GEN Der Panzertruppen Lutz – a Master Mentor retired BG Raymond Bell

heavy artillery.2 Nevertheless, it did not prohibit members of the Truppenamt, the successor organization to the German General Staff, from thinking about tanks and their possible employment in future warfare. At first, the vehicle for experimenting with mobile-warfare concepts was the mundane car or truck. It was with such rudimentary means that Guderian became involved in mobile operations. However, he had to get to motor-vehicle-mounted combat first. Guderian’s first opportunity came in 1922 when the chief of motor transport troops, COL Erich von Tschischwitz, requested the assignment of a German General Staff-educated officer to his staff.3 The assignment’s purpose was to enable von Tschischwitz to expand the role of motorized formations from a logistics to a combat role. Von Tschischwitz saw the potential in moving a mobile operational reserve more quickly about the battlefield by motor transport rather than by horse or rail, and he felt that the flexibility motor vehicles had filled that requirement. To exploit the potential, von Tschischwitz turned to Guderian, who had been studying the concept of motorized combat formations. (Editor’s note: Guderian, who was fluent in English and French, had been studying the works of British maneuver-warfare theorists J. F. C. Fuller and B. H. Liddell Hart, and the writings of then-obscure Charles de Gaulle. He translated these works into German. In 1931, when he became chief of staff to the Inspectorate of Motorized Troops under Lutz, he wrote many papers on mechanized warfare based on extensive wargaming without troops, with paper tanks and then armored vehicles. Later, when Britain was experimenting with tanks under MG Percy Hobart, Guderian kept abreast of Hobart’s writings and, at his own expense, had someone translate the articles being published in Britain.) During the early 1920s, Guderian taught military history and tactics to officers of the motor transport corps in an official capacity.4 He also published articles in German military publications such as Mili-taer-Wochenblatt about mobile troops.5 In 1927, Guderian transferred to the transport section of the War Ministry, where he also continued instructing motor-transport officers on tank tactics. Strangely, however, although Guderian was gaining a reputation through teaching and wargaming, he had his first actual encounter in 1929 with armored fighting vehicles, the employment of which he was to become so well known. A trip to Sweden afforded him the opportunity to visit the second battalion of the Gota Guards, a Swedish tank battalion equipped with tanks based on a German model developed during World War I (but which never went into full-scale production).6 Enter Lutz Guderian’s promotion in the post-war Reichswehr was typical of many of the officers in the small 100,000-man German army. Although Guderian received encouragement in his work with mobile troops from individuals such as the editor of Militaer-Wochenblatt and von Armor leader profile: GEN Der Panzertruppen Oswald Lutz – a Master Mentor by retired BG Raymond E. Bell Jr. Mentors do not get much respect. Often they do not receive much recognition, especially those mentoring the famous. Take, for instance, the famous German armor general, Heinz Guderian, the reputed father of the World War II German mechanized-warfare establishment and the author of the books Achtung Panzer! and Panzer Leader. Armored troopers are very familiar with GEN der Panzertruppen Guderian, but how many have heard of GEN der Panzertruppen Oswald Lutz (1876-1944)? Yet I believe if not for Lutz, there may never have been a famous GEN Guderian. Lutz is known as the German general who oversaw the German army’s motorization in the late 1920s and early 1930s. He was appointed as the first General de Panzertruppen of the Wehrmacht in 1935. Prelude: motor vehicles There is hardly a book about the birth of German armor in German or English that does not extol Guderian’s virtues and accomplishments. History tells us, however, that Guderian did not start his military career as an armor or tank officer. Indeed, he joined his father’s infantry regiment as an officer cadet and spent World War I as a signal officer.1 He had no dealings with tanks in the war and, when it was over, he still lacked knowledge of armored fighting vehicles and their tactics as executed in the war, such as they were. The Treaty of Versailles, which ended World War I, prohibited the new German republic from having a large army and being equipped with tanks, aircraft and 11

