An Armored Task Force Approach

In the ever-changing world of modern conflict, there is not a more pressing organizational challenge facing the U. S. Army than the need for warfighting units to plan and execute civil-military operations (CMO), which has been dramatically illustrated in Operation Iraqi Freedom II. Over the past year, the “Steel Tigers” of Task Force 1st Battalion, 77th Armor (1-77 Armor), part of the 1st Infantry Division’s 2d Brigade Combat Team, took an innovative and modern approach to conducting battalion-sized CMO in Iraq. Through an intuitive and commonsense task organization, deliberate and objective-based planning, focused nonlethal targeting, aggressive execution, and trial and error, TF 1-77 conducted civil-military operations at the battalion level with proven success. The Challenge In May 2003, immediately following the suspension of major combat operations in Iraq, President George W. Bush succinctly described the CMO challenge facing the Army as, “We have difficult work to do in Iraq… We are helping to rebuild Iraq, where the dictator built palaces for himself, instead of hospitals and schools. And we will stand with the new leaders of Iraq as they to Civil-Military Operations establish a government of, by, and for the Iraqi people. The transition from dictatorship to democracy will take time, but it is worth every effort. Our coalition will stay until our work is done. Then we will leave, and we will leave behind a free Iraq.” This statement was a clear signal to U. S. Army units, who had just charged across Iraq in an amazing display of tactical warfighting proficiency, that the job was indeed not done. Those units were now to engage in activities entirely unique to those of U. S. warfare. The same soldiers who brought the regime of Saddam Hussein to its knees in a stunning and violent display of American military strength, were now to pick up the mantle of peacemaker and take on the task of rebuilding a country in political and financial ruin, as they worked with a beleaguered people most Americans did not understand. CMO is not anew concept for the U. S. Army; indeed, the Army has conducted different forms of CMO during conflicts from the end of World War II through to the Balkan operations, which continue today. However, CMO, particularly in Kosovo and Bosnia, have benefited from a heavy United Nations (UN), NATO, and nongovernment organization (NGO) influence. CMO in Iraq is new because U. S Army combat maneuver elements bear the brunt of conducting CMO in country. With a still-stabilizing security situation and active combat operations taking place daily, there are very few NGOs in central Iraq, outside of Baghdad, as well as little on-the-ground support from the U. S. State Department and other government agencies beyond the provincial capitals. As a result, U. S. Army soldiers engage in daily support to civil government and reconstruction missions in a large majority of the country. For the modern combat unit in Iraq, CMO have become just as crucial to mission accomplishment and execution as traditional combat operations. Unit CMO Organization and Roles Early in preparation for deployment to Iraq, TF 1-77 realized that there were two operational legs to the mission at hand. The first was tactical operations, the daily combat operations conducted by the task force to ensure the safety and security of its area of operations (AO). The second was CMO, the daily reconstruction efforts conducted by task force soldiers in an effort to rebuild and stabilize the area. Organization for the first leg followed traditional models. For the second leg, however, Task Force 1-77 Armor reorganized and created new positions to manage and execute CMO. In particular, the task force created a CMO section (S5) and an information operations (IO) cell from organic unit resources, and benefited from a U. S. Army Reserve civil affairs team (CAT) and a tactical psychological operations team (TPT), which was attached from division direct support resources. All of these resources provided increased flexibility to the maneuver commander. However, there was an inherent challenge in using these assets: they were not a normal part of the traditional task force organization. The attachments had not trained with the host unit and were not part of the division prior to deployment to the theater of operations. The roles and responsibilities of these assets had to be defined, as well as organized to fit the task force commander’s overall vision and scheme of maneuver for operations in his AO. TF 1-77 activated the S5 immediately following deployment notification. The S5 section was created in a manner that at least initially had a patchwork look — individuals were pulled from various companies and sections in the organic battalion and asked to quickly come together as a cohesive team. The S5 section was made up of two officers and two noncommissioned officers (NCOs). The S5 officer in charge (OIC) was staffed with an officer from the task force, a junior non-career course captain who previously served as the battalion tactical intelligence officer. The S5 coordinated the task force CMO effort and designed the CMO operations strategy. He managed the overall civil reconstruction effort in sector, to include physical infrastructure reconstruction, as well as government system development and mentoring. He was also responsible for finding and delivering funding from a