2012 Reconnaissance Summit EXSUM

Active-duty and retired senior leaders from the Maneuver, Fires, Mission Command and Maneuver Support centers of excellence; current regiment, brigade, battalion and squadron commanders; and U.S. Marine Corps leaders focused on how our current reconnaissance organizations, leadership and training prepare our Army to perform required reconnaissance functions at the 2012 Reconnaissance Summit. More than 150 locations worldwide joined leaders at Fort Benning, GA, through Defense Connect On-line March 7-8 as the summit also focused on how organizations must perform in the future within the model of the Army 2020 strategic narrative. Ultimately, the 2012 Recon Summit showed that our Army continues to respond to the changing operating environment by developing expanded reconnaissance capabilities to enable decisive action anywhere in the world. Army 2020 strategic narrative This year’s summit opened with the Army Capabilities Integration Center’s COL Mark Elfendahl’s brief on the Army’s 2020 strategic narrative. The 2020 narrative is a vision for what our Army will look like and how it will function in 2020. This narrative fits within the Joint Operational Concept of Air-Sea Battle (written by the Navy and Air Force) and Gain and Maintain Operational Access (written by the Army and Marine Corps) to address how the Army will prevent, shape and win conflicts across 10 major mission sets. These mission sets range from projecting power against anti-access and area-denial campaigns to conducting humanitarian aid and disaster relief. To build these capabilities, the Army must maintain a high level of organizational adaptability and prepare for the probable, the possible and the unthinkable outcomes for a future world. Among the most notable aspects of the Army’s 2020 strategic narrative is the alignment of corps, divisions and brigades regionally, much as Special Forces groups currently align. Aligning units regionally will enhance these units’ access to their regions, focus their training and improve wartime responsiveness. In addition to the regional alignment of corps, divisions and brigades, the Army’s 2020 strategic narrative proposed the formation of theater-engagement groups as an enduring regional capability to engage foreign militaries for security cooperation. Elfendahl closed by asking questions about whether our Army needed any major organizational or doctrinal realignments, specifically at the corps and division level, and whether we still maintain the early-entry capabilities to follow initial-entry forces into an airhead or beachhead by conducting the reconnaissance and security operations necessary to build up combat power and maintain operational access. Hybrid threat Retired COL Tom Pappas from U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command G-2 illustrated a threat forecast for the future. Pappas described the hybrid threat as the most probable type of enemy our Army will face in the future. The hybrid threat has three main components:

• The threat will include nation-states or their proxies with a range of capabilities; Summary of 2012 Reconnaissance Summit by CPT Michael Patrick Stallings

• These nation-states will desire to preclude the United States from fighting on our own terms; and

• The threat will employ capabilities to create a “strategic lever” specifically designed to impact U.S. actions and decision-making. The hybrid threat will be a complex, rapidly changing, competitive, adaptive, decentralized and opportunistic enemy capable of overmatching U.S. capabilities at the small-unit level. One of the hybrid threat’s challenges lies within a unit’s capability to find and fuse information on multiple networked actors. Although independent, these actors will share a common goal of affecting U.S. access into the area. An example would be a threat where political leadership, theocratic cadre, regular armed forces, national police forces, space and missile forces, special forces, paramilitary forces and criminal elements act independently but have mutual interests counter to the United States’ interests. This type of threat will challenge units’ recon and analysis capabilities as they strive to get inside the actors’ decision cycles. The challenge will arise from the fact that the enemy will not be hierarchical and that each actor will have a unique decision cycle. This results in multiple decision cycles among the networked elements. Also, Pappas anticipated that many of our strategic-reconnaissance assets focusing on identifying and tracking weapons of mass destruction will require robust reconnaissance capabilities at corps level and below. Priority information requirements After the threat brief, retired COL Clinton J. Ancker III, director of the Combined Arms Directorate, spoke