Highlighting the Most Significant Work of Volume III (1865 to 1914) of the Multivolume Collection

Foreword I am pleased to introduce the third installment of this exposé. The eight-volume work by Iraqi sociologist Ali al-Wardi is a definitive history of modern Iraq from the arrival of the Ottomans in the 16th century to the creation of the modern Iraqi state after World War I. This third volume covers four decades of Iraq’s history from 1865 to 1914, a time when modern conveniences, such as telegraph, steam riverboats, postal service, the printing press, and modern schools were introduced to Iraq by the Ottomans and the British Indian Viceroy. With these changes came ideas, such as Arab nationalist movements, political changes, constitutionalism, the rise of bureaucrats, and the subjugation of tribes, using the telegraph to move Ottoman forces rapidly to areas that required pacification. Wardi’s work is known among experienced Middle East foreign area officers proficient in reading the Arabic language. Russo-Turkish War 2 October 1877, Fight near Ivanovo Chiflik

Iraq’s Social, Political, and Military History: of Dr. Ali al-Wardi I have had the pleasure of discussing these volumes not only with Commander Aboul-Enein, but with Brigadier General H. R. McMaster and special operations field commanders deployed to Iraq. Commander Aboul-Enein has done a great service by highlighting Wardi’s work, which ranks among those Arabic books of military significance. I commend ARMOR for providing a forum to help U. S. forces understand the nuances and complexities of Iraq. Wardi’s book is not only known by our experienced Middle East foreign area officers, but it is also known by our adversaries, who use its history to stoke old sectarian grievances in the 21st century, by taking fragments of Iraqi history out of context. We must not be blind to the existence of Arabic works, but instead study them with the same tenacity as we used to examine Russian materials during the Cold War. Gary Greco, Chief, Office of Intelligence Operations, Joint Intelligence Task Force for Combating Terrorism

The first two volumes of Ali Wardi’s Social Aspects of Iraqi Modern History cover the arrival of the Ottomans in the 16th century and the start of the industrial age. Volume III takes readers from the industrial age to the outbreak of World War I. This era, from the 1850s to 1914, was a crucial period of change for Iraq as it became exposed to new social, political, and technological ideas. These changes were stimulated by the printing press, the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869, the steam engine, postal service, and the telegraph. These breakthroughs, particularly in the realm of communication, caused Iraqi society to become less isolated. The Ottoman Vali (governor) of Baghdad, Midhat Pasha, introduced hospitals, schools, newspapers, tramway (public transportation), and paved roads. These new projects would have an economic and intellectual impact on Iraq. Agricultural subsistence intended only to feed tribes were replaced with large plantations designed to export Iraqi products such as dates. Industrial farming saw the introduction of rice processors, wheat harvesters, and motorized water pumps. Dozens of villages and hamlets grew into towns creating places such as Amara in 1861, Aziziyah in 1865, Ramadi in 1870, and Nasiriyah in 1870. These changes also brought on the rise of the Effendi, or Effendiah, class (bureaucrats), a population of educated Arabs who graduated from Ottoman modern schools. Some of these bureaucrats became either Francophiles (lovers of French culture) or Anglophiles (lovers of British culture); they insisted on speaking Turkish among the Arabs and held tribesmen and farmers with disdain. These bureaucrats were masters at either easing or throwing obstacles to affect the commoner’s business. The people of the Effendi class were educated consistent with western bureaucratic models and were placed in a sea of tradition, superstition, and tribalism. They spoke in terms of “reform,” “oxygen,” “microbes,” and “evolution,” terms utterly alien to Iraqis of the mid-19th century. Egypt’s Printing Press Shakes Iraq Amid-19th-century renaissance blossomed in Egypt with the arrival of the printing press. Many intellectuals fled the oppressive atmosphere of Syria under the Ottomans and found anew intellectual awakening in the British Protectorate of Egypt. European revolutionary ideas of nationalism, the ideals of the French Revolution, and sciences were translated into Arabic and mass printed in Egypt. Magazines, books, and papers arrived by packet steamboat to Baghdad in the 1870s. The first to feel the threat of these new ideas of nationalism, secularism, and Darwinism were the Shiite, Sunni, Jewish, and Christian clergy of Iraq. Noman Alusi led the Islamic Reform Movement in Iraq, inspired by Egyptian modernist reform cleric, Muhammad Ab-duh (d. 1905). Darwinism was advocated by Shibl Shameil, who was joined by the Shiite cleric and Newtonian physics teacher, Haba al-Deen Sharistani. Sunni cleric, Sheikh Zahdawi, abandoned his clerical robes and joined the Effendi class of bureaucrats to continue his modernist education. 1877 Russo-Turkish War Abdul-Hamid II, the Ottoman Sultan who reigned during most of this period, took the throne in 1876 and remained for 32 years. In 1877, the Russo-Turkish War broke out. The sultan appealed to the clergy to issue a fatwa (religious opinion), sanctioning all Muslims to fight, making this declaration in mosques throughout the empire. Furthermore, he requested they add “ghazi” (conqueror) to his title. The Ottoman Sultan and his religious advisors attempted to link the title “ghazi” to the saying of Prophet Muhammad, “He who prepares a ghazi (raid) in God’s path, has already triumphed.” However, Ottoman ground forces lost in the Caucasus and Balkans. The Russo-Turkish War was the first Ottoman conflict in which the Sultan had a telegraph link to the front and to his field commanders. This technology only worsened matters, as it eroded military initiative, leaving commanders to await word from Istanbul. Russian forces made their way to Istanbul, but were pushed back by French and British naval forces aiding the Ottomans. The Russo-Turkish War, and the subsequent Treaty of San Stefano, would be a preview of Versailles and the carving up of Ottoman dominions after World War I. San Stefano would give Bulgaria its independence, Russia gained Armenia and the Port of Batu-Above, Midhat Pasha, Ottoman governor of Baghdad who introduced many modern conveniences. At left, Baghdad tramway introduced by Midhat Pasha. 28 — “…breakthroughs, particularly in the realm of communication, caused Iraqi society to become less isolated. The Ottoman Vali (governor) of Baghdad, Midhat Pasha, introduced hospitals, schools, newspapers, tramway (public transportation), and paved roads.”

