Be There: A Case Study in Counterinsurgency Warfare

Be There: A Case Study in Counterinsurgency Warfare by Captain Jim Capobianco and First Lieutenant John Dickson “Article 10. ‘Be there.’ The first rule of counterinsurgency is to be there. You can almost never outrun the enemy. If you are not present when an incident happens, there is usually little you can do about it. So your first order of business is to establish presence. If you cannot do this throughout your sector, then do it wherever you can. This demands a residential approach, living in your sector, in close proximity to the population, rather than raiding into the area from remote, secure bases. Movement on foot, sleeping in local villages, night patrolling: all these seem more dangerous than they are. They establish links with the locals, who see you as real people they can trust and do business with, not as aliens who descend from an armored box. Driving around in an armored convoy, day-tripping like a tourist in hell, degrades situational awareness, makes you a target, and is ultimately more dangerous.”1 This article focuses on one of four fixed sites that the 3d Squadron, 1st Cavalry (3-1 CAV) Regiment, 3d Brigade, 3d Infantry Division, established during Operation Iraqi Freedom V; however, it also applies to all of the squadron’s established patrol bases — being there enabled us to achieve significant effects along all lines of operations in our area of operations (AO).2 Upon assuming responsibility for the Mada’in Qada, the 3d Brigade, 3d Infantry Division established Forward Operating Base (FOB) Hammer at an isolated Iraqi army training base.3 All troops within 3-1 CAV were initially located at FOB Hammer and conducted operations outside the base. At times, we conducted extended operations, 24- to 48-hour missions, in an attempt to achieve a sustained presence in an area and build personal relationships with the populace. Although productive, it was evident that a forward patrol base would best enable the squadron to conduct successful counterinsurgency operations (COIN). U.S Army Field Manual (FM) 3-24, Coun terinsurgency, outlines “successful and unsuccessful counterinsurgency operational practices,” and instructs units to “emphasize intelligence.”4 Using this as a foundation, the squadron staff framed a critical path that required its troops to be unremitting in their engagement of the local populace. All operations were aimed at improving security, making visible improvements, gaining the trust of local professionals/leaders, and building capacity — the cumulative effect that could allow the squadron to retain critical terrain and set conditions to transition to tactical overwatch in the future. Prior to the arrival of 3-1 CAV, the local area had a very limited coalition force (CF) presence over the past 4 years. To be successful, the staff determined that the squadron should aggressively pursue immediate relationships with the local people. To accomplish this, the squadron was required to identify the needs of the people, and key terrain from which it could project combat power. Establishing a patrol base required a detailed reconnaissance, which focused on the physical terrain, human terrain, and enemy activity.

Physical terrain. Our AO, Assassin, which was named after the call sign for A Troop, 3-1 CAV, was approximately 310 square kilometers. There were three major avenues of approach that ran along the perimeter and through the middle of our AO. There were two north-south routes (one of which was a main highway that connects the Al Kut Highway to Baqubah), and one main west-east route. The west-east route was a two-lane highway and served as the brigade’s main lines of communication (LOC). The intersection of the west-east route and the main north-south route was referred to as “four corners,” a four-way intersection that contained the largest market and business district in AO Assassin. Controlling this intersection allowed the squadron to interdict extremists along two main LOC in the Mada’in Qada. Human terrain. AO Assassin had a total population of approximately 200,000. There were six major villages dispersed along the main routes, which were made up of roughly 60 percent Sunni and 40 percent Shia populations. Prior to the fall of Saddam, Sunni and Shia Muslims lived together as a united people; however, the bombing of the Golden Dome mosque in Samarra in February 2006 turned the area into a sectarian fault line. Enemy activity. Following the bombing of the Golden Dome mosque, sectarian conflicts engulfed the area. Al Qaeda pushed into the northern area of AO Assassin and Shia militias dominated the southern and central portions. Intense fighting erupted along the Shia-Sunni seams, resulting in numerous abandoned villages and an improvised explosive device (IED) obstacle belt that obstructed local national and CF movement. Local Sunni who lived within Shia-dominated areas went into hiding; they rarely left their homes and, when they did, were often forced to lie about their Sunni identities for fear of reprisal. The Shia militias dominated the area and maintained control through intimidation, coercion, and extortion. Brutal murders occurred in broad daylight and kidnap-pings were reported daily. The