Fault Trend Analysis: A Proactive Maintenance Approach

Flexibility is one of the hallmarks of the cavalry organization. Cavalry leaders have to be comfortable with three basic operational and planning constraints: minimal planning and preparation time; widely varying mission sets; and complex logistics planning. Cavalry units are expected to maintain the ability to move around the battlespace with just enough information to get the job done, which often results in limited planning and preparation time. Cavalry units must also retain their ability to move out and accomplish the mission under various circumstances, which range from convoy security to direct action against known enemy positions. Finally, cavalry units are expected to be adept at developing detailed logistics plans — being “out front” entails a significantly more complex logistics set due to the long and tenuous line back to the rear area. The case studies and analysis that follow are intended to assist cavalry leaders with detailed logistics planning and are based on the 1st Squadron, 14th (1-14) Cavalry’s deployment to Iraq. The lessons learned from the three case studies below will assist leaders in developing a proactive maintenance approach. By taking the mission sets and the expected terrain into consideration, leaders will be able to anticipate, in a general sense, maintenance faults and repair part needs and prepare accordingly. The 1st Squadron (Reconnaissance, Surveillance, and Target Acquisition (RSTA)), 14th U. S. Cavalry (Warhorse), 3d Brigade, 2d Infantry Division, Fort Lewis, Washington, is the U. S. Army’s first Stryker Brigade Combat Team (SBCT) and the only RSTA-capable squadron in the U. S. Army. It deployed to Operation Iraqi Freedom with 54 Strykers, which included 39 reconnaissance vehicles (RV), six mortar carrier vehicles (MCV), three fire support vehicles (FSV), four medical evacuation vehicles (MEV), and two command variants (CV). Each line troop had 13 reconnaissance vehicles, two MCVs, and one FSV, a total of 16 Strykers. Headquarters and Headquarters Troop consisted of two CV vehicles and four MEVs. All Stryker variants have the same chassis, power train, steering components, and electrical systems. Each vehicle’s hull varies slightly, as does its weapons systems. The categories used to analyze the fault trends include power train, steering, hull, electrical, heating and cooling systems, and fuel system. The power train category includes engine failures, transmission, transfer case, suspension, and driveline. The steering category includes tires, hubs, and tie rods. The hull category includes damages to slat armor (a steel cage surrounding the vehicle to provide additional standoff), headlights, armor plating, and weapons systems. The electrical system encompasses all power generation and distribution, which includes batteries, wiring harnesses, generators, and communications equipment. The fuel system category covers fuel tanks, pumps, lines, and gauges. The heating and cooling category encompasses heaters, coolant lines, and water pumps. To categorize and analyze data, all Strykers were treated equally. There are slight variations in the hull structure, weight, electrical systems, and weapons systems. However, they are extremely similar in the automotive sense and the variant differences do not seem to have a significant effect on maintenance status. Al so, this study was not intended to determine the different maintenance requirements of each variant, but provide leaders with some broad-based lessons learned to assist in logistics and maintenance planning. One particular maintenance aspect that has been emphasized is fault category numbers are more important than the actual 36 — number of component failures. That is, if a Stryker requires three new tires at one time, that fault is recorded as one steering component failure, not three. Similarly, if a vehicle accident or enemy contact results in slat armor damage and some electrical damage, the maintenance fault is categorized as one hull fault and one electrical fault because the incident affected both categories. Case 1: Convoy Security During the months of April and May 2004, the Arrowhead Brigade Combat Team was tasked to provide convoy security for civilian and military convoys moving along Highway 1 from Convoy Support Center (CSC) Scania to Logistics Support Area (LSA) Anaconda and back down to the CSC — a distance of about 300 miles round-trip. Initially, an infantry battalion that was previously detached from the brigade undertook the mission, conducting a company-sized escort mission daily with one company escorting trucks south, one company escorting trucks north, and one company on maintenance and rest. Toward the end of May, the brigade commander decided that the convoy security operation was more of a cavalry mission; he decided to bring the infantry battalion north to Mosul and send the 1-14th Cavalry to assume convoy security responsibilities. The mission sets did not change once the cavalry assumed control of the operation. Each troop would make one trip daily for two consecutive days, and then have one rest and recovery day. One troop would move south from LSA Anaconda to CSC Scania, one troop would move north from CSC Scania to LSA Anaconda, and one troop would be on rest and maintenance. The terrain that the troopers had to negotiate along Highway 1 and associated bypasses included both improved and semi-improved roads and heavily congested urban areas. As the enemy situation dictated, the units used both sides of the highway, the median, and frontage roads to continue convoy movements. The heavily congested urban areas were located mainly in and around Baghdad; however, driving was mostly done along improved or semi-improved roads and