Commander’s Intent: Uniformly Known and Misunderstood

In the July-August 1990 issue of ARMOR, an article appeared named, "The Abuse of Paragraph 3a, or What Commander's Concept is Not." I read the article many times over the last year, often frustrated by it, several times beginning but never finishing a response. It seemed to me that if anyone were able to outline the framework for commander's intent, it would be an S3 observer/controller at the National Training Center. Why, then, was Major Stephenson, whom I personally know. to be a superb officer, unable to outline what commander's intent is in a five-page article. Over two of the last three years, I have been a small group instructor responsible for teaching company through brigade tactics. During this time, I received three memorandums, three messages from Fort Leavenworth, and five articles defining commander's intent. All had things in common, but all were different to a significant extent. This made teaching a difficult proposition. Additionally, I have been part of several video teleconferences with other TRADOC branch schools. As with the memorandums and messages, each school had significant differences in what commander's intent is. Does intent equal purpose? At battalion and below, is there a formal Commander's Intent paragraph, or is it integrated in the Concept of the Operation? Is Commander's Intent part of paragraph 3a or is it a "floating paragraph" between 3 and 3a? In the Estimate of the Situation process, Course of Action Development, is there one intent for each course of action, or is the intent the same for all possible courses of action? Only last week, I participated in the preparation for a General Officer Workshop. One of the topics of the workshop was future Army doctrine, specifically, AirLand Operations. To facilitate discussion, a scenario was provided for working groups to develop courses of action. Each course of action was to include commander's intent and a concept of the operation. As the staff began to work, one of the first issues on the informal agenda was what format should be used for the intent and concept paragraphs. Members of this staff were some of the finest minds and most experienced officers I have worked with, former brigade and battalion commanders, battalion S3s and observerlcontrollers, and yet we had to determine and continually review what our format would be. Considering all of this, it's no wonder that Major Stephenson, the author of the above-mentioned article, had difficulty defining commander's intent. 30 One might ask, is this really an important issue, or is it something that TRADOC schools just enjoy pondering. It would appear that even without an Army wide understanding of intent, we have been very successful in several of our last operations. Even so, having a mmmon understanding of intent is important for several reasons. First and foremost, if mission orders and mission oriented command and control are truly the heart of our AirLand Battle Doctrine, then understanding the commander's intent is crucial. If the purpose the commander gives a subordinate is truly more important than the task, then the intent (the method the commander uses to begin to articulate his purpose), must be understood clearly. If we are to take advantage of the often mentioned initiative of the American soldier, then every soldier must understand that initiative should only be taken within the commander's clearly articulated intent. Second, although we have been successful recently, there are realistically potential future battlefields that may test our doctrine much more than recent operations. Low-intensity conflict describes a battlefield on which mission oriented command and control will be a cornerstone to successful operations. Additionally, it appears that our future doctrine, AirLand Operations with its emphasis on the offense, and dispersed wide ranging operations, will rely even more heavily on understanding the commander's intent. Finally, quoting from FM 100-5, "...to be useful, doctrine must be uniformty known and understood." I believe that commander's intent, a dactrinal issue as identified in FM 100-5 and FM 101-5, is not uniformly understood and therefore not as useful to us as it might be. At this point you may be asking yourself, 'Is commander's intent not uniformly understood, or is it rather that the author just doesn't understand?" This is a fair question. In an attempt to provide a fair answer, I have compiled some objective statistics that support my position. I am currently serving as one of the three team chiefs for the Infantry Officers Advanced Course. My team recently started anew class of 165 students, 129 of which were U. S., both Active and Reserve Component. I asked all 11 of my small groups instructors to give a quiz to the IOAC students, before their first major block of tactics instruction. I asked them to use it as away of introducing concepts and encouraging discussion. Below is the quiz that I provided. The number of people that responded to each possible answer is noted in parenthesis at the right of each answer. Questions specifically about commander's intent are 3 through 6, but go ahead and read all of the questions, because they will also be discussed.

For IOAC Do not place your name on this document. Complete the following eight questions, and turn it in to your SGI. If you do not know an answer, do not guess. A response h<s been provided if you am unfamiliar with that specific question. Remember, this is an ungraded quiz to be used for discussion purposes. The results, in general, will be discussed with you at a later time.

