Tactical Patience

Tactical Patience by Captain Daniel J. Pecha In November of 2004, 1st Battalion, 87th Infantry Regiment deployed to Afghanistan, where I was assigned as platoon leader of Charlie Company’s first platoon. The company consisted of four platoons (two dismounted, one mounted, and a headquarters). First platoon was one of the dismounted platoons and I arrived just as the company was completing its cycle of local patrolling missions, which allowed me to get a feel for the terrain, learn how day-to-day operations were conducted, and get to know my soldiers. Charlie Company conducted its routine long-range missions out of Forward Operating Base (FOB) Orgun-e. The unit’s normal battle rhythm was to conduct 12 to 14 days of force protection, 12 to 14 days of local or counter-rocket patrols, and finally complete its cycle by conducting a 3- to 5-day mission in our company’s extended area of operation that would reach as far east as the Pakistani border. Within a few days, we transitioned to the force protection element and were beginning the planning process for our extended mission. As a platoon, we conducted necessary preparations for the mission, which included battle drill rehearsals (mounted and dismounted), vehicle preparation, weapons maintenance, and a map reconnaissance of the route we would be traveling. Our preparations also included a map reconnaissance of various dismount locations that would require either of the dismount platoons to clear the high ground along the route in the absence of air assets. The evening prior to our departure, we had completed all necessary preparations and were ready to execute. Our mission was to be conducted in four phases. Phase I involved the unit conducting a medical civic action program while dismounted units would conduct random searches to gather intelligence on the local population in and around the town of Ghaybikhel. We then moved a short distance and conducted rest-over-night operations near the ruins to the north of Tora Wrey. Phase II required the company to divide into two sections and move along the northern and southern routes to the village of L’wara, about 3 kilometers from the Pakistani border, where the company commander would attend a meeting with local leaders. Phase III involved the company moving back to the west along the northern route to the village of Gayan, where it would link up with the local police chief to get a situational update on significant activities that had occurred in the area over the past month. Finally, Phase IV completed operations in Gayan and the company continued its move along the northern route and returned to FOB Orgun-e. The unit had conducted similar missions on at least four other occasions, including one in this same area. On the morning of 25 January 2004, Charlie Company departed FOB Orgun-e en route to Ghaybikhel to conduct a medical civic action program and random searches inside the village. All activities were going as planned during the company’s movement to Ghaybikhel and during the medical civic action program. The company’s air assets arrived and provided information and route clearance during our movement, which relieved the dismounted platoons from ascending into the mountainous terrain and clearing the high ground and possible ambush sites that surrounded a vast majority of our movement. Charlie Company spent the better part of the day in the village getting a feel for the area and ascertaining what types of civil affairs projects local elders deemed beneficial to the area. As the sun began to set, Charlie Company saddled up and initiated movement to its rest-over-night site near Tora Wrey. The company executive officer moved to the front of the formation and took a section from second platoon to conduct a reconnaissance of the site. When he returned, the dismount platoons moved into the high ground, surrounding the old ruins that would become our home for the next few hours. The two dismount platoons conducted their priorities of work, such as range cards for the defensive perimeter, security roster, weapons maintenance, hygiene, and a sleep plan, which were overseen by the platoon sergeants. Charlie Company’s commander soon called for all platoon leaders to report to his location. The platoon leaders gathered with maps in hand to discuss how we would conduct our movement into L’Wara the following morning. There was little change to the plan that had been established prior to our departure from the FOB. Our platoon would move along the southern route with the executive officer and have a section from the up-armored wheel platoon to lead us to our dismount point. After reaching the dismount point, our platoon would begin the approximate 2-kilometer movement to high ground, overwatching the intersection leading into L’Wara. The foot movement, which would take us from 8,800 feet to nearly 10,000 feet in elevation, would take no less than 2 hours in perfect conditions. This would place our platoon on the eastern side of the “Y” intersection with excellent vision along the planned approach route. The other dismounted platoon would move with its company commander along the northern route and conduct a similar clearance of the high ground to the west of the intersection. Their climb would be shorter in distance, but higher in elevation. Either way, it was apparent that it would take a significant amount of time for the dismounted platoons to get into position and conduct a proper clearance of the high ground. Another factor that added a bit of difficulty to our mission was the lack of air assets to cover our movement into the area. This subject had become a point of irritation between the company commander and senior leaders in the company — we were moving into a known ambush site without bringing all assets to bear on the enemy. At 0330 hours on 26 January, Charlie Company began to move to its staging area as they prepared to meet the 0400 hours departure time. After working through some issues with the maintenance assets that were attached to our company, we were finally able to get moving around 0430 hours. Each element had about a 25- to 30-kilometer mounted movement that would take up to 2 hours, followed by another 2- to 2½-hour dismounted movement. We were less than 2 minutes into movement, moving through the wadi system, when our light medium tactical vehicle (LMTV) got high centered, which took nearly an hour to break free because we