A Commander’s Guide to the Forward Support Company

ified table of organization and equipment (MTOE) will be used throughout the article. The Forward Support Company The FSC is a 233-soldier, multifunctional unit that includes a distribution platoon and a maintenance platoon organized to provide support to a maneuver battalion (see Figure 1).2 This is intentionally a very broad mission statement. The FSC provides each battalion a robust and flexible logistics capability to support both doctrinal and non-doctrinal missions in support of full-spectrum operations. Although the FSC is organic to the brigade support battalion (BSB) due to Title IX considerations, it operates under the command and control (C2) of the CAB commander through attachment or operational control. Several sections provide the doctrinal missions and capabilities of the subordinate elements of the FSC. These elements include the company headquarters section, the food service section, the distribution platoon, and the maintenance platoon. Each section’s critical equipment, The Army is making great transformation progress as it moves to a brigade-centric organization, which includes creating forward support companies (FSC) that provide logistics support to battalions and operate as subordinate units of that battalion. Integrating these new companies has created a few challenges, many of which stem from creating new doctrine and deviating from the accepted norms of Army of excellence (AOE) doctrine. Battalion commanders and executive officers struggle with the differences between the AOE doctrine they learned early in their careers and the emerging doctrine of the transformational Army. Many commanders across the Army do not use the FSC to its full potential because they do not fully understand its capabilities and subject-matter expertise. Most of these commanders have not yet been trained by the institutional Army on its new logistics doctrine. For many years, brigade-level logisticians created forward logistics elements (FLE) “out of hide” to augment existing capabilities, such as the support platoon or battalion maintenance section, to weight the battlefield logistically as needed with assets and command and control (C2). This ensured that critical supply and maintenance capabilities were forward with supported battalions. The FSC was created to provide all assets a battalion needed to be self-sufficient and the necessary command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence (C4I) to plan, synchronize, and control logistics operations. The FSC is a multifunctional unit that includes a distribution platoon and a maintenance platoon organized to support a maneuver battalion.1 This article provides information on the doctrinal composition, capabilities, and operations of the FSC, as well as doctrinal and non-doctrinal tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) to both current and future combined arms battalion (CAB) commanders and staff officers. It also focuses on the CAB FSC and not the unique requirements of FSCs supporting reconnaissance squadrons and fires battalions; however, the fundamental principles are the same for all FSCs. Also, for the sake of discussion, the heavy brigade combat team (HBCT), CAB, FSC’s mod- A Commander’s Guide to the Forward Support Company by Major Trenton J. Conner — 11 military occupational specialties (MOS), and potential shortfalls are discussed below. The company headquarters. The FSC headquarters is similar to every other company headquarters in the Army. The headquarters section is responsible for the C2, supply, and administration of the company. The headquarters section also performs logistics tasks that were previously performed by the battalion S4. However, the battalion now has trained and dedicated logisticians to coordinate and provide continuous support, which includes:

• Coordinating and providing technical support to the CAB.

• Advising the CAB commander on sustainment requirements versus available assets.

• Determining sustainment requirements in coordination with the BSB operations section, CAB S4, and logistics representatives from attached units.

• Providing input to the CAB logistics estimate and service support paragraph of the operation order (OPORD).

• Planning and monitoring support operations and making necessary adjustments to ensure support requirements are met.

• Planning and coordinating allocation of available combat service support (CSS) resources.

• Tracking available assets through subordinate company teams, BSB support operations section, CAB S4, and other units.

• Requesting backup support when needed.

• Recommending support priorities and enforcing priorities received from higher headquarters.

• Coordinating with the S3, S4, and headquarters company commander on CAB support area locations.

• Planning and executing contingency operations as required.

• Coordinating with the S3 and S4 on primary and alternate routes into the CAB support area.

• Establishing and monitoring brigade and battalion logistics situation report (LOGSITREP), logistics status (LOGSTAT), and logistics spot reports in accordance with approved standard operating procedures (SOP).

• Planning future logistics operations in coordination with the S4.

• Developing and maintaining tactical and CSS overlays.

• Developing the CSS synchronization matrix.