1. Many of our doctrinal and tactical manuals use the term, MAIN EFFORT. A MAIN EFFORT: a. Is usually a company for a task force. (11) b. Is the same as MAIN ATTACK. (21) c. Is a mission-essential task to be accomplished at a certain d. Changes as the battle.develops. wherever the e. I do not know. (10)

2. In the Estimate of the Situation Process, during Courss of Action, (COA) development, a DECISIVE POINT will often be identified and become the heart of a single COA. A DECISIVE POINT is: time and location. (24) commander's focus is. (63) a. The same as Main Effort. (15) b. A location on the ground. (45) c. An enemy vulnerability. (48) d. An enemy unit. ( 0) e. I do not know. (21) 3. As part of the Operations Order format, COMMANDERS INTENT is optional at battalion level and below.

a. TNe (8) b. False (1 14) c. I do not know. (7)

4. As part of the Operations Order format, brigade and higher, COMMANDER'S INTENT is: a. Located in paragraph 3a, Concept of the Operation.(66) b. A floating paragraph between paragraph 3 and 3a. (34) c. Given verbally by the commander before the OPORD to d. Given verbally at the end of the OPORD to identify aitical e. I do not know (17)

5. COMMANDERS INTENT should indude: provide a framework fur the operation. (10) tasks.

a. Significant factors and critical tasks in relationship to mission accomplishment, i.e. speed, surprise. etc. (40) b. Purpose of the operation, end state of enemylfriendly forces and terrain, and how this will be achieved. (80) c. Motivational comments to inspire subordinates. (0) ARMOR - JUly-AUguSt 7992 d. Clarification of specifE points not previously mentioned in the order. (5) e. I do not know. (4)

6. Paragraph 30, Concept of the Operation should include: a. A desaiption. in general terms, of how the operation will be conducted from beginning to end. (68) b. Expansion of the purpose, generic task organization. and arrayal of forces. (5) c. A description of the Row of the battle to include significant factors in relationship to mission accomplishment, i.e. speed, surprise, etc. (43) d. An expansion of the Commander's Intent (5) e. I do not know. (8)

7. An example of a good MISSION STATEMENT is: a. B Company defends m sector, NLT 0600 11 March 92, to deny penetration of PL Blue. (21) b. B Company denies penetration of PL Blue in sector, NLT O600 11 March 92, to prevent the envelopment of D Company. (20) c. B Company occupies BP 10 NLT, 0600 11 March 92 and defends in sector to deny pene?ration of PL Blue. Be prepared to conduct counteratta& to complete the destruction of enemy forces vicinity OBJ RED. (42) d. All examples are acceptable mission statements. (46) e. I do not know. (0)