local populace was terrorized; the economy was stagnant and essential services were all but nonexistent. Patrol Base Establishment Based on the results of a reconnaissance in zone and a desire to put an end to the violence, the squadron staff conducted a deliberate military decisionmaking process (MDMP) and selected an abandoned ministry of transportation compound as the site for the patrol base. The compound was 100 meters wide and 400 meters long and was located 100 meters north of four corners; the proximity to the four corners markets facilitated increased interaction with the locals. From this location, A Troop could conduct 2.5 patrols (a patrol consisting of 4 up-armored HMMWVs and 12 soldiers) daily while simultaneously maintaining a dedicated force-protection platoon. Of course, the patrol base security requirements reduced the total number of soldiers available for combat patrols, but the effects achieved by merely “being there” over time justified the troop-to-task cost. Once construction was completed, Patrol Base (PB) Assassin contained a life support area (LSA); morale, welfare, and recreation (MWR) area; dining facility; motor pool; 25-meter zero range; forward aid station; and a troop command post that contained a command post node for secure internet protocol routing connectivity, a surveillance system for enhanced local force protection, a surveillance system for enhanced force protection and surveillance, a lightweight counter-mortar radar system, and a command post of the future for seamless communications and situational awareness. PB Assassin housed both CF and Iraqi national police; in total, the base could sustain up to 250 soldiers. Enemy reaction. The Shia militias were not going to allow the patrol base to be established without a challenge. Attacks remained relatively low for the first few weeks after the patrol base was built; however, enemy activity suddenly spiked during the third week of its operation. IEDs increased along the main west-east LOC and indirect fire (IDF) attacks, launched from a Shia stronghold, became increasingly commonplace. Locals that frequented the market, located within 100 meters of the patrol base’s front gate, received threats. Shia militants attempted to infiltrate the patrol base by posing as local national contractors and walk-ins (people who approach the gate claiming to have enemy information). Several militiamen were found on nearby rooftops conducting surveillance of the patrol base’s inner-layout. By the end of the first month of operation, PB Assassin had been attacked four times with IDF, and on six occasions, patrols in the vicinity of the PB were hit with IEDs. Counteraction. The squadron’s counteraction consisted of a multipronged approach to assume security in this critical area, which included developing the trust and confidence of the local populace; neutralizing key enemy leadership through precision targeting; and empowering/employing the local populace by thickening the lines via establishing the local “Sons of Iraq” (SoI) program.5 By living in the local community, A Troop quickly developed the trust and confidence of the local populace. Dis- “Once construction was completed, Patrol Base (PB) Assassin contained a life support area (LSA); morale, welfare, and recreation (MWR) area; dining facility; motor pool; 25-meter zero range; forward aid station; and a troop command post that contained a command post node for secure internet protocol routing connectivity, a surveillance system for enhanced local force protection, a surveillance system for enhanced force protection and surveillance, a lightweight counter-mortar radar system, and a command post of the future for seamless communications and situational awareness.” July-August 2008 — 43 mounted combat patrols were conducted through the markets and all the villages in the area. Local people grew comfortable with increased CF presence and began to provide detailed information on extremist networks, which was integrated in target development at both the troop and squadron levels. The human intelligence (HUMINT) that was gained through personal relationships developed by our troopers was critical in identifying various enemy organizations and the specific networks that comprised each of those organizations. Once the organization and network information was developed, the squadron could deliberately target key individuals and neutralize the cells. The Iraqi National Police (INP) assigned a platoon to live at PB Assassin, which enabled A Troop to be partnered with Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) daily. The troop trained and conducted joint operations with the INP platoon at every opportunity. The INP became an increasingly effective and viable security force. The local perception of the ISF improved and increased their confidence in their government and its ability to secure the area. As security improved, local leaders began to emerge and resume their place as productive members of their communities. Over the past few years, many tribal and political leaders were forced into hiding by extremists, but as they saw the conditions around them improving and CF conducting daily patrols, they felt empowered. Through a series of negotiations and