TOC Security

Major Michael Hurley was livid. The brilliant sun was rising on the far side of Tiefort Mountain, but none of the red-eyed members of the 218th Heavy Separate Brigade’s tactical operations center (TOC) could enjoy the natural beauty of the Mojave Desert morning. In the first three nights of maneuver training at the National Training Center, the People’s Parumphian Guerrillas (PPG) had managed to enter the commander’s primary C2 (command and control) node and disrupt his operations. The PPG came not in a heavily armored formation but in small, lightly-equipped dismounted teams who hit quickly, produced “casualties,” and upset the units’ battle rhythm. Yes, the TOC had successfully gone to 100 percent security, but Fort Irwin’s world-class opposing force, or OPFOR, still entered the main command post (CP) and “killed” planners and TOC workers. Battle planning had been set back for hours. “Where is my wire,” Major Hurley demanded. “We’ve been here for three days and I haven’t seen my wire yet!?!” There were other lapses in the perimeter security. That morning a partisan “guerrilla” team had driven to within 100 meters of the facility unchallenged. They entered the CP to trade an American “deserter” for food and water followed by a “news team” with cameras aimed at tactical overlays and combat power charts. The benign event further demonstrated the gaps in operational security (OPSEC). Major Hurley had had enough. Tactical operation centers are valuable targets preyed upon by guerrilla and special purpose forces, or Levels 1 and 2 threats. Like a boxer protecting his head from his opponent’s rabbit punches, TOCs must institute aggressive security plans to remain inviolable to hostile acts. Establishing a C2 site is an evaluated “command and control” BOS (battlefield operating system) found in the ARTEP 7-20- MTP: Mission Training Plan for the Infantry Battalion (Task Number 07-6-1104, Establish/Operate Command Post). It has 23 subtasks and 14 requisite leader tasks for successful accomplishment. This article describes techniques used to protect command and control centers from small attacks aimed at disrupting units’ planning cycle. There are three considerations for the successful defense of lightly armed C2 facili-ARMOR — July-August 2002 19 Photos by Robert L. Stevenson OP /

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Example #1: Rear IPB Template OP /

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Example #1: Rear IPB Template ties: a security manager, passive security, and active security. Defensive fundamentals can be found in FM 7-8, Infantry Rifle Platoon and Squad and C2 operating methods are found in: FM 7-20, The Infantry Battalion; FM 71-3, The Armored and Mechanized Infantry Brigade; and FM 71-123, Tactics and Techniques for Combined Arms Heavy Forces: Armored Brigade, Battalion Task Force, and Company Team. Security Manager The onus for operational security (OPSEC) at the CP belongs to the security manager. By implementing counterreconnaissance and surveillance measures, he denies the enemy observation of the TOC and prevents an unhindered approach to the site. The security manager begins with rear area intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB). He identifies named areas of interest (NAIs) such as air corridors and dismounted mobility corridors the enemy will most likely use to attack his facility. Further, he factors the civil-military situation in his area of operation as civilians in his area may effect his security plan. IPB produces a template of activity near the TOC used in the unit’s integrated R&S plan (see Example #1). At the TOC site, the security manager’s priority of work is: a) Assign sectors.

b) Position key weapons.

c) Establish local security.

d) Identify engagement areas and TRPs.

e) Clear fields of observation and fire.

f) Emplace wire, mines, and other obstacles and cover them with fire.

g) Prepare fighting positions and protective positions.

h) Prepare range cards and sector sketches.

i) Establish a wire communications system. Passive Security The CP’s survivability depends on terrain for cover and concealment in a 360-degree perimeter defense. An exterior and interior ring of obstacles inhibits movement into the heart of the facility, the CP, (see Example #2) while camouflage nets obscure equipment and activity from enemy observation. The two overriding requirements in the TOC site selection are defensibility and communications; per ARTEP 7-20 MTP, it is located where the unit can maintain control of the battle while minimizing its exposure. The ideal location is large enough to accommodate all the tenant vehicles and is outside of enemy direct/ indirect fire range. The terrain has adequate drainage, supports the

20 ARMOR — July-August 2002 CP Gate Guard Crew Served Weapon Fighting Positions Tank on Thermal Watch Example #2: TOC Site M8 Alarm M8 Alarm

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HQ66 HQ63 Tangle Foot Exterior Perimeter Interior Perimeter CP CP Gate Guard Crew Served Weapon Fighting Positions Tank on Thermal Watch Example #2: TOC Site M8 Alarm M8 Alarm

