Employing Armor in Urban Combat

After every war, since 1918, prime military analysts predicted that the “tank was an obsolete weapon” and it was time for it to be replaced. Some U. S. officials have already set the date to cease production of the M1 Abrams tank, replacing it with the lighter system Stryker as a stopgap, and ultimately the much-debated Future Combat System (FCS). Despite all the talk, lessons emerging from Operation Iraqi Freedom reveal that during high-intensity combat, the role of the main battle tank is far from over. In fact, both the Abrams and Challenger have more than proven their mettle in combat and are an indispensable element in the fast-moving strike through Iraq. Disregarding political implications, professional soldiers are confident that there is no current replacement for the combination of mobility, firepower, and protection offered by the main battle tank. Experiences in Israel and Iraq have demonstrated (assuming correct tactical employment) that the main battle tank’s contributions are vital to reducing an other wise unacceptable loss of ground forces. Adapting Armor to Urban Warfare To readjust armor, primarily tanks, to fight in an urban environment, two elements must be considered: adaptation of tactics by the small unit combined combat team; and certain modifications to the tank’s infrastructure to enhance its protection and firepower for close-in combat. Tactical Aspects The first rule in armored combat is: “Alone tank in the all-round risk nature of the urban battlefield is a dead tank.” Thus, to a tanker, even the best trained infantry support does not secure the tank’s survival against lurking tank-killer teams. To ex perienced tank crews, the employment of individual tanks supporting infantry squads is a worst-case scenario, which they hope to avoid. Like fighter pilots, tankers rely mostly on their ‘wing-man’ tank for protection. But the compartmentalized and restricted nature of urban combat terrain not only reduces the line of sight of the tank/tank teamwork, but actually minimizes the tank’s inherent fighting power. Many of those limitations become serious liabilities, which in many cases, makes the normal tank/wingman overwatch drill nearly impossible. Naturally therefore, most traditional tank proponents warned against employing tanks in an urban environment for several reasons, some of which not only seem natural, but most result from inappropriate use of tanks by infantry commanders, who are unfamiliar with the limits of tanks in the heat of battle. While concern that the heavy cumbersome 60-ton colossus could collapse bridges, chew up city streets, or cause unacceptable collateral damage is acceptable, single tanks can become trapped in narrow alleys, having been called in to support foot soldiers pinned down by heavy enemy fire. Under such circumstances, the single tank becomes a dangerous liability to the troops. Not only is a stationary tank a prime target to enemy tank-killer snipers, but it becomes a focal point to hazardous enemy artillery and mortar barrages endangering not only the tank, but the very infantry that unintentionally called it into the lethal trap. Indeed, a tank is not an ideal platform for block-by-block fighting in a city, not to mention the confines of Middle East Iraqi bazaars, or the cramped surroundings of Palestinian refugee camps, in which Israel Defense Forces (IDF) tanks are frequently forced to operate. This is nightmare country for young Israeli tankers and they hate it. But there are other problems, which are lesser known to the layman. The powerful tank engine emits tremendous heat from its exhaust fumes, which can virtually ‘cook’ a nearby soldier seeking the tank’s armored hull for protection. Additionally, once the main armament is fired, it emits poisoned gases and the powerful force can cause lethal concussion to bystanders, especially in the confines of narrow streets surrounded by multi-story buildings. There are some important tactics that the IDF have refined for urban combat, some of which were ideally suited, and even implemented by coalition forces during Operation Iraqi Freedom. A key factor in urban warfare is the combined combat team, usually fighting at squadron/company-platoon/troop level, but mostly at squad/section level. This means, that with a three-tank troop, a single tank remains idle and is frequently used by infantry commanders, insufficiently familiar with the technical shortcomings of the tanks as single support platforms. In the IDF, a conscript army, the single tank commander is usually a young sergeant who is under the command of an infantry officer, while his troop leader fights with the two-tank section (in a four-tank platoon, each two-tank section is commanded by an officer or senior noncommissioned officer). In professional armies, such as