mi, and the Berlin Conference granted Britain the island of Cyprus, a strategic prize in the Eastern Mediterranean. In 1882, with mounting debts racked by the Egyptian Khedive (Ottoman Viceroy), the British converted fiscal administration of Egypt to an outright Protectorate of the British Empire. Under these conditions, the Ottoman Sultan revived the Islamist trend citing that the British and Russians are the same infidel and began a systematic intellectual isolation from Western Europe. In 1878, the Sultan abrogated the constitution and disbanded the Majlis (parliament). Abdul-Hamid, though hard-working, spent most of his efforts rooting out conspiracies and is reputed to have had 20,000 spies in Istanbul alone to uncover assassination plots and constitutionalists bent on eroding his authority. Censorship was rampant, there was mail tampering, and the printing press was limited; if three persons convened in a coffeehouse, they were immediately suspected of wrongdoing. Sultan Abdul-Hamid II Plays the Islamist Card Another event that characterized Sultan Abdul-Hamid II’s reign was the Armenian massacres that started in 1894, leading to Armenian resistance strikes in 1896, including the seizure of hostages in Istanbul’s Ottoman Bank. The retaliation of massacres lasted 3 days, which proved to galvanize Europe. This further caused Abdul-Hamid to retreat into Islamist politics under the theme of “Muslims of the World Unite!” He hoped to stoke Muslim uprisings in French and British possessions in Africa and India, as well as Russia and parts of Eastern Europe. Abdul-Hamid spoke in terms of leading a jihad against these crusaders. He invested heavily in the propagation of Sufism, printed Qurans, and opened religious schools. In Istanbul alone, 40,000 students attended these schools in one academic year alone. In 1886, Abdul-Hamid orchestrated an Islamist public relations campaign, distributing hairs of the Prophet Muhammad kept in the Topkapi Palace. Iraq received five hairs, distributed to the Sunni mosques of Abu Hanifah, Kilani, Kazimiyah, and the Shiite mosques of Karbala and Najaf. It was an event designed to bind the Iraqi people to the Ottoman Empire. The last Friday of Ramadan was set aside in Iraq to bring out the relic and was designed to energize Islamist feelings and incite it against the enemies of the empire. Another project designed to bind Ottoman subjects together in the Arab dominions was the Damascus to Medina railway. This rail system consisted of 900 miles of track that had logistics, communications, trade, and military applications. It would be built almost exclusively through personal donations and was marketed as a project for Muslim unity to bring them closer to the holy sanctuaries of Mecca and Medina. The line was completed in 1908. Sultan Abdul-Hamid viewed European civilization as being poisoned and had a special hatred for the British. He saw the west as swallowing Muslim lands piece by piece and undermining his caliphate. Contrary to his distaste for Europe, Abdul-Hamid seemed to favor Germany for its military training. When Kaiser Wilhelm II ascended the throne in 1889, he announced his friendship toward the Ottomans as a means of undermining the common enemy of Britain and France. In 1898, the Kaiser and his wife visited Abdul-Hamid in Istanbul in the first official visit of a European monarch. When the Kaiser visited Jerusalem, he wore Arab dress, took the persona of a Christian knight and friend of Islam, and declared that 300 million Muslims could rest assured they had a friend in Germany. The German monarch laid a wreath at the tomb of Saladin and left a gift of a large silver set of worry beads, a symbol of remembrance to God. The German propaganda machine touted the friendship between the Kaiser and the Abdul-Hamid to that between Holy Roman Emperor Charlemagne and Abbasid Sultan Haroon al-Rashid who conducted along diplomatic correspondence in the late 8th century CE. The Ottoman press followed the Kaiser’s travels; some felt he had truly embraced Islam, calling him “Hajj Abdullah William.” The closeness between Germany and the Ottoman Empire worried France, Russia, and Britain. Some of these concerns can even be seen in the debates of the British Parliament under the ministry of Prime Minister Lord Salisbury. The British countered “Contrary to his distaste for Europe, Abdul-Hamid seemed to favor Germany for its military training. When Kaiser Wilhelm II ascended the throne in 1889, he announced his friendship toward the Ottomans as a means of undermining the common enemy of Britain and France.” “Abdul-Hamid II, the Ottoman Sultan who reigned during most of this period, took the throne in 1876 and remained for 32 years. In 1877, the Russo-Turkish War broke out. The sultan appealed to the clergy to issue a fatwa, sanctioning all Muslims to fight, making this declaration in mosques throughout the empire.” — 29 by extending support to ethnic, constitutional, and nationalist movements in Egypt, the Levant, and Iraq. However, when this was started, the Ottoman Sultan was in the apex of popularity in Iraq, being known as “Protector of the Faithful.” Wardi describes how Iraqi parents would open a story to their children saying, “Once upon a time and God grant victory to the Sultan, faith, and nation (deen wal dawla).” Abdul-Hamid wrapped the fate of Islam with the fate of the empire and his reign. In 1893, he ordered his Vali, Hassan Pasha, to select five representatives as wandering clerics, who would travel throughout