My Kingdom for a Proper Fitting Fan Belt

In the northeast corner of the Patton Museum, there once was a display (until

2006) on the subject of ill-fitted engine fan belts for the M26 Pershing tank during the early days of the Korean conflict. One had to search for the display because it was tucked in behind an M47 tank. As the Army underwent its postwar reduction at the end of World War II, from eight million men and 89 divisions to 591,000 men and 10 divisions, it also underwent numerous structural changes.1 After detonation of the atomic bomb, strategists determined that conventional warfare was obsolete, which resulted in personnel and equipment being reduced to a minimum. To build back the Army’s strength after these massive cuts, the Army downplayed its combat role and emphasized its career and training opportunities. This carried over to training, where recruits were given a much reduced regimen, as opposed to the strict discipline required of an Army in the field. By 1950, the Army seemed to have forgotten that a soldier’s job was to fight.2 25 June 1950 At the time of the North Korean invasion, there were no U. S. combat troops in Korea. The closest combat troops to Korea were four divisions on occupation duty in Japan, the 7th, 24th, and 25th Infantry Divisions, and the 1st Cavalry Division (dismounted). Close at hand was the 29th Infantry Regiment on Okinawa and the 5th Regimental Combat Team in Hawaii. The only other ground unit in the Pacific area was the 1st Marine Division in California. The U. S. Army units in Japan were at approximately 70 percent of their combat strength. They had no where near their full complement of recoilless rifles, mortars, and machine guns. The units were also lacking in anti-tank mines and did not have the new 3.5-inch bazookas. Since it was feared heavier tanks would tear up Japan’s roads and cause its lightweight bridges to collapse, the divisional tank units were equipped with M24 light tanks instead of the heavier M4 or M26 medium tanks.3 On 25 June 1950, North Korea’s ar my invaded South Korea on multiple fronts with eight full divisions, two half divisions and 120 T-34 soviet-made tanks against a poorly armed Republic of Korea (ROK) army. Armed with obsolete 37mm anti-tank guns and 2.36-inch bazookas, the South Koreans were unable to stop the armored monsters.4 28 June 1950 On 28 June 1950, the fourth day of the war, Colonel Olaf P. Winningstad, Eighth Army ordnance chief, found three M26 Pershing medium tanks at the Tokyo Ordnance Depot in bad condition and needing extensive repairs, including rebuilt engines. The repair work began at once and was completed on 13 July. The three tanks were shipped to Pusan where they arrived on 16 July, the first American medium tanks in Korea. Arriving with the tanks, Lieutenant Samuel R. Fowler and 14 enlisted crew members, trained to operate M24 light tanks, were expected to become familiar with the Pershing tank. The tanks experienced mechanical difficulties because their ill-fitted fan belts would stretch, causing their motors to overheat. Belts made in Japan were either too short or too long despite emergency orders to have them corrected. Eighth Army hoped to use the M26 tanks to help stop North Korea’s drive in the southwest and sent the tanks by rail to Chinju where they arrived at 0300 hours, 28 July. They were unloaded at the rail transportation office on the south side of the Nam River where they awaited new belts. When the North Korean 6th Division entered Chinju on the morning of 31 July, the M26 tanks took no part in the battle. Flatcars from Pusan to evacuate the tanks passed through Masan the morning of 31 July, but never got beyond Chungam-ni, about 25 miles short of Chinju. A rail traffic snarl caused by evacuation of the 19th Infantry’s supplies blocked the way. At daybreak, Lieutenant Fowler went to 48 —