• Keeping the BSB abreast of the logistics situation and future support requirements.3 The headquarters section is also equipped with unique communications equipment, which allows for theater-wide communications. These systems include: The battle command sustainment support system (BCS3). This system is the Army’s maneuver sustainment C2 system. It aligns sustainment, in-transit, and force data to aid commanders in making critical decisions. This system capability provides operators the complete logistics picture in the form of a “running estimate.” BCS3 provides a map-centric display on a commercial laptop, which provides a thorough technical and visual picture of the battlefield; the ability to plan, rehearse, train, and execute on one system; and a systems software that can operate on unclassified or classified networks. Very small aperture terminal (VSAT). This system serves as the satellite communications system that allows the BCS3 and the maintenance platoon’s standard Army maintenance system-enhanced (SAMS-E) to transmit and receive data. CSS automated information systems interface (CAISI). This system is a secure, wireless local area network (LAN), which provides the “last mile” connectivity between logistics automation systems and VSAT-type networks. CAISI provides wireless line-of-sight (LOS) transmission, encryption on all wireless LAN links, and a digital subscriber line backup capability for anon-LOS requirement within a 3-kilometer distance (extended version has greater distance). Movement tracking system (MTS) controller station. This system is a satellite-based, messaging and mapping system that provides asset visibility of and communication with transportation assets. This system is designed to be integrated with command post operations. MTS vehicle mount ed. This vehicle-mounted system provides the FSC commander with the same capability as the controller station while on the move. All of these systems combine to provide the FSC and the CAB with a logistics common operating picture (COP) and a “reachback” logistics capability. When these systems combine with the CAB’s Army battle command system (ABCS) suite, it creates a complete picture of the battlefield for the battalion commander. For example, a CSS communications architecture would include the following equipment: one M1068 carrier command post; two Force XXI battle command brigade and below (FBCB2); 27 M249 squad automatic weapons (SAWs); one MK-19; two M1083 medium tactical vehicles (MTVs); and one M149 water trailer. Key personnel include: a multifunctional logistician commander; a mechanical maintenance supervisory first sergeant; and a transportation corps executive officer. The field feeding section. The FSC food service section provides class I food service and food preparation. The food service section prepares and delivers hot meals to the maneuver company teams. It distributes prepackaged food, prepared food, or both. It provides one heat-and-serve meal and one cook-prepared (A or B ration) meal per day. Central to the food service section’s mission is its ability to task organize and deploy with company teams and support remote feeding sites using the kitchen, company level, field feeding-enhanced Forward Support Company

HQ Section General Supplies Section Class V Section Maintenance Platoon Platoon HQ Section Field Feeding Section Class III & Water Section Distribution Platoon Service and Recovery Section Maintenance Section Field Maintenance Teams (1 x CO) Maintenance Control Section Platoon HQ Section Figure 1 12 — (KCLFF-E), as well as central feeding sites using the containerized kitchen (CK). The CK is a mobile field kitchen that can support 800 soldiers with up to three hot, cook-prepared or heat-and-serve meals per day. One CK replaces two mobile kitchen trailers and has a greater food-preparation capability. The CK is mounted on a tactical trailer and towed. Its major features include electrical power from an on-board tactical quiet generator (TQG), an environmental control for heating and cooling, and 60 cubic feet of refrigerated storage. The CK provides food preparers the options of roasting, grilling, boiling, frying, and baking. It also has running water, a protected serving line, and ventilation to clear out exhaust and cooking byproducts. The KCLFF-E is used for field feeding company-sized units. It is designed to heat, deliver, and serve one heat-and-serve ration per day for up to 200 soldiers. It also has a limited capability to provide perishable and shelf-stable meals prepared by food preparers. The KCLFF-E requires two food service specialists to operate, with assistance from the supported unit. The KCLFF-E is moved using a high mobility, multipurpose wheeled vehicle (HMMWV) or larger vehicle. To operate to full capability, a FSC field feeding section requires: two CKs; five KCLFF-Es; one M2.50-caliber machine gun; two MK-19 40mm grenade machine guns; three family of medium tactical vehi cle (FMTV)-series vehicles; five HMMWVs; and 23 food service specialists. Distribution platoon. The mission of the distribution platoon is to provide supply and transportation support to the CAB. The platoon is made up of a platoon headquarters section, a class III (POL) transportation section, a general supply section, and a class V (ammo) transportation section. The platoon receives, trans-loads, and distributes all classes of supply with the exception of class VIII; however, the platoon may distribute class VIII based on battalion standard operating procedures (SOPs). The platoon is capable of distributing supplies via unit distribution (combat logistics patrols), supply point distribution (forward operating base-centric), or both. It also has the ability to conduct simultaneous class III and V support to line companies, headquarters companies, and the FSC. The platoon provides its own security while conducting combat logistics patrols or it can be augmented by maneuver forces based on mission, enemy, terrain, troops, time, and civilians (METT-TC).