did not have any additional heavy assets that were capable of pulling out the vehicle. We were now nearly 90 minutes behind our planning timeline as we finally reached our checkpoint and split into the northern and southern elements. From the checkpoint to the dismount points things went as well as could be planned. We arrived at the dismount location at around 0745 hours and made our best attempt to get into position by the drop-dead time of 0900 hours, but an infantryman can only move so fast in full kit, carrying an assault pack and moving up extreme elevation. The disposition for the company at this time had the two dismounted platoons on their way to clear the high ground and the two mounted sections, along with their respective headquarters elements, holding at the dismount points and waiting for us to get into position. During the movement into the mountains, the radio communications between the mounted and dismounted elements were degraded to the point that we did not have communications for 15 to 20 minutes at a time. The difficulty with communications continued for about an hour until the dismounted elements had moved into higher terrain. At 0845 hours, the “Charlie Company conducted its routine long-range missions out of Forward Operating Base (FOB) Orgun-e. The unit’s normal battle rhythm was to conduct 12 to 14 days of force protection, 12 to 14 days of local or counter-rocket patrols, and finally complete its cycle by conducting a 3- to 5-day mission in our company’s extended area of operation that would reach as far east as the Pakistani border.” July-August 2008 — 17 calls starting coming from the commander and the executive officer, asking for situational updates. I reported that we needed at least another 45 minutes before we would have eyes on the intersection and could catch sporadic radio traffic from the other platoon as they were reporting a similar situation. The persistent calls for situational updates continued for the next 30 to 45 minutes and the responses from both of the dismounted platoon leaders were the same: “We are moving as fast as we can, but we need more time to get into position.” At 0930 hours, we received the call for the final time and both platoon leaders requested an additional 10 minutes. This was the last situational update; the commander had given the order for the mounted elements to move. Within 5 minutes, we heard the distinct sounds of AK-47s, PKM and RPK machine guns, and the random exploding rocket-propelled grenade (RPG) round. Both elements had been ambushed at or near the templated locations. The element moving with the company commander took the brunt of the fire. As soon as contact was made by the mounted element, my lead team, along with one mortar tube, dropped all additional gear and moved out as fast as we could with the weight we were carrying. In approximately 5 minutes, we were able to get eyes on the lead elements of the convoy and elements of the enemy ambush squad. At the same time, the dismounted element on the western side was also moving into position and had another enemy team trapped between them and the mounted element. Since we were initially out of position, the enemy disappeared into the surrounding village because we were unable to cordon off the village in time because we had only four M1026s from the mounted platoon. During this exchange, we had two casualties from the engineer team that was attached to us, along with one M998 that had a RPG go directly through its front windshield and explode in the cargo area. This incident forced us to miss the event to which we were hurrying. We changed our focus to tracking down the people responsible for the ambush — our efforts netted little return. I learned three invaluable lessons during this mission. The first lesson is to realize we are operating in an environment where time means nothing to the local people; friend or foe this culture does not share our respect for time. Therefore, scheduled meeting times with locals should not be the sole driving force for our operations. The second lesson is to bring all available assets to the fight. In Afghanistan this probably means you will have to plan your missions around certain available assets. Understandably, we must assume risk during our missions, but moving through a known ambush site without air assets in direct support is unacceptable. Finally, the most important lesson learned is that of tactical patience. We could have mitigated our lack of aviation assets by allowing our organic assets to move to planned locations to provide coverage for the safety and security of troops moving through the ambush site. Our plan was sound and the enemy had no idea we had dismounted forces in the high ground; had we been given adequate time to get into position, we would have killed no less than two ambush teams and possibly a third, as well as protected our soldiers moving through the wadi system. Senior leaders owe it to their soldiers to provide them with the highest level of protection at all times. If we have the ability to control the situation or influence the situation, we should use all means possible to make it happen. Listening to your senior noncommissioned officers and exercising tactical patience is an invaluable asset to mission success. Captain Daniel J. Pecha is currently serving as the assistant operations officer, Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 1st Battalion, 26th Infantry, 3d Brigade Combat Team, 1st Infantry Division, Fort Hood, TX. He is a graduate of Bellevue University. His military education includes Maneuver Captain Career Course, Infantry Officer Basic Course, Ranger School, and Airborne School. He has served in various command and staff positions, to include commander, B Company, 2d Battalion, 46th Infantry, Fort Knox, KY; XO, A Company, 1st Battalion, 87th (1-87) Infantry, 10th Mountain Division, Fort Drum, NY; assistant operations officer, 1-87 Infantry, Fort Drum; and platoon leader, C Company, 1-87 Infantry, Fort Drum. “All activities were going as planned during the company’s movement to Ghaybikhel and during the medical civic action program. The company’s air assets arrived and provided information and route clearance during our movement, which relieved the dismounted platoons from ascending into the mountainous terrain and clearing the high ground and possible ambush sites that surrounded a vast majority of our movement.” 18 — July-August 2008