Iraq, preaching, adjudicating disputes, and further binding the Iraqis to the state and their religion. Prayers to the Sultan were offered in mosques and emphasis was placed on Quranic verses, commanding obeisance to God, the Prophet, and those in charge of Muslim affairs from among Muslims. First Elections and Tribal Revolt In 1877, under Ottoman Wali of Baghdad, Abdel Rahman Pasha, Iraq held its first election to select representatives to send to Is-tanbul’s newly created Majlis al-Mabutheen (chamber of empire designees). Three representatives from Baghdad looked after and articulated the interests of Iraq before the Sultan, his ministers, and the Ottoman central bureaucracy. Regrettably, they spent only one month in the position before the Sultan abrogated the new Ottoman constitution. From 1879 to 1880, a great tribal revolt occurred in Iraq, led by Mansur (Pasha) al-Sadoun. The participants of the Sadoun Revolt declared themselves an independent emirate, stretching from the outskirts of Baghdad to Basra. Under Sadoun, 10,000 tribal forces were suppressed by 2,000 Ottoman regulars, equipped with field artillery under command of Ottoman General Taqi al-Deen Pasha. Of note, the tribal forces used donkeys to kick up sand in the battlefield to mask their deployment. They also used these pack animals, stuffing their ears with cotton, to march toward the cannon to receive the first fire against the Ottomans. These tactics, although interesting, were useless against the disciplined German-trained Ottoman forces. In 1881, the Sadoun tribal emirate was suppressed. In 1889, a serious Jewish pogrom occurred in Iraq when Chief Rabbi Abdullah Shumaikh died of cholera. The Jewish community received permission to bury the Rabbi at the nearby Prophet Ezra’s Tomb, located 60 miles north of Basra. The population in the village of al-Uzair, where the tomb resides, refused to allow the burial. Moreover, the community was backed up by the Ottoman captain of the garrison. Violence broke out, leading to the earliest Jewish riot in Iraq. Namiq Pasha (the Younger), Vali of Baghdad, in an attempt to unify the people, re-introduced the reforms of the previous Vali, Midhat Pasha, including:  Girl’s schools.  Technical school.  First music school.  Hospitals equipped with imported European medicines and equipment.  A carriage factory.  Government buildings, some of which remain in use today. The first major bridge over the Euphrates River was built in anticipation of the 1870 visit of the Persian Shah to Baghdad, which led to a series of bridges built over the Euphrates and Tigris until 1902. Chaos in Basra One of incessant problems of Ottoman governors included the pacification of tribes and dealing with breakdowns in civil authority. One unique problem of this period was piracy in the Shatt al-Arab waterway and marsh estuary at the mouth of the Euphrates in southern Iraq. These pirates used escape routes to Persia to evade Ottoman authority. Some of these brigands formed a tribal confederation and developed an autonomous emirate led by Sheikh Ka-zal, known as the Emir of Muhammara. The Ottomans used force, but also combined force by creating wedges between tribes to undermine confederacies and offering a combination of positions, bribes, and threats. An example of this was Sayed Taib bin Saeed, a Robin Hood figure in Iraq who the Ottomans fought and then offered amnesty, making him Mutasaraf of al-Hasa in Eastern Arabia. A Mutasaraf was a desig-nee of the Ottoman Vali. Accused of embezzlement, Taib bin Saeed was removed, but not returned to southern Iraq; instead, he was given a posting on the consultative council in Istanbul, representing the Basra area. The lawlessness in Basra was not brought under control until the former Ottoman commander in chief of Iraq, Fakhri Pasha, was appointed Vali of Baghdad. He used a strategy of disaggregation. Using infantry regiments, supported by artillery batteries, he attacked the pirate’s enclaves on the Iraqi side of the Shatt al-Arab. This Map of the al-Rashid Tribal Confederacy at its height. 30 — led to a diffusion of the pirates; some retreated to Persia, others sought asylum with the Emir of Muhammara. Fakhri Pasha used flattery and politeness to sternly demand a return of the brigands and thieves from the Emir of Muhammara, adding it would please him, as Vali of Baghdad, and the Sultan. The Emir, feeling a sense of importance, credibility, and recognition from the Ottomans, was faced with a dilemma of whether to please the Sultan and be rewarded, or betray the pirates who supplied him with spoils. In the end, he betrayed the pirates and turned them over. Fakhri Pasha executed pirates, murderers, and rapists, placing their bodies in rice sacks and throwing them into the river. He used a combination of fear, negotiation, flattery, force, and a kaleidoscope of emotions to pacify Basra. Fakhri’s inspiration not only arose from modern European tactics, but also historical figures from Iraq’s past. One such figure was Ziyad ibn Ubey, who, in the 7th century, found Basra in a state of chaos and said to an innocent man facing execution, “I testify you are innocent, but your death benefits the community.” It was a Hobbesian view that would characterize rule in Iraq. The Rise of Abdul-Aziz al-Saud, the Creator of Modern Saudi Arabia In the late 19th century, Abdul-Aziz al-Saud was spending his exile from his ancestral homeland of Central Arabia in Kuwait. The Machiavellian Emir of Kuwait, Mubarak al-Sabah, offered asylum to the al-Sauds in the hope he