To operate to full capacity, the distribution platoon requires one FBCB2; one forward area water point supply system; 12 M978 heavy expanded mobility tactical truck (HEMTT) fuelers; one M977 HEMTT cargo; five M1120 HEMTT load handling systems; five M1075 palletized loading systems (PLS); five M1083 MTVs with ring mounts; five M2.50-caliber machine guns; one container handling unit (CHU); one quartermaster corps platoon leader; one 92A40 automated logistics specialist platoon sergeant; 13 petroleum specialists; one water treatment specialist; 28 motor transport operators; and one automated logistics specialist. The real shortfall of the distribution platoon is a lack of ammunition specialists (89B) within the platoon. The class V section is composed of only motor transport specialists and the battalion relies on these specialists to get ammunition management on-the-job-training. Maintenance platoon. The maintenance platoon provides field maintenance to the CAB. With more than 140 soldiers, the maintenance platoon is larger than most companies, consisting of nine sections, which include the platoon headquarters, maintenance control, maintenance, service and recovery, and five company-level field maintenance teams (FMTs). The platoon has a wide variety of military occupational specialties, which provides a robust maintenance capability. The maintenance platoon supports various systems, including M1-series tanks, M2/M3-se- “The maintenance platoon provides field maintenance to the CAB. With more than 140 soldiers, the maintenance platoon is larger than most companies, consisting of nine sections, which include the platoon headquarters, maintenance control, maintenance, service and recovery, and five company-level field maintenance teams (FMTs). The platoon has a wide variety of military occupational specialties, which provides a robust maintenance capability.” ries fighting vehicles, construction equipment, tracked vehicles, wheeled vehicles, weapons systems, fire control systems, power generation equipment, communications equipment, specialty electronic devices, utility equipment, and quartermaster and chemical equipment such as pumps, hoses, and water/fuel systems. The platoon maintains limited quantities of combat spares (prescribed load list and shop/bench stock) in the maintenance control section. The platoon is also responsible for the unit maintenance collection point. When a company is detached from the battalion, the FSC commander detaches a supporting maintenance package that includes personnel, tools, test equipment, and prescribed load list (PLL) stocks necessary to support the company, which usually includes the habitual field maintenance team and any additional capabilities required by the mission. The maintenance platoon headquarters section provides C2 and supervision for all platoon administrative functions. With guidance from the FSC commander, the headquarters section monitors established maintenance priorities, provides recommendations for reinforcing support, and plans and conducts all necessary platoon training activities. The maintenance control section is the primary manager for all field maintenance in the HBCT CAB and serves as the “nerve center” for the battalion’s maintenance activities. The maintenance control section performs all of the Army maintenance management system (TAMMS) and dispatching operations, and tracks scheduled services for the CAB using SAMS-E. All company team SAMS- E boxes and PLL clerks are collocated with the maintenance control section. The maintenance control officer (MCO) manages all the SAMS-E operators. The SAMS-E clerks operating each company box process each DA Form 5988-E (equipment inspection maintenance worksheet) completed by the operator or crew and verified by the FMT. U. S. Army Field Manual-Interim (FMI) 4–90.1, Heavy — 13

