Tanks and Urban Combat

by Lleutenant Colonel Wllllarn R. Betson Military operations on urban terrain (MOUT) are among the most complex, demanding, and bloody f m s of war. Experience at Aachen, Manila, Seoul, Hue, and Panama City notwithstanding, it is also an area to which we in the United States Army devote little real effort. If the Army in general has given short shrift to the MOW problem over the years, we in Armor have ignored it almost completely. Virtually no tank units practice techniques of city fighting. We simply declare our desire to avoid built-up areas, and thereby wish the problem away. Thus, one should not be surprised to discover that what MOW doctrine we have is weak, and seems written for an army equipped and manned like the one that we had in 1945. Further, doctrine for tank employment is virtually nonexistent. The limited coverage that MOW receives in FMs 71- 1, 71-2, and 71-123 are no practical help to the lieutenant, captain, or even the lieutenant colonel. Infantry manuals are not much better, and FM 90- 10, the MOUT manual, was last u p dated in 1978 - before the impacts of precision weapons and modem armor were fully understood. To try to apply our current “doctrine” today (if we can even apply such a grandiose title to what we now have) we would need World War II-style heavy infantq (not mech) units. Even so, these foot soldier-rich units would suffer casualties that we could not accept today. Our cumnt units would have difficulty applying these tactics. Heavy units are too infantry poor, and light units do not have the fmpwer. So what do we do? Clearly, we do want to avoid city fighting when we can. But what if we cannot? We could not in Panama. I firmly believe that we would not have been able to in urbanized West Germany. Too often, a major objective (such as a capital or seat of government) will be in a city. Also cities or villages often lay astride lines of communication or block choke points in difficult terrain. Bypassed cities may also serve as places from which strong enemy units may foray against our rear. It, then, is also clear that we must be ready to fight in built-up areas, and we need doctrine to do so. Such doctrine must take into account the demands of the likely conflicts that we could fight. It must keep damage and casualties, both our own and civilian, to a minimum. Massive, indiscriminate use of firepower is out. We must also assume that we will have a comparatively small amount of infantry (the small city of Stdingrad 22 ARMOR - July-August 7992 consumed more infantry divisions than we now have in the Army). Thus, our doctrine must have two characteristics: it must not be manpower intensive, and it must maximize our firepower and technological advantages without laying waste to the area in which we are fighting. The answer to this dilemma is to be found, I believe, in the MlAl tank. As a member of the Berlin Brigade, I have watched some of our best mined, city-fighting infantrymen in action. When applying our current doctrine, well rehearsed soldiers run across streets, supported by overwatching machine guns, and throw grenades into windows before they rush in to execute practiced room-clearing techniques. It is a squad and platoon leader’s fight. Little opportunity exists for effective artillery and mortar support, Tanks, traditionally, are left to “isolate the objective” and cover armor counterattack avenues of approach. Sometimes, but only rarely, do they support by fire. We should not be surprised that tanks are forgotten or little used Berlin’slight infantry company commanders were lieutenants at Campbell, Ord, or Bragg where there are no tanks at all, and many of these infantrymen have never worked with tanks. During force on force maneuvers, the result of these efforts are predictable by anyone who has read history. Infantry attacks either bog down in bloody fighting or succeed only at great cost. A defending company, equipped only with rifles and machine guns, stops a battalion in its tracks. Belatedly, tanks are called forward, but cooperate poorly with the infantry and are destroyed. In Berlin, however, a unique situation exists where we are able to attempt to find answers to this problem. Light infantry and heavy armor are in the same unit and can practice together. Recently the 6-40 Armor and the 5-502 Infantry conducted an exercise designed to determine if away Figure 1 Urban Movement Formation m - * p\I Infantry Platoon With Tank Section could be found to fight offensively in the city and produce the results we require - low casualties and discrirni-nate use of firepower. The exercise involved two MlAl (heavy armor) tank companies, one light infantry company, and one platoon from the British 1st Battalion, The Royal Welsh Fusiliers. Lasting four days, the operation consisted of multiple offensive STX lanes in which platoon- and company-sized combined ARMOR - 23 that enabled us to arrive at some clear conclusions concerning tanks in cities and good techniques for infantry-armor cooper- I ation. Concluslons. The advent of mod- -*---- -. - __ - - - em armor has changed Tanks and infanby on the attack in “Doughboy City” the city fighting equa- - - - - -. I. - arms teams attacked defending forces of various sues. On the first day, tank and infantry units developed and rehearsed techniques and learned each other’s capabilities. For the second and third days, infantry platoons and tank sections repeatedly attacked different enemy forces of squad-platoon size. The problem culminated with a day of company attacks against an enemy of reinforced platoon size. The defending enemy had no tanks, but had AT weapons, and laid mines and wire. Each attacking element assaulted a different portion of Berlin’s “Doughboy City” combat-incities facility during each iteration. A large controller package, supplied by 640 Armor’s TOW company, ran the battles and assessed some of the casualties. They carefully adjudicated the effects of 120-mm fire on buildings and caused tanks to be “damaged” by FWG fm when necessary. Much controller judgment was required, as normal CTC MILES rules do not account for the fact that S O caliber bullets go through walls, and main gun fire kills people inside of buildings. I should note that all of the controllers were infantry officers or NCOs, so there was no “tank favoritism.” Casualty evacuation and obstacles were also played and strictly enforced IAW CMTC rules. Further, “civilians” were included in the scenarios, and the U. S. forces had to avoid shooting them and evacuate civilian casualties. Twenty-eight separate battles w m fought, and careful AARs were held. tion. T& a& &i- sive if properly used. When employed correctly they are nearly invulnerable to hand-held AT weapons, and large, missile-type AT weapons are difficult to employ in urban terrain. When working together with infantry, the MlAl/foot soldier combination was unstoppable. Our results demonstrated that when tanks and infantry failed to cooperate, the attacking force normally suffered 10-25 casualties and lost at least one tank while attacking a 5-10 man enemy force. If the tanks and infantry stayed and worked together, they could destroy that same 5-10 man enemy force while suffering only 0-2 friendly losses with no tanks destroyed. On two occasions, a 25- man rifle platoon reinforced, by two tanks destroyed a defending 20-man enemy platoon while suffering fewer than three casualties.. If the infantry got out ahead of the tanks, their attacks usually failed at high cost. Conversely, if tanks got out ahead of infantry, they were quickly damaged and often destroyed by fire from flanks and rear. See Figure 1 for an effective platoon formation.. When properly directed, 120-mm and S O caliber fire quickly eliminated enemy forces that resisted from buildings. The OPFOR won learned that, even when equipped with RPGs and medium AT missiles, attempting to hold a building when tanks and infantry worked together was suicidal. They quickly adopted delaying or hide/stay behind tactics to have any hope of success. Also, we assessed that while overwhelming the enemy, collateral damage from precisely aimed tank fire was relatively low. Care must be taken, however, to ensure that accompanying infantry take cover when tanks fire their main gun. Some pre-frring signal can be effective.. The tank section and infantry platoon combination was the most effective. Larger tank formations could not function as a unit, and individual tanks were vulnerable after receiving minor damage. Also the trail tank could look and fire at upper stories while the lead concentrated at street level.. The infantry platoon leader must be in charge, but the tank section leader (normally a platoon leader or sergeant) must be aggressive in selling his product and advising on the use of tanks. Tank leaders who waited to be told what to do usually failed. Often, a poor decision by a tank section leader had a m m important impact on the battle outcome than a poor decision by the infantry lieutenant. Obviously, the infantryman must listen to the tanker. In the earlier battles, the infantrymen often forgot about their tanks - after some experience, they never did in the later iterations.. We need an extemal phone on our tanks. Placing the tanks on the infantry platoon frequency is a must, but not sufficient. An infantry squad member must be able to direct tank fife, and he does not have a radio. 40th Armor tankers lashed TA-312s to the side of MlAls as a not-too-successful field expedient.. Good techniques for infantry direction of tank fire must be worked out. Hand and arm signals must be practiced. Small arms tracer or M203 smoke work well to mark targets. All infantrymen, not just leaders, need to know the direction methods.. Rear security is critical. The OPFOR soon discovered that stay-behind tactics were the most effective. Infantrymen should always be assigned to this role, no matter what the size of the unit accompanying the tanks (see Figure 1). 24 ARMOR -