could use them as proxies in destabilizing central Arabia’s tribal confederacies. The strongest of these confederacies was the al-Rashids, who had evicted the al-Sauds in the late 19th century. In 1902, Abdul-Aziz departed Kuwait with several dozen fighters and began a three-decade effort, recapturing his ancestral capital, Riyadh, and then proceeding to craft what would become the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. The early phase of this conflict saw the Ibn Sauds versus the Ibn Rashids. In 1904, the Ottomans backed the Ibn Rashids against the Ibn Sauds, in an ancient game of tribal balance of power. The southern Iraqi city of Samawah was transformed into an Ottoman military logistics base. Four Ottoman infantry regiments and desert mobile field artillery, commanded by General Shukri Pasha, fought with the Ibn Rashids against the Ibn Sauds. The Ibn Sauds, supported by fanatical ultra-Wahabi shock troops, known as the “Ikhwan,” fought in what is now the Eastern Provinces of Saudi Arabia around the region of al-Qassim. Shukri Pasha was killed during the military engagement, causing the Ottomans to reacquaint with desert guerrilla tactics. Ibn Saud’s forces defeated Ibn Rashid and Ottoman forces, with thousands of decimated and emaciated forces trickling into Basra, after days of wandering the desert. The Ottomans responded to this challenge by sending two military expeditions: one into Qassim, along the Persian Gulf coast; the other into the Hejaz, along the Red Sea coast. Field Marshal Ahmed Faydi Pasha commanded eight infantry battalions, reinforced by two artillery batteries, which left Najaf in late 1904. When Ibn Saud learned of this force, he abandoned Qassim to avoid a direct confrontation with the modern Ottoman force. After remaining in Qassim less than a year, Istanbul ordered Faydi Pasha and his military expedition to Yemen and transferred Qassim to his deputy. In 1906, Ibn Saud saw the Ottomans garrisoned in Qassim; however, the bulk of the forces were in Yemen and the Hijaz, and not providing forces to support the Ibn Rashids. Therefore, Ibn Saud sought battle with his archenemy. During this engagement, the Ibn Rashid chieftain was killed. A major center of gravity, wrapped up in the charisma of the tribal chief, led to the collapse of the Ibn Rashids. These circumstances laid open the Ibn Sauds to become the undisputed leaders of Central Arabia. Ibn Saud sought to immediately negotiate with the Ottomans. The deal struck between the Ottomans and Ibn Saud would recognize Abdul-Aziz as Ottoman vassal of Hail, Qassim, and Riyadh, which was a swath of Arabia extending from central eastward to the Persian Gulf coast near present-day Dhahran. In return, Ottoman forces located in Qassim would evacuate, unmolested, to the garrisons of Medina and Iraq. Ibn Saud provided the camels and guides for the evacuation of Ottoman troops. In Baghdad, aside from the problems of Ibn Saud, the Vali of Baghdad was Abdul-Wahab al-Albani Pasha (1904-1905). It was during this time that Sunni cleric, Mahmoud Shukri al-Alusi, was exiled from Iraq to Turkey for evangelizing Wahabism. The Sultan and his Valis were Sufis who considered the Wahabis a heretical cult that would destabilize Iraq’s sects. Al-Albani Pasha’s replacement was Abdul-Mejid Bey (1905-1906), whose rule would see the massacre of Persian pilgrims visiting Karbala. Mirza Shirazi and the Influence of a Grand Ayatollah Mirza Mohammad Hassan al-Shirazi became one of the most influential clerics during the reign of Ottoman Sultan Abdul-Hamid. Wardi does a marvelous job explaining the clerical debates that characterize the Shiite hierarchy; chiefly, the differences between Usuli and Akhbari views of Shiite Islam. The Akhbaris depended on the akhbar (reports) of Prophet Muhammad and the twelve Imams. The Usulis argued that the reports varied in degree of authenticity; therefore, only someone immersed full time in studying these reports could guide a Shiite to their true application. Akhbaris believed that the reports and the Quran contain all that is needed for an individual to lead a moral life without dependence on a clergy. The Akhbaris also believed that an individual could interpret these texts without taking the clerics opinion as the final word. One popular slogan in Shiism was “Akhbaris depended on na’ql (imitation) and Usulis on a’ql (rational analysis).” By 1821, relations with Persia and the Ottomans improved and Najaf resumed its historical importance as the center of Shiite debate. Among the differences between Sunni and Shiite clergy was that Sunnis were government employees paid by the Ottoman bureaucracy, while Shiite clergy depended on the tithing of its flock. So Shiite clergy felt, and continue to feel, the economic privations of their flock and tended to advocate for their quality of life as it has a direct correlation to religious donations and taxes. Sunnis and Shiites view central government authority differently: for the Sunnis, the Sultan is the Commander of the Faithful; for the Shiites, he is not, and if they accept his oversight, he would be deputy to the twelfth Imam. Mirza Shirazi was born in 1815 and educated in Isfahan in 1843, as well as in Najaf where he ministered to Shiites in Iraq. By 1864, he became one of four Marjas (Grand Ayatollah) considered as a candidate following the death of the leader of the Najaf Marjayah and most senior cleric, Marja Ansari. Failing to achieve the highest office of the Najaf clerical cluster, Shirazi migrated from Najaf to Samarra, a city of significance to both Shiites and Sunnis. He became locked in an ideological competition for converts with Sunni cleric, Sheikh Muhammad Saeed al-Naqshabandi. The Ottoman Sultan saw in Shirazi a potential problem with attempting to unify all of the empire’s Muslim subjects around the person of the Sultan as Caliph. What elevated Shirazi’s stature was the 1891 tobacco protest, an incident that would redefine Persia’s national identity and lead to the downfall of the Qajar Persian Shahs. — 31

