Sharpening the Spear: Training the Armor Crewman for Future Battlefields

“We are very good in the Army in developing single-event people. If we were a track team, we’d have the best 100- yard-dash people, the best milers, and the best discus throwers. But what we really need to be making right now are decath-letes that are just good enough at everything.” — General Peter Schoomaker1 Serving on the leading edge of operations in Iraq will challenge soldiers in ways never before seen during a Combat Training Center rotation or stability operation. The pace and types of missions in Iraq make no allowance for a soldier’s military occupational specialty (MOS) or a company modified table of equipment (MTOE). Unit commanders and leaders must overcome organization and equipment shortcomings to accomplish all missions. The Army in Iraq faces the true test of the “three-block war,” as described by former U. S. Marine Corps Commandant, Charles Krulak. Conducting full-spectrum operations means, in one day, a company can assist in humanitarian assistance, advise a local Neighborhood Advisory Council, conduct a joint patrol with Iraqi security forces, or raid a home to seize an anti-coalition operative, weapons dealer, or criminal. Although many of these missions are best suited for infantry, Special Forces (combat missions), or civil affairs (humanitarian assistance) soldiers, they are executed in Baghdad each and every day by field and air defense artillerymen, engineers, scouts, and armor crewmen. All types of units are assigned areas of responsibility and expected to conduct full-spectrum operations. The probable long-term occupation of Iraq by 100,000 or more soldiers, sailors, airmen, and Marines, forces every servicemember to reexamine long-held preconceived notions about the “proper” employment of our services and branches. There will never be enough infantrymen to raid homes, enough Special Forces to train security forces, or enough civil affairs soldiers to establish order in local communities. Armor forces will have to learn to execute these missions regularly, to a high standard — as they have in Iraq. We have discussed the “post-Cold War bat tlefield” for nearly 15 years, long enough to make it cliché. Most of today’s new soldiers don’t even remember the Soviet Union, much less how to fight the Red Army in the Fulda Gap! While much pulp and ink has been invested in defining the “asymmetric threat,” little work has been done to prepare U. S. Army combat arms units for the asymmetric battlefield. In the armor community, many continue to look at “missions,” such as Grenada, Haiti, Panama, Somalia, Bosnia, and Kosovo, as irritating exceptions to the rule — foisted on proud and professional soldiers and Marines by weak and vacillating politicians, United Nations wonks, and nongovernment agitators. Perhaps our experience in Iraq will make us realize that military operations with a relatively short and initial high-intensity phase followed by long-term stability and support operations requiring frequent and — 15 deep military involvement is the model for past, present, and future military missions.2 For those of us worried about relevance and being obsolete, keep in mind that being able to impose the Nation’s will is one skill that will never go out of style on the modern battlefield. To succeed in Iraq, or on future battlefields, the Army must focus on developing a multifunctional soldier with particular subject matter expertise in mounted armor operations, rather than adaptable armor crewmen who leave tanks to execute stability operations and support missions for a relatively brief period. As armor leaders, our challenge is to identify the critical skills that will make our tankers, fuel handlers, mechanics, supply sergeants, and forward observers able to impose our will on the enemy or on the host nation. Preparing for Deployment B Company, 2d Battalion, 37th Armor Regiment, is an M1A1 Abrams Integrated Management (AIM) system-equipped tank company stationed in Germany as apart of 1st Brigade, 1st Armored Division. The unit received initial warning orders of impending deployment in December 2002. The company conducted high-intensity conflict (HIC) training at Grafenwoehr Training Area during January 2003, which included Tank Tables VIII and XII, as well as externally evaluated situational training exercises (STX) for breach, movement to contact, nuclear, biological, and chemical decontamination, and urban operations. The company returned to home station in early February and, in early March, received deployment orders in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom. The unit changed commanders and witnessed “shock and awe,” the ground war, and the battle for Baghdad on television and through other media sources. After loading equipment in late April, the company deployed to Kuwait in mid-May and arrived in Baghdad at the end of the month. B Company spent the entire deployment attached to 1st Squadron, 2d Cavalry, a high-mobility, multipurpose wheeled vehicle (HMMWV)-equipped light cavalry squadron with responsibility for the largest