Air-Ground Integration

Air-Ground Integration by Captain Shawn Hatch Conventional U.S. Army doctrine applies aviation assets primarily to the linear battlefield — the traditional Cold War-style battles on relatively open terrain. In fact, current doctrine recommends “isolating and bypassing urban areas when possible due to the costs involved.”1 While operating in an urban environment may be costly, it will be much more costly to fail to adapt and not have any aviation assets fighting along side ground maneuver units. We see that battles and wars are increasingly less linear and executed less on open terrain. Instead, wars are often fought in and around built-up urban terrain. Much of the doctrine for the linear battlefield applies in this urban and noncontiguous battlespace, but U.S. Army aviation procedures must adapt drastically to accommodate this new battle space. Many of these adaptations have occurred in the aviation community, and many more are ongoing and yet to be discovered. However, the best procedures and application of aviation assets are useless if they are not properly integrated with ground assets, which aviation assets must support. Aviation is potentially the greatest untapped combat multiplier in the urban environment; failing to learn and apply these qualities may prevent the U.S. Army from maintaining its dominance as the world’s greatest and most adaptable military force. This article provides a general understanding of some concepts to consider when integrating aviation assets into the ground maneuver plan; it will look at three areas: roles of Army aviation, planning considerations, and air-ground synchronization of aviation assets in the urban environment. Current doctrine is evolving slowly and has already adopted some of these concepts; however, some concepts are currently being practiced but are not reflected in current doctrine, and some of these concepts are all together original and not currently practiced anywhere. Roles of Army Aviation Army aviation is arguably the most maneuverable branch of the Army. As a result of its maneuverability and unique characteristics, it has the capability of performing certain roles and missions with greater speed, less danger to soldiers, and more effectively than any other combat asset. Tables 9-1 through 9-4 in U.S. Army Field Manual (FM) 3-06.11, Combined Arms Operations in Urban Terrain, do a good job listing many of the roles in which aviation can be employed.2 However, this is not an exhaustive list and some roles and missions should be expanded with further clarification. These tables are organized by the four main categories of operations that commanders in the urban environment must conduct: assess and shape; dominate; transition; and stability and support. Assess and Shape. This category includes the traditional cavalry role of reconnaissance. Contrary to FM 3-06.11, aviation possesses the ability to perform reconnaissance in much more than just the “urban peripheral area.” Air cavalry units (and in some cases, lift and attack units) are currently being used daily to recon deep into the heart of urban terrain.

Certainly, the aerial observation provided by these units is slightly limited by structures and the high concentration of other obstacles common to urban terrain, but some areas, such as rooftops, around corners, and open-top entrenched areas, are much more readily observable from the air. Most casualties sustained in the urban environment occur when moving between buildings, down streets, and through open areas; these casualties can be reduced by using a reconnaissance platform capable of seeing around corners, on rooftops, and other areas not visible to maneuvering ground forces.3 Another unused role of aviation in the assess-and-shape category is that of a deception force. When needed, helicopters can be a very noticeable presence both during the day (visual) and at night (audible). This is especially true in many of the world’s underdeveloped urban areas where other civil aviation assets are limited, making Army aviation assets more apparent. Using this factor, the battlefield can be effectively shaped, causing the enemy to believe operations are occurring where they are not. Dominate. The cordon mission paired with any of its variants, such as knock, search, and destroy, is ideally suited to aviation support. Starting from route reconnaissance to the cordon objective and then focusing both in and out (as discussed later in planning considerations), helicopters provide the ground commander with a critical view of the objective, making the cordon more secure. Early warning from an aerial view prevents any element from moving in or out of the cordon, which may have otherwise passed through the cordon undetected, especially during the initial establishment of the cordon. Stability and Support. Experience in Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) has shown that aviation can play several roles during stability and support operations. Improvised explosive devices (IEDs) are one of the most deadly enemy actions used in Iraq. Many of these IEDs, and their potential locations, can be located using aerial reconnaissance. Lines of communication (LOC) security is a common role that incorporates aerial reconnaissance, which is a variation of a route reconnaissance, but is done routinely and focuses on a few elements as dictated by the ground commander. These elements can include traf-ficabilty of the LOC, potential threats (including IEDs), and the presence of known or suspected enemy along the LOC. A close variant of LOC security is convoy security. Aviation has a significant advantage in