meetings, the squadron established a local SoI group.6 A local tribal sheik, who spent the majority of the past 2 years confined to his house, was chosen as the SoI leader.7 The SoI was created in areas where no ISF were present, which allowed the ISF to focus on main LOC and populated areas. The SoI worked hand-in-hand with both the ISF and CF in fighting extremists who had, until recently, dominated the area. Within 3 months, the tables had literally been turned on the extremists. Effects. The establishment of PB Assassin achieved gains that were unimaginable just weeks prior. Security improved markedly — attacks against CF decreased by 80 percent; kidnappings and murders went from a reported 20 per month down to zero. More than 120 extremists were killed or captured, and over 18 cache were seized or turned over to the ISF or CF. Economically, the four-corners market grew from 30 businesses to more than 150 businesses in 6 short months. Vast improvements were made in essential services — canals were once again full of irrigation water, and drinking water and fuel were no longer controlled and manipulated by the militia — everyone had equal access to these basic commodities. Local government began to function as effective legislative bodies; two local community councils, comprised of tribal sheiks, business leaders, and SoI leaders, were formed to link the people and their needs to representatives on the Nahia council. The establishment of PB Assassin enabled 3-1 CAV to dominate the battlespace by winning the support of the people (trust and confidence), controlling the main LOC, and projecting the perception of security and stability to an area long dominated by extremists. The ability to “be there,” among the people, was the critical factor in achieving immediate results and was the catalyst for a chain reaction of improvements in this area and the remainder of the Jisr Diyala Nahia. Forward-positioned patrol bases and fixed sites enabled 3-1 CAV to connect to the people and thus deny extremists sanctuary. Notes 1David Kilcullen, “Twenty Eight Articles: Fundamentals of Company-level Counterinsurgency,” Military Review, May-June 2006, p. 31. 2To maximize resources and synchronize all targeting efforts, the squadron staff organized along four lines of operation — security, Iraqi Security Forces (ISF), government and economics, enduring employment and essential services (E3), and information operations were integrated into each line of operation and operation. 3The Mada’in Qada is a part of the Baghdad Province and is comprised of the Jisr Diyala Nahia, Narhwan Nahia, Wahida Nahia, and Salman Pak Nahia. 4Headquarters, Department of the Army, U.S. Army Field Manual 3-24, Counterinsurgency, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, DC, December 2006. 5The “Sons of Iraq,” previously known as the “Awakening,” was recently changed to “Concerned Local Citizens.” Due to political sensitivities within the government of Iraq and difficulties in translation, the name was changed to reflect the cross-sectarian unity and nationalist ideals, which is the essence of the program. 6The SoI program was a multiphased operation. The names of all volunteers were provided to the local government, ISF, and CF. Each organization vetted the names to ensure that no extremists were accepted into the program. Once vetted, the volunteers were entered into a biometric database, given an identification card and uniform and swore their allegiance to the government of Iraq. 7The SoI leader was adamant that for a security program to work in the area it must include both Shia and Sunni volunteers and they must serve together at the checkpoints. This integration facilitated reconciliation meetings and sparked the reconciliation process throughout the entire Jisr Diyala Nahia. Captain James A. Capobianco is currently serving as S2, 3d Squadron, 1st Cavalry, 3d Brigade, 3d Infantry Division, Fort Benning, GA. He received a B.A. from Binghamton University and an M.A. from the University of South Carolina. His military education includes Military Intelligence Officer Basic Course, Officer Candidate School, and Chinese Mandarin Basic Course at the Defense Language Institute. His previous assignments include XO and platoon leader, B Company, 3d Brigade Troops Battalion, 3d Infantry Division, Fort Benning. First Lieutenant John A. Dickson is currently serving as XO, B Troop, 3d Squadron, 1st Cavalry, 3d Brigade, 3d Infantry Division, Fort Benning, GA. He received a B.A from the University of Notre Dame. His military education includes Scout Leaders Course and Armor Officer Basic Course. His previous assignments include scout platoon leader, A Troop, 3d Squadron, 1st Cavalry, 3d Brigade, 3d Infantry Division, Fort Benning; and assistant operations officer, 3d Squadron, 1st Cavalry, 3d Brigade, 3d Infantry Division, Fort Benning. “The squadron’s counteraction consisted of a multipronged approach to assume security in this critical area, which included developing the trust and confidence of the local populace; neutralizing key enemy leadership through precision targeting; and empowering/employing the local populace by thickening the lines via establishing the local “Sons of Iraq” (SoI) program.” 44 — July-August 2008