those of the U. S. or Britain, this problem may be less complex, as the tanker may well be more experienced than the infantry subaltern who may listen to his advice. The tank/infantry combat team fighting in a high-risk urban environment can only survive if it operates in close mutual support, which requires each team to maximize its inherent strength and minimize its inherent weaknesses against the enemy. As the tank crew is operating ‘closed down’ (all hatches shut), its all-round vision is reduced to the effectiveness of the optical vision blocks. Most of these are designed for open country warfare, namely to the frontal arc, for tank-on-tank fighting. Thus, the tank crew cannot properly see the accompanying infantry. To enable the infantry commander to designate targets to the tank, communication is vital, but visual hand signals cannot be used. Infantry laser target designators are virtually ineffective to closed-down tanks, because most of the equipment requires night vision goggles, scanning through open hatches. Due to these limitations, the IDF has implemented a simple infantry/tank target designation drill, in which the terrain is divided into coordination lines, with specific targets predesignated by codes. As the battle progresses, the infantry commander, normally using a rear-mounted external phone on the tank, communicates with the tank commander intercommunication, without the tank commander having to discard his harness. Infantry/tank radio communications are severely degraded when short-range FM radios become screened by line-of-sight loss, as well as increased traffic volume, and enhanced by small tactical units parallel fighting, all operating simultaneously on different (but usually neighboring) frequencies, resulting in interference. Under such stringent combat conditions, special attention must be given to pre-mission briefings to avoid fratricide by means of combat identification and pre-designated terrain compartmentalization, preventing dangerous cross-movement. A most vital, frequently lifesaving element is maintaining a constant and realtime situation awareness (SA). Thanks to new network systems, tank commanders can respond quickly against threats, especially sophisticated beam-riding antitank guided missiles (ATGM) fired from well-camouflaged and confined locations. Integrated combat intelligence by tactical unmanned aerial vehicles (TUAV), helicopters, and other means, such as Blue Force Tracking and Force XXI battle command, brigade and below (FBCB2), can become crucial support elements once sufficiently developed for tactical units. Explosive reactive add-on panels may become extremely dangerous in the confines of urban combat; their outward explosion, as well as shrapnel debris, can cause severe casualties to accompanying infantry, so more effective modular armor suites are preferred. Adapting Main Battle Tanks for Urban Combat Survivability measures. Traditionally, modern tanks were designed for fast-moving, open terrain combat operations in which their mobility, firepower, and battle- “To improve restricted observation, panoramic optics are installed in the tank com mander’s position, from which he has an all-round observation arc. Other means are mast-mounted gimbaled sensors with look-up/look-down capability. Installing observation cameras around the tank’s hull in deadspace areas, especially vulnerable zones, is another cost-effective method. Such a system has been mounted on the Merkava Mk4, enabling the driver to reverse without external guidance.” 24 — field survivability made them ideal weapons platforms for high-fire saturated decisive warfare operations. Unfortunately, due to its close-in lethality nature, the urban battlefield reduces these attributes virtually to nil, which makes the tank not only a prime target, but actually a highly vulnerable steel trap for its crew. Some of these limitations can be overcome by relatively simple modifications, enhancing survivability, and ensuring the vehicle is handled by a professionally experienced crew. To improve restricted observation, panoramic optics are installed in the tank commander’s position, from which he has an all-round observation arc. Other means are mast-mounted gimbaled sensors with look-up/look-down capability. Installing observation cameras around the tank’s hull in deadspace areas, especially vulnerable zones, is another cost-effective method. Such a system has been mounted on the Merkava Mk4, enabling the driver to reverse without external guidance. No less critical is the tank’s armored protection suite. Normally, the best protected part is a frontal arc, which is the most dangerous against high-velocity kinetic energy (KE) rounds in a tank-on-tank engagement. But in urban combat, highly lethal incoming threats are all-round, especially dangerous to vulnerable