The Qajar Persian Shah, Nasr al-Din, sold the Imperial Tobacco Company of London’s (a British firm) entire tobacco concession, from growing to packaging, for £15,000 and 25 percent of the annual profits. Persians wrote to Marja Shirazi, asking him to intervene with the Shah. Shirazi communicated with the Qajar Persian consul in Baghdad. After failing to convince him of the unpopularity and injustice of the concession to British firms, he issued a fatwa, forbidding the use of the Tanbak Brand of Tobacco, the brand processed by British firms. Amazingly, Persian and Iraqi Shiites, within their communities, left opium addicts alone, looked the other way when alcohol was sold or consumed, but enforced the Tanbak ban. The fatwa of Shirazi was printed and distributed; it is estimated 100,000 fatwa pamphlets were distributed from Najaf to Persia. Mosques in Persia read the fatwa and expected followers to heed its warnings. A backlash of the fatwa consisted of threats to westerners in Persia; many fled Teheran and others retreated into their legations. Rumors of a jihad fatwa were circulated, which had to be dispelled by Ayatollah Muhammad Hassan al-Ashtyani. As a token of thanks to Ashtyani, the Shah Nasr al-Din offered him a diamond ring; however, the cleric refused to accept the gift until the Shah cancelled the tobacco concession. The Shah complied in 1892, with British firms imposing a £500,000 indemnity. Shirazi became the most popular cleric in Shiism and Shiites bestowed on him the title Imam al-Mujaddid (the re-newer of God’s religion). His popularity would be tested in 1893, when a Persian pilgrim in Samarra attacked an Ottoman gendarme, Hassan bin Zaghir, of the Albu Malais Tribe. This escalated to alterca-tions between Ottoman forces and Persians that digressed into overall Shiite versus Sunni violence. The British sent a river gunboat to calm the violence. Ayatollah Shirazi refused to meet with the British consul, sending word that this was a dispute between Muslims. The rift between Sunnis and Shiites was finally resolved with the intervention and negotiations between Ayatollah Shirazi and the Ottoman Vali of Baghdad, Hassan Pasha. Shirazi died in 1895, leaving Samarra to decline as a Shiite center, resulting in the Sunni conservative Naqshabandi order to ascend in Samarra. The Najaf clerical cluster competed for who would take Shirazi’s place on the apex of Shiite leadership. Shiite leadership contenders were divided into factions as follows:  Mirza Hassan Khalili was supported by the Qajar Persians;  Sheikh Muhammad Taha Najafi was sponsored by the Iraqi Shiite Arab factions; and  Hassan Mamaqani was supported by the Ottomans with the encouragement of Turkish Shiite factions. Najaf was deadlocked with these three contenders until their deaths between 1905 and 1908. Among the debates the Shiites clerical cluster had to contend with were the 1905 constitutional reforms in Persia, the 1908 promulgation of the Ottoman Constitution, and a tax protest against the Ottomans. The tax protest would be broken up violently after delivering to Karbala, the area of the protest, three warnings to break up the demonstration and requests for asylum from the British. The protestors were given a 3-week warning, then a 24-hour warning, and finally a 6-hour warning of an impending attack, which was designed to influence the protestors to disperse gradually and capitalize on group dynamics, until they were left with the most ardent protestors. On the issue of constitutionalism, Iraq’s Shiite clerics came to a consensus that mashrutiyah (constitutionalism) equaled the Islamic requirement for shura (consultation); that istibdad (despotism) led to killing Prophet Muhammad’s grandson and martyr of martyrs, Hussein. The Arab Awakening Another pressure within the Arab Middle East was the trend toward what would be called the “Arab awakening.” This was stimulated first among Christian Arabs educated in American missionary colleges that evolved into the American University of Beirut and Cairo and spread to Muslim Arabs. The seeds of this movement began in 1875, causing secret Arab nationalist societies to spring up in Iraq and the Levant, which would eventually be suppressed by Ottoman authorities. Many Iraqi and Syrian Arab nationalist thinkers were given asylum in Egypt, then a British protectorate. From where these secret societies formed, Ottoman protest movements, such as the Group for Ottoman Consultation and the Group against Evil and Corruption, formed. Christian Arab Nationalists and Muslim Arab Nationalists were split on the outcome of the Arab awakening movement. The Christians wanted independence for Arab Ottoman lands; the Muslims wanted representation and autonomy under Ottoman rule. In 1913, the first Arab congress convened in Paris. This forum, including all Arab nationalist exiles, as well as those within Arab lands, assembled in the French capital to work out their differences. Delegates represented specific areas such as Syria, Iraq, and Egypt; Arab exiles