battalion-sized area of responsibility (AOR) in Baghdad. The AOR includes upper-middle-class neighborhoods, poor neighborhoods, and rural areas. In support of the squadron’s mission, the company conducts wheeled and dismounted operations in zone, and provides a platoon-sized M1A1 quick response force to the regimental AOR. Shoot Individual weapons training. Events during the war in Iraq have prompted the Chief of Staff, Army to reiterate the importance of all soldiers to be riflemen first. Soldiers in Iraq must be capable, accurate, and confident with the M16 rifle or M4 carbine. Soldiers must be taught proper engagement techniques that can be used in the urban environment and at ranges of less than 50 meters. Soldiers must arrive at armor units with greater skills in rifle marksmanship, which must be sustained at the unit level. As a tank company, B Company is equipped with 61 M9 pistols, 28 M4 carbines, and 14 M16A2 rifles. The company arrived with 100 percent individual weapons qualification on assigned MTOE weapons. Attachments brought additional M16s as well as one squad automatic weapon (SAW). Replacements brought five additional M16A2s from Europe. The squadron provided two additional SAWs for vehicle movements. The M9 pistol, though a great personal defense weapon for armored crewmen, is not sufficient for conducting patrols in Baghdad. Its range and lethality are not sufficient for personal defense at long ranges, and is certainly not suitable for offensive operations. Perhaps not surprisingly, the perennial shortage of 9mm ammunition that hampers weapons training at home stations effects units in Iraq as well. The rifle and carbine have proven to be much more versatile weapons. During the war’s initial and later stages, tank commanders and loaders used the M4 from tank turrets to engage and kill enemy forces at close ranges when vehicle mounted crew served weapons did not provide the required speed or precision of engagement. This continues to be the trend. Every soldier in the company team is required to qualify on a rifle. The rifle is the weapon of choice for the combat soldier in Baghdad. Its range, accuracy, and volume of fire make this a superior weapon for soldiers who will operate on foot or from wheeled vehicles. M16, M4, and SAW ammunition is available in much greater quantities to support both operational missions and training. All soldiers are familiar with the rifle from their initial entry training. Training and coaching basic rifle marksmanship offers a challenge to junior leaders and creates a bond when forming fire teams and squads. Fortunately, there was a standard 25-meter range on our forward operating base (FOB). As operations throughout Iraq continue to consolidate on fewer and larger FOBs, deployed units will find it easier to maintain marksmanship skills. There are several approaches that can be used to better train soldiers on marksmanship skills. At home station, commanders should: qualify all soldiers twice annually on the M16 or M4, to Army standard, to include night and NBC fire; record weapons zeros for individual weapons, pairing soldiers with these weapons whenever possible during operations; schedule monthly platoon range days to integrate “The M9 pistol, though a great personal defense weapon for armored crewmen, is not sufficient for conducting patrols in Baghdad. Its range and lethality are not sufficient for personal defense at long ranges, and is certainly not suitable for offensive operations. Perhaps not surprisingly, the perennial shortage of 9mm ammunition that hampers weapons training at home stations effects units in Iraq as well.” 16 — new soldiers, improve the skills of weak shooters, and hone new expert marksmen; conduct M9 firing, as ammunition is available, at least annually; and purchase PVS-7 helmet mounts for every soldier, as well as tank commander and loader combat vehicle crewmen (CVC) helmets. The U. S. Army Armor Center and the U. S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) should: adjust the MTOE for tank companies to provide one M4 for each tank crewman and mechanic (an additional 33 x M4 carbines); provide M68 reflex scopes and flashlights for each rifle; resource all combat soldiers with the PVS-4 monocular night-vision goggle; resource home station training ammunition for 5.56 qualification at least three times annually for each soldier; and ensure all soldiers conduct basic rifle marksmanship as apart of individual entry training, the Armor Officer Basic Course, or the Basic Officer Leadership Course. Short-range marksmanship training. Experience in Iraq teaches that most engagements occur at less than 150 meters, and frequently engaging with a.50 caliber or M240 will cause greater than warranted collateral damage. Many units in Iraq were fortunate enough to have Department of Defense (DOD)-contracted instructors teach close quarters marksmanship at Udairi Range in Kuwait. Using a template from Infantry magazine, 1st Squadron, 2d Cavalry, developed a short-range marksmanship table system to train and sustain rifle marksmanship at ranges less than 100 meters.3 