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HQ66 HQ63 Tangle Foot Exterior Perimeter Interior Perimeter Pickets 5 Paces Apart 1 Meter Between Pickets

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ID Tent With Guard Example #3: CP Set Up Pickets 5 Paces Apart 1 Meter Between Pickets

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ID Tent With Guard Example #3: CP Set Up unit’s heaviest vehicles, affords vehicle dispersion, cover and concealment, and a line-of-sight of ground and air avenues of approach. The perimeter is established prior to the arrival of the main body. The unit’s advanced party, or ADVON, enters the site with a Class IV cargo HEMTT of barrier material to construct the obstacles and outline the TOC site dimensions. During the initial occupation, a row of single-strand concertina wire outlines the exterior perimeter. Fighting positions are simultaneously dug behind the wire outside the enemy’s hand-grenade range while crew served weapons monitor the enemy’s main avenues of approach. The exterior wire has one gate manned by a soldier and overwatched by a crew served weapon. As time and mission requirements allow, the wire is reinforced with “tangle-foot” (barbed wire) inside the first ring and trip flares along dismounted avenues of approach. Simultaneously, the security manager places observation posts (OPs) oriented on ground avenue of approaches and NAIs to provide early warning. When the main body arrives, it has 10 minutes to assume C2 tasks such as communications, data collection, and information dissemination. The CP is quickly guided to the center of the site by the ADVON and enclosed in triple-strand concertina wire with an identification check tent at the entrance of the wire wrap (see Example #3). All vehicles and tents are finally covered with camouflage nets. The C2 location is now concealed within the terrain with a central point for authorized soldiers to enter the command post. Active Security Hiding the TOC is the first step in its protection. Aggressive patrolling assures the world-class OPFOR looks elsewhere for prey. This again falls to the security manager. He directs mounted and dismounted patrols to clear his NAIs. A mounted patrol by off-duty soldiers and military policemen clears open areas quickly while dismounted teams clear ravines or wadis. From different vantage points, the patrols also check the camouflage of the TOC both in the day and at night and looks for gaps in the perimeter. Lesson Learned

1. The unit templates TOC sites using the Terra Base program. Before deploying troops, this computer model tests potential locations for defensibility, line-of-sight communication, and accessibility.

2. Scout platoons conduct area reconnaissance of the likely TOC sites prior to site selection.

3. The terrain dictates the shape of the facility.

a. Open terrain (NTC) stresses supplies of Class IV. It requires maximum vehicle dispersion, less wire on the exterior perimeter, more wire around the TOC, and more patrols.

b. Restrictive terrain (Korea) produces smaller sites or forces the TOC to divide into clusters around the CP. Smaller sites and clusters are ideal for triple-strand concertina enclosures but do not provide vehicle dispersion.

4. In the brigade, the headquarters company commander is the TOC security manager; the operations NCO is the task force TOC security manager.

5. Speed is essential to establishing a CP in a secure area — the main body has 10 minutes upon arrival to begin vital activities.

a. Since each 300-meter of the perimeter requires 160 long and four short pickets and 56 coils of barbed concertina, the advanced party divides into three teams: one lays the pickets at every five paces, one drops the wire, one raises the wire.

b. A Small Emplacement Excavator (SEE) from the engineer company digs holes for fighting positions which soldiers will improve as time allows.

6. Thermal sights from headquarters tanks or IFVs/CFVs scan NAIs when they are in the perimeter and not otherwise used.

7. Ground surveillance radar and air defense assets not dedicated to the fight are used to pick up enemy signatures.

8. Establish a quick reaction force (QRF) of off-duty soldiers under the control of a sergeant of the guard (SOG). The SOG is also responsible for supervising the “guard mount” during his shift.

9. Always rehearse the perimeter defense during lulls in the battle. Conclusion Security at all levels has remained an immutable tenet of warfare and will remain so throughout the history of conflict. Similarly, command and control of battle is critical to orchestrating multiple assets. Active and passive security under the control of one manager protects not only the brains of the unit but is also useful for logistical sites such as the combat trains and field trains.

CPT J.M. Pierre is a 1992 graduate of the Fordham University ROTC program. He has served as a tank platoon leader and tank company XO in 1-67th AR, 2d AD. After AOAC, he commanded A/1-72 AR and HHC, 2-9th IN (M), in the 2d ID, Korea. He is assigned to the Operations Group at the NTC and is currently TDY as a Coalition Operations Officer at HQ, Central Command.

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