. Tanks should always keep tow cables fastened to their front slopes so that they quickly can mover other damaged tanks from behind while under fire. The infanby can help here. This is especially important in narrow streets where the enemy may often seek track, suspension, or engine/ transmission hits to block the advance. F’racticed obstacle reduction techniques are critical. The infantry should be trained in methods of clearing surface-laid mines quickly. (We use the “pop and drop” technique.) Tanks should have grappling hooks and ropes attached to their turrets. The TC or an infantryman can throw the hook and connect it to wire obstacles that the tank can then back up to clear away. Mine plow tanks would also be invaluable in MOW fighting. Further, everyone, including tankers, must know how to breach minefields.. An MlAl fitted with a blade would be very useful to clear away rubble or barricades. CEVs are too vulnerable to hand-held antitank fire and are not very effective.. Tank-generated smoke is extremely useful. City fighting tanks should receive DF-2 fuel. Care must obviously be taken if infantry and tanks operate in close proximity in smoke.. During the advance, the cupola-mounted S O caliber is useful for reconnaissance by fire. Because rounds often penetrate buildings, the weapon can suppress likely enemy positions. 120-mm rounds should only be used on identified enemy locations. The tank section can move by bounds so that the rear tanks can reload the S O more safely. The 50’s ability to elevate to near vertical elevation also helps.. Tanks must stop and move intelligently. Stopping in the middle of an intersection invites fire from several directions and exposes the more vulnerable aspects of a tank. Tanks should try to keep one side close to a cleared building. Also, careful turning of comers can keep flank exposure to a minimum.. Tank crews must think 360 degrees. Sometimes, there is no way to avoid having the loader up and scanning to the rear with the M240. When he does, he should wear full body armor, to include kevlar helmet. Headphones under the kevlar can keep the loader tied to the intercom system. Stacking sandbags around the loader’s hatch also gives some added protection.. Thermal sights are very effective in the city. Tanks could detect the heat through the windows in a mom with several OPFOR soldiers in it. TCs must take care, however, when using the GPS, and keep ballistic shields closed for all except brief periods. Most firing was done using the

