The Company Intelligence Section

Company Intelligence Section by First Lieutenant David R. Cowan The experiences of the U.S. Army operating as a counterinsurgency (COIN) force in Iraq have demonstrated a compelling need for military intelligence sections with in every company-sized maneuver force. Intelligence in low-intensity conflict is a bottom-up process, where human intelligence is largely developed by small units coming into close contact with the population, thereby building the intelligence that drives operations at the company level. In the COIN environment, company-sized forces must have a robust intelligence collection and analysis capability to be effective at executing these intelligence-driven operations. The modified table of organization and equipment (MTOE) for infantry, armor, and artillery companies/troops/batteries does not authorize intelligence sections at their level. The Army should modify the MTOE so each maneuver company is authorized one military intelligence officer (1LT 35D), one intelligence analyst noncommissioned officer (35F30), two intelligence analysts (35F10), and one human intelligence (HUMINT) collector (35M10). This augmentation would provide a robust capability, allowing the company to independently collect and analyze intelligence. Changing the MTOE to reflect the need for intelligence sections at the company level would be the preferred solution, although it is unlikely that military intelligence trained personnel would be available due to current demand for these soldiers at higher echelons. Even with an updated MTOE, it would take time to train and integrate adequate numbers of military intelligence personnel into existing company formations. Battalion and brigade S2 sections, as well as brigade military intelligence companies assigned to special troop battalions, are unlikely to be able to internally resource company intelligence requirements without losing capabilities at the battalion and brigade levels. An immediate solution is to use existing personnel at the company level. The company fire support team headquarters can fulfill this intelligence personnel gap when properly trained and employed. In the COIN environment where the law of armed conflict (LOAC) severely restricts the use of conventional fire support assets in urban terrain, fires are normally kept under the control of brigades and battalions.1 In these environments, the fire support team is not routinely employed in the same capacity as it would be in a high-intensity conflict. The fire support team is uniquely suited in the low-intensity fight to fulfill this S2 section requirement. The armor company fire support team consists of one fire support officer (1LT 13A), one fire support noncommissioned officer (13F30), and two fire support specialists (13F10), while the infantry company adds three forward observer teams, each with one forward observer (13F20) and one radio telephone operator (13F10).2 All 13F military occupational speciality (MOS) soldiers already possess the required secret security clearance. By Army regulation the handling of classified information demands that soldiers be cleared to handle information of the appropriate classification level.3 The company fire support officer (FSO) would serve as the company S2 section officer in charge (OIC), responsible for coordinating intelligence collection and analysis efforts that drive the targeting process at the company level. The fire support noncommissioned officer (NCO) would serve as the senior enlisted leader for the section, training the fire support specialists as intelligence analysts, and assuming the duties of the FSO in his absence. Army regulations prohibit non-military intelligence trained personnel from conducting source-based intelligence collection; therefore, the fire support team cannot assume this capability. The company S2 section requires augmentation in the form of at least one military intelligence qualified HUMINT collector.4 Without this support, the company S2 section cannot reach full capability. July-August 2008 — 19

The company S2 section is not intended to replicate the functions the battalion S2 section performs, but complements their efforts. The company S2 can focus on a smaller battlespace with a smaller set of targets. The company S2 becomes the de-facto subject-matter expert on targets inside his company’s battlespace, maintaining a company-level target list worksheet. The company has direct insight into their operating environment through dismounted combat patrols and can leverage atmospherics from the population quickly and frequently. The battalion S2 is responsible for all targets throughout the battalion operating environment, coordinates higher-level assets for collection, and assists the companies in shaping their intelligence collection priorities. Nearly all operations to capture and detain high-value targets (HVT) remain at the company level. In this environment, the battalion S2 section’s function is to coordinate for additional intelligence assets, deconflict assets based on the commander’s priorities, and synchronize intelligence collection efforts among the companies to maximize payoff against HVTs. The company S2 is responsible for developing targeting packets for individual insurgents and groups operating in his company’s operating environment. These targeting packets are then forwarded to the battalion S2 and nominated for the battalion’s high-value target list (HVTL) based on the battalion’s targeting priorities. Once a company target is accepted as a battalion HVT, the battalion provides higher-level assets to collect additional intelligence on that target. Information must flow in both directions, with the company and battalion S2 sections communicating frequently. Target refinements are made at all levels based on reliable intelligence. A fully functional company S2 