Colonel Ned D. Moore, the 19th Infantry’s commander, for instructions. Moore told him that if the enemy overran the 19th Infantry’s positions on the northwest side of Chinju and he could not evacuate the tanks on their own power, he was to destroy them and evacuate his tank crews by truck. Lieutenant Fowler telephoned Masan and apparently learned that the flatcars had departed for Chinju to get the tanks, so he decided to stay. Gradually, the firing in Chinju died down. A ROK soldier who passed the rail station about noon told Fowler that only very few ROK soldiers were still in the town. Sometime later, William R. Moore, an Associated Press correspondent, suddenly appeared and suggested that Fowler check out a group of men coming up the rail track. It was now perhaps an hour past noon. Fowler had an interpreter call to the approaching men — they were North Koreans. Fowler ordered his tank crews to open fire. In the fire fight that immediately flared between the tanks’.30- and.50-caliber machine guns and the enemy’s small-arms fire, Fowler was hit with a bullet on his left side. During this close-range fight, the tanks’ machine gun fire killed or wounded most of the enemy group, which was about platoon size. The tankers put Fowler in his tank and began moving the three M26 tanks east on the road to Masan. Two miles down the road, the tanks came to a blown bridge. The men prepared to abandon the tanks and proceed on foot. They removed Fowler from his tank and made a litter for him. Fowler ordered the men to destroy the tanks by dropping grenades into them. As soon as three crewmen started for the tanks, an enemy force lying in ambush opened fire. A number of men got under the bridge with Fowler. Master Sergeant Bryant E. W. Shrader (Silver Star recipient), the only tanker manning the tanks, opened fire with the.30-caliber machine gun. A North Korean called out in English for the men to surrender. Shrader left the machine gun and started the tank, driving it as close as he could to one of the other tanks. He dropped the escape hatch and took in six men. He then drove back toward Chinju and stopped “...three tanks were shipped to Pusan where they arrived on 16 July, the first American medium tanks in Korea. Arriving with the tanks, Lieutenant Samuel R. Fowler and 14 enlisted crew members, trained to operate M24 light tanks, were expected to become familiar with the Pershing tank.” “...on their arrival in Korea, these Pershing tanks were the only allied tanks on the Korean Peninsula that could rival the North Korean T-34 tank, so they were pushed to the front line quickly, despite their shortcomings. There must have been a great sense of urgency inside the Pusan perimeter and U. S. commanders needed tanks that could stop North Korea’s T-34.” — 49

This brief review showcases two important points: that the wrong questions have been asked about cavalry needs for six decades (at least), not four; and it is clear — and this is LTC Kojro’s implicit point — the main reason the Army keeps asking and answering the wrong questions is because it seeks to fit doctrine to available technology instead of tailoring available technologies to doctrinal needs. As a professional military historian, it pains me to see that this still appears to be the case as we transform from the current force (mounted in HMMWVs and Bradleys), through the interim force (HMMWVs and Strykers), and ultimately to the future force (Future Combat System).

“Riding to the Sound of the Guns” Dear ARMOR, I enjoyed reading “Ground Cavalry Troop in Afghanistan,” by Captain Mike O’Neil in the MayJune 2007 issue of ARMOR. I was especially interested in the organization. Some of your readers don’t realize how much the cavalry has changed since Vietnam. Our squadron commander believed in “riding to the sound of the guns,” so he would call and tell us to leave one crewman per vehicle and become a provisional rifle company. Because Delta Troop (air) was assigned to our squadron, we normally had about an hour to get ready for UH1 pickup. My biggest concern was indirect support, so my supply sergeant did some “trading” for 61mm mortars and ammunition, so our mortar crew could support us when we hit the ground. If my memory is still good, C Troop, 1st Squadron, 10th U. S. Cavalry, only conducted five airmobile assaults (only one hot) in my 11 months in command.

COL, U. S. Army, Retired 5th AD at St. Vith: Could the Battle of the Bulge Have Been Prevented? Dear ARMOR, I thoroughly enjoyed Captain Borows’ article, “Armor’s Stand at St. Vith,” in the March-April 2007 issue of ARMOR. My unit, Company C, 628 Tank Destroyer Battalion, probably owes much to Colonel Bruce Clarke, his combat command of the 7th Armored Division, and the other unit stragglers he was able to enlist to help defend at St. Vith and delay the German advance. We were attached to CCR, 5th Armored Division, and had just come out of Hurtgen Forest. We were given replacements from a corps tank destroyer battalion, which was being dissolved, and were given the new M36 tank destroyer with the 90mm anti-tank gun. The 5th Armored Division, having been in Hurtgen Forest, was given the mission of anchoring the bulge near Monschau and backing up the four infantry divisions that were anchoring the bulge on the Elsenborn Ridge. They were the 2d, 1st, 9th and 99th Infantry Divisions. These divisions did such a great job that 5th Armored was never completely committed. My unit was temporarily transferred from the 5th Armored Division and attached to the 82d Airborne Division, which was adjacent to the 7th Armored Division, to assist in their antitank defense. The German forces were blunted and stopped before reaching the Meuse River and driven back across the border. An interesting article was reprinted in March 2007 in the 5th Armored Division’s newsletter that presupposes if our penetration of the Siegfried Line by CCR, 5th Armored Division in September 1944 had been acted on by Corps or Army, there might not have been a Battle of the Bulge.

