sending our Soldiers – both verbally and non-verbally. We must be fully aware of the limitations our new equipment has put on our troops’ ability to gain and maintain the initiative, close in, destroy the enemy in close combat and manage our own expectations accordingly. Advancements made in equipment to improve protection were necessary for counterinsurgency operations in Iraq. However, they may not be best suited for maintaining a mobile, agile force capable of maintaining the initiative throughout the spectrum of operations. We’ve made a mistake by putting protection above mobility, agility and the ability to detect, identify and track as a parameter for new equipment, and thus are out of balance. Therefore, we must resource our squads and platoons with agile equipment that provides them decisive overmatch and allows them to accomplish their mission-essential tasks across the spectrum of operations and dominate the enemy on the battlefield. 1LT Kaleb Blankenship is a scout platoon leader with Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 1st Battalion, 5th Cavalry, 2nd Brigade Combat Team, 1st Cavalry Division, Fort Hood, TX, where he previously served as tank platoon leader with D Company. His military education includes Basic Officer Leader Course II, Fort Benning, GA; BOLC III (Armor Officer Basic Course) and the Army Reconnaissance Course, Fort Knox, KY. He holds a bachelor’s degree in political science from the U. S. Military Academy. BOLC – Basic Officer Leader Course FLIR – forward-looking infrared ISR – intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance MRAP – mine-resistant, ambush-protected TTPs – tactics, techniques and procedures Acronym Quick-Scan MCoE Libraries …the places where Soldiers go for information 24/7 wherever they are in the world. When visiting Fort Benning, please stop in at any of our library locations: ‰ ‰ Armor Research Library Bldg. 5205 (Harmony Church) ‰ ‰ Donovan Research Library Bldg. 70 (Main Post) For 24/7 access, visit http://www.benning.army.mil/library/ 28