multitude of sources, both within the Army and from NGOs, to provide the fiscal force behind the massive reconstruction effort. The assistant S5, a newly arrived armor branch second lieutenant, served as the project development officer (PDO). His vast responsibilities included: OIC of the civil-military operations center (CMOC); developing all civil projects from basic concepts provided by the S5, beginning with development/refinement through to completion; civil contract negotiations with local nationals; and tracking and paying for task force civil projects. A senior staff sergeant served as the operations sergeant with responsibilities ranging from task force movement coordination to CMOC logistics support. A sergeant served as administrative sergeant with responsibilities that included managing large amounts of collected information and developing databases and systems for tracking and reporting. The S5 section was split into two sections due to the large scope of responsibilities in the AO. The operations branch, made up of the S5 officer in charge, the IO cell, and elements of the CAT, conducted long- and short-term CMO planning and daily missions with the task force companies. The project development branch, comprised of the assistant S5 and elements of the CAT, handled all contracting and civil project development and execution. The IO cell within the operations branch of the S5 section was created from the task force fire support element (FSE). The fire support officer (FSO) assumed the additional role as the task force IO officer and was assisted by the task force targeting officer. The task force IO officer was a pre-command career course graduate captain, and the targeting officer was an E5 whose actual position was targeting NCO. The fire support officer conducted future IO planning, current operations synchronization, and target assessment. The IO officer also ensured appropriate resourcing for other members of the CMO team by working with the S3 to produce IO tasking in the daily fragmentary order (FRAGO). Additionally, the IO officer was responsible for all tasks normally associated with the traditional role of fire support officer in support of combat operations. The task force targeting officer conducted all IO duties for the FSO in his absence, and was responsible for submitting all reports to higher, as well “President George W. Bush succinctly described the CMO challenge facing the Army as, “We have difficult work to do in Iraq… We are helping to rebuild Iraq, where the dictator built palaces for himself, instead of hospitals and schools. And we will stand with the new leaders of Iraq as they establish a government of, by, and for the Iraqi people.” 28 — as assisting the FSO in planning and conducting kinetic fire support operations. At the company level, the company FSO or fire support NCO (FSNCO) functioned as the IO officer. Again, due to personnel constraints, company fire support teams consisted of only the FSO/IO officer (lieutenant) and FSNCO/IO operator (E6). The role of the company IO was to serve as a conduit between the IO cell and the maneuver company. In this role, they provided IO support and advice to maneuver company commanders in the execution of IO targets, as well as provided feedback to the task force FSO on measures of effectiveness (MOE) of CMO/ IO operations. Company FSOs also performed their traditional FSO roles in support of kinetic fire support operations. The IO cell performed three functions for the task force IO fight. First, the IO cell participated in long-term operational planning in conjunction with the S5. This included developing key tasks to be accomplished in accordance with task force objectives and the commander’s desired endstate. Second, the IO cell conducted current operations planning and synchronization between the task force, maneuver companies, and higher headquarters. The results of this function were specified tasks and talking points, which went into daily FRAGOs for execution by maneuver companies. This involved coordinating IO themes and messages for specific CMO and tactical operations, such as themes for major utility openings or talking points following a tactical raid. The third function was to provide feedback to the IO working group (IOWG), a group that convened biweekly to coordinate and evaluate the CMO/IO fight, which assisted in assessing MOE and refining both the short- and long-term IO and CMO plans. Integrating External Assets The increased focus on civil affairs led to traditional Army integration with Special Forces civil affairs and psychological operations units to assist conventional combat units in conducting these unconventional missions. This translated into integrating a civil affairs team A (CAT-A) and TPT into the maneuver task force of 1-77 Armor and the 1st Infantry Division. The teams were made up of soldiers from the U. S. Army Reserve or National Guard’s direct support civil affairs and psychological operations battalion. Task Force 1-77’s CAT-A consisted of an officer and three attached soldiers. The CAT-A team, although reporting to its battalion of origin, worked directly for the task force commander and executed all missions according to the task force CMO strategy. The team worked with the S5 and was instrumental in both operational mission planning and execution, as well and civil project development. The specialized training and skills in conducting assessments in