Accurate Battlefi eld Information in the Digital Age

Accurate Battlefield Information in the Digital Age “Taken as a whole, present day military forces, for all of the imposing array of electronic gadgetry at their disposal, give no evidence whatsoever of being one whit more capable of dealing with the information needed for the command process than were their predecessors a century or even a millennium ago.”1 — Martin van Creveld Military commanders since the dawn of warfare have struggled with command and control of their subordinate units in combat, using a variety of different methods such as messengers, signaling flags, and more recently, Force XXI battle command, brigade and below (FBCB2). However, one method used by commanders, such as Alexander the Great, Napoleon, and General George S. Patton, has fallen into disuse in the contemporary operating environment — what modern historians, such as Martin van Creveld, refer to as the “directed telescope.” In Command in War, van Creveld explains that, “Climbing through the chain of command … reports tend to become less and less specific; the more numerous the stages through which they pass and the more standardized the form in which they are presented, the greater the danger that they will become so heavily profiled (and possibly sugar-coated or merely distorted by the many summaries) as to become almost meaningless. To guard against this danger and to keep subordinates on their toes, a commander needs to have in addition a kind of directed telescope … which he can direct, at will, at any part of the enemy’s forces, the terrain, or his own army in order to bring in information that is not only less structured than that passed on by the normal channels but also tailored to meet his momentary (and specific) needs.” 2 This article examines the reporting phenomena that van Creveld discusses in the context of the modern Army in the contemporary operating environment (COE) and addresses which role the directed telescope should play in the contemporary operating environment. It further argues that due to the complexity of the COE, senior commanders should employ a directed telescope system to assist them in obtaining a better situational awareness than typical reports from subordinate commanders currently provide. History of the Directed Telescope Several commanders have used various directed telescope methods to acquire the information they need to make timely and informed decisions. Napoleon’s use of the directed telescope is well documented; in addition to the normal reporting channels, Napoleon employed smart, energetic, and brave lieutenants and captains to provide him not only with more detailed information than the routine reports contained, but the “intangible aspects of a unit’s status — like leadership, morale, and esprit.”3 Napoleon also used these officers (and colonels with a similar mission) as his eyes and ears to personally observe various tactical situations, convey his intent to subordinate commanders, and report to him levels of detail and intangible aspects that often did not appear in normal reports.4 General Patton also used a directed telescope system to great effect during World War II. Patton had two squadrons of cavalry that operated as “a special liaison and monitoring system for the army commander and his staff.”5 Led by highly qualified, intelligent, and combat veter-by Captain Andrew Hubbard 12 — July-August 2008

“Another directed telescope method Patton used to ensure that he and his staff had an accurate situational understanding was requiring his staff officers to visit frontline units daily to gain a better understanding and provide encouragement. Incidentally, these visits also reduced the number of reports that subordinate units had to routinely submit.” an junior officers, the patrols visited the headquarters of units in contact, and in addition to reporting the situation on the ground to Third Army headquarters, exchanged information about adjacent units with the division G2s and G3s. Although subordinate command ers initially perceived “Patton’s house hold cavalry,” as they became known, as “spies” from Third Army headquarters, they came to appreciate them for the up-to-date information they often possessed.6 Another directed telescope method Patton used to ensure that he and his staff had an accurate situational understanding was requiring his staff officers to visit frontline units daily to gain a better understanding and provide encouragement. Incidentally, these visits also reduced the number of reports that subordinate units had to routinely submit.7 Field Marshall Bernard Montgomery’s directed telescope system was perhaps the most effective — he used brave, young, and often decorated officers (mostly majors) to ensure his orders were carried out, convey his intent to subordinate units, and ensure units reported directly to him with objective observations. These officers could travel anywhere within Montgomery’s area of operations; even though one can see the potential for a commander to abuse such a system and some of Montgomery’s subordinate commanders did initially look on the liaison officers with suspicion, they eventually came to know and trust Montgomery’s liaisons because of the officers’ personality, competence, bravery, and honesty in reporting.8 During a visit to Montgomery, Winston Churchill had the opportunity to observe Montgomery’s liaison officers render daily reports directly to their boss, “Each had come back from a different sector of the front… As, in turn, they made their reports and were searchingly questioned by their chief, the whole story of the day’s battle was unfolded. This gave Monty a complete account of what had happened by highly competent men whom he knew well and whose eyes he trusted. It afforded an invaluable cross-check to the reports from all the various headquarters and from the commanders. I thought the system admirable, and indeed the only way in which a modern commander in chief could see as well as read what was going on in every part of the front.”9 Commanders from Napoleon through Patton have used a directed telescope in July-August 2008 — 13

