Preparing for the Unknown: Leadership Development for the Next War

How do we prepare our junior leaders and soldiers for the next war? Army leaders at the company and battalion levels must begin to ask themselves this critical question as the final withdrawal of U.S. forces in Iraq quickly approaches. Because the next generation of lieutenants and junior noncommissioned officers won’t necessarily receive battlefield experience before they attain senior rank in the Army, the current generation of company and battalion commanders must institutionalize a professional-development experience to teach lieutenants and junior NCOs how to think critically and adapt rapidly to changing circumstances. Several possible strategic scenarios exist for employing U.S. forces in the future. For example, a high-intensity conflict in Korea is one possibility. The Middle East riots and the United Nations’ passage of a no-fly-zone resolution concerning Libya both present cases where American forces can use a low-intensity military intervention. Still other scenarios include sending U.S. forces to disaster-ridden areas in humanitarian or peacekeeping roles such as in the Sudan, Somalia, Ivory Coast or other fragile states. Without a clear mission, how do we prepare our lieutenants and junior NCOs to conduct operations throughout the full spectrum of conflict? ‘Small wars’: lessons from history The Cold War and the expectation of a high-intensity conflict on the plains of Western Europe overshadowed the answer, the seed of which leaders can find in the 1940 U.S. Marine Corps’ Small Wars Manual: “Training for small wars missions is carried on simultaneously with training for naval operations overseas and major warfare on land. Training for naval overseas operations and major warfare on land is often applicable, in many of its phases, to small wars operations. Training that is associated particularly with small wars operations is of value in the execution of guerrilla operations on the fringes of the principal front in major warfare. In small wars, the normal separation of units, both in garrison as well as in the field, requires development of all military qualities in the individual and in the unit. Particular attention should be paid to the development of initiative, adaptability, leadership, teamwork and tactical proficiency of individuals composing the various units. These qualities, while important in no small degree in major warfare, are exceedingly important in small wars operations.”1 Historical evidence supports this conclusion. A platoon-sized Marine patrol under the command of MAJ Smedley Butler successfully defeated an attack by several hundred Haitian insurgents (known as cacos) in 1915. The Marine patrol trained in the fundamentals of patrolling and marksmanship. Although the bulk of its combat power was a single machine gun, the patrol easily overwhelmed the cacos. The cacos negated their numerical advantage with an inability to properly mass fires, poor marksmanship skills and lack of coordinated fire and maneuver.2 by CPT Michael Kiser 14 July-August 2011