a variety of areas was vital to the overall operation. The team was primarily tasked by the S5 to conduct major population assessments in critical areas such as education facilities, energy and water distribution, and telecommunications capabilities. These assessments were vitally important in establishing baseline determinations of what assistance would be required, and continued periodic assessment was crucial to determining MOE throughout the campaign. The CAT-A’s work with the PDO was also important in tracking and ensuring quality assurance in managing over 100 civil projects throughout the task force’s AO. The TPT consisted of an NCOIC in the grade of either E5 or E6, and two soldiers. The TPT performed several vital roles for the task force. The team leader participated in the task force IOWG and assisted with planning, creating, and disseminating task force themes, messages, and talking points. The TPT was also responsible for obtaining products, such as fliers containing commanders’ messages and themes, from higher headquarters and participating in distributing these products to company IO operators. If products were unavailable, the TPT was responsible for creating a product for the task force to use and submitting the product to higher headquarters for approval, production, and distribution. The TPT acted as the primary contact for all mass media outlets within the task force AO. They conducted thorough assessments of newspaper and radio outlets in the area and also acted as point of contact for communications with the task force. Finally, the TPT performed loudspeaker missions in support of kinetic operations and for disseminating talking points, conducting face-to-face interactions, and assessing the local population’s attitudes to assist with further IO targeting. Another task force asset — one specific to the Iraqi theater — was creating and using an Iraq Security Forces (ISF) liaison officer (LNO). This position was created to provide a direct link between the newly created Iraqi National Guard (ING), Iraq Police Service (IPS), and Task Force 1-77 Armor. The ING and IPS were not only distinct organizations, but had very different missions. The task of establishing the new security forces was an operation that called for close coordination between the task force S3 and S5 sections with the LNOs actually assigned to the S3 for operational use. The S3 was tasked with oversight on training and tactical operations, and the S5 was tasked with creating resources and infrastructure for the new forces. LNOs worked in dual roles as trainers and resourcers, with heavy assistance from the operations (S3), logistics (S4), and CMO (S5) sections. Planning Task Force 1-77 Armor’s CMO strategy was to employ CMO and its effects as an additional “fire” that the commander could use to accomplish his desired result. The use of CMO was to be focused and deliberate to maximize effects and resources to pro- “Another task force asset — one specific to the Iraqi theater — was creating and using an Iraq Security Forces (ISF) liaison officer (LNO). This position was created to provide a direct link between the newly created Iraqi National Guard (ING), Iraq Police Service (IPS), and Task Force 1-77 Armor. The ING and IPS were not only distinct organizations, but had very different missions.” — 29 duce a desired endstate. The strategy had to be command supported at every level and was treated like an operational campaign plan, with the task force executive officer (XO) receiving multiple briefs prior to the task force commander’s decision brief and final approval of the concept. The task force used a combination of field artillery and intelligence techniques to develop an extremely detailed target and planning concept. The process began with creating a CMO synchronization matrix, which was to be the one product that guided all CMO operations in the AO. It was the tool used to synchronize the kinetic combat and offensive operations with civil affairs and IO. The S5 began with a detailed examination of the brigade combat team’s (BCT’s) operational plan and order, and extrapolation of the BCT commander’s key tasks and desired endstate. He then researched current operations that were being conducted in country and resources that were available at the time. The S5, in conjunction with the task force and company IO operators, developed specific objectives that the task force would focus on for the 12-month operation. These four objectives were focused on areas where the task force could have realistic measurable effects. In the initial planning stage, the objectives were general topics with specific definitions so development would continue following the task force’s relief in place (RIP) and assumption of the AO. The objectives were also chosen to be relevant throughout the entire rotation, taking into consideration national policy and indicators of future operations over the course of the deployment. The chosen objectives were:

• Law enforcement — train and equip ING and IPS so they can execute specific missions and operate independently in sector and support U. S. operations.

• Civil management — civil utility functions are operating independently and basic civil services provided under the guidance of the local government.

• Civil governance — AO freely elected local governments properly organized and operating under approved guidelines within the new Iraq government constructs.