even came from the United States to partake in discussions. Also included in the representatives were the Ottomans, and after weeks of talks, a statement recognizing Arab rights in Ottoman dominions and their right to representation and participation in Ottoman government was affirmed. This statement did not satisfy all Arabs — the dissatisfied sect wanted independence. The opposition would manifest itself in a movement started by Iraqi Aziz Ali al-Masri, a former Arab military officer in the Ottoman army. The Arab nationalist movement would also explode on the scene with the promulgation of the 1916 Arab revolt that made T. E. Lawrence a household name. What made things worse for the Ottomans was their inability to put to practice promises of Arab rights and the need to have equal representation in Istanbul. Even after breaking secret societies and participating in the Paris talks with Arab nationalists, Arabs were made to feel like second-class subjects by the Ottomans. Russian and Italian Encroach ment on the Muslim World If the first Russo-Turkish War portended the carving up of Ottoman possessions, 1911 would see a more aggressive move to- 32 — “The Qajar Persian Shah, Nasr al-Din, sold the Imperial Tobacco Company of London’s (a British firm) entire tobacco concession, from growing to packaging, for £15,000 and 25 percent of the annual profits. Persians wrote to Marja Shirazi, asking him to intervene with the Shah. Shirazi communicated with the Qajar Persian consul in Baghdad. After failing to convince him of the unpopularity and injustice of the concession to British firms, he issued a fatwa, forbidding the use of the Tanbak Brand of Tobacco, the brand processed by British firms.”

ward capitalizing Ottoman weaknesses. Designs on the Ottoman Sunni world encompassed an even weaker Qajar Persian dynasty. A financial dispute between the Qajar Persians and Tsarist Russians led to a war in which Tsarist forces occupied Tabriz. Russian forces proceeded to hang Shiite clerics, leading to a call for resistance and jihad, causing a widespread insurgency in Northern Persia. Additionally, in 1912, Russian artillery opened fire on the Imam Reza Mosque, demolishing its dome. The call for fighters reached Najaf and Karbala in Iraq, which was met by a trickle of Iraqi Shiites into Persia to fight alongside insurgents. With hostilities between Persia and Russia raging, Italian forces landed in Tripoli and began what would be a three-decade war of Libyan colonization. It is in this war, known to Arabs as the conflict in Tarablus Gharb (West Tripoli), that a series of junior Ottoman officers would receive their baptism of fire and would rise to become integral leaders in the Arab and Turkish nationalist movements. Two of these officers were Mustafa Kemal (Attaturk), founder of modern Turkey, and Aziz Ali al-Masri, who would play a role in creating modern Iraq. They were part of a dozen Ottoman military officers sent to organize the Sanussi tribal resistance against Italian forces. The officers were under the command of Anwar Bey, who incited the Sanussis to rebel with a general call for jihad. The war lasted 11 months before digressing into the three-decade long insurgency campaign in which the Italians controlled the coastal cities and the guerrillas controlled much of the Libyan deserts and mountains. The Ottoman-Italian war over Libya stimulated a Balkan uprising against the Turks in 1912. In Iraq, with the departure of Fah kri Pasha, who had brought order in southern Iraq in the late 19th century, tribal lawlessness returned and was not remedied until the arrival of Nazim Pasha and his modern weapons. Of particular note, in the later part of Wardi’s Volume III, there is discussion of the fatwa endorsed by Iraq’s Sunni and Shiite clergy that addressed the need for Muslims to undertake jihad against Italian forces in Libya. One major cleric dissented, Ayatollah Kazim al-Yazdi, who said the British and Russians have occupied Persian Muslim lands longer than the Italian invasion of Libya. Moreover, Yazdi argued that Persian lands were closer to Iraq, and therefore, the jihad against Russian occupation of Northern Persia and British manipulation and control of Persia took precedence over the Libyan jihad. Nazim Pasha Assumes Baghdad In 1909, Nazim Pasha tried to balance military force, tribal negotiation, and public works in an attempt to pacify Iraq. Among the public works, he was known for filling the military trenches that circled Baghdad, which had been used for centuries of warfare and eventually became garbage dumps. The trenches had become cesspools and a breeding ground for vermin and disease. Nazim Pasha then undertook building locks and dams to address the partial flooding of Baghdad when the Euphrates River rose. On the military front, he opened Iraq’s first noncommissioned officer school in which the future leaders of Iraq would first receive their education. Students of this program included Jafar al-Askari, who rose to become a war minister in Iraq, and Nuri al-Said, who rose to become prime minister of Iraq. Perhaps the biggest factor that contributed to lawlessness was Iraqi troops not being regularly paid. The lack of a regular income made it difficult for soldiers, which led them to pillage Baghdad markets on every Eid holiday (marking the end of Hajj and Ramadan), taking what they pleased. This became a custom known to the Iraqis as the “farhood” (storm). Nazim instituted regular pay, provided troops with retroactive pay, and proceeded to punish, without