Brigade Combat Team Logistics, defines the responsibilities of the maintenance control officer as: “…the principal assistant to the commander, both battalion and FSC, on all matters pertaining to the field maintenance mission. The MCO serves as maintenance officer for the maneuver battalion and FSC. … He is responsible to the commander for the management of the combined efforts of the maintenance control section, maintenance section, service and recovery section, and the maintenance system teams.”4 This eliminates the need for maneuver commanders to pull a battalion motor officer (BMO) “out of hide.” Battalion commanders now have a school trained maintenance officer with supervision (the FSC commander) to manage their fleets! The MCO is also aided by a maintenance officer, usually a warrant officer, and a sergeant first class who serves as the maintenance sergeant. The maintenance control section must coordinate recovery of the battalion’s equipment, evaluate and ensure the quality of all maintenance completed by the maintenance platoon, monitor the status of equipment undergoing repairs, determine the status of the repair parts required to complete repairs, and perform maintenance according to the priorities established by the maneuver battalion commander.5 The service/recovery section provides recovery support to elements of the CAB and limited reinforcing recovery support to FMTs. When reinforcing recovery support is required, FMTs request support from the maintenance control section. The maintenance section provides field maintenance for the HBCT CAB. This section primarily focuses on the headquarters company and the FSC. It also provides maintenance support to elements attached to the CAB and reinforcing maintenance to the FMTs. Each FMT is tailored to support infantry, armor, and engineer companies. As the FSC commander task organizes his company, all or part of an FMT is assigned to the company teams to maintain habitual support doctrinally. The company commander is responsible for setting his company’s FMT priorities; however, the FMT operates under the control of the company first sergeant and is supervised by the FMT maintenance noncommissioned officer in charge. FMTs carry limited onboard combat spares to help facilitate repairs forward. If inoperable equipment cannot be repaired by the FMT, due either to METT-TC or a lack of repair parts, the FMT uses recovery assets to relocate the equipment to the unit maintenance collection point (UMCP) or designated linkup point. FMTs are fully integrated into the combined arms units’ operational plans and their combined assets include one FBCB2, three M88A1s, six M88A2s, two M984 HEMTT wreckers, one M1089 MTV wrecker, six M1075 PLS, six forward repair systems, 18 FMTV-series vehicles, and 13 M2.50-caliber machine guns to operate. The Role of the FSC during Counterinsurgency (COIN) Operations The FSC fulfills its primary mission of battalion-level support almost without fail at combat training centers and in theater. This is done through traditional methods of C2, distribution operations, and maintenance activities. However, the FSC has many other capabilities and possesses areas of expertise that are not being used. The following sections highlight tactics, techniques, and procedures to assist battalion commanders in exercising the capabilities of the FSC as it conducts both doctrinal and non-doctrinal missions. The FSC can perform valuable shaping operations such as combat logistics patrols, assessment of essential services [sewer, water, electricity, academics, and trash (SWEAT)], and limited support and training for host-nation security forces logistics. Combat logistics patrols. The enemy seeks out the most visible and “easiest” targets to exploit in the media. The enemy realizes the most vulnerable targets are lightly armored logistics convoys. Nothing looks better on television than a blazing fuel tanker in the middle of the day. The Army is at its best at night, using most of its assets watching, listening, and poised to attack. Since the enemy chooses to attack logistics targets, we should operate them at night when we are best prepared. Combat logistics patrols should not be used as “bait,” as some may suggest, but supplies must be moved across the battlefield, so we should force the enemy out of hiding on our terms. Assets should be positioned at critical points on the battlefield where they can best engage the enemy. The most common mission for the FSC is combat logistics patrols and much has been written on the subject of convoy security in the past few years. However, it is not the intent of this article to discuss convoy battle drills and things of that nature, but to discuss decisions that must be made by battalion commanders concerning security, air/ground integration, and setting the conditions for success. Security. Every unit rotating through the National Training Center has difficulty determining who has responsibility for the security of combat logistics patrols. Each unit struggles with convoy operating procedures and the allocation of combat forces to the FSC. The question of, “Who’s the convoy commander?” becomes a heated topic of discussion, the answer to which is not clear and must be “The service/recovery section provides recovery support to elements of the CAB and limited reinforcing recovery support to FMTs. When reinforcing recovery support is required, FMTs request support from the maintenance control section.” 14 — settled by the unit through standard operating procedures. There are basically three methods of security for a combat logistics patrol:

• Organic assets — the FSC uses organic assets to provide its own security.

• Allocating external assets — roughly a platoon-sized element is temporarily attached to the FSC for the conduct of the mission.