• Economic development — work with all institutions and individuals in providing support for economic development, agriculture production, distribution, and employment. After defining the objectives, lines of operation were developed. Lines of operation are types of operations that were to be conducted throughout the entire rotation and the method by which each objective was approached. The lines of operation were constant and uniform, each of the four objectives was approached through the following four lines of operation:

• Support to civil administration — the task force conducted direct support to the local civil authority by providing credibility to the government in the form of government mentorship, teaching, and development.

• Humanitarian assistance — the task force conducted humanitarian relief such as direct food supply and medical assistance.

• Military civil action — the task force worked with civil authorities, to include legislative council and government administrators, on multiple levels to provide fiscal and technical resources and support.

• Military-other agency cooperation — the task force worked with non-Army agencies to provide stop-gap measures and additional NGO resources to the area. The next step in creating this planning product was to translate into action the BCT and task force commanders’ desired endstate, which is crucial because understanding the commander’s endstate and intent is the force behind multiechelon command synchronization and ensuring the task force is embedded in the BCT’s concept of operation. The desired endstate was improving civilian infrastructure within the task force’s AO. The final piece in developing this plan of action was developing key tasks to be accomplished, by quarter, throughout the rotation. These tasks were specific “way points” of accomplishments that had to be met in specific time periods. They encompassed the entire task force operation, including not only civil affairs and IO tasks, but also company tasks. The IO officer and S5 began this development with key RIP tasks to be accomplished during hand-over of the AO from the departing unit. This first step was the key to understanding the AO, which was critical to further developing the synchronization matrix. Up to this point, the entire product was based on facts and assumption developed during mission analysis. It was only after having boots on the ground that a realistic and practicable plan could be further developed. This “key tasks” product was an evolving document in matrix form, updated monthly through conferences between the IO officer and S5. As the task force’s priorities shifted, key tasks were redefined and adjusted, and the objectives were continuously evaluated to ensure CMO operations remained relevant. The key tasks matrix served as a map that defined civil operations in the area. This ensured operations remained focused, and commanders leveraged resources against proper targets. Targeting Task Force 1-77 Armor quickly determined that Iraqi society, at least in our AO, operates on three interwoven levels: political, tribal, and religious. This complex social stratification present- “CMO engagement occurred by contacting and working with different spheres of influence (SOI) on each social level. Each social level had an associated SOI — political SOIs included city council members and mayors, tribal SOIs included sheiks and community leaders, and religious SOIs included Sunni and Shiite clerics and Imams.” 30 — ed challenges in targeting and execution, as the task force had to non-kinetically engage targets on all three levels. CMO engagement occurred by contacting and working with different spheres of influence (SOI) on each social level. Each social level had an associated SOI — political SOIs included city council members and mayors, tribal SOIs included sheiks and community leaders, and religious SOIs included Sunni and Shiite clerics and Imams. These targets were different in many ways and each had different motivations and issues of concern. To effectively focus CMO assets, 1st Infantry Division and Task Force 1-77 Armor modified traditional artillery targeting techniques and executed the decide-detect-deliver-assess (D3A) target process for CMO targeting. The D3A process is familiar to the artillery community and has become common practice in the IO community to conduct IO targeting. The IOWG was used to conduct all phases of the D3A process from initial target identification to current operations synchronization and target effects assessments. The IOWG was chaired by the task force XO, and attended by the task force IO officer, targeting officer, S5, TPT team leader, CAT-A team leader, and company IO operators. The IOWG would first evaluate possible “targets” in each company’s AO. These targets consisted of events, such as ground breakings and openings, or individuals, such as clerics or political figures, in each company’s AO. Detection criteria addressed specific needs in the area that were consistent with task force objectives, such as water compact units, schools, or ING resources. The group then decided appropriate actions, such as directing IO or S5 engagement, company IO assessment, or TPT evaluation, to take on specific targets. The task force IO officer then published recommended talking points and themes to accompany most operations. These themes were nested, but modified, from higher headquarters’ themes. Company IO operators would then adapt recommended talking points particular to their AO. Finally, the IOWG would assess past operations