Importantly, MAJ Butler’s patrol experience was common among officers during the multiple American interventions between the Civil War and World War II. At the Battle of Parral, during the Punitive Expedition into México, MAJ Frank Tompkins commanded a series of running engagements with two troops of the 13th Cavalry Regiment. About 100 cavalry troopers defeated a force of 500-600 Mexican irregulars.3 In the Philippines, Frederick Funston successfully evaded enemy patrols during a raid deep into guerrilla-controlled territory. Funston captured rebel leader Emilio Aguinaldo and returned him to Manila, resulting in the surrender of more than 4,000 insurgents.4 The major American setbacks during the same period occurred when commanding officers violated well-known tactical fundamentals. For example, at the Battle of Balangiga, insurgents armed with machete-like bolos almost destroyed an entire company of the 9th Infantry Regiment after a series of security and organizational failures.5 Focused leader development Moving forward, the need for a focused leadership-development program is clear. Preparing our lieutenants and junior NCOs for the next war first requires company and battalion commanders to focus training on developing lieutenants and junior NCOs as leaders capable of making tactically and morally correct decisions while operating in decentralized environments. Second, training should focus on generating and maintaining a high level of individual and small-unit tactical proficiency. Focusing on these lines of effort during training exercises will pay dividends for units when it is time to deploy. Theory-of-war through doctrinal instruction should ground lieutenants and sergeants, while practical exercises (i.e., terrain walks, tactical exercises without troops, field exercises) season them. The knowledge taught in one session should link to subsequent sessions, and adjusted mission variables should force leaders to recognize the differences between situations and apply their knowledge accordingly. Leadership development among lieutenants and junior NCOs should “enhance the officer’s ability to make rational choices in complex situations; [solve] problems of tactics and strategy, logistics and technology, [and] command and control.”6 In line with Scharnhorst’s Bildungprinzip, professional-development programs should combine theoretical instruction with practical exercises. Programs should also include a healthy dose of history, culture, political and socioeconomic instruction, encouraging junior leaders to “understand the political and cultural complexities that will affect their activities,” thus helping achieve national goals by nesting their tactical plans inside the strategic concept.7 Deliberately placing junior leaders outside their comfort zones is a good way to achieve this effect. For example, allow an infantry-platoon leader to plan a formal dining in/out for the battalion, or task the S-2 or S-4 to plan and execute platoon attacks during training. Presenting junior NCOs with a different set of challenges can also achieve this effect. Assigning junior NCOs to fill roles on the company intelligence-support team or act as supply sergeant during a training exercise can accomplish this goal. Reinforcing lessons-learned With the imminent withdrawal of U.S. forces from Iraq and, most likely, Afghanistan in the next three years, it’s crucial we remember lessons-learned about low-intensity conflict during those wars. Weeding out the mentality prevalent among junior NCOs that what worked on the last deployment will work again in the future is also important. A leadership-development program should balance historical vignettes and possible future scenarios. Junior leaders can attempt to solve problems while seeing a historical solution. What host-nation leaders consider morally or culturally acceptable is often radically different from the American moral and cultural standard, so balanced leadership-development programs should also provide situations that require making morally ambiguous decisions that stress the leader’s ability to balance his personal ethics with mission needs. Leaders need training that emphasizes the difference between situations requiring acceptance of the host nation’s ways and situations that demand action to rectify the situation. John Nagl defined the work of a military professional as “the repetitive exercise of discretionary judgment.”8 Discretionary judgment is not only required on the battlefield, but it’s also required during key-leader engagements. Leaders not only make decisions about which civil projects to pursue, but they also know when promises made to local civil and military leaders are safe, or when promises risk compromising the long-term situation. Basic tactical proficiency Developing tactical proficiency is also important. Individual movement techniques and basic rifle marksmanship remain the two biggest blocks for individual tactical proficiency. Fire must be accurate to suppress the enemy and allow friendly forces to maneuver. Rifle-marksmanship training should allow units to place accurate, sustained fires at ranges of up to 500 meters. (Sustained rifle fire stopped German troops in World War I multiple times, including at the Battle of Belleau Woods.) However, a large volume of fire isn’t enough to achieve effects when fighting at long ranges. Once soldiers develop individual movement techniques and marksmanship skills, leaders can combine them in mounted and dismounted battle drills. Armor and infantry leaders should conduct dismounted and mounted drills skillfully. Platoons mounted in humvees and mine-resistant, ambush-protected