assisting ground forces in this area in the urban environment. In addition to providing suppressive fires in support of the ground convoy, aviation assets provide early warning offered by the aerial perspective, a marked advantage when buildings limit the ground unit’s field of view. A proven role of aviation is the presence patrol. The psychological factor of a helicopter is a significant deterrent to would-be disrupters of stability. But, the aerial presence patrol offers much more than just a psychological deterrent; aircraft can cover a much larger area in a presence patrol than a ground unit, and still observe much of the same activities as a ground presence patrol. Intelligence analysts in the 502d Infantry Regiment, 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault), deployed in Mosul, Iraq, from May 2003 to January 2004, noted that there was a significant decrease in insurgent activity when presence patrol aircraft were on station. In the absence of continuous aerial operations, aerial presence patrol schedules were shifted continuously and irregularly to convey the sense of continuous aerial coverage, thus decreasing insurgent activity. Aviation roles in the urban environment are only limited by our ability to adapt. Current doctrine lists common roles, but these should not be considered all inclusive. Limiting aviation to traditional roles will fail to maximize its unique advantages, and rob the ground commander of limitless opportunities against the enemy. Mission Planning Considerations The aviation liaison officer (LNO) is critical to properly employing all aviation assets at the discretion of the ground commander. The LNO should be the resident expert on the capabilities and limitations of his unit and know how to best use its capabilities to support the ground mission. At the same time, all planners involved in the military decisionmaking process (MDMP) should, at a minimum, be familiar with some basic planning considerations, such as aircraft station time and rotation plan, hovering and graphic control measures, inner loop/outer loop security, and objective altitude planning, for using aviation in an urban environment. Aircraft Station Time. Planning for cavalry and attack aircraft should almost always assume that aircraft will operate in teams of two aircraft. While this is not doctrine, the “hunter/killer” team approach is a proven technique that, in my experience, is nearly universally followed. This will effect planning for the amount of ammunition available, observable area, and speed for reconnaissance missions. However, the greatest consideration for this is the time on station and rotation plan. Without extended fuel tanks, Army helicopters universally have about a two-hour station time based on fuel. When planning any operation, this can be a significant consideration, especially if continual coverage is necessary. A common tendency is to request teams to split up and refuel separately, leaving one on station while the other refuels. While possi- “The aviation liaison officer (LNO) is critical to properly employing all aviation assets at the discretion of the ground commander. The LNO should be the resident expert on the capabilities and limitations of his unit and know how to best use its capabilities to support the ground mission.” July-August 2005 — 19 ble, this is a highly undesirable technique and should be avoided. Therefore, it may be necessary to employ multiple teams and establish a rotation or plan for gaps in coverage, depending on the distance between the operation and the refuel point. Hovering Flight. A difficult lesson learned during OIF is that hovering in the urban environment does not work. Numerous news sources commented on the notably greater survivability of helicopters that continued to move while fighting over cities in Iraq, verses hovering and near-stationary aircraft, even in higher-threat environments.4 The 3d Infantry Division attributed the high survivability of the OH-58D Kiowa helicopters in urban environments during OIF to the “movement techniques used by the aircrews.” Kiowas operated at or below 50 feet above ground level, while maintaining at least 60 knots.5 The bottom line: planning restrictive control measures, such as attack by fire positions, which force helicopters to remain over a relatively small piece of terrain, endangers the mission. This may appear to be a simple principle to maintain, but as the plan gets more and more complicated, and more assets fight for the same time or space, deconflicting airspace and direct fire control can become quite complicated and the easiest remedy is to “cut the legs off” the helicopters, forcing them to stand still. Alternatives must be found to rule out a plan that includes stationary aircraft. Inner Loop/Outer Loop Security. Many operations in urban environments necessitate an “inner loop/outer loop” security pattern. This is very similar to how a ground element would focus observations during cordon operations, but executed quite differently. Cordon and isolation operations often occur on a relatively small objective; to avoid hovering flight, helicopters must constantly circle to stay within operating distance from the objective. If the objective is only a city block or smaller, two aircraft are very cramped for airspace. The inner loop/outer loop security pattern allows both aircraft to make concentric circles in opposite directions around the objective. The inner aircraft focuses observation inward in the circle, and the outer aircraft outward. The circles are in opposite directions to allow the pilot who is not operating the controls clear observation, while the