and define MOE or the level of success for the operation. This process was used as an after-action review (AAR) for future operations, as well as a forum for company operators to inform task force planners of the actual impact and effectiveness of specific operations. IOWG meetings were generally held biweekly, which allowed targets to mature and companies to gather information required for target assessment. During the intervening week, the task force IO officer and S5 met with the XO to ensure assets were synchronized, and to receive guidance for the upcoming week. SOI Management and Execution The SOI program served as the basic building block for interactions between members of the task force and the local population. Task Force 1-77 Armor managed and interacted with hundreds of SOI in the year-long operation. Developing SOI was largely a task for the IOWG and the task force IO officer. This group identified the role of each person with whom the task force needed to interact regularly and assigned an appropriate U. S. counterpart who was similar in age, responsibility level, and position. The task force then modified the resulting SOI matrix, recognizing that there was often a member of the task force who would habitually interact with an SOI, even though that SOI should have had a higher-ranking counterpart. For example, the city mayor was identified as the task force commander’s SOI; however, while conducting daily business, the S5 commonly interacted with the mayor to allow the task force commander freedom of maneuver and limit access to higher-ranking U. S. officials. The S5’s primary engagements were with government officials and contractors concerning infrastructure projects. Promoting the establishment and legitimization of local government was a primary task in the support-to-civil-administration objective. Teaching a people basic democratic principles and the practical application of those principles was a constant and sometimes frustrating challenge. With the support of organizations, such as the Research Triangle Institute (RTI), the task force conducted workshops teaching practical democracy. It also assisted in developing government systems and institutions, such as project approval processes and standing committees. The NGO/task force partnership also taught legislative and administrative separation and cooperation, mediated disputes regarding district and local responsibilities, and constantly mentored local leaders. This was accomplished by constantly observing national level-policy, gauging local political winds of change, and monitoring the progress of the fledgling government. Common sense and practicality were most often the touchstones in assisting local leaders in establishing lasting and legitimate institutions. The PDO and CAT-A engaged multiple SOI in the project development process. The PDO had daily interaction with contractors and government administrative officials to integrate all task force projects into the developing government system. He mentored officials in negotiating fair contracts, validated designs, and assisted in providing oversight for quality assurance and control. In their daily assessment duties, the CAT-A engaged government officials and private citizens, as well as connected government officials to outside resources and assisted in acquiring special expertise for specific projects that were outside the local populace’s technical knowledge. Through continuous engagements with SOI, the PDO and the CAT-A ensured continuous area development, and mentored a fledgling government. The task force IO also had multiple SOI relationships that crossed traditional “SOI lanes.” The task force IO was used to engage media SOI to assist in the overall information campaign, and was also used at the task force commander’s discretion to assist in high-level engagements. This ability to “float” and “flex” across many SOI assisted the task force IO in developing talking points that were current and emphasized the commander’s key areas of interest. Company IOs were used at the company commander’s discretion. They were most often employed as the company level CMO/ IO operator. Receiving guidance and tasks at the IOWG and specified missions by their commanders, the company IO was most often the company commander’s voice throughout the AO. They were tasked with conducting direct impact local assessments, establishing preparation for ground breakings and media events, and conducting many daily local SOI engagements below the task-force level. Talking-point development was a key task for the IOWG. These talking points were the “command message,” pushed during and after combat and non-kinetic operations, or themes that were to be pursued consistently with SOI for given periods. It was important to create well-thought-out talking points, tailored to specific topic areas to be engaged and individual targets to be executed. The task force IO took the BCT and division talking points and refined them for use in the task force’s AO. The IOWG would also add talking points based on upcoming operations, successes by task force elements or Iraqi Security Forces, and information concerning CMO projects to support the task force commander’s intent. These talking points would then be issued in a FRAGO to company IOs and would be further refined for platoon or individual patrols. All talking points were reviewed by the task force IO and XO before dissemination. — 31