about answering corps and division priority information requirements to frame discussions about recommended force-design updates for reconnaissance and surveillance brigades. One of the standing corps’ PIRs is to identify the size, composition and disposition of the uncommitted enemy operational reserve within the corps’ deep area. This operational-level reserve traditionally maintains the capability to defeat a division (the corps’ decisive operation). In strictly combined-arms maneuver operations, the corps reconnaissance assets must be able to look into a physical deep area at great depth to find and fuse information about the enemy operational reserve. In strictly wide-area-security operations, the enemy operational reserve consists of several networked organizations across multiple division boundaries. In this scenario, the corps’ deep area consists of the actual networks, which span across division boundaries; a corps reconnaissance asset must be capable of finding and fusing information about networks across division boundaries. Similarly, the division PIR focuses on identifying the size, composition and disposition of the uncommitted enemy tactical reserve capable of defeating a friendly brigade (the division decisive operation). In a combined-arms maneuver scenario, these forces would be at a much more limited depth than the operational reserve. The limited depth and lower combat power of the tactical reserve favors using conventional ground reconnaissance assets, Army aviation and tactical unmanned aerial system. In a 20 July-August 2012 wide-area-security scenario, the enemy tactical reserve is within the networks that span across brigade boundaries; a division reconnaissance asset must be capable of finding and fusing information about networks across brigade boundaries. Ancker pointed out that the R&S brigade’s ground reconnaissance capabilities align closer to tactical-level (division) requirements. Under its current design, the R&S brigade has one recon squadron with two mounted recon troops and one long-range surveillance company. The R&S brigade must be able to fight for information or else it cannot develop the situation once it locates the enemy tactical reserve under any scenario. If the R&S brigade cannot develop the situation for the division, the division must deploy a brigade combat team to develop the situation. Deploying a BCT detracts from the division’s combat power and disrupts the division’s tempo. These two issues show that the R&S brigades struggle to find a niche as either a corps or division reconnaissance asset, even though the R&S brigade currently exists as the primary reconnaissance asset for both echelons. Force design BG Thomas James, the Armor School commandant, outlined an FDU to enhance the R&S brigade’s capabilities to conduct tactical reconnaissance for the division. The first change James outlined was to reorganize the military-intelligence battalion within the brigade to include tactical UAS. These UAS would give the R&S brigade the organic capability for pursuit and exploitation of threat forces. Next, adding 120mm mortar sections to the mounted reconnaissance troops would enable these troops the limited organic fires necessary to maintain freedom of maneuver against an enemy force and fight for information. The commandant also proposed to increase the mounted reconnaissance troops’ scout squads from four to six men to allow them to sustain observation posts. Also, he recommended adding a third mounted recon troop to the recon squadron to give it the combat power necessary to fight for information. Finally, James recommended that the Army consider a new ground reconnaissance vehicle to replace the M1151, as, among other reasons, the M1151 doesn’t have the mobility to navigate complex terrain. He suggested that an existing combat vehicle from current overseas contingency operations such as the mine-resistant, ambush-protected all-terrain vehicle could replace the M1151. After James’ proposals, a panel of three current and former R&S brigade commanders discussed the R&S brigade’s capabilities and limitations. The panel consisted of COL James Edwards, COL Xavier Brunson and COL Paul Norwood. During the panel, all three commanders noted the capabilities of the R&S brigade to see, understand and analyze information. However, they pointed out that the R&S brigade still requires external augmentation to fuse information effectively since it has no organic all-source collection element or analysis-control team. To deconflict assets whenever they were assigned their own battlespace, all three commanders noted that they had to augment their brigade staffs with a fires section, civil-affairs section, military-police section and public-affairs section. However, they developed the capability to fix and finish