8. How do you identify the Mission Essential Task($) far your mission statement?

a. From your Mission Essential Task List (Mm). (34) b. From the Estimate of the Situation process, Mission Analyc. I do not k w. (7) Note that there is not an overwhelming majority of responses to any question. Even more pertinent is that five of the eight questions were answered incorrectly, (arguably,) by the majorii of students. Specifically, questions 1,3,4, 6, and 7. Two objections mght be raised in regard to this quiz. First, the quiz itself mght be biased, to which I would respond, it may be. Although I have not tried to trick the students, and offered only possible answers from responses that I have head over the last several years, I realize this may not be a statistically verifiable test. Even so, I believe it does provide at least an indication of where we stand. Second, some mght say that junior officers aren't suppose to be doctrinal experts. Again, there may be some truth to this, but these company grade officers are reflections of their experience, specifically the company and battalion commanders they have worked for. So where is the answer key? At this point, the answers aren't important. What is important is that you can see we have a wide variety of opinions about some basic doctrinal concepts. Up to now, I haven't given you anything more than Major Stephenson did in his article. My hope is, at this sis. (88) 31 point, that you would agree that there is a problem and that it is significant. So what is commander's intent? I will offer you an opinion, and then explain afterward why it's not worth much. I believe that the commander's intent is the pivotal point in the operations order where the commander continues, in some detail, to explain the purpose of the operation. He is telling his subordinates why the mission essential task is.important. He is not explaining the purpose to convince his subordinates, but rather to ensure, if it becomes necessary, they can take initiative within the commander's purpose. If a subordinate finds himself in a difficult situation, unable to communicate with his commander, he should be able to recall the commander's intent and answer the question, "What would my boss have me do if he was here?" I mentioned earlier that the commander continues to expand on his purpose. He begins in his Mission Statement, where he also articulates his purpose or the 5th W; why. In the Mission Statement it's not-enough to say *DEFEND in order to DESTROY." Rather it should be, *DESTROY in order to PREVENT THE BYPASS OF THE MAIN EFFORT." This tells a subordinate that defending a battle position is meaningless as opposed to preventing the bypass of the main effort. Therefore, if the situation changes and the subordinate can't contact his higher, he can act independently, within the commander's intent, and do whatever is necessary to accomplish the purpose. That might include moving a battle position, or even conducting a limited counterattack. Similarly, the higher's purpose should tie directly into his higher's purpose, as stated in paragraph lb. (l), Friendly Forces, Higher Unit. This is a tool that ensures all units are synchronized. So, to be concise, the commander's intent is stated immediately preceding paragraph 3a It is the commander's stated vision which defines the purpose of the operation, (why), themd state with respect to the relationship among the force, the enemy, and the terrain. The intent statement is included only if the commander believed it necessary to expand on the purpose of the mission statement or higher's intent in paragraph 1 b. At battalion level and below, the commander's intent may be the same as the purpose of the mission statement. If so, it is not necessary to restate it. This definition is a compilation of directives, definitions from manuals, and much discussion within the seminar room and is used in the IOAC. There is one significant problem with this definition. Although generally accepted by the people with whom I work, it may differ from the Armor School's definition, which may differ from the Field Artillery School's definition, etc. Individual TRADOC schools cannot wriie doctrinal definitions. If we do, we will probably never have a doctrine that is 'uniformly known and understood." Individual schools can certainly write tactics, techniques, 32 and procedures, but Fort Leavenworth must be the source that 'articulates doctrinal issues. Fort Leavenworth's answer to many questions appears to be ST 100-9, which supposedly clarifies many issues and discusses, "emerging doctrine." In my discussions with many other TRADOC schools I have learned that ST 100-9 is the basis of much instruction and is even issued as part of their student book issue. But, in my opinion, a student text infiltrated throughout the Army, does not replace a doctrinal manual. Is commander's intent that big of an issue? In the grand scheme of things, probably not. Commanders, one way or another, seem to be communicating effectively to their subordinates. Although, the issue of commander's intent identifies the tip of a much larger iceberg. That is, there are many areas within the estimate process and the operations order format that are unclear. How does the average commander identify a decisive point, and from that build a course of action? What is a main effort? Is it a unit, or does it identify the task that will be accomplished at the decisive point at a specific time? Is there a relationship between a mission essential task identified during mission analysis and the METL? What should be included in the Concept of the Operation? Should it describe the operation from LD through reconstitution, or should the commander only explain in general terms how the mission will be accomplished? I can't give you a definitive answer on any of these questions, only a school position. I think that's why I have been so frustrated after reading and rereading Major Stephenson's article. I personally believe that instructors, students, observer/controllers, and the entire Army require and deserve a common doctrinal lexicon, specifcally a FM 101-5 and 101-11 that answer these questions. What they don't deserve are recently published tactical manuals that are inconsistent with each other because our doctrinal manuals are sometimes vague. Additionally, I can say with some confidence, the clarity required in the estimate process and operations order format will be even more important if we transition into AirLand Operations. If we do make the transition, it would appear to be the perfect time for Fort Leavenworth to answer many difficult and challenging questions. Major Calvin R. Sayles was wmmissioned in Armor in 1980 from the University of Southern Colorado. He sewed as a tank platoon leader in 2-68 Annor, BaumhoMer, Germany, and as company commander of D Company, 5-73 Armor, ft. Knox, Ky. He is currently serving as a team chief for the lnfantry Officer Advanced Course at ft. Benning, Ga. He is a graduate of the Annor Officer Basic and Advanced Courses and CAP. He is currently attending Command and General Staff College. ARMOR - July-AUgUSt 7992