Holding Ground: Echelon Defense in Open Terrain
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Echelon Defense in Open Terrain by Lieutenant Colonel Bo Friesen A regimental armored cavalry troop’s unique structure makes it ideal for conducting reconnaissance and security missions. However, classic defense missions pose problems for such a unit. The lack of organic or attached infantry makes it difficult for a troop to hold ground or defend against an enemy advance. Fighting in open terrain increases the difficulty factor, as there are few terrain features to channel the enemy or construct defensive positions. The open, desert region of Iraq, where we have fought two of our most recent major conflicts, is exactly such terrain. In a perfect world, a cavalry troop would receive a minimal number of defense missions, with infantry/armor company teams assuming them instead. In practice however, cavalry troops must often assume the less exotic, but vital, defense missions in an economy-of-force role. These missions also arise during independent reconnaissance or security operations. Cavalry troops must use superior firepower and maneuverability to compensate for lack of infantry. Maintaining weapons standoff and preventing enemy infantry from closing with the defending unit can overcome a lack of infantry support — an echelon defense can accomplish exactly that. The following scenario illustrates simple, flexible tactics for conducting a hasty echelon defense. These tactics were refined by I Troop, 3d Squadron, 3d (3/3) Armored Cavalry Regiment (ACR) in Saudi Arabia during Operations Desert Shield/Storm. The unit conducting this mission was a standard regimental armored cavalry troop of the early 1990s era. It consisted of two scout platoons, equipped with six M3A2 Bradley Fighting Vehicles; two tank platoons, equipped with four M1A1 Abrams tanks; two M106A2 armored personnel carriers, equipped with 4.2" mortar carriers; a fire support team vehicle (FISTV); and the troop commander’s M1A1 Abrams (see Figure 1). The combat trains (not depicted in Figure 1) consisted of two M113A2 armored personnel carriers (first sergeant and maintenance), an M88 recovery vehicle, and an assortment of fuel/ammunition transports. One mortar carrier followed each scout platoon during offensive operations. The mortar section remained consolidated under fire support team (FIST) control during defensive operations. General Situation The enemy force in this scenario consists of an under-strength tank battalion (30 tanks and nine mechanized infantry carriers). The troop commander realizes that he will not receive support because the troop is operating independently. He also knows that stopping the enemy is critical to the squadron’s flank guard mission. He decides to make maximum use of his maneuverability and weapons stand off to attrit the enemy without sacrificing his unit. He will conduct an echelon defense. The Tactics The 1st platoon makes contact with the enemy force. It determines that the bulk of the enemy is in the platoon’s sector. Therefore, 1st platoon will withdraw (see Figure 2), creating a troop left echelon. The 3d platoon reconnoiters to gain contact with the enemy while the mortar carriers consolidate with the FIST in a central location behind 1st platoon. The 1st platoon must draw the enemy force into an area where 3d platoon can engage it in the flank. If the enemy wants a quick penetration, he will pursue 1st platoon, which he perceives as a weak spot. If he wants to attack, he will probably attempt a flanking maneuver. Either way, he will run into 2d platoon while 3d platoon fires into his flank. If the enemy tries to bypass on the
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July-August 2005 — 33
left or outflank the troop, 4th platoon can shift to a position behind and to the left of 2d platoon (see Figure 3). The 3d platoon then moves to the reserve position in the center of the troop sector. The troop commander can repeat this shift of forces for as long as logistically feasible. This gives the enemy the impression that he is facing a much larger unit than is actually present. If enemy forces decide to maneuver around the troop’s right flank instead, the troop shifts to a right echelon. The platoon in reserve moves to the right (see Figure 4), assuming the bottom position in the new right echelon. The center platoon in the left echelon moves to the center of the right echelon. The platoon at the bottom of the left echelon moves into the reserve position. The troop is now in a right echelon and can conduct the same shifting maneuver as described above in the left echelon. Fire Support and Weapons Control Since pre-plotted targets are not available, indirect fire will be difficult to call if the enemy force moves rapidly. The FIST must act quickly to bring fire to bear. Platoon leaders and vehicle commanders must be skilled in calling for fire to assist the FIST in getting inside the enemy’s decision cycle. The troop must make maximum use of its weapons stand-off capability. The platoons cannot become decisively engaged with the enemy or the echelon defense will collapse. Although this tactic appears complex at first glance, it becomes quite simple after a bit of practice. A well-trained unit can execute it with almost no radio traffic. Figure 1. Initial Unit Configuration Figure 2. Troop Left Echelon “Fighting in open terrain increases the difficulty factor, as there are few terrain features to channel the enemy or construct defensive positions. The open, desert region of Iraq, where we have fought two of our most recent major conflicts, is exactly such terrain.”
Once again, the above scenario depicts a unit at 100 percent strength, which is often not the case. The troop must maintain four maneuver platoons for this tactic. The troop commander may need to cross-level or add his vehicle to a platoon to achieve this. The flexibility gained by having a fourth (reserve) unit makes up for having smaller platoons. Training These tactics worked very well for I Troop, 3/3 ACR during Operation Desert Shield/Storm. They required only minimal practice before the troop achieved a proficient level of execution. Train ing followed the proven “crawl-walk-run” progression. Troop leaders conducted sand table exercises, followed by walk-throughs, with every vehicle commander participating and providing input. The final training phase consisted of several full-scale rehearsals. A continuous flow of input from all levels brought forth necessary changes to improve the tactics. Coordination and communication are very important elements of these tactics. Rehearse them as often as possible, so Figure 3. Extending Left Echelon every vehicle commander and scout instinctively knows where everyone else is or should be positioned. Once the troop can execute these tactics flawlessly, rehearse them at night in full chemical protective gear and with radio listening silence. Such practice greatly reduces the chance of fratricide and quickly alerts key leaders to possible problems in the middle of a training mission — while there is still time to make corrections. The above scenario was used by a 1990s- era armored cavalry troop to illustrate tactical principles. However, an innovative combat company commander can tailor his unit to use these same tactics. While there are many additional defensive options from which a small unit commander can choose, a solid grasp of the echelon defense will enable the unit to fight and win open terrain defensive engagements. The teamwork and coordination developed through these tactics encourages vehicle commanders and platoon leaders to think in terms of higher-level missions, providing a strong foundation for more complex operations. Mastering the echelon defense will greatly enhance a unit’s lethality. Lieutenant Colonel Bo Friesen, U.S. Army Reserve, is currently the admissions liaison officer, U.S. Military Academy, West Point, NY. He received a B.S. from the U.S. Military Academy and an M.S. from University of Texas. His military education includes Combined Arms and Services Staff School, Airborne School, Armor Advanced Course, Armor Officer Basic Course, and Cavalry Leaders Course. He has served in various command and staff positions, to include plans and training officer, U.S. Army Air Defense Center, Fort Bliss, TX; armored cavalry troop commander, I Troop, 3d Squadron, 3d (3/3) Armored Cavalry Regiment (ACR), Operations Desert Shield/Storm, Saudi Arabia and Iraq; squadron adjutant, 3/3 ACR, Fort Bliss; and M1 tank platoon leader and XO, 1st Battalion, 64th Armor, 3d Infantry Division, Kitzingen, Germany. Figure 4. Troop Right Echelon July-August 2005 — 35
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