From the Ashes: Rebuilding the Iraqi Army

When you hear the term “observer controller (OC),” it brings to mind images of non-MILES wearing, doctrine-spouting, mistake-hunting experts who are the bane of units going through Combat Training Centers. They are also considered to be safe from deployments, other than the occasional temporary duty trip. However, on 16 March 2004, members of the Timberwolf OC team from the Combat Maneuver Training Center (CMTC), Hohenfels, Germany, arrived in Baghdad, Iraq, with anew mission: to train a battalion of the new Iraqi army. Suddenly, those doctrinal experts would have to practice what they preach. The CMTC sent two ten-man teams to support the Coalition Military Assistance Training Team (CMATT). A mix of armor and infantry backgrounds, each team was made up of several OCs, which included one field grade officer, two captains, and seven senior noncommissioned officers (NCOs). The Timberwolf team was the first to hit the ground, with the mission of training the Iraqi 6th Infantry Battalion. Two weeks later, another team from the CMTC, the Grizzlies, arrived to train the Iraqi 7th Battalion. As with so many units entering Iraq, there was the initial confusion, apprehension, and frustrations normally involved with a deployment. It took approximately two weeks travel time to arrive at our training base in Kirkush, Iraq. Located in the U. S. Army’s 1st Infantry Division’s (1ID’s) sector, Kirkush lies between the towns of Balad Ruz and Mandalay. The Iranian mountains are clearly visible to the east. Kirkush Military Training Base (KMTB) was residence to the 30th Enhanced Separate Brigade (Forward Operating Base Caldwell), a North Carolina Army National Guard unit assigned to 1ID, and the Iraqi army training area. All CMATT activities, courses, and infantry battalions are located on the Iraqi portion of KMTB. All courses for the Iraqi army, ranging from primary leadership development courses to senior NCO courses, are conducted at KMTB. Currently, control of the courses is gradually being handed over from a joint team of U. S. military instructors to Iraqi instructors, a sure sign of the Iraqi army starting to train their own. Three Iraqi battalions, 5th, 6th, and 7th, were stood up in KMTB. Challenges began immediately for the Timberwolf Advisor Support Team (AST). Our ten-man team had the responsibility to train approximately 1,000 Iraqi army soldiers and stand up the life-support facilities for the entire battalion. Weapons, vehicles, bunks, mattresses, bedding, mess hall equipment, uniforms, administrative equipment, and anything else a battalion needs to operate, had to be found, requisitioned, and set up. Vehicle support and CMATT support convoys were very limited due to intense insurgent activities during the month of April. Using borrowed two-and-a-half-ton trucks from the 30th Brigade, we pulled together basic life-support resources for the battalion. 44 —

Iraqi officers had undergone a one-month training period in Jordan. The senior NCOs (SFC and above) were graduates of the senior NCO course, which was managed by a civilian contractor company. All the battalion officers and senior NCOs arrived in Kirkush to conduct leader’s integration training. Once integration training was complete, battalion leaders would conduct their own basic training for approximately 600 privates. The AST’s mission was to prepare, coach, teach, and mentor battalion leaders to successfully train their soldiers. CMATT based its training principles on the U. S. Army of World War II — if you have the necessary cadre to train an army, you can build quality, professional forces in a short time. Our grandfathers had years to get ready for war; we had months. Leader integration exposed us to the material, cultural, and leadership challenges we would experience over the course of training. Classroom aids, such as laptops, light projectors, and PowerPoint slides, were nonexistent. It was not until two Timberwolf AST members risked life and limb to go to another forward operating base (FOB) and bring back supplies that we had the materials to train teachers. Even simple overhead projectors were difficult to find. The first week of class consisted of whiteboards and strictly hands-on training. For classes, such as first aid and weapons, this proved to be the most effective teaching method. For more difficult concepts, such as land navigation (intersection and resection proved to be extremely difficult), visual class materials were invaluable. Cultural differences also proved difficult. Formations, timelines, and uniform standards were slow to be accepted. Part of the uniformity problem stemmed from a lack of supplies. Kirkush was the central distribution point for all Iraqi Civil Defense Corps (ICDC) and Iraqi army uniforms. Therefore, as soon anew supply of uniforms arrived, they were rapidly distributed across all Iraqi law enforce-ments units. Sporadic supply deliveries limited the AST’s ability to provide uniforms for even battalion leaders. Finally, overcoming the ghost of the old Iraqi army proved to be a leadership challenge. Many of the officers and senior NCOs had prior military experience, either with the Iraqi army or in the Kurdish Peshmerga. However, in the old Iraqi army, the roles of the officer and NCO differed greatly from officer and NCO