through moderate to light urban congestion. A quick glance at overall trends suggests the lion’s share of maintenance faults were with steering components. Incidentally, almost 80 percent of those faults were tires. Tires have been the number one in-demand item for the Stryker vehicle, but should come as no surprise to anyone. Mission factors that influenced this trend include the distance each vehicle traveled in the 14-day period (almost 2,000 miles), the surface conditions of Highway 1, and the many local bypasses the convoys were forced to travel. Also, convoy speed and travel distances exacerbated slight alignment problems and contributed to steering component failures. The second highest fault trend in the study was in the hull category. Mission factors that influenced this include high volumes of traffic in urban areas through which convoys traveled and the fact that no coherent traffic laws are enforced. Installing the slat armor increased the Stryker’s width, which made motor vehicle accidents a significant amplifier to the overall category of hull failures. “To categorize and analyze data, all Stryk ers were treated equally. There are slight variations in the hull structure, weight, electrical systems, and weapons systems. However, they are extremely similar in the automotive sense and the variant differences do not seem to have a significant effect on maintenance status.” Figure 1 — 37 Convoy Security Fault Trends 16-29 July 0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 Power Train Steering Electrical Hull Fuel System Cooling and Heating A B C

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Case 2: Reconnaissance Operations in the Vicinity of Iraq/Syria Border During its sixth week of conducting convoy security operations through Baghdad, the squadron received a warning order to prepare to deploy in less than 72 hours along the Syrian border. The mission was to conduct reconnaissance and security operations as part of a larger multinational force — Iraq’s initiative to stem the flow of terrorists across porous borders. The mission required the squadron to deploy en masse along hundreds of miles of border and focus all intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assets toward shutting down infiltration routes into Iraq from Syria. In support of the interdiction mission, Warhorse troopers conducted joint border patrol missions with the Iraqi border police, border fort occupation and improvement, and long-range reconnaissance of suspected infiltration routes. The terrain along the Syrian border is made up of rolling, dusty desert plains, cross-cut by wadis and unimproved roads. The conditions in early August are extremely dry, hot, and dusty, as in most of Iraq. Vehicle travel along the roads kicks up a tremendous amount of dust and sand, and temperatures often exceed 115 degrees. Although travel along the border was done at decreased speeds compared to the convoy security mission, the engine and power train were under increased stress due to off-road and undulating terrain conditions. During the first 14 days of Syrian border reconnaissance operations, the fault trend changed to indicate a significant increase in the amount of power train failures and a decrease in the aggregate amount of steering component failures. Although steering component failures remained a large source of the overall maintenance faults, power train components took the overall lead when conducting reconnaissance operations along the border. Unimproved roads and varying degrees of desert berms, wadis, and dry lake beds appear to have contributed to failures in driveline components, such as east/west shafts and wheel assemblies (hubs). Another interesting development was a sharp comparative increase in cooling and heating systems failures. High temperatures and the need for troops to operate vehicles in the heat of the day seem to have caused failures on items, such as water pumps, water pump belts, thermostats, and coolant lines. During the first 14 days on the Syrian border, there was also a spike in electrical faults during reconnaissance missions. This is possibly due to vehicles being run almost continuously to support the power needs of communications systems and the long-range advanced scout surveillance system (LRAS3). Case 3: Security Operations in Western Mosul Almost exactly two weeks after the mission along the Syrian border began, Warhorse received orders to deploy to Mosul to a conduct relief-in-place with an infantry battalion currently conducting security operations on the west side of the Tigris River. The squadron was given less than 12 hours to close on Mosul and begin relief-in-place activities. One Warhorse troop was task organized to an infantry battalion remaining in Western Ni-nevah Province, and Warhorse picked up a rifle company once it closed in on Mosul. The squadron’s mission was to conduct security operations in and around Mosul to maintain a stable and secure environment and facilitate the continued development of the local government and security forces. Troop level tactical operations consisted of counter-mortar pa- “The conditions in early August are extremely dry, hot, and dusty, as in most of Iraq. Vehicle travel along the roads kicks up a tremendous amount of dust and sand, and temperatures often exceed 115 degrees. Although travel along the border was done at decreased speeds compared to the convoy security mission, the engine and power train were under increased stress due to off-road and undulating terrain conditions.” Figure 2 38 — Syrian Border Recon Faults 1-14 August 0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 Power Train Steering Electrical Hull Fuel System Cooling and Heating A B C