• Combination of both — platoon-sized elements secure the patrol through more dangerous terrain and the FSC secures itself through less dangerous terrain. This usually involves link up operations with multiple companies within the battalion area of operations. All three of these methods can be successful; the decision comes down to METT-TC and what levels of training soldiers assigned to the mission have. Air/ground integration for combat logistics patrols. The use of Army aviation is almost automatic when planning for ground combat operations. Immediately, the battalion S3 contacts higher headquarters to schedule air assets for the next cordon and search operation; but what about combat logistics patrols, especially if they are “self securing?” Is the use of an air weapons team for convoy security a good economy of force mission? Aviation support provides valuable firepower and “eyes forward” for combat logistics patrols. They can detect improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and other potential threats, and they can provide accurate fires for the convoy commander as the unit moves through the kill zone. Training FSC leaders is critical to integrating aviation; however, planning and using close air support is not yet taught at the logistics schoolhouse. These tasks need to be incorporated into home-station training at least at the squad leader and above levels, and the use of air support can be refined at combat training centers by all elements within the battalion. Finally, on deployment, battalion S3s should include combat logistics patrols into habitual aviation requests to brigade. Setting the conditions. Much has been written on setting conditions for offensive operations. Terms, such as tactical patience and momentum, are often used, but we do not apply the same level of thought and analysis for tactical logistics operations. More often than not, the battle captain does not even know when the FSC is on a mission because another operation has his attention. Below is an example of a conditions checklist that could be helpful for battalion S3s and battle captains during planning, coordinating, and tracking combat logistics patrols:

• Identify the mission, route, and frequency/call-sign of the combat logistics patrol.

• Determine if aviation support is on station; identify frequency/call-sign.

• Ensure the security force linked up with the FSC and completed rehearsals.

• Determine when the last route clearance was conducted.

• Identify friendly operations in progress or planned during the combat logistics patrol; determine if there is a conflict.

• Ensure the quick-reaction force is postured to support the combat logistics patrol.

• Determine if units have been notified that a combat logistics patrol is moving through their area of operations.

• Confirm the latest intelligence for the route.

• Ascertain if the patrol will be traveling through Tier I IED sites at prime hours.

• Ensure the convoy commander turns in a final manifest and receives the latest intelligence update. Assessing essential service requirements. The FSC has a wide variety of military occupational specialties that can be readily applied on commercial equipment in civilian jobs. One of the primary reasons many soldiers enlist in the Army is to obtain job skills they can use after completing enlistments. These same skills can be used to assist local populations during counterinsurgency operations. Chapter 8 of the new U. S. Army Field Manual (FM) 3-24, Counterinsurgency, states: “In general, according to existing U. S. military logistics doctrine, there is no provision for U. S. forces to become decisively or exclusively engaged in providing essential services to the HN [host nation] population during COIN operations. However, this doctrinal position does not prohibit units from using applicable skills and expertise resident in their military organizations to help assess essential HN service needs. In conjunction with these assessments, logistics and other units can also be used to meet immediate needs where possible and in the commander’s interest, and to assist in the handoff of essential service functions to appropriate U. S. Government agencies, HN agencies, and other civil support organizations.”6 In other words, if you have the ability, do what you can with what you have until other measures can be implemented. By having a FSC within the battalion, commanders have the ability to do more, and extending assistance to the local populace will lend credibility to commanders. The FSC commander and the civil affairs team leader/S5 can work together to build area assessments for the battalion commander. Using the SWEAT framework, the list of available capabilities includes:

• Sanitation — water treatment specialist and field sanitation expertise in food-service section (along with “Combat logistics patrols should not be used as “bait,” as some may suggest, but supplies must be moved across the battlefield, so we should force the enemy out of hiding on our terms. Assets should be positioned at critical points on the battlefield where they can best engage the enemy.” — 15 headquarters company medical platoon).

• Water — water treatment specialist.

• Electricity — power generation specialists.

• Academic — all can aid in training and education for critical job skills.

• Transportation — assessment of rail/ bus/ferry/port capacities and facilities, and assessment of mechanical maintenance of rail/bus/truck/ferry operating equipment.

• Food supply — food-service section inspects packaging and facilities with veterinary assistance on food quality and vector control.