section can collect intelligence, conduct analysis, and provide a finished intelligence product to the maneuver company to plan operations. The company S2 would work in coordination with the battalion S2 to synchronize the companies’ efforts into the targeting process. Communications between the company and battalion S2 elements is therefore essential to mitigating redundant efforts. Training Using the company fire support team as the company S2 section requires more than simple task reorganization; it also creates a demand for informal training in intelligence analysis. Ideally, this training would start at home station prior to an operational deployment. The company S2 section will spend a fair amount of its time using classified military intelligence applications to develop targets. Many of these systems are theater-specific and require on-the-job training for battalion S2 sections. During the unit’s relief in place, all company S2 sections should join the battalion S2 for training on these systems. Essential tasks that the company S2 section must perform are the development of targeting packets, link-analysis diagrams, use of biometrics tools, tactical questioning, sensitive site exploitation, and pattern and trend analysis. All of these functions are core competencies that all members of the company S2 section must be proficient in to support the company with intelligence products. Additional resources for enhanced training include mobile training teams from the Army’s Asymmetric Warfare Group and civilian intelligence professionals. The battalion S2 section must also be able to provide additional training as new systems are fielded and techniques shared. Civilian law enforcement professionals, when assigned to units, provide a nonmilitary perspective with years of civilian law enforcement experience. All of these assets should be used when available. Intelligence-Driven Company Operations In a COIN environment, the populace serves as the greatest source of information on insurgents.5 To gather information of intelligence value from the populace, leaders must build relationships within the community. The most meaningful relationships are often built by junior leaders conducting daily interactions with the population they are securing. In the COIN environment, it is platoon and squad leaders who are out leading patrols. They, not military intelligence personnel, are most likely to encounter information of intelligence value. To collect information from the populace, a patrol must be dismounted where face-to-face interactions with the local population are a routine occurrence. The local population can provide a wealth of information on insurgent activities. Tribal communities in Iraq easily recognize outsiders and can provide detailed information on enemy locations, strengths, weapons caches, and emplaced improvised explosive devices (IEDs). Intelligence products, such as tips cards, which are nondescript cards that contain a unit’s contact information, are used to provide the populace a method of anonymous reporting. Individuals who provide specific, credible information on insurgent activity may be further developed by a trained HUMINT collector into valuable intelli- “A fully functional company S2 section can collect intelligence, conduct analysis, and provide a finished intelligence product to the maneuver company to plan operations. The company S2 would work in coordination with the battalion S2 to synchronize the companies’ efforts into the targeting process. Communications between the company and battalion S2 elements is therefore essential to mitigate redundant efforts.” 20 — July-August 2008 gence sources, who serve as vetted informants. The longer a unit spends on the ground, developing relationships with the community and its leaders, the more likely the population is to trust them. The more friends that patrol leaders make on a patrol, the greater the likelihood that the next time the unit comes through the area, they will receive information of intelligence value. This dynamic can be an extreme challenge when the COIN force does not share a common language or culture with the host nation. Developing relationships that build intelligence requires patience and cultural acumen. For example, our company platoon leaders, operating in eastern Baghdad, stopped by a local tea shop once a week to talk with the owner. Each time a platoon leader visited the shop he was received warmly, drank tea, and talked to the owner and his patrons. A month of visits passed before the shop owner offered information on a suspicious house in his neighborhood. The company then focused collection assets in the area, developing additional intelligence on the house, which eventually led to a deliberate intelligence-driven operation. If the platoon leader had not invested the time in developing that relationship, the information would likely have never been shared. Building relationships takes time and patience, but produces dividends well worth the effort. The Company Targeting Process The same targeting methodology for lethal fire support is used when targeting insurgent forces in a low-intensity conflict. The acronym D3A (decide, detect, deliver, and assess) is the Army’s doctrinal process for targeting and remains unchanged in the COIN environment.6 The biggest deviations between the COIN and high-intensity environments are the assets used to service targets and the length of the targeting cycle. Targets in a high-intensity conflict may go through all four phases of the targeting cycle in the course of several hours. In the COIN environment, a target may take weeks or even months to complete the cycle: Decide. During the decide phase of the targeting cycle, the company S2 identifies targeted areas of interest. These may be places that are extrapolated as significant from human or signal intelligence