This training is conducted on a standard 25m range and requires approximately 100 rounds per soldier. Because tank companies will operate frequently on dismounted patrols, these skills are essential for every soldier in the company team. Platoon leaders and platoon sergeants complete “train-the-trainer” certification and are tasked to conduct this training bimonthly for all soldiers in the company. A platoon of 16 soldiers can conduct this training to standard in approximately 3 hours, which includes walkthroughs, dry runs, and live runs. Certified leaders train basic movements, weapons posture, rifle orientation, tactical safety, and target acquisition. Soldiers are taught to acquire and engage targets from stationary positions, on the move, to the flank, and from a variety of ranges both during the day and at night. The benefits of short-range marksmanship training are many. Soldiers become more aware of their responsibilities to nearby soldiers and noncombatants when engaging in close-combat environments. Squads learn to work together, discriminate between targets, and deliver accurate fire. Platoon leaders and platoon sergeants can use the short-range marksmanship template to learn how to plan and conduct training to the 8-step training model. Coupled with a strong basic rifle marksmanship program, short-range marksmanship builds confident and lethal squads that are comfortable operating in built-up areas. Short-range engagements are very common in Iraq, and training this technique prior to deployment is imperative, as well as after arriving in an AOR. Unit commanders should: plan and resource short-range marksmanship training at home station; maintain crew cohesion during conduct of training whenever possible; conduct short-range marksmanship month ly during deployments; and ensure unit leaders use the 8-step training model while deployed. The Armor Center should include short-range marksmanship train-the-trainer in all Armor School programs of instruction and ensure all force-on-force training includes dismounted enemy action at close range. Squad tactical training. The true test of an armor unit in Baghdad is its ability to operate on the battlefield during wheeled and dismounted patrols. While tank missions certainly display the firepower and lethality possessed by coalition forces, building a rapport with the local populace requires a wheeled and dismounted presence on roads frequently not passable by tracked vehicles. Stopping criminal activity, weapons dealing, and insurgent activity frequently requires coalition forces to cordon city blocks and enter homes during hostile situations. Tank companies, as often as infantry companies, must be proficient in basic squad infantry tactics. Additionally, a primary focus of coalition forces in Iraq has been to train Iraqi security forces to “put an Iraqi face on security.” These units, at least initially, will be very lightly equipped and must develop the same level of proficiency in infantry operations. Armor leaders obviously must have enough proficiency to train these tactics, so that locals can take responsibility for their own security. Because the tactical situation changed relatively late in the deployment timeline, B Company did not initially focus on dismounted tactics, and no mission rehearsal exercise for Iraq was scheduled or executed. We used the personnel and vehicle search and traffic control point procedures as the foundation for dismounted operations. After arriving in Kuwait, we organized tank sections as provisional infantry squads, and conducted dismounted training for reactions to contact, actions on the objective, and enemy “Soldiers must be taught proper engagement techniques that can be used in the urban environment and at ranges of less than 50 meters. Soldiers must arrive at armor units with greater skills in rifle marksmanship, which must be sustained at the unit level.”

prisoners of war handling before crossing into Iraq. These skills continue to be honed here in Iraq. The armor commander’s challenge is to inspire his 19Ks to be competent infantrymen and scouts, while retaining their pride as mounted warriors. Armor leaders, while maintaining their special skills on tanks, must execute the mission on the ground, as it exists in Iraq. Your subject-matter experts in infantry tactics will be commissioned officers who have gone through this training at their commissioning source, fire support personnel with experience in infantry operations, and noncommissioned officers (NCOs) who have deployed to similar Army operations. Future transitions between tracked and dismounted operations will be easier if we expect our leaders to have expertise in basic infantry tactics. To meet this challenge, commanders should: use squad and fire team dismounted tactics as the foundation for home station sergeant’s time training; identify leaders for dismounted operations and include squad patrolling techniques in unit standard operating procedures; and use the standards for the expert infantry badge as a goal for armor crewman individual training, in the absence of an expert armor