• Fuel — petroleum specialists inspect and test fuel facilities and storage. A good configuration for a SWEAT team might include: a security team; a civil affairs team; sanitation/water/fuel/food crew with one 92W water treatment specialist, two 92F petroleum supply specialists, one 63J quartermaster/NBC equipment repairer, one 92G food-service specialist, and one 68W (HHC) combat medic; an electrical crew with one 52D power generation equipment repairer and one 52C utilities equipment repairer; an academic crew with a civil affairs team; and a transportation crew with a distribution platoon leader. Host-nation security forces logistics. Since the advent of military transition teams, deployed units are not as involved with the Iraq/Afghanistan security forces logistics operations as they once were; however, units may still be called on to assist these forces with training and/or logistics support. The most significant logistics challenge in training host-nation security forces is enforcing accountability and curtailing corruption. To better illustrate this point, FM 3-24 states: “Logisticians conducting such training should expect to find themselves repeatedly emphasizing the long-term benefits of supply discipline and materiel accountability and the importance of those practices to the security and development of the host nation. For this reason, emphasis should be placed on inventory procedures. Simultaneously, the black market should be monitored for the presence of pilfered military equipment as a means of determining the effectiveness of logistics procedures and accountability training.”7 Other areas of logistics training may include warehousing and transporting supplies, combat logistics patrols, maintenance, and recovery operations. Units may also be called on to provide emergency resupply to host-nation security forces. If so, then contingency stocks of Halal (food permissible under Islamic law), meals ready to eat (MREs), bottled water, and ammunition should be kept on hand. Ammunition can be obtained through captured stocks. Overall, support to host-nation security forces should have minimal impact; however, units will increasingly conduct joint patrols with host-nation forces, and are better postured to react quickly to urgent needs. Maintenance support to the combined arms battalion. Current doctrine for maintenance support to the CAB is written in the context of supporting high-intensity conflict (HIC) operations. FMI 3-90.5, Heavy Brigade Combat Team Combined Arms Battalion, discusses allocating field maintenance teams to CAB companies.8 During a HIC fight, this is perfectly logical; but what about in the current forward operating base (FOB)-centric counterinsurgency? When a preponderance of maintenance personnel is sliced out to companies, decentralized maintenance activities occur, as they should in a HIC fight; however, for units operating on battalion or larger sized FOBs, maintenance should be centralized at the battalion level. This enables a number of capabilities. Firstly, the maintenance control section has better visibility of the battalion’s non-mission capable vehicles and parts statuses, which enable the maintenance control officer to better enforce maintenance priorities and surge mechanics for high-priority efforts. Secondly, maintenance personnel can better sustain 24-hour operations. It is important to remember than not only will mechanics be performing their primary duties, but will also have force protection requirements and other details. Historically, 30 percent of personnel from support units provide force protection at FOBs. Having all of the mechanics underneath the umbrella of the maintenance platoon ensures both the force protection and maintenance missions. Thirdly, the consolidation of maintenance personnel in a FOB environment provides for both the specialization and cross-training of mechanics, leading to better efficiencies in the production capabilities of the platoon. A final recommendation for the employment of the FSC maintenance platoon is to establish a “service station” for patrols when they return to the FOB. This ensures combat vehicles are taken care of and returned to the fight in peak condition. The service station is a one-stop shop for line companies returning from missions (see Figure 2). The changing role of Army food preparers. Current field feeding is primarily performed by logistics contractors. These contractors provide quality meals for over 90 percent of coalition facilities in Iraq and Afghanistan. Contractor services limit the role of Army food preparers to only providing prepared meals for soldiers working in remote locations. When Army food preparers are not performing their primary MOS functions, they perform security functions. The field feeding section in the FSC has 23 soldiers, which provides the commander with a good number of soldiers to accomplish many tasks. The field feeding section can be trained to conduct:

• Convoy/area security — takes the security burden off of line companies and ensures every combat logistics patrol has a maneuverable security element. This element can also perform security for area Battalion Service Station Tasks:

1. Conduct after PMCS

2. Report deficiencies to mechanic

3. Mechanic verifies fault and orders/installs parts

5. Draw Class I, IV, V, and

6. Repack vehicle for combat Fuel Pt

Distro assessment teams or medical civilian-assistance programs (MEDCAPs).

• Personal security detachment — train approximately 16 soldiers to provide personal security for the battalion commander and other battalion leaders.

• Force protection for entry control points and other guard duty.

• Dislocated field feeding — the FSC should maintain a reserve of four food preparers to operate two KCLFF-Es in case of unforeseen out-of-sector missions. The field feeding section should have four M1114s, equipped with M2.50-caliber machine guns and multiband intra-team radios (MBITRs) for dismounted operations. The key to success for these security operations is home-station training, followed by training at a combat training center prior to deployment. Other nontraditional logistics missions. The FSC is also capable of performing the following nontraditional missions:

• Non-standard casualty evacuation. The FSC has 28 FMTV vehicles that can mobilize to support casualty evacuation.