reporting, atmospherics during patrols, tips received from local nationals, or previous enemy activity. It is primarily the job of the company S2 section to analyze this information and make a recommendation to the commander for future targets. During the decide phase, the company S2 section conducts analysis on recent HUMINT reporting within the operating environment and develops a list of named targets and areas of interest in the operating environment. These targets are then briefed to the commander and prioritized for collection efforts. For example, the company S2 section has identified an insurgent named Abu Ahmed, who has been reported by a HUMINT source to be the leader of an IED emplacement cell in the company’s operating environment. The same source is also reporting that Abu Ahmed owns and operates a fish and juice stand at a local market, which has been used to monitor friendly forces’ movements and provide early warning for IED emplacement. The company commander decides that his most significant threat to force protection is Abu Ahmed’s cell and “Essential tasks that the company S2 section must perform are the development of targeting packets, link-analysis diagrams, use of biometrics tools, tactical questioning, sensitive site exploitation, and pattern and trend analysis. All of these functions are core competencies that all members of the company S2 section must be proficient in to support the company with intelligence products.” “The longer a unit spends on the ground, developing relationships with the community and its leaders, the more likely the population is to trust them. The more friends that patrol leaders makes on a patrol, the greater the likelihood that the next time the unit comes through the area, they will receive information of intelligence value. This dynamic can be an extreme challenge when the COIN force does not share a common language or culture with the host nation.” July-August 2008 — 21 wants to focus his targeting efforts on their disruption. Detect. The detect phase of the targeting cycle focuses assets on targeted areas of interest with specific information requirements. Every patrol in this cycle should be treated as a reconnaissance patrol and given specific information requirements. These information requirements must be briefed to the patrol leader and understood by the entire patrol. These information requirements are drawn from data received from previous patrol debriefs and human and signal intelligence reporting. The company S2 develops the information requirements in accordance with the company commander’s collection priorities. As in conventional operating environments, information requirements are used to confirm or deny an enemy course of action. For example, a patrol has been tasked to conduct a reconnaissance of Abu Ahmed’s stand, with the specific information requirements of confirming the location of the fish and juice stand, identifying Abu Ahmed, and photographing everyone in the vicinity of the juice stand. During the reconnaissance patrol, the patrol leader stops by the stand and enjoys a cup of juice, engaging in small talk with local nationals in the area. The patrol makes no obvious efforts to show specific interest in the juice stand. The patrol even makes an effort to visit other shops in the market. The patrol leader is even savvy enough to convince the shop owner to pose with him for a picture. At the conclusion of the patrol, the patrol leader submits his patrol debrief with his findings to the company S2 section. The S2 section then confirms the identity of Abu Ahmed by providing the HUMINT source the picture collected during the reconnaissance. At this point, the company has confirmed the identity of the target, his location, and now has a method for positive identification. Deliver. The deliver phase begins when a specific named target can be identified and assets are directed to it with a desired effect. Returning to the previous example of Abu Ahmed’s cell, the company commander decided that based on the intelligence available that an operation should be conducted to capture Abu Ahmed at his fish and juice stand. The desired effect of this operation was the disruption of IED emplacement activity in the operating environment. Operation “Juice Stand” was planned and executed, resulting in the detention of Abu Ahmed at his stand. Subsequent interrogations of Abu Ahmed will likely provide additional intelligence on insurgent activity in the area and the names of other members in the IED cell. This intelligence fuels the targeting processes. The deliver phase does not always require that a target be serviced with a kinetic asset, resulting in detention and, in the most extreme cases, death. Non-kinetic assets can include using psychological operations (PSYOP) products meant to disrupt insurgent activity in a specific area, using reconstruction funds to deprive an insurgent group of support from the community, or reconciliation of a target that was previously a hostile entity. In the case of Abu Ahmed, the company had been unable to capture him after multiple operations and decided on an alternative approach, which they believed would achieve a similar desired effect. The company S2 section developed a leaflet with Abu Ahmed’s picture and name, offering a cash reward for any information leading to his arrest. This leaflet was “To collect information from the populace, a patrol must be dismounted where face-to-face interactions with the local population are a routine occurrence. The local population can provide a wealth of information on insurgent activities. Tribal communities in Iraq easily recognize outsiders and can provide detailed information on enemy locations, strengths, weapons caches, and emplaced improvised explosive devices (IEDs).” Continued on Page 50 22 — July-August 2008

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