Tschischwitz, it was not until February 1930 that his armor career began to accelerate. It was then that his true mentor, COL Oswald Lutz, took Guderian under his wing.7 The timing was also right because the restrictions of the Versailles Treaty were becoming less burdensome, although by no means less restrictive. The victorious World War I allies were beginning to look the other way with the emergence of diverging views on how to handle Germany in the future. Also, Germany was secretly experimenting with new equipment as well as conducting tank training in the Soviet Union.8 Guderian first met Lutz in January 1922 during Guderian’s attachment to Lutz’s 7th (Bavarian) Motorized Transport Battalion in Munich.9 Lutz came to respect Guderian’s work, and they became friends. Lutz, who was senior in rank to Guderian, did not let that stand in the way of encouraging Guderian and his ideas. It was also fortunate that Lutz and Guderian thought along the same lines when it came to tactical concepts. Both were advocates of combined-arms teams, not just pure tank or infantry formations, and the exploitation of advanced military weaponry.10 It was Lutz who helped lay out the basic premises for mechanized warfare supporting Guderian’s work even as the development of armored fighting vehicles by the British, French and Soviet Russians began to accelerate. Lutz said that the fundamentals of combat for all arms were the same.11 Von Tschischwitz’s tour of duty ended with the appointment of GEN Otto von Stuelpnagel to the post of inspector of transport troops. Von Stuelpnagel, a strong skeptic of the tank’s future, foresaw no possibility of the introduction of armored fighting vehicle into the German army.12 However, as is often the case, the real power in the inspectorate was not von Stuelpnagel but his chief of staff, Lutz. Lutz arranged for Guderian to get firsthand experience with mobile combat formations by seeing that Guderian was posted to command the Berlin-Lankwitz-located 3rd Motor Transport Battalion in 1931.13 Lutz also permitted Guderian to rearrange the battalion’s organization into an experimental unit. Von Stuelpnagel’s negative attitude notwithstanding, the battalion trained as a motorized combat formation under Guderian’s guidance. Through various means, an array of armored cars – not prohibited by the Versailles Treaty – and motorcycles assembled, along with automobiles decked out as dummy tanks. These vehicles were an excellent means with which Guderian could experiment because the reorganization allowed the demonstration of the utility of motorized combat formations to the rest of the German army. Guderian had the opportunity to execute the ideas and concepts he had been teaching for almost a decade, all under the cloak of Lutz’ tolerance, who stood between Guderian and von Stuelpnagel. In only a couple of months after Guderian took command of 3rd Motor Transport Battalion, von Stuelpnagel followed von Tschischwitz into retirement.14 Then Lutz, promoted to general-officer rank and appointed inspector general of transport troops, acceded to the position of being Guderian’s master mentor as well as commander.15 Through appointment, Guderian became Lutz’s chief of staff Oct. 1, 1931, which placed him in a very powerful and protected position. Mechanized warfare with armored fighting vehicles was still in an embryonic stage. The Americans, British, Soviet Russians and French were all experimenting with tanks and their future employment. The British and French, however, were tethered to the World War I concepts of tank employment, while the Americans dallied with various ideas. The Soviets and Germans had the advantage of working from what amounted to a clean slate, as tanks for them had figured only peripherally in battle in World War I. Guderian’s position as Lutz’s chief of staff also came at a propitious time in Guderian’s career. A change in government in 1933 brought Adolf Hitler to power, and with this came an acceleration of German combat power. In early 1934, Hitler observed a demonstration of motorized troops, including early models of German tanks, and expressed a desire for exploiting their potential. Still, development of a strong mechanized arm had to compete with other army components and received no special priority. Competitors were horse cavalry and the inclination to subordinate tanks