• Split-based operations. The FSC has enough communications equipment to support logistics C2 in two nodes.

• Female search teams. Since the FSC is the only unit that has females assigned at the battalion task force level, training all female soldiers in personnel search techniques allows units to search indigenous female personnel without violating cultural norms.

• Captured ammunition/arms holding area (CAHA). The FSC should operate the initial storage point for captured ammunition, arms, and equipment. This also provides for contingency stocks of ammunition, weapons, and armament repair parts for host-nation security forces. Battalion Commander Responsibilities Indeed, some battalion commanders place more emphasis on logistics than others. However, battalion commanders can ensure FSCs operate to full potential and are full members of the battalion by following a few recommendations: Integrating the FSC as a unit. This begins with the type of relationship the maneuver battalion commander has with the FSC commander. For example, if the battalion commander does not respect the FSC commander because of branch differences, then the rest of the battalion will not respect the FSC commander. The FSC commander is the senior logistician in the battalion and should be held fully responsible for the material readiness and supply status of the battalion. Additionally, FSC officers and soldiers should be held to the same standards as the rest of the battalion. Integrating the combat trains command post and FSC command post. Units are finding much success consolidating combat service support C2 in one centralized command post. Many times, the S1 and S4 operate independently of the FSC commander, which creates a disjointed concept of support. Creating a “fusion cell” combines the S1, S4, and FSC, providing a “one-stop” point for administration and logistics (see Figure 3). During battle tracking in the tactical operations center, FSC operations, including recovery missions and combat logistics patrols, should be planned, coordinated, and tracked just as other battalion operations. Commanders should task the medical platoon to provide at least one medic to support FSC missions. The FSC has no organic medical capability and although the FSC will have first responders and combat lifesavers, having a true medic saves lives. FSC operations should be fully integrated in all battalion training. The FSC should not be allowed to just simply feed, fix, and supply the battalion while the line companies train. The FSC should conduct convoy operations, tactical refuel and recovery missions, establish tactical feeding sites, and conduct crew-served and individual weapons training. The FSC provides each supported battalion a robust logistics capability. The FSC can provide critical shaping and sustaining operations to be integrated with the other lines of operations. The FSC commander provides battalion commanders an executive agent for all logistics matters and ensures integration with higher levels of support. After fully integrating the FSC into the maneuver battalion, commanders will see just how effective their logistics systems are and how well they integrate with other combat operations. Notes 1U. S. Army Field Manual Interim (FMI) 4-90.1, Heavy Brigade Combat Team Logistics, U. S. Government Printing Office (GPO), Washington, DC, 15 March 2005. 2Ibid. 3FMI 3-90.5, Heavy Brigade Combat Team Combined Arms Battalion, GPO, Washington, DC, 15 March 2005. 4FMI 4-90.1, Heavy Brigade Combat Team Logistics. 5Captain Eric A. McCoy, “Maintenance Management in the Heavy BCT,” Army Logistician, September-October 2006. 6U. S. Army Field Manual (FM) 3-24, Counterinsurgency, GPO, Washington, DC, 15 December 2006. 7Ibid. 8FMI 3-90.5, Heavy Brigade Combat Team Combined Arms Battalion. Major Trenton J. Conner is currently an observer controller, Operations Group, National Training Center, Fort Irwin, CA. He received a B. B. A. from North Georgia College. His military education includes the Combined Logistics Captains Career Course. He has served in various command and staff positions to include, forward support company trainer, Light Infantry Task Force, National Training Center, Fort Irwin; commander, Company A, 25th Brigade Support Battalion, 1st Brigade, 25th Infantry Division (SBCT), Operation Iraqi Freedom III; platoon leader, 1st Battalion, 187th Infantry, 101st Airborne Division (Assault), Kosovo; and platoon leader, 626th Forward Support Battalion, 101st Airborne Division (Assault), Kosovo. FSC/CTCP Integration

FUSION!

FUSION!

• One One-stop SA for FSC stop SA for FSC

• Functional ALT TOC Functional ALT TOC

• Centralized OPS Centralized OPS

• Ability to best support Ability to best support the TF the TF

• One

• Functional ALT TOC

• Centralized OPS

• Ability to best support the TF