roles in the U. S. Army. We led by example, making us the first to teach Iraqi leaders to lead by example. Eventually, most Iraqi leaders understood what their roles and relationships were. Arrival of the Iraqi soldiers also jolted leaders into leadership roles. We were pleasantly surprised when most of the NCOs stepped up and took charge when soldiers arrived. The officers and NCOs did not want to appear incompetent to the soldiers. The table of organization and equipment (TOE) strength for soldiers was 591, but 750 new recruits were brought in to account for eventual attrition. Over the course of five days, soldiers would show up at the front gate of Kirkush where Iraqi NCOs waited with busses to take them on post. This process went from 0900 hours until the front gate closed at 2000 hours. After undergoing various searches, soldiers were bussed to the battalion area for initial in-processing. Normal in-processing procedures included briefings, amnesty box, haircuts, medical exams, and equipment issue. Once our battalion reached 750 soldiers, our rosters were closed and basic training commenced. Basic training was broken down into two distinct phases: phase I dealt with individual soldier skills; and phase II taught squad and platoon maneuvers. Individual skills involved first aid, land navigation, general knowledge classes, and marksmanship training. Our battalion’s weapons arrived about four days prior to the start of range week. Over 750 brand-new weapons from Bulgaria arrived; due to construction constraints, all were placed in one arms room. Needless to say, weapons draw was along and time-consuming process. Without enough AK47s to equip every soldier (since we were overstrengh), zeroing and qualification had to be re-done at the completion of basic. The officers and NCOs ran both the zero and qualification range, with the assistance of some Jordanian soldiers assigned to CMATT. The classes paid off; nearly all the soldiers qualified. Pay became another source of frustration for both the AST and the Iraqis. Without any sort of central banking system in place, all payments had to be made in cash. A roster was sent from Kirkush to Baghdad. The cash then had to make its way back to Kirkush and be distributed to Iraqi soldiers. To complicate matters, the rosters sent down to the AST teams were in English. Company officers would pay their soldiers and the English/Arabic problem was resolved with the help of dedicated translators. Once the soldiers had money, they needed time off to get the money to their families. Again, with “The AST’s mission was to prepare, coach, teach, and mentor battalion leaders to successfully train their soldiers. CMATT based its training principles on the U. S. Army of World War II — if you have the necessary cadre to train an army, you can build quality, professional forces in a short time. Our grandfathers had years to get ready for war; we had months.” — 45 no banking system in place, the only way for the soldiers to get money to their families was to hand-carry the cash. An often overlooked challenge faced by all soldiers in Iraq is the language barrier. The Iraqi army is set up to mimic the societal breakdown of ethnic backgrounds. Our battalion strength would consist of 20 percent Kurdish and a split between Shiite and Sunni Muslims, which was a challenge for translators, many of whom only spoke Arabic. For example, in a class given in Arabic, a Kurdish soldier with a question would use another Kurd who understood both Kurdish and Arabic to translate. This soldier would then ask the translator the question in Arabic, who would in turn translate it into English for the AST instructor. An answer given in English would make its way back through two people in Arabic and then in to Kurdish — along process, but vital to ensuring the new Iraqi army is fully integrated to match the cultural diversities of Iraq. Phase-two training focused on getting the battalion ready to conduct operations in support of coalition forces. This meant training Iraqis on three key tasks: checkpoint operations; combat patrols through towns; and cordon and search operations. Checkpoint/traffic control operations encompassed a variety of tasks, all of which we had trained as OCs at the CMTC, which included vehicle search, personnel search, and checkpoint set up. Using the same standards that 1ID used during their Operation Iraqi Freedom training, the Iraqis became proficient at running effective checkpoints. Due to a lack of tactical vehicles, we focused on dismounted patrols. Some after-action reports (AARs) coming out of Iraq argue that coalition forces needed to leave their vehicles and put more “boots on the ground” to interact with the Iraqi people, following the “beat cop on patrol” that the New York City Police Department used so successfully to cut crime. This fit our training perfectly for two reasons: we were limited on transportation options both for training and for operations, so dismounted infantry tactics were perfect for the 6th Battalion; and the Iraqi population felt more comfortable seeing Iraqi soldiers patrol through their towns, stopping vehicles or even searching homes. Understandably so — Americans would feel more comfortable seeing U. S. troops conduct military operations within the United States. Phase two also involved more advanced weapons training. Machine gun training using RPK and PKM machine guns added a potent punch to the light infantry battalion. Weapons were assigned to an individual and more time was committed to zeroing and qualifying. Reflexive fire training also helped Iraqi soldiers develop trust in their abilities, weapons, and teammates. The AK47 proved to be the more difficult weapon to use in close-quarter battle (CQB) training because of its safety switch location. Whereas the M16/M4 has an easy-to-reach safety switch (left side and easily moved with the thumb), the AK47 safety is on the right and harder to reach. Also, moving the AK47’s selector switch from ‘safe’ sets the gun on ‘full automatic.’ “Rock and roll” is not the preferred method for controlled pairs in a CQB situation. However, through extensive training and coaching from the AST, Iraqi soldiers developed enough skill and confidence in their weapons to conduct both safe and effective operations. Concurrently, members of the 6th AST conducted right seat ride patrols with members of the 30th Enhanced Separate Brigade. Getting out and into the sector allowed advisors to see first-hand the problems, challenges, and different personalities that the Iraqis will soon face. Patrolling with the 30th Brigade also val- “Cultural differences also proved difficult. Formations, timelines, and uniform standards were slow to be accepted. Part of the uniformity problem stemmed from a lack of supplies. Kirkush was the central distribution point for all Iraqi Civil Defense Corps (ICDC) and Iraqi army uniforms. Therefore, as soon anew supply of uniforms arrived, they were rapidly distributed across all Iraqi law enforcements units.” 46 — idated many of the training scenarios units were put through at the CMTC. During situation training exercise (STX) lanes at Hohenfels, units often complained they were not given enough information, such as where to locate the town mayor, to conduct effective patrols. For example, on our first patrol, one of the tasks was to gather information on a small town outside of Balad Ruz. The town was designated by number, not name, on the American map. The patrol went from building to building, and eventually found the town mayor two hours later. The 30th Brigade again provided great support by answering all of our questions and providing great advice for their soon-to-be partners. Members of the Timberwolf team served as subject-matter experts and go-to guys for every type of problem, which included establishing necessary systems from S1 to S4 to the arms room, dealing with pay problems (in Iraqi Dinar), or teaching Iraqi medics how to administer an IV to one of the many soldiers who went down due to the extreme heat. Once operational, we served as the communications link between the Iraqi unit and the U. S. unit we were supporting. During the first Gulf War, the issue of properly using advisors with coalition units was addressed. It was determined that the role of advisors would include providing a communications link to the higher U. S. headquarters; providing accurate reports to the U. S. commander on successes or failures of the advisor’s unit; providing an accurate assessment on the unit’s capabilities to accomplish a mission; and coaching, teaching, and mentoring units — we were more than advisors. Tankers and infantrymen all shared the same goal: to ensure Iraqi army soldiers were successful. Watching Iraqi army soldiers go from a nonexistent battalion to a fully functional operational unit, provided us all with a great sense of satisfaction, greater than any end of a rotation at CMTC. With a lot of patience, experience, and hard work, OCs from the CMTC successfully completed their mission and helped the Iraqi military take a step closer “Watching Iraqi army soldiers go from a nonexistent battalion to a fully functional operational unit, provided us all with a great sense of satisfaction, greater than any end of a rotation at CMTC. With a lot of patience, experience, and hard work, OCs from the CMTC successfully completed their mission and helped the Iraqi military take a step closer to providing for their country’s security and its future.” — 47 to providing for their country’s security and its future. Major Mike Sullivan is currently assigned as battalion operations observer controller, Combat Maneuver Training Center (CMTC), Hohenfels, Germany. He received a B. S. from the U. S. Military Academy and an M. A. from American Military University. His military education includes Combined Arms and Services Staff School, Armor Officer Advanced Course, Tank Commanders Course, Airborne School, Air Assault School, Infantry Officers Basic Course, and Jungle Operations Training Course. He has served in various command and staff positions, to include airborne anti-tank platoon leader, airborne an ti-tank company XO, and airborne rifle platoon leader, 3d Brigade, 505th Parachute Infantry Regiment, 82d Airborne Division, Fort Bragg, NC; primary maneuver instructor, Warrior Preparation Center, Kaiserslautern, Germany; commander, Head quarters and Headquarters Company and A Company, 1st Battalion, 63d (1-63) Armor, 1st Infantry Division, Vilseck, Germany; S3 Air, 1-63 Armor; and company/team primary observer controller, CMTC, with duty as an Iraqi army advisor, 6th Iraqi Infantry Battalion, Kirkush, Iraq.