“During a visit to Montgomery, Winston Churchill had the opportunity to observe Montgomery’s liaison officers render daily reports directly to their boss, ‘Each had come back from a different sector of the front… As, in turn, they made their reports and were searchingly questioned by their chief, the whole story of the day’s battle was unfolded. This gave Monty a complete account of what had happened by highly competent men whom he knew well and whose eyes he trusted.…’ ” various forms to gain a more accurate situational understanding than that acquired through more traditional methods. At the end of World War II, a review board chaired by General Patton recommended that a directed telescope of some sort become a permanent, formal fixture in the U.S. Army’s organization — a recommendation that was never implemented. However, U.S. Army Field Manual (FM) 6-0, Mission Command: Command and Control of Army Forces, mentions that directed telescopes are a “method of positive control” that can be used “to observe selected events or units and report directly to the commander.”10 FM 6-0 additionally states that directed telescopes “can validate information received through regular channels or obtain important RI [relevant information] more rapidly than through regular channels. It is important that directed telescopes not interfere (or be perceived as interfering) with the normal functioning of the chain of command. The perception of spying or intruding on the province of the subordinate commanders can damage the trust between seniors and subordinates vital to mission command.”11 Given that directed telescopes have worked well when used by commanders in conflicts from the Napoleonic times through World War II, and are mentioned as useful, though not mandated or otherwise formalized, by U.S. Army doctrine, the next section of this article examines the usefulness of directed telescopes on the modern battlefield. Technology and the Contemporary Operating Environment Given advanced equipment, such as Blue Force Tracker (BFT), FBCB2, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV), and satellite communications, the U.S. Army currently possesses and plans to field in the near future to maintain situational awareness and facilitate command and control, some may question the need for a directed telescope. Indeed, due to the very rapid nature of present-day, high-intensity conflict operations, modern technology has perhaps alleviated much of the need for a directed telescope during these types of operations. However, in what the military refers to as the “current operating environment,” in such places as Iraq and Afghanistan, these modern technologies do not always accurately relay full situational awareness to higher commands. In the COE, high-intensity exchanges between U.S. soldiers and the enemy are infrequent on a scale above the company level. Leaders at higher levels can track these types of exchanges quite easily by using modern technologies such as the FBCB2 and UAV. In these types of exchanges, modern technology is a tremendous force multiplier and undoubtedly saves lives. However, decisively winning these types of battles at the tactical level does not directly translate to victory at the operational or strategic levels of war. To truly defeat insurgent forces, as the United States is learning in Iraq and Afghanistan, the Army must recognize the conflict’s center of gravity in any COE that it may face — accurate situational awareness is absolutely imperative in determining a conflict’s center of gravity. In this respect, the U.S. Army struggled after large-scale, high-intensity operations ceased in Iraq and Afghanistan. Although “…in what the military refers to as the ‘current operating environment,’ in such places as Iraq and Afghanistan, these modern technologies do not always accurately relay full situational awareness to higher commands. In the COE, high-intensity exchanges between U.S. soldiers and the enemy are infrequent on a scale above the company level.” 14 — July-August 2008 the policy blunders made by senior civilian officials are now well documented, and therefore will not be discussed here, the U.S. Army is not entirely innocent for failing to understand the nature of the conflict it confronted, particularly in Iraq. The U.S. Army seemed to struggle to understand the nature of the conflict that they confronted in late 2003, and failed to produce a coherent strategy to combat the burgeoning insurgency. Unfortunately, a good strategy is precisely what is needed to combat insurgency. In Thomas

E. Ricks’ Fiasco, retired U.S. Army Colonel Robert Killebrew, a Special Forces Vietnam veteran, argues that “when you’re facing a counterinsurgency war, if you get the strategy right, you can get the tactics wrong, and eventually you’ll get the tactics right … If you get the strategy wrong and the tactics right at the start, you can refine the tactics forever but you still lose the war.”12 Although many factors that contributed to the insurgency were outside the realm of the military’s control, such as de-Baath-ification, disbanding the Iraqi army, and other such policies, the lack of a coherent military strategy further hindered the U.S. Army’s prospects for success. The advanced command and control systems senior leaders in Iraq had at their disposal did not help them realize the magnitude of problems they faced nor help formulate a strategy to confront them — namely, to focus on securing the population and improving governance rather than overly focusing on “killing bad guys.” Although it is by no means certain that events would have been different had senior military leaders used a directed telescope system (as it must be properly focused by the commander and the enemy still “has a vote”), it would surely