to the speed of the foot soldier by forming tank brigades to support infantry formations.16 Nevertheless, Lutz was able to bring the Motorized Troops Command into being June 1, 1934, and when taking command was promoted to General der Panzertruppen. At the same time, three panzer divisions were activated, and Lutz saw that Guderian, as a colonel, received command of 2nd Panzer Division, which was organized in the city of Wuerzburg.17 Guderian still reported to Lutz, who continued to direct the development of the German armored force, while removed from the heart of tank affairs and center of operational mechanized policymaking. Guderian had the opportunity to put into practice on a large scale what he had previously been doing only in theory. At the same time, he worked with his mentor, and under Lutz’s guidance began to formalize the formulation of doctrine for armored forces. Thus, it was that in the winter of 1936-37 that Lutz directed Guderian to write the book Achtung Panzer! or Attention Tanks!18 The book’s purpose was to expose the tenets of mechanized combat to the rapidly expanding German army. Simultaneously, the book helped establish the armored force as a viable component of the army, and with it assurance of a legitimate share of the resources required to make it an effective combat arm. Guderian had his hands full in organizing 2nd Panzer Division, but when Lutz directed Guderian to write Achtung Panzer! Guderian did not hesitate to undertake the task. Lutz had long recognized Guderian’s talents and had guided his thoughts through the years. Yet Lutz, although Guderian’s superior and mentor, is not regarded in the same light as his protégé. On the other hand, if not for Lutz, it is probable the book would not exist. Lutz’s guidance to Guderian was to produce a work that would overcome the inertia the lessons of World War I had imposed on military thinking. Based on the French and British experience, the concentration of the mass of armor power was of paramount importance for future German operations. The principle of concentration of such power was in line with the German doctrine of applying the maximum amount of combat power at the decisive point. It was therefore incumbent on the German military establishment to develop to the utmost extent the potential offered by technology, which included tanks, and to exploit the opportunities presented by mechanization. Lutz wanted this book to assist in clarifying his (and Guderian’s) thinking on how not only armor, but combined arms, operations could be conducted.19 Guderian’s efforts more than fulfilled Lutz’s guidance and went on to bring Guderian important recognition in the armor community worldwide. Guderian soon came to overshadow Lutz as development of Germany’s panzer forces progressed and overtook horse cavalry as the model for mobile warfare. Forced retirement Lutz’s time on active duty and mentor to Guderian, however, would soon end. In 1938, it was helpful to be pro-Nazi. Lutz was not. Hitler announced the abolishment of the portfolio of war minister Feb. 4, 1938, dismissing a disgraced Field 12

Marshal Werner von Blomberg. Concurrently Hitler purged the general-officer corps, and Lutz became one of the victims of the cleansing.20 Almost immediately, Guderian received a promotion to Generalleutnant. Shortly thereafter, he received an assignment to command XVI Corps, an indication of Guderian’s preferential and recognized position in the new regime. Reputedly, Guderian neither tried to help his mentor hold on to his position in the new military hierarchy nor protested Lutz’s dismissal.21 Lutz, who was a “fine armor theorist in his own right,” was, according to Guderian, only his superior and protector.22 Four weeks after the purge, Guderian led the XVI Corps into Austria where his former command, 2nd Panzer Division, allegedly performed poorly in its 420-mile road march to Vienna.23 In spite of that inadequate showing, armored divisions in the German army had found a permanent place in the German military establishment. The next campaign soon followed with the 1939 invasion of Poland. The Polish operation brought with it the demise of the horse cavalry as combatant formations. The German army’s “light” divisions converted to panzer divisions, and by the time the Germans invaded France in 1940, there were 10 panzer divisions in the army’s force structure.24 Guderian went on to win accolades as a armor general in World War II and remains to this day