LTC, U. S. Army, Retired LETTERS from Page 3 50 — the tank a few feet short of the bridge over the Nam, undecided whether to cross to the other side. There, the overheated engine stopped and would not start again. The seven men abandoned the tank and ran into the bamboo thickets bordering the river. After many close calls with enemy forces, Shrader and his group finally reached safety and passed through the lines of the 25th Division west of Masan. The men back at the blown bridge had no chance. Some were killed or wounded at the first fire. Others were killed or wounded under the bridge. A few ran into nearby fields trying to escape, but were killed or captured. One captured soldier later recalled that he saw several bodies floating in the stream and recognized two as Fowler and Moore.5 The only medium tanks in Korea were lost.6 Studying this part of the Korean war some 57 years later, I pondered what was going through the minds of Fowler and his soldiers during their departure from Japan, their arrival at the Pusan port, and their movement to the front line at Chinju. There is not enough written about this particular part of history to get into the details of what Fowler and his soldiers experienced. For instance, we have no idea how much the soldiers knew about the fan belt problem with their Pershing tanks, or if they even had the capability to apply measures to overcome the problem. I would venture to say they did what they could under the circumstances. Today, we use a pre-combat inspection (PCI) sheet that lists all the items needed prior to movement. A leader’s initial inspection includes preventive maintenance checks and services (PMCS), followed by the DA Form 5988E, the dispatch, and technical manual (TM). However, on their arrival in Korea, these Pershing tanks were the only allied tanks on the Korean Peninsula that could rival the North Korean T-34 tank, so they were pushed to the front line quickly, despite their shortcomings. There must have been a great sense of urgency inside the Pusan perimeter, and U. S. commanders needed tanks that could stop North Korea’s T-34. Without being there, I will probably never know how much attention was pushed higher about the condition of the M26 tank’s fan belts and thus the future operation of the tanks. However, I can safely assume that, at the time, the mission was to get the tanks to the front to help slow down the armor attacks until additional allied medium tanks arrived. Notes 1Brigadier General William A. Stofft, Army Historical Series, American Military History, Office of the Chief of Military History, U. S. Army Center for Army Lessons Learned, Washington, DC, 1989, p. 540. 2Jim Mesko, Armor in Korea: A Pictorial History, Carrollton, Squadron/Signal Publications, February 1984, p. 6. 3Ibid., p. 7. 4Ibid., p. 6. 5Roy E. Appleman, South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu, Department of the Army, U. S. Government Printing Office, Washington, DC, May 1998, pp. 231-233. 6Armor in Korea, p. 13. Lieutenant Colonel Scott K. Fowler is serving as executive officer, Office of the Special Assistant to the Commanding General, Fort Knox, KY. He received a B. A. from Northern Kentucky University. His military education includes the U. S. Army Command and General Staff College, the Armor Officer Basic and Advanced Courses, and Combined Arms and Services Staff School. He has served in various command and staff positions, to include executive officer, 4th Battalion, 85th Training Support Brigade (4/85 TSB), Fort Knox; plans officer, 4/85 TSB, Fort Knox; S3, 103d Chemical Battalion, Kentucky Army National Guard (KYARNG); commander, University of Kentucky, Army Reserve Officer Training Corps, Lexington, KY; company commander, 3d Battalion, 123d Armor, KYARNG; platoon leader, A Troop, 1st Squadron, 4th Cavalry, 1st Infantry Division (Forward), Boeblingen, Germany; and tank platoon leader and company XO, C Company, 4th Battalion, 37th Armor, 2d Brigade, Fort Riley, KS.