enemy forces by handing off targets to close air support, and they achieved significant economy of force by doing so. The panel highlighted the R&S brigade’s capabilities to screen by providing early warning for a headquarters using technical platforms and emplacing their LRS assets. The commanders noted they didn’t have the operational reach necessary for ground reconnaissance in a combined-arms maneuver scenario. Even with James’ proposed FDU, the panel determined they wouldn’t have the capabilities to achieve the operational reach required to answer corps PIR and recommended the use of special reconnaissance to answer those PIRs. Despite this gap in the R&S brigade’s capabilities, the commanders affirmed their capability to answer other PIRs relating to the enemy’s tactical reserve in both combined-arms maneuver and wide-area-security scenarios. Stryker BCTs LTC Sean O’Neal, commander of 2nd Squadron, 3rd Cavalry Regiment, proposed modifying three Stryker BCTs into a corps-level reconnaissance element and early-entry force. He highlighted the SBCT’s capability for rapid deployment across the globe and the cavalry regiment’s legacy to develop the situation through action, or fight for information. He also proposed to align three SBCTs with regional combatant commands to follow initial-entry forces and provide early-entry reconnaissance and security capabilities for the COCOM from an airhead or beachhead. O’Neal recommended modifying the three infantry battalions within these specially designated SBCTs into recon and security battalions. This would be accomplished by absorbing the Soldiers from the Stryker reconnaissance, surveillance and target-acquisition squadron into the recon and security battalions. Also, O’Neal recommended maintaining a support battalion, fires battalion, separate companies and special-troops battalion, with the potential to add an aviation battalion and increase the engineer battalion’s capabilities within the SBCT. These early-entry brigades would maintain an enduring relationship with the COCOM, with at least one recon and security battalion ready to conduct early entry and follow initial-entry forces on short notice. More recon and security battalions could follow the ready recon and security battalion from the brigade to satisfy the COCOM commander’s requirements for reconnaissance and security based on the threat. These battalions would have the organic capabilities to fight for information, conduct security operations and answer the division, corps or joint task force commander’s PIRs. Further, this organization would allow the Army to continue using the BCT as the modular force of choice and preserve combat power for follow-on operations. After concluding early-entry operations, this organization would be able to conduct reconnaissance operations to find and fix the enemy across brigade and division boundaries and in between non-contiguous areas of operation between divisions. With the addition of assets or with the R&S brigades, this organization would have a robust capability to find, fuse and fix the enemy and enable BCTs to finish them. Breakout groups Attendees focused March 8 on analyzing reconnaissance capabilities at BCT and below. They broke out into three groups to discuss the armored BCT (which recently replaced the heavy BCT), SBCT and infantry BCT. Each breakout group watched a Virtual Battlespace 2 vignette as a primer for their discussion on each organization. At the conclusion of the breakout sessions, the groups came together to brief their analysis and conclusions to the MCoE commanding general, MG Robert Brown. SBCT breakout group. The SBCT breakout group identified personnel shortfalls within the RSTA squadron, doctrinal employment issues and several best practices from leaders across the Army. The most resounding shortfall within the RSTA squadron is a personnel shortage within the reconnaissance platoons resulting from the movement of all 35Ms (human-intelligence July-August 2012 21 specialists) from the RSTA squadrons to the brigade military-intelligence company. The commanders agreed they need at least 27-man platoons to effectively and safely employ dismounted elements, and that brigades are currently transferring infantrymen from the maneuver battalions to the RSTA squadron to make up the difference. Also, serving commanders advised against using RSTA squadrons as battlespace-owning units in wide-area-security missions. They assessed the RSTA’s optimal employment as units that operate across the entire brigade’s AO to develop the enemy situation and target networks that span beyond battalion boundaries. Such an employment of RSTA squadrons requires a cultural shift in battlespace-owning units to allow the RSTA squadron freedom to maneuver throughout the brigade’s AO. Likewise, the RSTA