badge. The Armor Center and TRADOC can support this training by: using infantry tactics as the tactical foundation of all NCO education system courses through advanced NCO course; sustaining the infantry foundation of the basic officer leader course; directing and evaluating more wheeled/dismounted missions during force-on-force exercises at combat training centers; and maintaining emphasis on semiannual M1A1 gunnery at crew and platoon levels. Move Physical fitness training. Those who have yet to experience the month of August in Baghdad will appreciate the value of good physical fitness while deployed. Temperatures in excess of 125 degrees during the day and 100 degrees during the night will tax every soldier’s endurance, especially during missions, when wearing kevlar helmets and interceptor body armor. Regardless of mission posture, it is absolutely essential that physical training (PT) be conducted at the unit level during deployments. We created a system, which includes three PT sessions and one company sports session per week, to set a baseline standard. Over time, the squadron gymnasium offered the option to workout on personal time. Nutrition, eating habits, and physical fitness can all improve, given proper command emphasis. An unscientific sampling of new arrivals indicated a higher level of physical fitness than had been expected in the recent past. Whether this is good fortune or the result of command emphasis at one-station unit training is unknown, but we were uniformly pleased with the quality and professionalism of our new arrivals. Our experience suggests that soldiers conducting operations in the Middle East must be physically fit, or they will not be combat effective for the entire tour. To promote high levels of physical fitness, unit commanders can: set the tone for high physical fitness rates at home station prior to deployment by executing a rigorous PT plan; ensure subordinate leaders understand they are expected to develop and improve their soldiers’ physical fitness; develop and execute a physical fitness program for all soldiers while deployed; set goals for overweight soldiers and PT test failures; have master fitness trainers assign mentors to help them reach goals during deployment; and make time for company sports to improve unit cohesion and provide stress relief. To encourage soldiers to reach higher PT goals, the Armor Center and TRADOC should: place a higher priority on physical fitness training, with specific emphasis on upper-body strength, cardiovascular conditioning, and injury prevention; and teach new soldiers how to develop and execute a personal physical conditioning program. Combat driver’straining/vehicle convoys. Soldiers must have the ability to execute complicated maneuvers in an urban battlespace when they arrive at the unit. Tank drivers, in particular, will be challenged to move safely on narrow and congested roads, among civilian traffic, and in all conditions. To prepare soldiers for the challenges of moving military vehicles, training centers and commanders must execute rigorous driver’straining programs that simulate the challenges of urban and rural driving under combat conditions. Tank operations. Maneuvering the M1A1 will be a stressful situation for personnel in urban areas such as Baghdad. As normal civilian traffic has returned and even increased, M1A1 drivers will find themselves surrounded by civilian vehicles, that, to be generous, have not been inspected by a qualified mechanic. Civilian cars will frequently lack lights, brakes, or even seating. While most are not foolhardy enough to challenge an M1A1 for road space during the day, the M1A1 is nearly invisible to civilian traffic at night, and the placement of headlights can confuse drivers, with deadly results. However, the M1A1 is a useful vehicle in urban environments. In the early days of the deployment, we established “rolling checkpoints,” made up of one tank section and one scout section, to enforce curfew and bring order to “The rifle is the weapon of choice for the combat soldier in Baghdad. Its range, accuracy, and volume of fire make this a superior weapon for soldiers who will operate on foot or from wheeled vehicles. M16, M4, and SAW ammunition is available in much greater quantities to support both operational missions and training. All soldiers are familiar with the rifle from their initial entry training. Training and coaching basic rifle marksmanship offers a challenge to junior leaders and a bond when forming fire teams and squads.” 