Totals trols through the city, flash traffic control points, joint patrols, and offensive operations to capture or kill known terrorists. Mosul is home to approximately 1.7 million people, most of whom live concentrated on the western side of the Tigris and within the squadron’s area of operations. Naturally, almost all of the terrain inside the area of operations is heavily restricted urban sprawl. Most of the patrols used smaller side roads and byways to travel to and occupy observation posts, while high-speed travel was restricted to a few highways cross-cutting the city. Given the lack of enforced traffic laws or a functioning police force, most of the traf fic, whether on small streets or the few highways, was stop and go. Fault trends observed during the first two weeks of western Mosul security operations revealed a similarity to those observed during convoy security missions, only on a smaller scale. This was evident by reemerging steering component failures as a main source of non-mission capable faults in each troop. Hull failures rose significantly compared to the border reconnaissance mission, commensurate with the rise in traffic accidents and enemy contact while conducting operations in the urban environment. Also, heating and cooling problems dropped significantly with none observed among the three troops because many of the patrols were short-duration operations and were conducted during limited visibility hours. Analysis Comparing the three case studies yields two fairly obvious conclusions. First, the differing mission sets have a significant effect on the type of maintenance faults observed. The influence of mission factors cannot be overstated; mission requirements affect everything from the time of day the vehicle is consistently operated to how long and how well an operator conducts preventive maintenance checks and services. While conducting security missions, most faults were in the steering component category, whether the security mission required a 150-mile escort on a main highway, or a short drive to a blocking position for cordon and search. Security operations, whether convoy security or area security, required a different type of vehicle usage than reconnaissance operations and therefore more steering components were affected. Conversely, during reconnaissance missions, the majority of failures occurred in the power train components with a spike in heating, cooling, and electrical components. The increase in the amount of heating, cooling, and electrical faults resulted from long periods of engine idling and a constant drain on electrical systems, which are requirements placed on the vehicle during reconnaissance operations. The study also revealed that the increase in power train faults was caused by the terrain along the Syrian border. Terrain, although not the most important factor, has an impact. The terrain along the Syrian border appears to have affected the ability of drive train components to stand up to dusty off-road conditions. Even though the distances traveled were almost one-quarter of the distances traveled during security missions, the power train components failed at a significantly higher rate during Syrian border reconnaissance missions. In short, vehicles were driven less and at slower speeds, but power train components failed at higher rates. The notion that different terrain and mission sets affect equipment failure differently is by no means novel; however, fault data shows that there is a real connection, which indicates the need for cavalry leaders to develop a proactive maintenance posture. The examples used in this article are not the only mission factor-maintenance fault relationships experienced in Iraq. Many other factors influenced the data, but were not discussed because those factors did not have the same value as lessons for advancing the notion of a proactive-maintenance approach. Too often, leaders conducting maintenance and logistics planning rely on prescribed load lists or additional stock listings to manage maintenance requirements. While these lists have to be maintained and adhered to, cavalry leaders need to be proactive in generating and filling logistics requirements through careful analysis of fault trends and resulting underlying conditions. For example, armed with the knowledge of the tangible connection between security operations and an increase in steering component failures, a unit S4 can anticipate requirements and requisition twice the standard amount of tires. Likewise, during a reconnaissance mission, leaders can expect to see a spike in electrical and cooling systems failures and plan accordingly by preparing operators with additional tips on keeping systems cool and ensuring mechanics know how to troubleshoot electrical systems. These are only a few examples of a proactive maintenance and logistics planning, and the connections demonstrated here will not always hold true; however, careful fault trend analysis and the resulting proactive maintenance approach can be an extremely useful tool for successful cavalry leaders. Captain Walter Reed is currently the squadron maintenance officer, 1st Squadron, 14th U. S. Cavalry (1-14 Cav), 3d Brigade, 2d Infantry Division, Fort Lewis, WA. He received a B. S. from the U. S. Military Academy. His military education includes Airborne School, Armor Officer Basic Course, Scout Platoon Leaders Course, and Ranger School. He has served in various command and staff positions, to include executive officer, B Troop, 1-14 Cav, Fort Lewis; and platoon leader, A Company, 1st Battalion, 23d Infantry, 3d Brigade, 2d Infantry Division, Fort Lewis. Figure 3 — 39 Western Mosul Fault Trends 15-28 August 0 5 10 15 20 25 Power Train Steering Electrical Hull Fuel System Cooling and Heating B C

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