GAS.

. Resupply and casualty evacuation are particularly difficult in the city. The enemy will always try to infiltrate behind the advance and disrupt CSS. Casualty collection points must have a security element, and LOGPACs and even ambulances often must be escorted. Tanks or “hard top” HMWWVs can escort. CSS planning must be detailed, and CSS units prepared to fight at all times.. Rehearsals are more important than ever.. Finally, it was the modem armor of the MlAl heavy tank that was decisive. The enemy was plentifully supplied with RF’G-type weapons, and older tanks (such as the non-reactive M60) or lighter armored vehicles would have taken heavy losses. Every tank was hit at least once per iteration by RPG fire. The MlAl’s ability to withstand such fire made it the devastating weapon that it was. I make no claim that this list is exhaustive, or that all of our lessons have universal applications. We clearly need more experimentation. We should, for instance, take a serious look at how well Bradleys would fare in such an environment. Nevertheless, I believe that some results are clear. If we are ever again forced to ARMOR - Ju/y-AUguSt 7992 fight in a city, infantry task organized with heavy armor are the units we need to employ. Working together, they can make short work of any defensive position. Infantry alone, no matter how well-trained, is insufficient against determined resistance. Infantry with light armor will do better, but still take serious losses. Further, combined arms tactical success in the city will depend on excellent leadership at the platoon and squad level. Such excellence comes only from good doctrine, tactics, and techniques, and realistic, repetitive bain-ing. We clearly need to develop such doctrine and techniques, and this article is intended to make a modest contribution to that need. But even excellent doctrine will not work without practice, and we clearly need more of that. Lieutenant Colonel William

R. Betson is a graduate of the United States Military Academy. He holds a MA Degree in history from the University of Pennsylvania and an MtblAS from the School for Advanced Military Studies. A graduate of Armor Officer Basic Course, Infantry Officer Advanced Course, and Command and General Staff College, he is currently the commander, 6- 40 Armor, Berlin Brigade. Previous assignments include scout platoon leader, support platoon leader, and company XO in 1-70 Armor, Fort Carson and Wiesbaden FRG; tank company commander, 6/3-68 Armor, Mannheim, FRG; assistant professor, Department of History, USMA; chief of operations, 5th ID (M); battalion S3, 3-70 Armor; brigade S3, 1st Bde, 5th ID (M); and deputy G3, 5th ID (M), at Fort Polk. 25