18 — the streets. Vehicles moved with lights off, and used the tank’s excellent optics to find curfew violators. The driver would move toward the violator, stop, turn on his headlights, and deploy scouts to search the vehicle and its occupants. The combination of tanks and wheels provided a vigorous symbol of coalition control, allowing the commander to establish a presence over a wide area, and protect the force by avoiding long-term fixed checkpoints. Units will also find the tank useful for cordons during searches of large neighborhoods, for security during high-profile events, and for route reconnaissance. While we did not use the obstacle-reducing round during our deployment, many noncooperative enemy forces in Baghdad were convinced or eliminated by the tank main gun. Mission success is determined in large part by the tank driver’s ability to confidently and safely move a 65-ton vehicle through a half-ton world. Wheeled operations. Armor units must have a solid driver’straining plan to teach combat driving on the HMMWV, in particular, the M1114 armored HMMWV. For most armored crewmen, the HMMWV will most likely be the vehicle they will drive during missions. Soldiers must be taught to safely handle vehicles in congested conditions, maintain situational awareness for roadside improvised explosive devices (IED), execute complex movements under stressful conditions, and react to any form of contact. Early in the deployment, convoys used aggressive, even dangerous, high-speed driving as a force protection measure. Wheeled convoys wanted to maintain integrity and prevent civilian vehicles from entering the convoy. These measures soon became counterproductive. With the volume of civilian traffic, civilian vehicles will inevitably get in the convoy. Driving at high speeds, or using unsafe lane changes, increases the risk of injury or death to soldiers and civilians. We found that aggressive combat driving increases the risk to our soldiers without improving force protection, as the most likely form of contact moved from direct fire to IED during the deployment. Bunching up vehicles in a closed column increases the potential number of vehicles and personnel in the IED kill zone. Further, driving at high rates of speed during an IED explosion increases the risk of drivers losing control of their vehicles, causing a subsequent collision. Drivers and vehicle commanders must be taught to maneuver in the urban battlespace just as they would anywhere else, without being distracted or unnerved by civilian traffic. In our squadron, we found the most effective formation is four-man crews moving in a staggered column, with a minimum of two vehicles armed with automatic weapons (M2, M240, or M249). All personnel are assigned a sector of observation and fire, with the lead automatic weapon gunner maintaining special emphasis on road medians or emergency lanes. Passengers in the rear observe and orient to the flanks of the vehicle, using spotlights to check suspicious areas when possible. Vehicles use the automatic weapons platform to complete a 360-degree plan of observation and fire planning. Using lower rates of speed and a staggered column improves observation and enhances safety. To ensure HMMWV drivers are properly trained, unit commanders should: conduct regular vehicle licensing periods at home station to ensure all soldiers (including officers) know how to operate and maintain the HMMWV; conduct wheeled convoy STX lanes during training, to include reaction to direct and indirect fires “Experience in Iraq teaches that most engagements occur at less than 150 meters, and frequently engaging with a.50 caliber or M240 will cause greater than warranted collateral damage. Many units in Iraq were fortunate enough to have department of defense (DOD)-contracted instructors teach close quarters marksmanship at Udairi Range in Kuwait.” Continued on Page 38 to help improve civilian observation; and deadline M1A1s or HMMWVs with nonfunctioning headlights. The Armor Center and TRADOC can assist by: continuing to train soldiers to a high standard on driving the M1A1 by using both simulators and live training; add HMMWV driver’straining to initial entry training; conduct wheeled missions as part of the Advanced Noncommissioned Officers Course, the Armor Officer Basic Course, and the Armor Captains Career Course; change the tank company MTOE to include at least one M1026; and develop an M1114-based package for military pre-positioned stocks to better equip units for stability operations and support operations. Communicate Give a spot report/develop the situation. The most challenging transition for your armor soldiers will be to teach them to find and analyze information on the battlefield. While 19D soldiers will usually adapt easily to the urban environment, for the 19K this is a radical transformation. Frequently, a tank commander or senior gunner will represent the company to a public utility, community leader, or religious figure. To save time required for action, these same leaders must understand how to develop the situation, and provide useful information to the chain of command. Commanders set the tone for patrolling by assigning platoon leaders specific priority intelligence requirements and desired endstates for company information operations. Sending patrols to drive around wastes soldier time and usually lead to a substandard patrol. Giving a platoon apiece of a company’s vision gets everyone involved and focuses the efforts of your soldiers in a useful way. Early in the deployment, we used written reports and oral debriefs with patrol leaders daily. When reporting incidents or information, patrol leaders must accurately report