pilot operating the controls can see and deconflict with the opposite aircraft. This technique provides observation on the actual objective, as well as outside the objective, offering a terrific advantage to the ground commander in cordoning or isolating the objective. This technique can also be conducted with a larger element (two teams of aircraft or more) on a larger objective such as a small village. In this case, one team would provide the inner loop security while another team provides the outer loop security. In either case, this technique allows the flexibility for any member of the team to divert temporarily from his assigned sector to support the other, should additional observation or firepower be required. Altitude. An often-overlooked common consideration for planning is the altitude of supporting aviation. In the case of a cordon or raid, the ground commander should consider the impact of supporting aviation at various altitudes. While lower aircraft (50 to 200 feet) provide better, more detailed observation, they may alert enemy forces to friendly troops’ presence, increase noise for ground personnel, and blow over weak structures or other loose debris in the area. When planning operations in the urban environment, it is critical to consider the third dimension to achieve the appropriate results. Air/Ground Synchronization Perhaps the greatest challenge in air-ground integration is synchronizing the viewpoints of air and ground components. Ensuring that all players are looking at the same target, building, vehicle, window, or other item has proven to be significantly difficult in the urban environment. Several methods exist to enhance the common operational picture and allow for expedient target designation, but none are foolproof — a concerted focus on building new technologies to solve this problem is certainly needed. In an urban environment, an eight-digit grid has little significance due to the proximity of urban features, as well as the vertical development common in many cities. Even if a highly accurate grid for a certain target were available, correlating that grid with a specific piece of terrain expeditiously is very difficult, even for the best soldiers. Therefore, current doctrine incorporates the use of several maneuver graphic aids, including the area sketch, urban targeting grid sectors, and “The 3d Infantry Division attributed the high survivability of the OH-58D Kiowa helicopters in urban environments during OIF to the “movement techniques used by the aircrews.” Kiowas operated at or below 50 feet above ground level, while maintaining at least 60 knots. The bottom line: planning restrictive control measures, such as attack by fire positions, which force helicopters to remain over a relatively small piece of terrain, endangers the mission.” 20 — July-August 2005

“bulls-eye” or target reference points (TRP).6 Each of these techniques has certain advantages and limitations, which make them more or less suitable in varying environments, and often a combination of techniques is needed to accomplish the mission. Still, the perfect solution for this problem has yet to be found. The area sketch may include a detailed drawing of all buildings and other significant terrain features in an area, all individually numbered and the corners of each building labeled to aid in building orientation. Phase lines, objectives, and other graphic control measures are not uncommon to aid in rapid target identification. Advantages to this technique include a highly detailed description of the area, high reliability when describing a numbered feature, and the ability to describe sides of oddly shaped buildings, especially when they do not conform to cardinal directions. However, the amount of pre-mission coordination required for this technique is quite significant. In addition, ensuring that all elements down to the lowest level have the same area sketch is very difficult. Larger objectives will be difficult to describe in the same way without creating a massive sketch, which is not practical for tactical operations. Similar to the area sketch is the urban targeting grid sectors. In this technique, an objective or area is broken down into a certain grid. Buildings and prominent features are labeled within each sector. This has many of the same advantages and disadvantages of the area sketch. It is not realistic to number every building and prominent feature within a large area. The 502d Infantry Regiment used a similar technique while in Mosul, Iraq, but without numbering every building. This was affectionately called the “horse-blanket,” where grid sectors were labeled with a two-letter identifier, the first letter indicating the owning battalion. This worked well for ground units who concentrated on relatively small areas and moved at a slower pace, but it was difficult for fast-moving aviation units covering the entire city to maintain accurate situational awareness at all times due to the high number grid sectors. Finally, the bulls-eye or TRP technique is a much more simplified method that simply identifies a series of easily identifiable terrain features called “bulls-eye” or “TRP.” Targets are described using a bearing and distance from the closest “Cordon and isolation operations often occur on a relatively small objective; to avoid hovering flight, helicopters must constantly circle to stay within operating distance from the objective. If the objective is only a city block or smaller, two aircraft are very cramped for airspace. The inner loop/outer loop security pattern allows both aircraft to make concentric circles in opposite directions around the objective.”