vehicles during low-intensity conflicts can use the same formations tanks employ during high-intensity conflict. The same direct-fire control measures apply regardless of the level of intensity. In addition, tactical surprise and concentration at the decisive point should remain the same. The Marines realized in the early 20th Century that we don’t need to train our soldiers and leaders for multiple kinds of war. We need to teach them tactical techniques and critical-thinking skills scaled to the level of conflict. Rehearsing scenarios containing unexpected contact before the platoon reaches the objective, on the objective and after the objective is critical. It’s also important to instill the mindset that battle drills are a start point, not a solution. Leaders need to adapt battle drills to the present circumstances rather than executing them by rote and becoming predictable in their tactical approaches. All the focus areas in this article’s sidebar (see Page 16) can be trained with little equipment requirements outside of the company’s normal modified table of organization and equipment and, more importantly, can be trained during those “hurry up and wait” periods when the unit is accomplishing other taskings. Doctrinal flexibility The answer to how we should prepare our leaders is simple. Training plans allow leaders to develop tools to be successful under July-August 2011 15 ficiency and give junior leaders the skills necessary to develop a solid operational plan for new circumstances. CPT Michael Kiser is the assistant S-3 for 1-7 Cavalry at Fort Hood, TX. He has served in various command and staff positions in Texas and Korea, including tank platoon leader, assistant S-3 and executive officer for units including 2nd Brigade Combat Team, 1st Cavalry Division, Fort Hood, and Company C, 2nd Battalion, 9th Infantry, Camp Casey, Korea. His military education includes the Army’s Reconnaissance Course, Cavalry Leader’s Course and Maneuver Captains Career Course. His civilian education includes a bachelor’s of arts degree in religion and political science from Gettysburg College. Notes 1Small Wars Manual. Honolulu, HI: University Press of the Pacific (U.S. Marine Corps), 1940; republished 2005. Author’s italics. 2Boot, Max. The Savage Wars of Peace: Small Wars and the Rise of American Power. New York: Basic Books, 2002. 3Ibid. 4Ibid. 5Ibid. 6White, Charles Edward. The Enlightened Soldier: Scharnhorst and the Militarishe Gesellschaft in Berlin, 1801-1805. Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 1989. 7Nagl, John A. et al. Keeping the Edge: Revitalizing America’s Military Officer Corps. Washington, DC: Center for a New American Security, February 2010. 8Ibid. many circumstances. For example, forward-operating-base security and assembly-area security are forms of a perimeter defense. Both use the same principles in their implementation. Cordon-and-search is a form of a deliberate attack. In other words, many tools exist in current doctrine that suffer misuse or neglect because adapting them for use beyond their original purpose never occurred. Adapting doesn’t mean creating new doctrine when new circumstances emerge unless something in the changes fundamentally invalidates existing doctrine. Rather, apply existing doctrine in new ways to meet the situation’s unique challenges. By developing a strong baseline in the fundamentals, company and battalion commanders enable subordinate leaders to focus on 1) identifying the unique variables of their new mission, 2) compensating for the variables and 3) ensuring mission success. Just as important, this approach is technologically independent; as technology levels increase, the fundamentals of war don’t change. Instead, leaders have to adapt how to implement those fundamentals. Such technological improvements occurred during the Napoleonic era, Industrial Revolution and post-Industrial Revolution, and will no doubt occur in the future. Technology enables leaders to achieve mission success, but it isn’t a substitute for tactical proficiency. Company and battalion commanders need to teach lieutenants and junior sergeants how to be leaders and how to think critically. Develop tactical proficiency from the individual level to the platoon level. There is no substitute for educated, competent leaders – leaders who can make rapid and rational decisions in the face of changing circumstances – and small units capable of applying the fundamental principles of tactical-level warfare in an array of environments. Our company and battalion commanders need to train the fundamental building blocks of tactical pro-

• Composition, armament and equipment of patrols;

• Formations and tactics of dismounted patrols;

• Formations and tactics of mounted patrols;

• Casualty evacuation;

• Battle drills;

• Security on the march;

• Security during short halts and in patrol bases;

• Night operations for defense and offense;

• Employment of weapons;

• Logistical operations;

• Ambushes;

• Attacking a building; 16 July-August 2011

• Tactical movement in an urban environment;

• Riot duty;

• Offensive and defensive operations;

• Scouting and patrolling, to include tracking;

• Basic and advanced rifle marksmanship;

• Map and imagery reading;

• Air-ground integration;

• Training as forward observers;

• Laws of land warfare, escalation of force and (if a known deployment is pending) country-specific rules of engagement; and

• Functional physical fitness and conditioning. Training plans for tactical proficiency Effective company-training plans focus on the following subjects: (List adapted from 1940 training plan in the Marine Corps’ Small Wars Manual.)