probably the most applauded German thinker on mechanized warfare. Although Lutz commanded the first panzer corps from 1936-38, as an early critic of Hitler’s expansionist policies, he slipped into obscurity when Hitler took Germany into war. Lutz held no field command in active operations during World War II, having relinquished command of the first panzer corps to Guderian. Nor is his name found in most World War II histories, which indicates he was not a player in armor operations after 1938.25 In fact, Lutz was forcibly retired in 1938, recalled to service Sept. 22, 1941, and appointed to head a minor special-staff unit, then was retired again May 31, 1942, and died in Munich in

1944. Yet, if it were not for Lutz’s mentorship, Guderian may never have had the opportunity to shine in the annals of armor combat. Lutz as mentor did not suffer for lack of respect, but there is no doubt he has not received much recognition and credit for his contributions to the development of German tank forces between the two world wars. Indeed, Lutz was a master mentor who had a major impact not only on his protégé Guderian but on modern armor combat as well. Unfortunately for Lutz, his lack of appreciation for Hitler’s war aims and subsequent dismissal gave Guderian a window of opportunity to enhance his own career and go on to win fame in World War II. Retired BG Raymond Bell is a consultant, writer and tour leader living in Cornwall-on-Hudson, NY. BG Bell served in various leadership and staff positions, including commanding general, 220th Military Police Brigade, Gaithersburg, MD; commander, 5th Psychological Operations Group, Camp Springs, MD; chief of operations and intelligence, 97th Army Reserve Command, Fort Meade, MD; state recruiting officer, New York Army National Guard, Albany, NY; assistant professor of History, United States Military Academy; executive officer, 3rd Squadron, 5th Cavalry, Republic of Vietnam; joint operations staff officer, Military Assistance Command-Vietnam, Republic of Vietnam; assistant professor of German, USMA; commander, Company A, 2nd Battalion, 15th Armor, Republic of Korea; S-3 Air, Combat Command, Company C, 3rd Armored Division, Federal Republic of Germany; platoon leader and executive officer; Company A, 1st Medium Tank Battalion, 32nd Armor, Federal Republic of Germany; and platoon leader, Company I, 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment, Fort Meade. His military education includes the National War College, U. S. Army War College, U. S. Army Command and General Staff College, Armor Officer Advance Course and Armor Basic Course. He received a bachelor’s of science degree from USMA, a master’s of arts degree from Middlebury College and a doctorate from New York University. Notes 1 Guderian, Heinz, Achtung Panzer!, London: Cassell, 1999. 2 Ibid. 3 Ibid. 4 Munzel, Oskar, Die deutschen gepanzerten Truppen bis 1945, Maximilian Verlag Herford: Herford, Germany, 1965. 5 Guderian, Achtung Panzer! 6 Munzel. See also Achtung Panzer! 7 Guderian, Achtung Panzer! 8 Rosinski, Herbert, The German Army, Infantry Journal Inc.: Washington, DC, 1944. 9 Guderian, Heinz, Panzer Leader, Dutton & Co., Inc.: New York, 1952. 10 Munzel. See also Achtung Panzer! 11 Ibid. See also Achtung Panzer! 12 Guderian, Achtung Panzer! 13 Munzel. 14 Guderian, Achtung Panzer! 15 Ibid. 16 Ibid. 17 Munzel. 18 Guderian, Achtung Panzer! 19 Ibid. 20 Rosinski. 21 Mitcham, Samuel W. Jr., The Panzer Legions, Stackpole Books: Mechanicsburg, PA, 2007. 22 Dinardo, R. L., Germany’s Panzer Arm, Greenwoord Press: Westport, CT, 1997. See also Guderian, Panzer Leader, and James S. Corum, The Roots of Blitzkrieg, University Press of Kansas: Lawrence, KS, 1992. 23 Boatner, Mark M., The Biographical Dictionary of World War II, Presidio Press: Novato, CA, 1999. See also Guderian, Panzer Leader, for Guderian’s portrayal of 2nd Panzer Division’s performance on the road march to Vienna. 24 Bauer, Eddy, Der Panzerkrieg, Band I, Verlag Offene Worte: Bonn, Germany, 1965. 25 See Senff, Hubertus, Die Entwicklung der Panzerwaffe im deutschen Heer zwischen den beiden Weltkriegen, Verlag E. S. Mittler & Sohn: Frankfurt/Main, Germany, 1969, for an example of Lutz’ exclusion in discussions of armored warfare’s development between the two world wars. Senff’s monograph won the General Carl von Clausewitz Honor Medal for the year 1968 for his exposition on the subject of interwar armor development. Acronym Quick-Scan USMA – U. S. Military Academy 13