areas. The IDF has modified an older version of Merkava Mk3 by up-armoring it with a special all-round add-on suite, including a heavier bottom plate, named Batash (low intensive conflict ((LIC)) to fight against urban threats. The Batash version tank was fitted with marking poles, which assist the commander and driver in movement through narrow confines, such as refugee camp alleys, and minimizes damages to surrounding structures. To eliminate the chance of individuals planting ex plosive charges in the air intake, wire meshes were added to close such openings, as well as protecting optic sights. A redesigned commander’s cupola was also installed, offering better all-round visibility at higher elevations. The external 0.5" machine gun, mounted on top of the main gun was linked to the fire control system and can now be fired by electrical actuation under armor. The IDF realized that the 0.5" is more useful in close-range, urban point target combat, than the main tank gun, which has problems traversing and causes severe collateral damage. Another system demonstrated for the first time at LIC-2004 is a 360-degree omni-directional panoramic camera that can alert on any suspicious activity around the tank. The system uses patent pending omni-directional optics, providing continuous coverage of a 360-degree field of view without rotation mechanism, rendering the entire vehicle’screw with realtime awareness of the vehicle’s surroundings and any potential dangers outside the vehicle. The tank is also equipped with a video motion detector that can be programmed to selected areas of choice to provide real-time alerts. The system uses a high-resolution digital camera, mounted on a mast placed on the rear part of the upper turret. The system feeds the processed images to the computerized display installed inside the tank. A firing hatch and observation window was also opened in the rear compartment access door, where a sniper or crewmember can operate from a protected position against approaching killer teams. Firepower. The tank’s most powerful weapon is its main armament, the 120mm high-velocity (HV) gun; however, it is not a very effective weapon for urban combat. Designed for a low-profile vehicle hull and turret, it has restricted elevation and depression angles, which makes the gun ineffective against targets in tall buildings or low cellars. Moreover, the high velocity gun has along barrel, which restricts traverse in narrow streets, making it virtually impossible to engage targets to its rear once the barrel is pointed forward. These blind spots are the tanks most dangerous areas. As for ammunition, the prime armor-piercing fin-stabilized discarding sabot (APFSDS) and high-explosive antitank (HEAT) rounds are nearly worthless against short-range targets in urban terrain. Thus, a pre-mission restor-age would be necessary, only if the tank would not fight in the open! Special ammunition has been developed for urban combat. The IDF uses the 105- mm antipersonnel, antimaterial (APAM) multi-purpose (four-in-one) tank round. The round consists of a main body, which contains six submunitions with thousands of tungsten cubes for controlled fragmentation. It can also be fired as a unitary round to penetrate reinforced (double-bar concrete wall) and armored targets (other than main battle tanks). A 120mm APAM version for smooth bore barrels, mounted on the Merkava Mk3/4, is currently under development. Tank-mounted machine guns, using the tank’s excellent target acquisition capability, are far more effective against snipers in urban environments. Through the fire control system and optical (and thermal) sights, a.50-caliber machine, coax “The Trophy ADS system has three elements, which provide threat detection and tracking, launching, and intercept functions. The threat detection and warning subsystem consists of several sensors, including flat-panel radars, placed at strategic locations around the protected vehicle, to provide full hemispherical coverage. Once an incoming threat is detected, identified, and verified, the countermeasure assembly is opened and the coun termeasure device is positioned in the direction where it can effectively intercept the threat.” Continued on Page 49 — 25

Armor in Urban Combat continued from Page 25 “Another highly effective machine, which proved its mettle in urban warfare, is the so-called “beast,” which is a heavily uparmored D9 Caterpillar bulldozer employed by the IDF in the West Bank and Gaza. The U. S. Army ordered a dozen of these 52-ton monsters before Operation Iraqi Freedom. Equipped with machine guns mounted in the armored cabin, these mean-looking “monsters” are quite impressive in high-risk combat areas, preceding tanks and infantry to clear rubble from the streets, crush suspected buildings, and activate explosive charges.”