the time and location of the incident or conversation, including the name and title of the citizen involved, and conduct an initial reconnaissance of the report to give an eyes-on perspective to the commander. Once a basic standard of information required is understood by company leaders, an oral debrief to the company information officer (usually the fire support officer) will be sufficient to develop required reports. Developing the situation in this environment is an art. Units will find that, in talking with local people in Iraq, rumors are rife and Iraqis do not necessarily analyze the truthfulness of information or sources — frequently, local citizens report rumors as if they were facts. Patrol leaders should conduct an initial reconnaissance or ask follow-on questions to allow the unit to get a better understanding of what is happening in the community, and also separate true reports from false reports. Teaching armor leaders to always be scouts will be the capstone of your company’s transformation. We use nighttime dismounted patrols in residential neighborhoods to teach these skills, which requires speaking to groups of local citizens on various topics, including water services, propane, and criminal activity. Patrols leave with assigned neighborhoods and topics, but are free to discuss anything of interest to the community. By assigning junior leaders and soldiers to be the “speaker,” the company will build a team of scouts who are comfortable using a translator to speak to the local population. The neighborhood will be appreciative of the interest and the interaction, and will see soldiers doing something other than searching homes at midnight. Finding and analyzing information on the battlefield is a challenging mission. Unit commanders can make this transition easier by: developing priority information requirements for missions to support platoon collection plans — debrief all patrols after missions; appointing the company fire support officer or executive officer as the information officer and interact with the battalion S2 and S5; developing, at home station, STX for soldiers to interact with civilians on the battlefield to collect on assigned information requirements; and have the information officer develop scripts for civilians working in public utilities or other situations, with differing levels of cooperation or knowledge. A tank company deploying to Iraq will return as a multifaceted organization capable of achieving any mission. Soldiers will perform at a high level, show great patience and discipline, and want to make a difference. Although it is impossible to predict the future of warfare, perhaps Operation Iraqi Freedom will cause us to reassess our recent and not-so-recent past. While we always see ourselves as the gallant mounted warriors of large mechanized battlefields waiting for the next Kursk, to achieve our national objectives, we must see beyond a narrow view of who we are and what we do and instead focus on what we can and must do. From that perspective, our training and training priorities, while professionally planned and vigorously executed, are insufficient. In nearly every war, the U. S. Army has been asked to destroy the enemy and win peace. Arresting a confrontational leader or financier, destroying an ambush position, or finding terrorists might win peace in Iraq. Discovering why a water-pumping station does not work or ensuring the efficient operation of a petroleum station in times of shortage might also win peace in Iraq. We will return to home stations that are ever busier and have even less “precious white space” with which to train. We have a responsibility to train the best armored force in the world, but also to build “de-cathletes” capable of winning the peace to ensure the sacrifice made in this and future conflicts is not in vain. Notes 1Greg Jaffe, “A Maverick’s Plan to Revamp Army is Taking Shape,” Wall Street Journal, 12 December 2003, p 1. 2My grandfather, an infantry officer veteran of five campaigns in Europe, once told me “high-intensity conflict” could be defined as “one guy with a gun shooting at you.” 3Captain Bret Van Poppel, Captain John Paganini, and Captain Jeffrey A. Rynbrandt, “Close Quarters Marksmanship: Training for Conventional Infantry Units,” Infantry, January-April 1999, p. 39. CPT Geoffrey Wright is currently serving as commander, B Company, 2d Battalion, 37th Armor Regiment, 1st Armored Division, Baghdad, Iraq. He is a Distinguished Military Graduate of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. His military education includes Armor Officer Basic Course, U. S. Marine Corps Amphibious Warfare School, and Combined Arms and Services Staff School. He has held various command and staff positions, including tank platoon leader, C Company, 2d Battalion, 72d Armor Regiment, Camp Casey, Korea; tank platoon leader, Headquarters and Headquarters Company executive officer, and battalion S4, 2d Battalion, 70th Armor Regiment, Fort Riley, KS; and plans officer, 1st Brigade Combat Team, 1st Armored Division, Friedberg, Germany. 38 — Sharpening the Spear from Page 19