mercy, those troops who continued the practice of theft. He reorganized the Iraqi army, creating a full-time gendarme that would police Iraq’s major cities. Additionally, Nazim paid attention to prison reform, adopting the European model of employing prisoners in return for better food and conditions, rather than having them languish in a dungeon. Nazim also planned for the pacification of tribal lawlessness, brigandage, and raiding. He did not organize a force, but obtained a fatwa from a collective of Shiite and Sunni clergy. The fatwa negotiated equated tribal raiding with pre-Islamic practices that descended the Arabs into ignorance and darkness, undermined Islamic unity, and assaulted personal property and the rights of Muslims to worship God. The fatwa also stated that the raiding deprived a Muslim of life and dignity without just cause and used Prophet Muhammad’s examples of when the Meccans deprived Muslims of rights to their beliefs, and how the Prophet governed and arbitrated in Medina. The fatwa was signed by seven senior Shiite clerics and seven senior Sunni clerics. It was then distributed throughout Iraq. Nazim Pasha understood that a fatwa alone would not pacify wayward tribes, but this gave him religious legitimacy to undertake a systematic military assault. However, Nazim decided on an alternative tactic to outright assaulting the tribes; he organized a military parade. Nazim called on all Ottoman forces in Iraq to convene in Baghdad, the equivalent of an army corps. They conducted military maneuvers, drills, parades, and exercises before Ottoman Vali Nazim Pasha. Nazim invited all tribal elders, foreign diplomats, senior Shiite and Sunni clergy, and even tribal leaders he was likely to wage war against, to observe the military maneuvers as his honored guests. Nazim had Sunni and Shiite clergy seated near him, cloaking himself in a tangible demonstration of Iraq’s centers of power, including the religious, the diplomatic, the tribal, and the trappings of Ottoman authority (flags, crests of power), which left no doubt he represented Sultan Mehmet V, while displaying his military forces. This resulted in a willingness by leaders of tribal raids “It is in this war, known to Arabs as the conflict in Tarablus Gharb (West Tripoli), that a series of junior Ottoman officers would receive their baptism of fire and would rise to become integral leaders in the Arab and Turkish nationalist movements. Two of these officers were Mustafa Kemal (Attaturk), founder of modern Turkey, and Aziz Ali al-Masri, who would play a role in creating modern Iraq.” Continued on Page 43 — 33 and bands of thieves to negotiate and pacify Iraq without a shot fired. As long as Nazim Pasha governed, security reigned in Baghdad and its environs. Nazim Pasha was, however, removed in 1911 after being implicated in an amorous scandal with an Armenian woman, which led 20,000 Iraqis to protest the removal of a popular governor. Thousands of telegrams and petitions were sent to the Sultan and officers threatened to resign their commissions. It was to no avail; disorder, as well as tribal raids, returned to Iraq under the callous rule of Jamal Bey, the new Vali of Baghdad. Jamal Bey spent his entire governorship militarily subjugating the tribes. He used force only and not the subtle methods of Nazim Pasha, who worked with the clergy, cooperative tribes, and public works, in addition to force, to bring stability to Iraq. Wardi’s concluding chapter is a fascinating look at the several technological advancements that changed Iraqi society — the steamship, telegraph, automobile, postage mail, piston engine, printing press, newspapers and journals, hospital, and modern schools. The majority of these changes involved transport and communication, which minimized the country in terms of distance a person or idea could travel to, through, and out of Iraq. Wardi writes of how the telegraph was seen by some Iraqi tribesmen as being the spies of central Ottoman authority and sought to tear down poles. Others saw it as a means of sending grievances to Istanbul, with the practice of paying the telegraph operator extra for depressing the keys harder, thinking this would ensure the ability of the message getting through. American military planners can learn much from this volume, understanding the strong influence that Shiite Marjas have on Iraqi society and how Nazim Pasha brought peace to Iraq through a mixture of force, clerical interaction, and tribal diplomacy, to name just a few concepts explored. It is vital that Wardi’s work be highlighted in today’s intermediate and senior-level war colleges to equip America’s military leaders with a nuanced understanding of the complexities of Iraqi society. The next exposé features Volume IV, which covers Iraq being the stage on which Ottoman and British forces fought in World War I. Commander Youssef Aboul-Enein is a U. S. Navy Medical Service Corps Officer and Middle East foreign area officer. He currently serves as a senior counterterrorism advisor, warning officer, and instructor on militant Islamist ideology, Joint Task Force for Combating Terrorism, Washington, DC. He received a B. B. A. from the University of Mississippi (Ole Miss), an M. B. A. and M. A. from the University of Arkansas, and an M. S. from the National Defense Intelligence College. His military education includes the U. S. Naval War College, the U. S. Army War College Defense Strategy Course, the Marine Corps University Amphibious Warfare School, and advanced analytic courses