squadron commanders in the group highlighted the effectiveness of institutional scout-training programs. These programs train scouts throughout the brigade from private through captain. They also highlighted successes they had with pulling the scout platoons from the maneuver battalions for home-station training to establish positive relationships and enable effective reconnaissance pull and reconnaissance handoffs during combined-arms maneuver. After the recon handoff, the maneuver battalions controlled the RSTA’s reconnaissance troops with great success. ABCT breakout group. The ABCT breakout group also emphasized the benefits of tying in recon platoons from the maneuver battalions to the armored recon squadron. They recommended several organizational and task-organization changes, and advised against the M1151 as a reconnaissance platform. The ABCT breakout group seconded the SBCT group’s recommendation that pairing up the maneuver battalions’ recon platoons with the ARS during home-station training allowed a smooth recon pull during operations. Also, this breakout group recommended task-organizing a tank company to the ARS to give it the combat power to maintain freedom of maneuver and enhance its capabilities to breach. Further, moving the chemical recon platoon to the ARS would consolidate the BCT’s recon assets and mirror the SBCT RSTA squadron’s organization. The ABCT breakout group also highlighted the necessity of an S-3 engineer on the squadron staff as an expert for employing engineer assets and assessing requirements. Finally, the breakout group echoed the R&S brigade FDU conclusions. A different combat vehicle with better survivability and mobility to replace the M1151 is necessary for combined-arms maneuver and wide-area-security missions. IBCT breakout group. The IBCT breakout group identified an organizational requirement to add a third platoon to the dismounted recon troop within the IBCT recon squadron as well as a requirement to train all three troops as mounted and dismounted forces. This group also highlighted the need to receive and employ enablers (particularly lift assets) to optimize reconnaissance capabilities within the IBCT recon squadron. The three breakout groups emphasized the importance of the professionalization, but not the specialization, of the recon Soldier. This professionalization includes the formal incorporation of the Reconnaissance and Surveillance Leader’s Course, Army Reconnaissance Course, Cavalry Leader’s Course and Ranger School into the noncommissioned officer and officer career paths for reconnaissance Soldiers. Also, the groups pointed out that incorporation of military-intelligence assets and analysis into reconnaissance and security operations would improve existing reconnaissance formations’ capabilities throughout the Army. Finally, continuing to ensure that reconnaissance and security operations Soldiers are trained in Basic Officer Leader Courses, Maneuver Captain Career Course and Intermediate Level Education would standardize the professionalization of the reconnaissance Soldier in all types of units. The summit concluded with a presentation of its conclusions to GEN Robert Cone, TRADOC’s commanding general, who received the conclusions and recommendations of the attendees enthusiastically. CPT Michael Stallings is the troop commander, Headquarters and Headquarters Troop, 6th Battalion, 1st Cavalry, 1st SBCT, 1st Armored Division, Fort Hood, TX. His previous assignments include assistant S-3, 2-16 Cavalry, 316th Cavalry Brigade, Fort Benning, GA; battalion S-4, Headquarters, 3-8 Cavalry, 1st Cavalry Division, Mosul, Iraq, and Fort Hood; troop executive officer, HHT, 3rd Heavy Brigade Combat Team, 1st Cavalry Division, Mosul and Fort Hood; and armored reconnaissance platoon leader, C Troop, 6-9 Cavalry, Muqdadiyah, Iraq, and Fort Hood. His military education includes the Maneuver Captains Career Course, Armor Officer’s Basic Course and the Cavalry Leader’s Course. CPT Stallings received a bachelor’s of science degree in mathematics from the U.S. Military Academy, West Point, NY. His awards include two Bronze Star medals, a Meritorious Service Medal and an Army Commendation Medal for valor. ABCT – armored brigade combat team AO – area of operation ARS – armored reconnaissance squadron BCT – brigade combat team COCOM – combatant command FDU – force-design update HHT – headquarters and headquarters troop IBCT – infantry brigade combat team LRS – long-range surveillance MCoE – Maneuver Center of Excellence PIR – priority information requirement Acronym Quick-Scan R&S – reconnaissance and surveillance RSTA – reconnaissance, surveillance and target acquisition SBCT – Stryker brigade combat team TRADOC – (U.S. Army) Training and Doctrine Command UAS – unmanned aerial system 22 July-August 2012