bulls-eye. This technique is easily applied and is the simplest for coordination between units, but it does not provide for very accurate target locations. Despite all best efforts, most air-ground target synchronization eventually boils down to a target “walk on,” where either the ground or air unit begins with one or more of the techniques discussed above to synchronize viewpoints in the same general area, and final guidance is given by either a verbal or visual cue. While these are good techniques, they are not always sufficient, and a few additional procedures and future technologies are needed. These techniques include creating a standard vehicle identification (ID) list, simplifying and organizing large cities, and using real-time video communications through Force XXI battle command, brigade and below (FBCB2) or similar technology. Most maneuver units have a library of threat vehicles that every soldier is responsible to identify. In the emerging urban environment, the enemy will not always use a clearly identifiable T-72, so units must modify libraries of threat identification. What one soldier describes as a “box van” may be very different from another soldier’s perception of that same vehicle. Additionally, where a soldier at a traffic control point can read the make of a car and possibly its license plate, these identifying marks are nearly impossible to see from aviation assets, especially at night. Units should develop a library of vehicle identification, as seen in Figure 1, to standardize vehicle descriptions, which will prevent mis-communications of a vehicle description. A 90-percent accurate library can be easily reached, and it can be modified when the unit changes its area of operations. Urban environments in non-English speaking nations create the challenge of U.S. soldiers being unable to pronounce, and thus remember, names of places, roads, and other landmarks. A technique to effectively coordinate between various U.S. units is to simplify cities by renaming (at least for military use) main supply routes, key landmarks, and other key places. Nicknames will inevitably develop, but the key is to make these nicknames official so that all units use the same, easily pronounceable names. This is similar to the area sketch and bulls-eye technique, but focuses primarily on a few key routes and landmarks. Directing a ground quick reaction force from an aviation platform to a specific target is greatly simplified if both units are using the same names (not necessarily found on street signs unobservable from the air) along key routes. The alternative (take your next left then go one mile) is confusing and can quickly cause the ground unit to become disoriented. Finally, both ground and air units would benefit greatly from future technologies that incorporate real-time video broadcasted to other involved units over an FBCB2 or similar system. Designating a certain building, landmark, or other feature and then broadcasting that exact picture to the supporting air unit, would eliminate any confusion over the exact target identification; leaving no question of which building, door, window, or other feature was the target. Aviation plays a vital role in the success or failure of operations in urban terrain. We cannot be bound to traditional roles and thus fail to adapt to the threat and challenges found in the urban environment. Planners must have a working knowledge of aviation considerations so they can maximize the use of aviation assets and get exactly what they need to successfully accomplish the mission. Finally, the perfect role and best plan are useless if air and ground forces cannot effectively communicate and synchronize their points of view. Prior thought and planning is essential to ensuring everyone is looking at the same target, especially in the midst of high-stress situations. Combat helicopters can fight in unmatched ways; failing to properly integrate them in the urban environment is detrimental to the U.S. Army’s success. Notes 1U.S. Army Field Manual (FM) 3-06.1, Aviation Urban Operations; Multiservice Procedures for Aviation Urban Operations, U.S. Government Printing Office (GPO), Washington D.C., 15 April 2001, p. I-1. 2FM 3-06.11, Combined Arms Operations in Urban Terrain, GPO, Washington D.C., 28 February 2002, pp. 9-2 to 9-4, Appendix A. 3Ibid, p. 4-32. 4Robert Blackstone and Dorothy Norton, Evaluating Military Operations on Urbanized Terrain (MOUT) Tactics, Techniques, Technologies and Procedures (TTPs): Observations from Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), Project Metropolis, Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory, 8 August 2003, pp. 44-49. 5The U.S. Army 3d Infantry Division (Mechanized) After Action Report, Chapter 5, p. 25. 6Each of the publications in the FM 3-06 series discusses an element of air-ground coordination, much of which is covered in this paragraph. This discussion has tried to simplify the different techniques found in all of the publications to their basic components. Captain Shawn Hatch is currently a student at the Armor Captains Career Course, Fort Knox, KY. He received a B.S. from the United States Air Force Academy. His military education includes Aviation Officer Basic Course and Initial Entry Rotary Wing Course. He has served in various command and staff positions, to include squadron rear detachment commander, 2d Squadron, 17th Cavalry Regiment (2-17 CAV), 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault), Fort Campbell, KY; squadron S1, 2-17 CAV, 101st Airborne Division, Fort Campbell; flight operations officer, 2-17 CAV, 101st Airborne Division, Fort Campbell; platoon leader, A Troop, 2-17 CAV, 101st Airborne Division, Fort Campbell. Figure 1 22 — July-August 2005