at the Joint Military Intelligence College. His most recent assignments include country director for North Africa and Egypt, assistant country director for the Arabian Gulf, and special advisor on Islamist Militancy at the Office of the Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, Washington, DC. This work would not have been possible without the help of the librarians of the Library of Congress Middle East Reading Room and the librarians of the John T. Hughes Library in Washington, DC. A special note of thanks to Commander Margaret Read, Medical Service Corps, U. S. Navy, who provided valuable edits and comments and is currently studying for her Master’s degree in National Security Studies at the Naval War College Fleet Seminar. Works of Dr. Ali al-Wardi from Page 33 — 43 to examine the effectiveness of systems and tactics of a force composed of a combined arms battalion (CAB), one Stryker infantry battalion, force design update (FDU) reconnaissance squadron, supported by appropriate joint and Army enablers against a predominately dismounted enemy embedded in a semi-urban environment. 4During transformation and subsequent force design updates, guidance was given to look for internal billpayers within each formation as structure was created. For example, an engineer battalion headquarters from the legacy division structure became billpayers for brigade special troops battalion headquarters; however, the ACR is a single colonel level-command, making it difficult to find this type of efficiency that will allow growth. 5Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA), U. S. Army Field Manual (FM) 3-90.6, The Brigade Combat Team, U. S. Government Printing Office (GPO), Washington, DC, August 2006. 6Ibid., p. A-6. 7Ibid., pp. A-6 and A-7. 8HQDA, FM 3-20.98, Reconnaissance Platoon, GPO, Washington, DC, December 2002, pp. 1-7 through 1-9. According to doctrine, infantry squads operate as two four-man fire teams, led by a squad leader who has command and control over the teams. Scouts operate in two- to four-man reconnaissance and security patrols. The point of training with respect to scouts and infantrymen, and the implications of a scout being trained on more tasks and thus being more versatile, was also discussed during the 3d ACR analysis; however, we chose not to include this argument due to lack of empirical evidence. For the purpose of the analysis, we studied how many squads could be formed within a platoon, adding the additional six scouts as prescribed in the last round of FDUs. We used the standard mathematical rules of rounding. 9FM 3-90.6, The Brigade Combat Team. Although stated in FM 3-90.6, based on the design and specifications of the mobile gun system (MGS), the analysis team had a detailed discussion on the lack of protection for this system, which prevents it from being used as a tank; therefore, we disputed its use as armor. 10Ibid., p. A-9. 11Ibid., pp. A-3 and A-4. 12HQDA, FM 17-95, Cavalry Operations, GPO, Washington, DC, September 1996. 13HQDA, FM 3-20.96, Reconnaissance Squadron, GPO, Washington, DC, September 2006. 14According to the Maneuver Battle Lab at Fort Knox, there has not been an experiment using the ACR structure for at least 10 years. 15FM 17-95, Cavalry Operations, pp. 1-1 and 1-2. 16FM 3-20.96, Reconnaissance Squadron, p. 1-14. 17HQDA, FM 3-24, Counterinsurgency, GPO, Washington, DC, December 2006, p. 3-1. 18FM 3-20.96, Reconnaissance Squadron; and FM 17-95, Cavalry Operations. 19FM 17-95, Cavalry Operations. 20Ibid., p. 1-13. 21Ibid., pp. 1-13 and 1-14. 22FM 3-20.96, Reconnaissance Squadron; and FM 17-95, Cavalry Operations. 23Ibid. 24FM 3-20.96, Reconnaissance Squadron, p. 1-15. 25Each scout platoon can dismount up to four teams, which equates to 72 dismounted patrols. 26E-mail from Captain Steve Wojdakowski, Apache Troop, 1st Squadron, 3d Armor Cavalry Regiment, to Colonel Teeples, commander, U. S. Army Armor Center. 27According to FM 1-02, Operational Terms and Graphics, GPO, Washington, DC, 21 September 2004, economy of force is defined as one of the nine principles of war: allocate minimum essential combat power to secondary efforts. 28Battlefield surveillance brigade (BfSB) computer-assisted map exercise (CAMEX), February 2009; BfSB can collect information, but does not have the structure to conduct many of the tasks associated with reconnaissance. 29FM 3-24, Counterinsurgency, p. 1-26. 30Battlefield Surveillance Brigade (BfSB) Organizational and Operational (O&O) Plan, U. S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, 2007. Major Christopher S. Mahaffey is currently serving as the chief, Commanding General’s Initiatives Group, U. S. Army Armor Center and Fort Knox, Fort Knox, KY. He received a B. S. from Duquesne University. His military education includes Airborne School, Armor Officer Basic Course, Scout Platoon Leader Course, and Armor Captain Career Course. He has served in various command and staff positions, to include small-group instructor and team chief, Maneuver Captain Career Course, 3d Squadron, 16th Cavalry, Fort Knox; military transition team leader, Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 1st Battalion, 64th Armor, Adamiyah, Iraq; commander, D Company, 1st Battalion, 64th Armor, 2d Brigade, 3d Infantry Division (3ID), Fort Stewart, GA, and Baghdad, Iraq; assistant S3, brigade plans officer, 2d Brigade, 3ID, Fort Stewart and Iraq; and scout platoon leader, XO, and squadron maintenance officer, 3d Squadron, 6th Armored Cavalry Regiment, Fort Polk, LA, and Bosnia.