Finding the Funding In Iraq, there is no truer statement than “money talks.” As in traditional CMO environments, money had to be spent to gain influence and execute the CMO plan. Finding funds and accounting for expenditures was a complicated and ever-hanging task. Although the task force had a degree of financial freedom, division and brigade priorities had to be considered. Of course, these priorities were developed for application across abroad territory and did not always fit the needs of the task force-specific AO. To effectively spend limited resources with maximum impact, the task force again focused its efforts on the four CMO objectives: law enforcement, civil utilities, civil management, and economic development, with a concentration on agricultural assistance. One area the task force focused on was providing resources to the ING, particularly reliable, effective equipment such as bullet-proof vests and mission-specific equipment. In addition, we sought to outfit the IPS with police-specific equipment such as utility belts and checkpoint signs. The task force also engaged in a massive effort to properly quarter the newly created ISF by designing and constructing efficient command posts and hardened checkpoints. Another primary focus was to assist the local government in establishing and improving basic utilities, such as fresh water production and distribution, as well as power generation and sanitation. The government’s ability to provide basic services reliably was instrumental in establishing government creditability. Like any bureaucracy, the local government needed physical structures and resources to become established. The task force therefore assisted in renovating — and in some cases building —government facilities. Additionally, the task force focused on economic development by creating jobs through building schools and supporting the agricultural industry, which was the predominant source of employment in the task force’s AO. Task Force 1-77 Armor spent approximately $6 million on CMO activities in less than a year, completing over 70 projects and employing thousands of workers. Brigade and division did not have enough resources to execute this ambitious effort and one of the S5’s most important duties was to seek additional funding from outside sources. This was accomplished by “recruiting” other U. S. Army units to sponsor Task Force 1-77 Armor’s projects. Inside the task force AO, there was a massive logistics support area (LSA) that housed dozens of non-maneuver units that had money available for CMO, but no place to spend it. The S5 assisted in finding projects for this money. The outside units received favorable press and the comfort that they were making a difference in the area, and the task force received greatly needed additional funding for key projects. Other government agencies and NGOs were also vital in assisting the task force with reconstruction efforts. The role of these agencies in providing additional funding and special expertise was invaluable to the overall effort. The task force had to be frugal and vigilant with the funding it obtained. The S5 and PDO became “on-the-job” experts in building design and contract negotiations. The large volume of projects required grinding work by the PDO, who constantly made every effort to drive down artificial inflation and negotiate fair contracts for work and services received. He accomplished this by understanding fair market values for materials and services in the area. End state Through deliberate planning and some trial and error, Task Force 1-77 Armor had a positive impact on its small piece of Iraq beyond that of providing physical security. The soldiers who made up Task Force 1-77 Armor effected thousands of lives through their professionalism and dedication to a fight worth fighting. Sometimes rewarding, many times frustrating, and always dangerous, the soldiers helped give a people back their dignity and respect, while at the same time, conducting daily combat missions to rid a land of a constant threat. Captain Jason Goodfriend is a civil-military operations officer, Task Force 1st Battalion, 77th (1-77) Armor, Balad, Iraq. He received a B. A. from James Madison University. His military education includes Military Intelligence Officer Basic Course. He has served in various command and staff positions, to include tactical intelligence officer, assistant S2, 1-77 Armor, Schweinfurt, Germany; XO, D Company, Task Force 101st Military Intelligence Battalion, Camp Bondsteel, Kosovo and Wuerzburg, Germany; and deputy G2 planner, G2, 1st Infantry Division, Wuerzburg. Captain David Levasseur is a fire support officer, 1-77 Armor, Balad, Iraq. He received a B. A. from Pennsylvania State University. His military education includes the Field Artillery Captains Career Course and Field Artillery Basic Course. He has served in various command and staff positions to include, assistant operations officer, 1st Battalion, 7th Field Artillery, 1st Infantry Division, Schweinfurt, Germany; commander, Headquarters and Headquarters Battery, U. S. Army Field Artillery Center and Fort Sill (USAFACFS), Fort Sill, OK; XO, E Company, 1st Battalion, 22d Field Artillery, USAFACFS, Fort Sill; and fire support officer, B Company, 1st Battalion, 506th Infantry, 2d Infantry Division, Camp Greaves, Korea. “…the task force focused on economic development by creating jobs through building schools and supporting the agricultural industry, which was the predominant source of employment in the task force’s AO. Task Force 1-77 Armor spent approximately $6 million on CMO activities in less than a year, completing over 70 projects and employing thousands of workers.” 32 —