have helped to “paint the picture” for the commander during those crucial early months. Other Uses for the Directed Telescope A directed telescope system could also verify official routine reports by spot checking information, which would likely reduce the optimistic reports made by some leaders. Retired U.S. Army Colonel Larry Wilkerson, Secretary of State Colin Powell’s former chief of staff, noted that such reports are “not an attempt to lie or mendacity... It’s the way the military shapes the statistics … to make it look as if they are meeting whatever objectives they have. That’s as old as the United States Army. That’s as old as Alexander the Great.”13 In The San Antonio Express, another officer puts it more bluntly, noting that, “if you’re not painting the perfect picture ... you can be a hindrance.”14 Establishing a directed telescope system could perhaps encourage commanders to provide accurate and realistic assessments to their superiors, since these reports could be prone to direct verification from higher headquarters. A directed telescope could also give senior leaders more accurate viewpoints from individual soldiers, who often see a conflict much differently than do their superiors, as the now famous op-ed, “The War as We Saw It” by seven 82d Airborne Division soldiers published in the New York Times in 2007, vividly displays.15 Such varying views are valuable and add to, rather than detract from, situational understanding. A directed telescope can also illuminate a unit’s morale. For example, when a senior leader, such as a brigade or division commander, speaks directly with lower-ranking soldiers, they are not likely to express their concerns or be negative; however, the personality and aura that surround many senior leaders can prevent this from occurring. However, a captain who is part of a directed telescope is likely to get a more accurate perception of morale by speaking with soldiers and company commanders. The distinguished military historian Martin van Creveld stated that, “While up-to-date technical means of communication and data processing are absolutely vital to the conduct of modern war in all its forms, they will not in themselves suffice for the creation of a functioning command system, and that they may, if understanding and proper usage are not achieved, constitute part of the disease they are supposed to cure.”16 Van Creveld’s revelation more than 20 years ago remains relevant. The U.S. Army is in the midst of the most ambitious modernization program since the post-Vietnam War era, acquiring more computers, digital communications equipment, unmanned aerial systems, and other modern equipment to aid in command and control. However, in the type of conflict that the U.S. Army is likely to face in the foreseeable future — mostly a mix of stability and reconstruction operations as part of a counterinsurgency — such equipment is necessary, but by no means is sufficient. This type of warfare’s most important aspect is choosing the correct strategy, and to do this, senior leaders must understand the environments they confront and the center of gravity in the fight.17 One tool that successful commanders throughout history employed is the directed telescope, essentially a group of mid-grade officers sent by the commander to subordinate units to verify official reports, check morale and other such intangibles, and confirm that units are property carrying out the commander’s intent — in general, supplement the commander’s situational awareness, which, as noted above, is imperative to selecting a proper strategy and thus achieving mission success in the contemporary operating environment. In sum, the U.S. Army should formally institutionalize a directed telescope system similar to one used by Napoleon, Montgomery, and Patton to help senior commanders achieve accurate situational awareness — something Patton recommended more than 60 years ago. Notes 1Martin van Creveld, Command in War, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, 1985, p. 265. 2Ibid., pp. 74-75. 3Gary B. Griffin, The Directed Telescope: A Traditional Element of Effective Command, Combat Institute Studies Report No. 9, Combat Studies Institute, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 1985, p. 6. 4Ibid. 5Ibid., p. 26. 6Ibid. 7Ibid., p. 29. 8Ibid, p. 31. 9Ibid., p. 32. 10Headquarters, Department of the Army, U.S. Army Field Manual (FM) 6-0, Mission Command: Command and Control of Army Forces, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, DC, August 2003, para. 3-102. 11Ibid., para. 3-103. 12Thomas E. Ricks, Fiasco, Penguin Books, New York, 2007, p. 195. 13Sig Christenson, “Do GIs Have to Spin War’s Facts,” The San Antonio Express, 22 September 2007. 14Ibid. 15Buddhika Jayamaha, Wesley D. Smith, Jeremy Roebuck, Omar Mora, Edward Sandmeier, Yance T. Gray, and Jeremy A. Murphy, “The War as We Saw It,” The New York Times, 19 August 2007. 16Van Creveld, Command in War, p. 259. 17It must be noted that the present leadership in Iraq under General Petraeus understands the nature of the conflict they confront and its center of gravity. Additionally, General Petraeus seems to have a good situational awareness — no doubt because he frequently travels to various parts of the country to personally oversee things and get updates. Captain Andrew Hubbard is currently assigned to 2d Battalion, 69th Armor, Fort Benning, GA. He received a B.S. from the U.S. Military Academy and an M.A. from the Naval Postgraduate School. His military education includes Maneuver Captain Career Course, Armor Officer Basic Course, Airborne School, and Ranger School. He has served in various command and staff positions, to include battalion planner, 3d Squadron, 15th Infantry, Fort Stewart, GA, and Baghdad, Iraq; tank company executive officer and tank platoon leader, C Company, 3d Squadron, 15th Infantry, Baghdad, Iraq; and tank platoon leader, C Company, 3d Squadron, 15th Infantry, Fort Stewart. July-August 2008 — 15